

Online Appendix

The Good, the Bad, and the Converging:
Institutional Dynamics Across Europe

August 13, 2026

The appendix follows the order of the paper: the data and WGI source decomposition behind Section 3; the convergence apparatus of Section 4; the elite-concentration analysis of Section 5; and the four supplementary analyses that Section 6 summarizes. These are the channel-by-channel interaction behind Prediction 2, the within-EU analysis, its longitudinal resolution on the 2004 accession cohort, and the cross-tabulation of convergence clubs against the varieties of capitalism.

A Data description

This section documents the data behind Section 3: the five WGI dimensions and what each measures (Table 7), the 41 European countries with their EU status and accession years (Tables 9, 8), and the indicators mapped across Europe at the end of the study period (Figure 5).

Table 7: The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI).

Governance dimension	Description
Control of Corruption	Perceptions of the extent to which public power is used for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests.
Government Effectiveness	Perceptions of the quality of public services, the civil service, policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of a government’s decisions.
Rule of Law	Perceptions of the extent to which agents respect and follow the rules of society, including contract enforcement, property rights, the police, courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence.
Regulatory Quality	Perceptions of the government’s ability to design and implement policies and regulations that promote private sector development.
Voice and Accountability	Perceptions of the extent to which citizens can participate in selecting their government including electoral integrity, and of accountability mechanisms for citizens—reflected in the ability to access information, governmental oversight bodies, and independent traditional and digital media.

NOTE — Definitions reflect the 2025 WGI methodology revision.

Table 8: Entry years in the EU.

Year	Countries
1957	Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands.
1973	Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom.
1981	Greece.
1986	Portugal, Spain.
1995	Austria, Finland, Sweden.
2004	Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.
2007	Bulgaria, Romania.
2013	Croatia.


NOTE: Year of accession to the European Union for each cohort of member states.

Table 9: The countries in the European region and their EU status (1996–2024).

EU status	Countries
Historical members	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (15).
Entrants	Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (13).
Outsiders	Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine (13).

NOTE: The Historical Members group comprises countries that were founding members or joined the EU before 1996. The Entrants group comprises countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013. The Outsiders group contains countries that have never been part of the EU.

Figure 5: WGI indicators across Europe, 2020–2024



B WGI source decomposition for the European panel

A WGI dimension score aggregates up to 35 underlying data sources through an unobserved-components model rather than measuring institutions directly (The World Bank, 2025). What a dimension measures for a particular set of countries therefore depends on which sources reach those countries and on the weight each source carries in the aggregation. This appendix presents the aggregation for the 41 European countries in three steps: source coverage, re-computed European aggregation weights, and the content of the sources. The decomposition substantiates Section 3.3.

B.1 Source coverage

The WGI 2025 source dataset records, for every country-year-dimension, which of the 35 sources contribute a value. For the 41 European countries, one group of sources never contributes: the regional barometers (Afrobarometer, the Arab, Asian, and Americas Barometers, and Latinobarometro) and the African and Asian development-bank assessments cover no European country. Table 10 reports, for each dimension, how many of the feeding sources reach at least one European country. This absent content, drawn from citizen perceptions and regional assessments, shapes WGI scores in other regions but carries no weight in the European aggregation.

Table 10: European coverage of WGI data sources, by dimension.

Governance dimension	Sources	Coverage	
		Yes	No
Government Effectiveness	21	15	6
Regulatory Quality	16	14	2
Control of Corruption	25	19	6
Rule of Law	29	23	6
Voice and Accountability	29	22	7

NOTE: Source counts from the World Bank’s WGI source documentation. *Sources* is the number of data sources entering the dimension’s aggregation; under *Coverage*, *Yes* counts those reporting on at least one of the 41 European countries and *No* those reporting on none.

B.2 Recomputed European aggregation weights

The World Bank publishes the average aggregation weight of each source across all countries, not the weight specific to any subset. We recompute the European weights here from the published source-specific parameters. The unobserved-components model assigns source k the precision weight $w(k) = \sigma^{-2}(k)/(1 + \sum_{k'} \sigma^{-2}(k'))$, where $\sigma^2(k)$ is the source’s measurement-error variance and the sum runs over the sources available for each country-year (The World Bank, 2025). Applying this formula to the European country-years yields the

European-specific weights. This procedure reproduces the World Bank’s published global average weights to a maximum absolute difference no larger than 2.5×10^{-16} across dimensions (Table 11).

Table 11: Validation of the recomputed UCM weights against the World Bank’s published parameter file.

Governance dimension	Sources	Max. abs. diff.
Government Effectiveness	21	1.11e-16
Regulatory Quality	16	8.33e-17
Control of Corruption	25	2.78e-17
Rule of Law	29	1.39e-17
Voice and Accountability	29	2.50e-16

NOTE: Each dimension’s recomputed unobserved-components weights are compared with the World Bank’s published parameter file. *Sources* is the number of feeding sources; *Max. abs. diff.* is the largest absolute difference between recomputed and published weights. Differences at the 10^{-16} level reflect floating-point rounding, confirming that the recomputation reproduces the published weights.

B.3 Content of the sources

Annex 6 of the WGI 2025 methodology lists every indicator each source contributes to each dimension (The World Bank, 2025). For Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Voice and Accountability, we classify each indicator as political or economic-administrative. The political class covers electoral processes, civil and political liberties, press and media freedom, government accountability, human rights, and citizen trust in political institutions; the economic-administrative class covers bureaucratic capacity, public-service delivery, infrastructure, fiscal and budgetary management, regulatory conditions, and trade and investment. Combining the classification with the recomputed European weights gives the content composition reported in Table 12. Government Effectiveness draws 96.3% of its European weight from economic-administrative sources and Regulatory Quality draws all of its weight from such sources; Voice and Accountability draws 86.5% of its weight from political sources, with the residual from sources whose current-year indicators are not listed in WGI Annex 6. Control of Corruption and Rule of Law are not classified on this axis because their feeding sources span both political and economic-administrative content without a clean partition.

B.4 Government Effectiveness

Government Effectiveness draws 96.3% of its European aggregation weight from sources with economic-administrative content (Table 13). Its representative sources, which carry the bulk of the weight, contain no political indicators: they measure bureaucratic quality, infrastructure, public services, and tax administration. The political content reaches the dimension only through two non-representative sources that cover Europe, the Eurobarometer trust items and

Table 12: Content composition of the European aggregation weight, by dimension

Governance dimension	Econ.-admin. (%)	Political (%)	Political, strict (%)
Government Effectiveness	96.3	3.7	1.3
Regulatory Quality	100.0	0.0	0.0
Voice and Accountability	0.0	86.5	86.5

NOTE: Shares of each dimension's total European aggregation weight by source content. *Econ.-admin.* and *Political* partition the classified weight; *Political, strict* excludes borderline trust-in-government items. For Voice and Accountability the residual to 100% comes from sources whose current-year indicators are not listed in WGI Annex 6.

one Bertelsmann measure of democratic-institutional performance. This content accounts for 3.7% of the European weight, or 1.3% once borderline trust-in-government items are set aside.

Table 13: Government Effectiveness: European weight share and political content by source.

Source	Euro wt. (%)	Indicators	Pol. frac.	Pol. wt. (%)
S&P Global Country Risk Scores	26.9	2	0.00	0.00
Economist Intelligence Unit	19.2	1	0.00	0.00
PRS Group ICRG	15.4	1	0.00	0.00
WEF Executive Opinion Survey	13.5	4	0.00	0.00
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook	9.6	4	0.00	0.00
Bertelsmann Transformation Index	5.4	4	0.25	1.35
European Quality of Government Index	2.9	2	0.00	0.00
Eurobarometer	2.4	2	1.00	2.39
Gallup World Poll	1.8	3	0.00	0.00
IFAD Rural Sector Performance	1.1	5	0.00	0.00
Crisis24 Country Security Ratings	1.0	1	0.00	0.00
World Bank CPIA	0.6	3	0.00	0.00
BEEPS (World Bank/EBRD)	0.2	2	0.00	0.00
World Bank Enterprise Surveys	0.0	3	0.00	0.00
Asian Development Bank (CPA)	0.0	3	0.00	0.00

NOTE: Per-source contribution to Government Effectiveness for the European panel. *Euro wt.* is the source's share of the European aggregation weight; *Indicators* is the number of underlying indicators; *Pol. frac.* is the fraction of those indicators classified as political; *Pol. wt.* is the resulting political share of the European weight ($\text{Euro wt.} \times \text{Pol. frac.}$). Sources are ordered by descending European weight.

C Convergence analysis

This section reports the technical detail behind the convergence analysis of Section 4: the Phillips-Sul method, the per-dimension club estimates, and the average transition paths.

C.1 Phillips-Sul methodology: technical details

Following Phillips and Sul (2007), the log t regression is estimated over the final two-thirds of the sample (trimming fraction $r = 0.33$) to reduce the influence of initial transitory dynamics. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator of Newey and West (1987).

The Phillips-Sul framework requires several data conditions (Phillips and Sul, 2007; Sul, 2019). First, observations must be strictly positive: the transition path $h_{it} = X_{it}/\bar{X}_t$ is undefined when the cross-sectional mean crosses zero. Second, the series should exhibit trending behavior so that a common factor dominates individual dynamics. Third, data should be unbounded: tightly constrained series compress transition paths toward unity.

To satisfy the positivity requirement, WGI scores are transformed as $X_{it}^+ = X_{it} - \min(X_{it}) + 0.001$, where the minimum is computed across all country-year observations for each indicator. This shift preserves the relative ordering and temporal dynamics of the original series while ensuring strictly positive values for the log t test.

C.2 Phillips and Sul estimates

The four tables that follow report the convergence clubs for the four dimensions where global convergence is rejected, in the order Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Voice and Accountability; Government Effectiveness is omitted because its global convergence is not rejected and it forms a single club. Each table lists the clubs, their member countries, the club-level log t estimate, the membership mix across Historical Members, Entrants, and Outsiders, and the precision-weighted mean of the latest five years μ , with column definitions in each table's note. Figures 7–10 display the same clubs graphically.

Table 14: Club convergence for Control of Corruption (1996–2024).

Club	Countries	$\hat{\gamma}$	t -stat	Conv.	HIS	ENT	OUT	μ
1	Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (21).	0.194	1.708	Yes	11 73%	5 38%	5 38%	1.481 (0.016)
2	Belarus, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain (11).	0.178	1.225	Yes	4 27%	5 38%	2 15%	0.315 (0.022)
3	Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, Malta, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine (9).	0.283	1.032	Yes	–	3 23%	6 46%	-0.352 (0.025)

NOTE: Conv. = Convergence of the club; HIS = number and percentage of all Historical Members in a given club; ENT = number and percentage of all Entrants in a given club; OUT = number and percentage of all Outsiders in a given club; μ = precision-weighted mean of the WGI over the last five years ($1/SE^2$) and its standard error in parentheses, in case of club convergence. If the t -stat for the log t regression exceeds -1.645 , then we cannot exclude convergence at 5%.

Table 15: Club convergence for Rule of Law (1996–2024).

Club	Countries	$\hat{\gamma}$	t -stat	Conv.	HIS	ENT	OUT	μ
1	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland (18).	0.192	3.598	Yes	9 60%	5 38%	4 31%	1.463 (0.016)
2	Albania, Croatia, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, United Kingdom (10).	0.266	1.963	Yes	5 33%	4 31%	1 8%	0.763 (0.021)
3	Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland (9).	0.377	2.681	Yes	1 7%	4 31%	4 31%	0.115 (0.023)
4	Belarus, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine (4).	1.128	2.724	Yes	–	–	4 31%	-0.883 (0.034)

NOTE: Conv. = Convergence of the club; HIS = number and percentage of all Historical Members in a given club; ENT = number and percentage of all Entrants in a given club; OUT = number and percentage of all Outsiders in a given club; μ = precision-weighted mean of the WGI over the last five years ($1/SE^2$) and its standard error in parentheses, in case of club convergence. If the t -stat for the log t regression exceeds -1.645 , then we cannot exclude convergence at 5%.

Table 16: Club convergence for Regulatory Quality (1996–2024).

Club	Countries	$\hat{\gamma}$	t -stat	Conv.	HIS	ENT	OUT	μ
1	Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (11).	0.422	1.448	Yes	8 53%	–	3 23%	1.648 (0.029)
2	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova (10).	-0.049	-0.469	Yes	3 20%	4 31%	3 23%	1.031 (0.029)
3	Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine (20).	-0.168	-1.227	Yes	4 27%	9 69%	7 54%	0.239 (0.021)

NOTE: Conv. = Convergence of the club; HIS = number and percentage of all Historical Members in a given club; ENT = number and percentage of all Entrants in a given club; OUT = number and percentage of all Outsiders in a given club; μ = precision-weighted mean of the WGI over the last five years ($1/SE^2$) and its standard error in parentheses, in case of club convergence. If the t -stat for the log t regression exceeds -1.645 , then we cannot exclude convergence at 5%.

Table 17: Club convergence for Voice and Accountability (1996–2024).


Club	Countries	$\hat{\gamma}$	t -stat	Conv.	HIS	ENT	OUT	μ
1	Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (26).	-0.190	-1.641	Yes	14 93%	8 62%	4 31%	1.253 (0.014)
2	Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine (10).	-0.039	-0.202	Yes	1 7%	5 38%	4 31%	0.255 (0.022)
3	Belarus, Russia, Turkey (3).	-0.296	-0.734	Yes	–	–	3 23%	-1.269 (0.039)
D	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway (2).	–	–	No	–	–	2 15%	–

NOTE: Conv. = Convergence of the club; HIS = number and percentage of all Historical Members in a given club; ENT = number and percentage of all Entrants in a given club; OUT = number and percentage of all Outsiders in a given club; μ = precision-weighted mean of the WGI over the last five years ($1/SE^2$) and its standard error in parentheses, in case of club convergence. If the t -stat for the log t regression exceeds -1.645 , then we cannot exclude convergence at 5%.

C.3 Transition paths


Figure 6 overlays the club-average transition paths for the four dimensions where global convergence is rejected; Government Effectiveness does not appear because its global convergence is not rejected and it forms a single club, leaving no partition to plot. Figures 7–10 then disaggregate each of these dimensions club by club, one panel per club (plot elements defined in the captions): a dimension with k clubs produces k panels, and Voice and Accountability adds a further panel for the two divergent countries that join no club.

Figure 6: Club-average transition paths by dimension




NOTE: Average transition paths for convergence clubs across WGI dimensions. Each panel displays a governance dimension where global convergence was rejected: Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, and Voice and Accountability. Lines represent the average relative transition path h_{it} for each identified club, where $h_{it} = X_{it} / (N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^N X_{it})$ measures the deviation of each unit from the cross-sectional average. A value of $h_{it} = 1$ (dotted horizontal line) indicates convergence to the panel average. Club membership and convergence parameters ($\hat{\gamma}$, t -statistic) are reported in the legend. Clubs with $\hat{\gamma} \geq 0$ and $t \geq -1.645$ satisfy the log- t convergence criterion.

Figure 7: Control of Corruption: within-club transition paths



NOTE: One panel per convergence club (three clubs). In each panel the thin lines are the member countries' relative transition paths $h_{it} = X_{it} / \bar{X}_t$, the thick line is the club mean, the dashed line marks the European average ($h_{it} = 1$), and n is the number of countries in the club.

Figure 8: Rule of Law: within-club transition paths




NOTE: One panel per convergence club (four clubs). Plot elements as in Figure 7.

Figure 9: Regulatory Quality: within-club transition paths



NOTE: One panel per convergence club (three clubs). Plot elements as in Figure 7.

Figure 10: Voice and Accountability: within-club transition paths



NOTE: One panel per convergence club (three clubs), plus a panel for the two divergent countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway) that join no club. Plot elements as in Figure 7.

D Elite power concentration and club membership: technical details

This appendix provides technical details for the analysis of baseline elite concentration and convergence club membership reported in Section 5.

D.1 Data construction

The Elite Power Concentration Index (EPCI) is built from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, version 15 (Coppedge et al., 2025). We use two indicators:

- `v2pepwrres`: “Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?”
- `v2pepwrSOC`: “Is political power distributed according to social group?”

Both indicators are expert-coded ordinal assessments (originally scaled 0–4) that V-Dem transforms, via an item response theory model, into continuous estimates where higher values indicate more equal power distribution. We compute the country-level mean of each over 1991–1995, average the two, and invert the scale:

$$\text{EPCI}_i = 4 - \frac{1}{2} (\overline{\text{v2pepwrres}}_i + \overline{\text{v2pepwrSOC}}_i)$$

where the overline denotes the 1991–1995 average and higher values indicate greater elite concentration (power less equally distributed).

The 1991–1995 baseline precedes the WGI window (1996–2024), so the measured elite concentration cannot be an effect of the governance outcomes.

A principal component analysis on the baseline period confirms the simple average: the first component explains 86.3% of the variance with identical loadings (0.707) on both indicators and correlates with the averaged index at 0.998, so weighted aggregation would give virtually identical results.

In Section 5, we adopted the Elite Power Concentration Index (EPCI) to measure elites’ capacity to oppose reforms that would redistribute political power during the 1996–2024 period. We calculate the average value from 1991 to 1995 to mitigate reverse causality bias and smooth out noise. Nevertheless, for our theoretical link to be valid, we need to provide evidence that those remote values actually lasted over the entire period, not only at the beginning. To test EPCI persistence we estimate the model:

$$\text{EPCI}_{i,t} = a + b \cdot \text{EPCI}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where $\text{EPCI}_{i,t}$ is the index calculated over 2020–2024 for the i -th country, $\text{EPCI}_{i,t-1}$ is calculated for the same country over 1991–1995, a and b are estimands, and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is an error term. The parameter b measures the persistence of the remote value, while the positive intercept a shifts the whole relationship upward. The results in Table 18 show a general increase of the EPCI: the average country is 0.20 index points more concentrated in 2020–2024 than in 1991–1995, and measured concentration is higher today than in the early 1990s in most countries, including consolidated democracies. We also find that EPCI persistence is substantial: on average, the distance between any two countries today is about sixty percent of their distance in the early 1990s. Moreover, the cross-country ranking survives almost intact (Spearman $\rho = 0.745$).

Table 18: Persistence of the Elite Power Concentration Index

	Estimate	HC1 SE	95% CI
Baseline elite concentration (1991–1995)	0.592***	0.077	[0.437, 0.747]
Intercept	1.192***	0.191	[0.806, 1.578]
N	41	R^2	0.496
Residual SE	0.435	Adjusted R^2	0.483
$F(1, 39)$	38.41***	Spearman ρ	0.745
H_0 : slope = 1 (t , HC1)	−5.33***	Pearson r	0.704
Mean change (2020–24 – 1991–95)	+0.200	SD of changes	0.521

NOTE: OLS of the 2020–2024 country mean of the elite-concentration index on its 1991–1995 baseline mean, 41 European countries. The index is the inverted average of V-Dem v2pepwr_{ses} and v2pepwr_{soc} (higher values = more concentrated elite power), computed identically in both windows. HC1: heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; classical standard errors are nearly identical (0.095 and 0.242; Breusch–Pagan $p = 0.76$). The slope implies an annualized persistence of 0.982 over the 29-year horizon (window midpoints 1993 and 2022). H_0 : slope = 1 tests perfect persistence and is rejected. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

D.2 Coverage

V-Dem data are available for all 41 European countries. For Voice and Accountability, two countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway) are classified as divergent and excluded from the ordinal club ranking, leaving $N = 39$ for Voice and Accountability models.

D.3 Descriptive statistics

Table 19 reports descriptive statistics for baseline elite concentration. Table 20 extends the same decomposition used for the governance indicators to the index itself: between-country differences dominate temporal variation in every EU status group, and most of the variance of the baseline index that enters the Section 5 models lies within EU statuses rather than between them.

Table 19: Baseline Elite Power Concentration Index (1991–1995): descriptive statistics

Mean	Median	Std. dev.	Minimum	Maximum	N
2.429	2.308	0.721	1.294 (Sweden)	4.158 (Turkey)	41

NOTE: Elite Power Concentration Index (EPCI) computed as inverted average of V-Dem v2pepwr_{ses} and v2pepwr_{soc} over 1991–1995. Higher values indicate more concentrated elite power.

D.4 Club-level statistics

Tables 21–23 report descriptive statistics for elite concentration by convergence club for each governance indicator.

Table 20: Variance decomposition of the EPCI by EU status (1996–2024).

Variance	H. members			Entrants			Outsiders		
	W	B	B/W	W	B	B/W	W	B	B/W
EPCI	0.027	0.115	4.270	0.035	0.166	4.739	0.098	0.564	5.781
By socioeconomic position	0.026	0.130	5.011	0.056	0.156	2.775	0.208	1.186	5.698
By social group	0.071	0.240	3.383	0.047	0.291	6.225	0.072	0.406	5.612

NOTE: W = within-country variance (temporal variation within countries); B = between-country variance (cross-sectional variation across countries); B/W = ratio. The EPCI is the inverted average of V-Dem v2pepwrse and v2pepwrso (higher values = more concentrated elite power); the rows "By socioeconomic position" and "By social group" report the decomposition of each inverted component separately. Sample window 1996–2024, annual values, 41 countries. Estimates are unweighted: V-Dem point estimates carry no observation-level standard errors in our pipeline. Of the baseline (1991–1995) EPCI variance, 14.0% lies between the three EU statuses (one-way η^2) and 86.0% within them.

Table 21: Elite Power Concentration Index by Voice and Accountability club

Club	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range
Club 1 (high VA)	26	2.206	0.567	2.127	1.294–3.564
Club 2	10	2.765	0.645	2.551	1.955–3.827
Club 3 (low VA)	3	3.096	0.981	2.907	2.223–4.158
Divergent	2	2.653	1.791	2.653	1.387–3.920

NOTE: Descriptive statistics for the baseline Elite Power Concentration Index (1991–1995) by Voice and Accountability convergence club. Higher values indicate more concentrated political power.

Table 22: Elite Power Concentration Index by Rule of Law club

Club	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range
Club 1 (high RL)	18	2.140	0.560	2.061	1.294–3.431
Club 2	10	2.530	0.737	2.390	1.486–3.827
Club 3	9	2.679	0.802	2.478	1.434–3.920
Club 4 (low RL)	4	2.916	0.878	2.641	2.223–4.158

NOTE: Descriptive statistics for the baseline Elite Power Concentration Index (1991–1995) by Rule of Law convergence club. Higher values indicate more concentrated political power.

Table 23: Elite Power Concentration Index by Control of Corruption club

Club	N	Mean	SD	Median	Range
Club 1 (high CC)	21	2.179	0.626	2.132	1.294–3.564
Club 2	11	2.487	0.656	2.223	1.486–3.827
Club 3 (low CC)	9	2.942	0.786	2.624	1.927–4.158

NOTE: Descriptive statistics for the baseline Elite Power Concentration Index (1991–1995) by Control of Corruption convergence club. Higher values indicate more concentrated political power.

D.5 Country-level data

Table 24 reports elite concentration and club membership for all countries, ranked by baseline elite concentration (highest to lowest).

D.6 Robustness to autocracy exclusion

The ordered-logit associations of Table 6 could be driven by the consolidated autocracies rather than by a gradient across European countries generally; we test this directly. Russia, Belarus, and Turkey occupy the lowest-performing convergence clubs and, as a group, sit well above the cross-country mean on baseline elite concentration. We re-estimate the four ordered logits, with the same specification as Table 6 and the convergence clubs held fixed at their full-set Phillips-Sul assignments, on the full set and on two trimmed sets: one with all three autocracies removed, and one with Russia and Belarus removed and Turkey retained.

Table 25 reports the comparison. Control of Corruption and Rule of Law survive the most aggressive trim: with all three autocracies removed, the Control of Corruption association stays significant ($OR = 2.79$, $p = 0.036$) and the Rule of Law association remains positive and marginally significant ($OR = 2.42$, $p = 0.052$). The elite-resistance gradient therefore holds among the European democracies and is not a contrast between the autocracies and the rest. The Voice and Accountability cell for the all-three trim is not estimable: the worst club consists of exactly Russia, Belarus, and Turkey, so removing all three deletes that club, and the remaining two-club partition is perfectly separated by elite concentration, on which the ordered logit does not converge. The informative trim for Voice and Accountability removes Russia and Belarus and retains Turkey; the association is then stronger than in the full set ($OR = 7.06$ against 4.81, $p = 0.004$). Regulatory Quality stays non-significant throughout, as in the main analysis.

D.7 Measurement considerations

V-Dem and the elite measure V-Dem feeds three of the five WGI dimensions analyzed here. Voice and Accountability incorporates nine V-Dem variables (eight clean-elections items and one freedom-of-expression index), Rule of Law uses the V-Dem Liberal Component Index (`v2x_liberal`), and Control of Corruption uses the V-Dem Corruption Index (`v2x_`

Table 24: Elite Power Concentration Index and club membership by country

Country	Elite Conc.	VA Club	RL Club	CC Club
Turkey	4.158	3	4	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.920	Div	3	3
Croatia	3.827	2	2	2
Macedonia	3.684	2	3	3
United Kingdom	3.564	1	2	1
Georgia	3.431	2	1	1
Moldova	3.082	1	3	2
Latvia	3.026	1	1	1
Cyprus	2.916	1	3	2
Russia	2.907	3	4	3
Slovakia	2.901	1	2	2
Romania	2.631	2	1	2
France	2.628	1	2	1
Albania	2.624	2	2	3
Austria	2.572	1	1	1
Hungary	2.478	2	3	3
Lithuania	2.450	1	1	1
Bulgaria	2.406	2	3	3
Estonia	2.400	1	1	1
Ukraine	2.376	2	4	3
Ireland	2.308	1	1	1
Poland	2.239	2	3	1
Belarus	2.223	3	4	2
Switzerland	2.211	1	1	1
Spain	2.155	1	2	2
Czech Republic	2.132	1	1	1
Portugal	2.123	1	2	2
Italy	2.064	1	2	2
Belgium	1.990	1	1	1
Greece	1.955	2	3	2
Iceland	1.939	1	1	1
Malta	1.927	1	2	3
Netherlands	1.923	1	1	1
Germany	1.906	1	1	1
Finland	1.819	1	1	1
Denmark	1.561	1	1	1
Luxembourg	1.538	1	1	1
Slovenia	1.486	1	2	2
Armenia	1.434	1	3	1
Norway	1.387	Div	1	1
Sweden	1.294	1	1	1

NOTE: Countries ranked by the baseline Elite Power Concentration Index (1991–1995), highest to lowest. “Div” = divergent (not converging to any club). Club 1 represents highest governance performance for each indicator.

Table 25: Robustness of the elite-concentration gradient to autocracy exclusion

Governance dimension	Full ($N = 41$)		Excl. R, B, T		Excl. R, B	
	OR	p	OR	p	OR	p
Voice and Accountability	4.81	0.006	—	—	7.06	0.004
Control of Corruption	3.37	0.009	2.79	0.036	3.23	0.012
Rule of Law	2.80	0.015	2.42	0.052	3.07	0.012
Regulatory Quality	1.99	0.136	1.75	0.247	1.96	0.144

NOTE: Ordered logit of convergence-club membership on the baseline Elite Power Concentration Index (1991–1995). Entries are odds ratios (OR) and two-sided p -values; convergence clubs are held fixed at their full-sample Phillips-Sul assignments. “Excl. R, B, T” removes Russia, Belarus, and Turkey; “Excl. R, B” removes Russia and Belarus and retains Turkey. The Voice and Accountability cell under “Excl. R, B, T” is not estimable (—): the worst Voice and Accountability club consists of exactly those three countries, so removing all three deletes the club and the remaining two-club partition is perfectly separated by the index.

corr); Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality use no V-Dem data ([The World Bank, 2025](#)).

Because our elite measure is also V-Dem-based, a circularity concern might seem to arise, but it does not. The elite-concentration indicators (`v2pepwrses`, `v2pepwrsoc`) are V-Dem power-distribution measures, conceptually distinct from governance quality, and they are neither WGI inputs nor components of the V-Dem indices the WGI uses: the Liberal Component Index averages indices of equality before the law and of judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, and the Corruption Index aggregates measures of executive, legislative, and judicial corruption, none of which is a power-distribution measure ([Coppedge et al., 2025](#)). The elite measure and the WGI therefore share the V-Dem project but no variable or component, so the associations cannot be a mechanical artifact of overlapping inputs.

E Channel-by-channel decomposition: dimension fixed effects

This appendix reports the elite-side analysis behind Prediction 2, via the endpoint contrast in the elite gradient, summarized in Section 6.

E.1 Specification

We fit a Bayesian hierarchical logit on the country $\times$ dimension panel ($c \times d$, with $c = 41$ European countries and $d \in \{\text{CC, GE, RL, RQ, VA}\}$). The binary outcome is $L_{c,d} = 1$ if country c is not in the top Phillips-Sul club of dimension d , and 0 otherwise. The model parameterizes dimension as a 5-level factor with reference level Government Effectiveness (the lowest-rank

channel in the theoretical ordering), so the contrast coefficients capture the channel contrasts:

$$\text{logit}(\Pr[L_{c,d} = 1]) = \alpha + \sum_{d' \neq \text{GE}} \gamma_{d'} \cdot \mathbf{1}[d = d'] + \beta_e \cdot e_c + \sum_{d' \neq \text{GE}} \delta_{d'} \cdot \mathbf{1}[d = d'] \cdot e_c + u_c,$$

where $u_c \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_c)$ is a country random effect, e_c is the standardized baseline Elite Power Concentration Index defined in Section D, $\gamma_{d'}$ are channel contrasts, and $\delta_{d'}$ are channel-by-elite interactions. The four interaction coefficients $\delta_{d'}$ test whether baseline elite concentration predicts non-convergence differentially across channels.

E.2 Results

Table 26 reports the posterior summary of the channel-by-elite interaction layer. All four channel-by-elite interactions are positive with posterior probability at least 0.96, and the Government Effectiveness elite main effect clears zero with probability 0.90. The endpoint contrast resolves cleanly, at $P(\delta_{\text{end}} > 0) = 0.975$, where $\delta_{\text{end}} = \beta_{\text{VA} \times e} - \beta_{\text{GE} \times e}$. Across the full set of channels, the posterior-mean interactions correlate strongly with the predicted gradient (Spearman $\rho = 0.669$ against the target ranking $\text{GE} < \text{RQ} < \{\text{CC}, \text{RL}\} < \text{VA}$). The ordering of posterior means runs $\text{GE} < \text{RQ} < \text{RL} \approx \text{CC} < \text{VA}$, with Control of Corruption marginally above Rule of Law (1.11 vs 1.09); the framework places Regulatory Quality below the clientelistic channels but does not commit to the order within the clientelistic channel, between Control of Corruption and Rule of Law.

Table 26: Posterior summary of the channel-by-elite interaction

Governance dimension	Channel	Coefficient	95% CI	$P(> 0)$
Government Effectiveness	bureaucratic	0.52	(−0.29, 1.37)	0.90
Regulatory Quality	regulatory-capture	0.82	(−0.12, 1.85)	0.96
Control of Corruption	clientelistic	1.11	(0.18, 2.09)	0.99
Rule of Law	clientelistic	1.09	(0.15, 2.13)	0.99
Voice and Accountability	competitive-electoral	1.57	(0.51, 2.74)	1.00

NOTE: Posterior summary of the channel-by-elite interaction layer (full European sample, $N = 41$). GE is the reference dimension, so its coefficient is the elite-concentration main effect β_e ; the coefficients for Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability are the channel-by-elite interactions δ_d relative to GE. The 95% CI is the posterior credible interval; $P(> 0)$ is the posterior probability that the coefficient exceeds zero. Spearman ρ between channel rank and posterior mean is 0.669.

The clientelistic within-channel coherence check, motivated by the two dimensions' shared position on the axis, examines the posterior overlap between δ_{CC} and δ_{RL} : the two coefficients are almost indistinguishable, with $P(\delta_{\text{CC}} > \delta_{\text{RL}}) = 0.51$. A near-tie at 0.51 could mean either that Control of Corruption and Rule of Law share the clientelistic channel or that the joint posterior is too wide to separate any pair. Table 27 reports all ten pairwise overlap probabilities to distinguish the two. The nine cross-channel pairs deviate from 0.5 by at least 0.18 and on average by 0.30; the within-channel pair (CC, RL) deviates by only 0.01, sixteen times less than the smallest cross-channel deviation. The width of the posterior overlap is therefore effect-specific, not generic: the joint posterior separates pairs the framework places

on distinct channels and only fails to separate the within-channel pair, which is informative evidence of channel coherence.

Table 27: Pairwise posterior overlap of the channel-by-elite interactions

Pair	Channels	$P(\delta_{d_1} > \delta_{d_2})$	$ p - 0.5 $
CC vs RL	clientelistic (within)	0.511	0.011
RQ vs RL	regulatory-capture vs clientelistic	0.319	0.181
RQ vs CC	regulatory-capture vs clientelistic	0.303	0.197
GE vs RQ	bureaucratic vs regulatory-capture	0.283	0.217
CC vs VA	clientelistic vs competitive-electoral	0.234	0.266
RL vs VA	clientelistic vs competitive-electoral	0.219	0.281
RQ vs VA	regulatory-capture vs competitive-electoral	0.126	0.374
GE vs RL	bureaucratic vs clientelistic	0.124	0.376
GE vs CC	bureaucratic vs clientelistic	0.120	0.380
GE vs VA	bureaucratic vs competitive-electoral	0.025	0.475

NOTE: Pairwise posterior probabilities that one channel-by-elite interaction exceeds another, for the full set of European countries ($N = 41$). The within-channel pair (CC, RL) is listed first; the nine cross-channel pairs follow, sorted by ascending deviation from 0.5. $|p - 0.5|$ is that deviation; the within-channel deviation (0.011) is sixteen times smaller than the smallest cross-channel deviation (0.181).

Government Effectiveness is the noisiest channel: its elite effect has a 0.10 posterior probability of falling below zero, because the baseline moderator carries the weakest signal there. The Government Effectiveness elite main effect, though uncertain at the tails, sits clearly below those of the higher-rank channels, so the ordering remains consistent with the framework.

F Within-EU compression ratios across channels

This appendix section reports the analysis behind the within-EU question (whether EU membership compresses governance differences, and on which dimensions), summarized in Section 6.

F.1 Specification

For each WGI dimension d , we compute the cross-country standard deviation of the country-level mean WGI score over 2016–2023, separately within the EU-27 (σ_d^{EU}) and within the non-EU European group ($\sigma_d^{\text{non-EU}}$). The compression ratio

$$R_d = \frac{\sigma_d^{\text{EU}}}{\sigma_d^{\text{non-EU}}}$$

serves as the test statistic. Lower R_d corresponds to more tightly clustered member-state scores. We choose the 2016–2023 window to overlap with the post-Rule of Law Framework era during which all EU conditionality instruments operated. The channel ranking by EU

conditionality strength runs from Government Effectiveness (rank 1, strongest, via acquis, EU Semester, SIGMA) through Regulatory Quality (rank 2, single market, competition law), Control of Corruption (rank 3, OLAF/EPPO and CVM), Rule of Law (rank 4, Rule of Law Framework, weaker), to Voice and Accountability (rank 5, Article 7, weakest).

We summarize the pattern with two statistics: the Spearman ρ between channel rank (1 = strongest conditionality) and R_d , and the compression gap $\Delta = \text{mean}(R_{\text{GE}}, R_{\text{RQ}}) - \text{mean}(R_{\text{CC}}, R_{\text{RL}}, R_{\text{VA}})$. A differentiated-compression pattern would show ρ positive (compression strongest where conditionality is strongest) and Δ negative.

F.2 Results

Table 28 reports R_d values, country counts, and rank ordering. The within-EU standard deviations are $\sigma_{\text{GE}}^{\text{EU}} = 0.60$, $\sigma_{\text{RQ}}^{\text{EU}} = 0.53$, $\sigma_{\text{CC}}^{\text{EU}} = 0.75$, $\sigma_{\text{RL}}^{\text{EU}} = 0.59$, $\sigma_{\text{VA}}^{\text{EU}} = 0.47$, and the non-EU comparators are $\sigma_{\text{GE}}^{\text{non-EU}} = 0.93$, $\sigma_{\text{RQ}}^{\text{non-EU}} = 0.87$, $\sigma_{\text{CC}}^{\text{non-EU}} = 1.14$, $\sigma_{\text{RL}}^{\text{non-EU}} = 1.04$, $\sigma_{\text{VA}}^{\text{non-EU}} = 1.02$.

The compression ratios take values $R_{\text{GE}} = 0.637$, $R_{\text{RQ}} = 0.604$, $R_{\text{CC}} = 0.654$, $R_{\text{RL}} = 0.568$, $R_{\text{VA}} = 0.467$. Spearman ρ between channel rank and R_d is -0.700 and the compression gap is $\Delta = +0.058$, both opposite in sign to the pattern that differentiated post-accession compression would produce.

Table 28: Within-EU versus non-EU cross-country standard deviations by channel

Governance dimension	Channel	Rank	σ_d^{EU}	$\sigma_d^{\text{non-EU}}$	R_d	Position
Government Effectiveness	bureaucratic	1	0.60	0.93	0.637	4
Regulatory Quality	regulatory-capture	2	0.53	0.87	0.604	3
Control of Corruption	clientelistic	3	0.75	1.14	0.654	5
Rule of Law	clientelistic	4	0.59	1.04	0.568	2
Voice and Accountability	competitive-electoral	5	0.47	1.02	0.467	1

NOTE: EU-27 versus non-EU European cross-country standard deviations and their ratio, 2016–2023. σ_d^{EU} and $\sigma_d^{\text{non-EU}}$ are the within-group standard deviations on dimension d (the EU-27 members and the non-EU European control); $R_d = \sigma_d^{\text{EU}} / \sigma_d^{\text{non-EU}}$. Rank is the channel rank by EU conditionality strength (1 = strongest); Position is the empirical rank of R_d from smallest (1) to largest (5). Spearman ρ between Rank and R_d is -0.700 ; the within-EU compression is uniform-to-inverse across channels rather than concentrated where EU conditionality is strongest.

The empirical ordering of R_d approximately inverts the ordering that differentiated post-accession compression would imply. Voice and Accountability, the channel with the weakest post-accession EU conditionality instrument, displays the deepest compression ($R_{\text{VA}} = 0.467$), while Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness, where conditionality is conventionally strongest, display the weakest compression ($R_{\text{CC}} = 0.654$ and $R_{\text{GE}} = 0.637$). Section 6 reads this inversion as consistent with *Copenhagen-criteria selection at accession*: countries with weak democratic accountability are less likely to enter the member-state sample in the first place, so the within-EU standard deviation on Voice and Accountability is already small at entry. The pattern therefore points to a selection filter rather than to post-accession instruments compressing member-state scores.

F.3 Sensitivity to observation window

Refitting with the 2019–2023 (5-year, Phillips-Sul baseline window) and 2012–2023 (12-year, post-Rule-of-Law-Framework era) windows yields $\rho = -0.700$ and Δ values of $+0.058$ and $+0.061$ respectively. The inversion is robust to window choice.

F.4 Sensitivity to EU split definition

The primary specification splits the panel into 27 EU-ever-member countries versus 14 non-EU European countries. An alternative split, contrasting high-integration members (HIM, $n = 15$) with outside countries (OUT, $n = 14$), yields $\rho = -0.600$ and $\Delta = +0.105$, qualitatively similar to the primary specification.

G Accession-cohort compression trajectory

The compression ratios of Section F are cross-sectional and cannot date the within-EU compression they record. This appendix traces that compression over time for the 2004 accession cohort, separating a pre-accession origin from a post-accession one.

G.1 Specification

For each WGI dimension d and each year t from 1996 to 2024 we compute the cross-country standard deviation of the WGI score within the ten states admitted in the 2004 enlargement, $\sigma_d^{\text{coh}}(t)$, and within the non-EU European states, $\sigma_d^{\text{ctrl}}(t)$, and form the time-resolved ratio $R_d(t) = \sigma_d^{\text{coh}}(t)/\sigma_d^{\text{ctrl}}(t)$. We summarize R_d at three epochs: an opening window (1996–1999), an accession window (2002–2006), and a closing window (2020–2024). The compression added before accession, $R_d^{\text{early}} - R_d^{\text{acc}}$, and the compression added after accession, $R_d^{\text{acc}} - R_d^{\text{late}}$, decompose the movement of the ratio across the observation window; a negative post-accession term records post-accession de-compression.

G.2 Results

Table 29 reports the decomposition. Where the cohort compresses, it does so before accession rather than after. The cohort enters the observation window already far more compressed than the control: on Voice and Accountability $R_{\text{VA}}^{\text{early}} = 0.211$, the cohort roughly five times more tightly clustered than the non-EU comparator in 1996, eight years before accession. On every dimension the post-accession term is negative, so the cohort’s scores spread apart after joining. On Voice and Accountability the post-accession term is -0.189 : the cohort’s standard deviation on that dimension reached its minimum around the accession date and then rose, more than doubling by 2023 as Hungary and Poland moved away from the rest. The non-EU control’s Voice-and-Accountability standard deviation stays flat across the window, between 0.93 and 1.11, so the trajectory of R_{VA} records the cohort and not the comparator.

The pattern survives the comparison group’s composition. Restricting the control to non-autocracies, removing Russia, Belarus, and Turkey, leaves the post-accession term negative on all five dimensions and deepens it on Voice and Accountability. The cross-sectional compression recorded in Section F is therefore a pre-accession residue: the European Union’s homoge-

Table 29: Pre/post-accession decomposition of the 2004 cohort’s compression ratio

Governance dimension	R_d^{early}	R_d^{acc}	R_d^{late}	Added pre	Added post
Government Effectiveness	0.367	0.231	0.282	+0.136	−0.051
Regulatory Quality	0.234	0.224	0.394	+0.011	−0.171
Control of Corruption	0.349	0.254	0.380	+0.095	−0.127
Rule of Law	0.326	0.330	0.366	−0.004	−0.036
Voice and Accountability	0.211	0.175	0.364	+0.036	−0.189

NOTE: Pre/post-accession decomposition of the 2004 accession cohort’s cross-country standard deviation against the non-EU European control. $R_d = \sigma_d^{\text{coh}} / \sigma_d^{\text{ctrl}}$ is the ratio of the cohort’s standard deviation to the control’s on dimension d ; a lower R_d means the cohort is more tightly clustered. The columns give R_d at three epochs: early (1996–1999), accession (2002–2006), and late (2020–2024). $R_d^{\text{early}} - R_d^{\text{acc}}$ is the compression added before accession (Added pre); $R_d^{\text{acc}} - R_d^{\text{late}}$ is that added after (Added post); a negative Added post records post-accession de-compression.

nizing effect on member governance is located before accession, and the post-accession movement shows cohort-wide de-compression on three of the five dimensions and country-specific widening on Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law, as Section G.3 below documents.

G.3 Robustness: removing Hungary and Poland from the cohort

The cohort-aggregate decomposition reports cohort-level pre/post movement, but the post-accession Voice and Accountability widening in the full cohort is concentrated on Hungary and Poland. We test the attribution directly: remove Hungary and Poland from the cohort, recompute the pre/post decomposition on the remaining eight 2004 entrants against the unchanged non-EU control, and compare the post-accession term per dimension.

Table 30 reports the comparison. The post-accession contribution flips sign on Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law: Voice and Accountability moves from −0.189 (de-compression) on the full cohort to +0.036 (further compression) on the eight-country cohort, and Rule of Law moves from −0.036 to +0.070. The remaining three dimensions retain the qualitative direction of the full cohort, with attenuation on Government Effectiveness (from −0.051 to −0.031) and on Control of Corruption (from −0.127 to −0.108), and almost no change on Regulatory Quality (from −0.171 to −0.166).

The leave-out result sharpens the cohort-level reading more precisely than the full-cohort decomposition alone. On Voice and Accountability, the dimension on which the pre-accession-selection reading is sharpest, the eight-country cohort closes the observation window at $R_{\text{VA}}^{\text{late, LOHP}} = 0.153$, more compressed than at accession ($R_{\text{VA}}^{\text{acc, LOHP}} = 0.189$): the cohort-versus-comparator gap recorded at entry on Voice and Accountability does not erode on the eight cohort members that did not autocratize, consistent with the Copenhagen-criteria selection reading of Section 6. The same pattern holds, in attenuated form, on Rule of Law. The full-cohort post-accession movement on Voice and Accountability and Rule of Law is therefore not a generic loss of EU homogenization across all members; it is country-specific widening concentrated on Hungary and Poland against a backdrop of cohort-level continued compression on the other eight; Kelemen (2020) and Priebus (2022) document backsliding in these

Table 30: Leave-out-Hungary-and-Poland robustness of the cohort decomposition

Governance dimension	R_d^{late} (full)	R_d^{late} (LOHP)	Added post (full)	Added post (LOHP)
Government Effectiveness	0.282	0.256	−0.051	−0.031
Regulatory Quality	0.394	0.358	−0.171	−0.166
Control of Corruption	0.380	0.370	−0.127	−0.108
Rule of Law	0.366	0.280	−0.036	+0.070
Voice and Accountability	0.364	0.153	−0.189	+0.036

NOTE: Per-dimension comparison of the 2004 accession cohort's closing compression ratio R_d^{late} (2020–2024) and post-accession contribution (Added post) on the full ten-country cohort and on the eight-country cohort with Hungary and Poland removed (LOHP). $R_d = \sigma_d^{\text{coh}} / \sigma_d^{\text{ctrl}}$ is the cohort-to-control standard-deviation ratio; Added post = $R_d^{\text{acc}} - R_d^{\text{late}}$, so a negative value records post-accession de-compression. The eight-country cohort retains the qualitative direction on Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption, and inverts it on Rule of Law and Voice and Accountability, where the apparent post-accession widening in the full cohort is driven by Hungary and Poland.

two members. On the remaining three dimensions the post-accession term remains negative under the leave-out and reflects broader cohort de-compression: attenuated on Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption and almost unchanged on Regulatory Quality.

H Convergence clubs and varieties of capitalism

Section 6 reports that the convergence clubs do not reproduce the varieties of capitalism; the cross-tabulation behind that finding is the object of this section. We match each country's club membership on the four multi-club dimensions against two typologies the comparative-capitalism literature treats as canonical: the production regimes of [Hall and Soskice \(2001\)](#) and the welfare regimes of [Esping-Andersen \(1990\)](#). We use each typology's own categories and classify only the countries it covers, its Western and OECD core; the post-communist, post-Soviet, and Balkan cases that neither typology addresses stay unclassified rather than carry a contested label. Government Effectiveness drops out because it forms a single global club and so varies across no clubs to cross-tabulate.

Table 31 reports, for each type, the clubs its members occupy on each dimension. Were the clubs a relabeling of the typologies, each type would occupy a club of its own, but the types do not. Liberal and coordinated market economies, the two poles of the Hall-Soskice scheme, share the top club on every dimension. The liberal and social-democratic welfare regimes, the two poles of Esping-Andersen's scheme, are indistinguishable on three of those four dimensions. The Mediterranean cases spread across clubs 1 through 4 rather than forming one of their own. Coordination type and welfare regime cut across the convergence-club structure.

Table 31: Convergence-club membership by variety of capitalism and welfare regime

Type	<i>n</i>	Convergence club(s) occupied			
		CC	RL	RQ	VA
<i>Panel A. Production regimes (Hall and Soskice, 2001)</i>					
Liberal market economies	2	1	1, 2	1	1
Coordinated market economies	9	1	1	1, 2	1
Mediterranean / ambiguous	6	1, 2, 3	2, 3, 4	2, 3	1, 2, 3
<i>Panel B. Welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990)</i>					
Liberal	2	1	1, 2	1	1
Conservative-corporatist	6	1, 2	1, 2	1, 2, 3	1
Social-democratic	4	1	1	1	1

NOTE: Each cell lists the convergence club(s) that a type's member countries occupy on a dimension; club 1 is the highest-mean club. Production-regime types follow Hall and Soskice (2001, pp. 19–21) and classify 17 of the 41 countries, with the Mediterranean group the tentative “possible” third type Hall and Soskice flag as ambiguous rather than a settled variety; welfare-regime types follow Esping-Andersen (1990) and classify 12; in both cases the typology's Western and OECD core. Control of Corruption (CC), Rule of Law (RL), Regulatory Quality (RQ), and Voice and Accountability (VA) are the four dimensions that split into clubs; Government Effectiveness forms a single global club and is omitted.