

Online Appendix for ‘Climate Change Policy Preferences and Foreign State Behavior – Survey Experimental Evidence on Reciprocal Defection’

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A.1 Public opinion and foreign policy

Given that developed democracies combine the bulk of historic² and a large share of current emissions³, and given the crucial role of citizens' preferences in democracies for governments' environmental and climate policy (Schaffer, Oehl and Bernauer 2022; Vandeweerdt, Kerremans and Cohn 2016; Anderson, Böhmelt and Ward 2017; Weaver 2008), the question whether and how mass publics adapt their willingness to support climate mitigation policy if large emitter countries defect is important.

Past literature has shown that public preferences matter for foreign policy-making (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012), and studies from developed economies indicate that decision-makers take the environmental preferences of voters into account when deciding on environmental policy (e.g., Vandeweerdt, Kerremans and Cohn 2016; Anderson, Böhmelt and Ward 2017; Weaver 2008). More generally, research indicates that public opinion can shape policy debates, the extent of political mandates, and subsequently the decision-making of policymakers (Burstein 2003; Page and Shapiro 1983; Wlezien 1995). For example, Hager and Hilbig (2020) show that exposure of politicians to polling information affects both their priorities and positions in political speech. Hence, policy seems to reflect shifts in public sentiment (Bakaki, Böhmelt and Ward 2020; Schaffer, Oehl and Bernauer 2022), and it makes sense to infer the relevance of state-level constraints from public opinion survey experiments.

A.2 Literature on free-riding and defection in climate policy making

Reciprocity considerations are foundational for collaboration in society (Schedler 2021). Likewise, and as a consequence, they are an important component of citizens' general approach to forming political preferences. Bechtel and Scheve (2017: 206) show the extent to which they directly reflect in citizens' considerations: presenting survey respondents from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the US with (general) cooperation scenarios, they find "that almost 50% of the population employs a conditionally cooperative strategy". Hence, they have been found to matter relevantly in different areas of international politics and guide preferences towards own-country compliance, and reaction to foreign-country non-compliance. Regarding the former, Tingley and Tomz (2022) show, for example, that concerns for their own country's reputation resonate strongly with US citizens under shallow climate policy implementation, and can lead them to support more ambitious climate policy. Likewise, Elsig and Spilker (2024) find that Swiss citizens show strong concern for reputational costs when their climate policy might violate international (trade) law. Regarding the latter, Schweinberger (2022) shows that US and Chinese citizens' support for trade agreements falls drastically when they learn the foreign country

² OECD countries contributed 40% of total emissions 1850-2022 (see Table 4 in Jones et al. 2023).

³ 28% for OECD countries in 2022, see <https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions>.

has been breaching agreements in the past, also in non-related domains, and due to lowered trust. Similar effects emerge for US and Turkish respondents Kiratli and Ertan (2024), and for foreign direct investment as an additional policy area (Chilton, Milner and Tingley 2020). Chen, Pevehouse and Powers (2023) show that US citizens show a strong preference for US trade being increased with foreign countries when the trade partner is described as a democracy (compared to not) – and that this is because citizens view democratic trade partners as more reliable. Also, (Walter 2026) indicates that European citizens favor non-accommodating policy responses when faced with foreign-country non-cooperation, but only when contagion consequences were highlighted. These studies indicate that reciprocity considerations matter, and indicate potential mechanisms why this is the case: fear of contagion effects, reliability considerations, and trust in future compliance – factors which should also matter for considering climate policy.

However, some recent work dismisses the relevance of free-riding concerns for preferences on climate mitigation policy. Prominently, Aklin and Mildemberger (2020) argue that not free-riding but domestic distributional concerns are the core determinant for climate policy preferences in particular and government policy more generally. They propose that “national publics are unconditional cooperators” (Aklin and Mildemberger 2020: 14), based on time-series survey data from the US. There, over 60% of respondents support participation in a multilateral climate agreement, irrespective of other countries’ behavior. Around 13% indicate conditionality on other countries reducing emissions. Below 10% indicate that the US should not participate and not reduce emissions (20%: don’t know/refused; see Figure 2, p. 15). This finding similarly shows in other Western democracies (Tingley and Tomz 2014). Seemingly, a majority of citizens are sympathetic to emission reductions and do not require other states to go first.⁴ At the same time, when eliciting attitudes regarding treaty defection directly, Kenny (2024) report that among 38 developed and emerging economies, majorities in 35 countries disapprove of the 2017 US exit from the Paris Agreement under Trump – while the extent of disagreement varies by geographic region, regime type, and domestic mitigation ambition.

However, to what extent respondents would adapt their stated preferences if the behavior of other countries changed is a question that a non-experimental research design can hardly reveal. For example, social desirability bias likely affects the share of unconditional cooperation. Therefore, a small but growing strand of survey-experimental literature addresses whether reciprocity considerations affect citizens’ preference formation. In line with the accounts mentioned above, the early literature indicates that reciprocity considerations seem to reflect only weakly in citizens’ considerations. McGrath and Bernauer (2017) summarize that by and large, citizens show “robust support for unilateral climate policy [which] suggests that conditional cooperation strategies [...] are not supported by citizens” McGrath and Bernauer (2017: 7f.).

⁴ Note that also in these studies nuanced results emerge: Tingley and Tomz (2014), e.g., find that (US) respondents show multifaceted preferences for conditionalizing support on other states behavior, seemingly not reacting to foreign pollution, but to increased efforts in other countries, and supporting what they call ‘external’ reciprocity via issue linkage.

Much of this literature is focused on the role of reciprocity regarding international climate agreements. When asked about international policy design, features mitigating free-riding concerns (Bechtel and Scheve 2013) as well as fair contributions by third actors (in France, the UK, and Germany) (Bechtel, Scheve and van Lieshout 2022) strongly increase policy selection of respondents. Likewise, Li et al. (2004) report that support increases when frameworks include binding emission reduction targets for developing countries, and Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer (2019) find (for US and Chinese samples) that reciprocity considerations matter for policy design (while they are unaffected by information on de-/increases in coal consumption in other countries). Relatedly, Beiser-McGrath et al. (2021) show that other states' behavior affects support for conditionality built into domestic policy designs. Inconclusive evidence is reported by Tvinnereim, Lachapelle and Borick (2016), where only specific country samples (Scandinavian countries, but not the US), or Stroik et al. (2019), where only certain subgroups of their US and China samples respond to reciprocity elements in agreement-making.

A smaller strand of the literature investigates the role of reciprocity considerations when citizens form preferences for domestic climate policy. Bernauer and Gampfer (2015) find that designs for domestic climate policy conditional on other countries' actions are not preferred by respondents (in the US and China), while support for unilateral policy somewhat declines "when respondents are primed to think about [...] free-riding of other countries and the policy's low global effectiveness this would engender." This latter finding does not replicate in China, however (Bernauer et al. 2016). Likewise, Bernauer et al. (2016) report for their Chinese sample that survey-experimental information on other countries' pledges under the Paris Agreement (framed positively or negatively) does not affect preferences for an index of domestic climate policy measures. Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer (2022) show that other countries' increasing emissions (i.e., coal consumption, in their case) do not negatively affect domestic ambition levels, and particularly so, if survey respondents are more aware of their own emission history – while decreases positively affect the willingness to decrease coal consumption in turn. In contrast, for the context of Japan and citizens' support for carbon taxation, Beiser-McGrath et al. (2021) vary information about whether (yes/no) and at what level (higher/lower than domestic) other countries have set their carbon tax. They show that such information affects public support for domestic taxation levels in a direction expected from reciprocity considerations.⁵

Taken together, reciprocity considerations seem to matter for ex-ante preferences regarding international policy design (with some exceptions). Regarding actual climate policy, citizens' support seems to depend on reciprocity considerations in some contexts/study designs, but not in others. However, despite its theoretical importance, there is surprisingly little research regarding the consequences of direct defection from pledges under the Paris Agreement for public support.

⁵ Note that the foreign state behavior is operationalized differently in the approaches mentioned above. For example, studies partly inquire whether enhanced efforts of foreign states increase domestic support and partly whether reduced efforts decrease support.

A.3 Definition of concepts: Free-riding, defection and non-compliance (of actors pivotal for climate change mitigation)

Free-riding occurs when a party receives the benefits of a public good without contributing to the costs (Nordhaus 2015: 1339). Conceptually, ‘free-riding’ can take place at the pre-treaty (countries not committing to a treaty and/or not conducting their own pro-climate action, hence sharing in the benefits of any pro-climate action of other countries while avoiding own mitigation costs) (Nordhaus 2015) or at the post-treaty stage (countries reneging on their commitments, i.e., sharing in the benefits of other countries complying with their treaty-obligation of providing for a cleaner environment while avoiding their own mitigation costs) (Bernauer 2013; Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia 2011). My manuscript is concerned with free-riding at this latter stage. In particular, I am concerned with how citizens react to apparent free-riding behavior of other countries (as distinct from their considerations whether their own country should free-ride or not in the first place, which other literature addresses (e.g., Tingley and Tomz 2022; Bernauer et al. 2016)).

Moreover, I understand such behavior of other countries at the implementation stage not only as free-riding, but as ‘defection’ from their treaty obligations. Defection constitutes state behavior in violation of obligations under international law (Verdier 2001), as usually codified in international treaties, in our case by the Paris Accord. In this context, and in a broad understanding, this concerns both state obligations to behave in line with the goal of limiting climate change, and concretely of following up on their ‘pledges’, i.e., their own NDCs (Mayer 2018). As the 2025 International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change (July 23, 2025, General List No. 187) outlines, this even holds under International Customary Law. Hence, when states do not comply with their NDCs, i.e., their obligations under the Paris Agreement, they defect on their obligations and free-ride on others’ efforts.

I understand pivotal emitters as singular countries whose current GHG emissions are so high that reaching Paris targets is practically infeasible without their compliance. As of 2024, the share in global GHG emissions/total GHG emissions in Gigaton CO_{2eq} is 29.2%/15.536 for China, 11.1%/5.913 for the U.S., and 8.2%/4.371 for India (Crippa et al. 2025) – making them the three largest individual emitters, with India even projected to increase emissions substantially over the next few years. Also as of 2024, the remaining CO₂ budget to keep global warming below 1.5 degrees with a 67% likelihood is around 80 Gigaton CO_{2eq} (1.7 degrees: 390; 2.0 degrees: 870) (Friedlingstein et al. 2024). Hence, these countries alone would exhaust the remaining 1.5 degree budget with continued emissions at current levels in about 5/14/18 years (China/U.S./India), 25/66/89 years for 1.7 degrees, and 56/147/199 years for 2.0 degrees.

A.4 Additional information on survey and research design

A.4.1 Background on the Swiss Environmental Panel

The Swiss Environmental Panel is based on a sample drawn by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BfS) from the resident-population register and is representative of the Swiss resident population aged 15+. While termed ‘Environmental’, the survey was presented to respondents as about ‘societal issues’ to preempt selective survey take-up by respondents with ‘greener’ preferences. The survey is dual-mode, i.e., fielded as a pen and paper and an online (implementation with Qualtrics) survey. I use wave 1 for pre-treatment characteristics of respondents, but mostly rely on wave 2, which contained the survey-experimental components and ego-/socio-tropic burden perception questions reported in this manuscript. 73% of wave 1 respondents (first wave: 4,813, raw response rate of 32.17%) participated in wave 2, with a median survey duration of 13 minutes.

A.4.2 Prior information levels and survey flow

I used SEP wave 2, which focused on climate change policy preferences, particularly the Paris Agreement. The questionnaire early on⁶ inquired about baseline knowledge on climate change and the Paris Agreement. Subsequently, the survey provided factual information to raise information levels. This survey structure allows me to understand the starting points of respondents when entering our survey experiment later on – and hence also underlying beliefs against which the treatment was interpreted, both about the urgency of climatic changes and about current Swiss ambition.

Regarding climate change, I observe a population in strong agreement that climate change is human-made and severe, but split on whether Switzerland will be able to adapt to climate change without sacrifices.⁷ In addition, only a minority of our population is knowledgeable about the Paris Agreement.⁸ Subsequently, the survey inquired about respondents’ best guess on the level of emission reductions required for the 2°Celsius goal. This reveals relevant heterogeneity – about 30% of the sample (which provides a response) relevantly underestimate required emission reductions, about 35% are within the correct range, about 35% overestimate.⁹

The survey subsequently raised information levels to a common baseline. It informed

⁶ See descriptives for wave 2, questions 1-5, reported in Rudolph et al. (2020).

⁷ Only 13% of respondents deny climate change fully or partly. Only 6% of respondents deny that climate change is caused by human activity, and only 4% that it is a challenge for humanity. However, 56% agree at least partly that Swiss society will be able to adapt to climate change without sacrificing its living standard.

⁸ Only 35% of respondents indicated they had heard or read about the Paris Agreement and would be confident to describe its core content at least roughly.

⁹ Overall, 15% indicate ‘don’t know’. Among those providing a guess for how strongly global emissions are to be reduced compared to base 2010 until 2050, about 15% indicate emission reductions up to 15%, about another 15% up to 40%; about 35% are in the 40-60% range; 25% guess in the 61-80% range, and 10% beyond 80%.

on the core content of the Paris Agreement, its goal of limiting global warming to at best 1.5, or at least 2 degrees Celsius, introduces the concept of NDCs in five year intervals, and current Swiss NDCs aiming at 50% reduction until 2030, and 70% until 2050.¹⁰

Providing this baseline information on the Paris Agreement reduces heterogeneity in later treatment understanding. Additionally, it makes our treatment more realistic: in a real-world election in Switzerland, voters receive factual information sheets together with their ballot.

A.4.3 Paris agreement information text

The information text, administered in the first third of the survey (before the treatment), read as follows:

“In the Paris Climate Agreement reached at the end of 2015, most of the world’s countries committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions so that global warming does not exceed two degrees Celsius. To further reduce the risk of severe damage from climate change, additional efforts will be made to limit global warming to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. The Paris Agreement requires all member states to set a national greenhouse gas reduction target every five years and to announce the measures they will take to achieve it. Achievement of the target will be monitored internationally [...]”

Repeatedly throughout the survey, respondents were then introduced to and reminded of the Swiss Paris Goals as of the time fielding the survey, whereby Switzerland committed to “the target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 and by at least 70% by 2050”

The ambition gap experiment, not reported on in this manuscript, is contained in the survey instrument (information text after question 5, see Appendix B.1).

A.4.4 Measurement of ego- and sociotropic burden

First, measurement of egotropic burden for Hypothesis 2 is straightforward as described in the main manuscript. Hypothesis 3 requires measures of sociotropic concern, i.e., of economic burden for the country, both if a Green Transition is implemented, but also when it is not. This differentiation reflects the tension in public debate where, e.g., Green parties regularly emphasize economic benefits from the Green Transition (e.g., innovation benefits; industry laggard effects, see Dimitrov 2012), while, e.g., populist right parties emphasize the economic burden thereof (e.g., energy costs, international competitiveness, see Drews and Van Den Bergh 2016). Inquiring these perceptions by way of a split-sample survey experiment allows to analyze reactions to ‘defection’ by both types of sociotropic concerns: first, among respondents that believe that implementing the Paris Agreement

¹⁰ For the information text wording, see Appendix subsection A.4.3. Note that the information text wording entailed an additional vignette experiment, not reported upon in this manuscript, whereby respondents’ belief of the “ambition gap” between what is required and current reduction plans was altered.

actually benefits (vs. harms) the Swiss economy; second, which does not necessarily mirror the above, whether defecting from the Paris Agreement benefits (vs. harms) the Swiss economy.

Second, these perceptions of ego- and sociotropic consequences are not experimentally assigned. The consequences of implementing the Paris Agreement are very likely influenced by socio-demographics, general worldviews regarding risk, trust, the future, the role of the state, political ideology, and, most importantly, broader perceptions of climate change and economic policy. In order not to confound perceived ego- or sociotropic burden with correlates, I need to control these. Fortunately, measures for these concepts are available from wave 1 of the Swiss Environmental Panel, i.e., I can control for pre-treatment characteristics from an unrelated survey wave. While still only an observational approach, this lessens endogeneity concerns considerably. As measures, I can draw on: socio-demographics (age categories, gender, nationality, main language, region of residency), general worldviews (state efficacy, trust in state institutions, risk aversion, discounting of the future), broader perceptions of climate change (environmental concern index, climate change belief index, climate change saliency, stated support of environmental NGOs), political ideology, and economic outlook (personal and societal 3-year economic expectation, current income).

Regarding survey flow, sociotropic assessments precede the international cooperation question and egotropic assessments.

A.5 Descriptive evidence

Descriptive evidence from our survey (in 2019) shows that respondents are overall rather skeptical whether Switzerland will, and also whether it even can reach its emission reduction goals. As reported in Appendix Figure A.1, average ratings that these will be reached are at 3.36 on a five-point scale; average ratings are at 3.11 that they can be reached (scale 1 (certainly) to 5 (certainly not)). However, when citizens subsequently rate the likelihood of four potential international consequences of Switzerland failing to reach its emission reduction targets, respondents perceive reciprocal defection by other countries both as relatively and absolutely likely to occur, with a mean of 3.41 (median of 4) on the 5-point scale (see Appendix Figure A.2). In turn, they assess other potential consequences that were inquired, lowered reputation (2.81, median of 3), less willingness to cooperate with Switzerland (2.38, median of 2) or even trade sanctions against Switzerland (2.21, median of 2) as rather unlikely to occur. Hence, when judging the consequences of their own country's behavior, the idea of a dilemma-type situation with reciprocal defection (though not punishment) resonates most with citizens.




Figure A.1: Distribution of ratings on “Do you think that Switzerland can or cannot achieve the goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 and at least 70% by 2050? Switzerland [can reach]//[will reach] this goal...” with a scale from 1 (“Surely reaching”) to 5 (“Surely not reaching”); $N = 1,769/1,706$




Figure A.2: Average rating on “What international consequences would you expect or not expect if Switzerland did not achieve its goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 and at least 70% by 2050?” with a scale from 1 (“Certainly not occurring”) to 5 (“certainly occurring”) for four items (a: “Switzerland’s reputation in the world would be damaged.” b: “Other countries would restrict their trade with Switzerland (trade sanctions).” c: “Other countries would cooperate less with Switzerland in international bodies.” d: “Other countries would not reduce their greenhouse gas emissions either.” $N = 3,145$).

A.6 Supporting information for main effect




Figure A.3: Constant and treatment effect for survey experimental treatment condition of defection from linear regression of policy preference on treatment dummy. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors shown. $N = 3,302$. According to the model, baseline support (under compliance) is at 1.85 on a linear scale (between strengthening and implementing, tilting towards the latter) under compliance, but increases by 0.4 scale points to 2.3 (between implementing and weakening, tilting towards the former) under defection.




Figure A.4: Marginal effects for changes in the probability of choosing one of the outcomes with the survey experimental treatment condition of defection. Marginal effects based on ordered logit regression of policy preference on treatment dummy. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors shown. $N = 3,302$

According to the model, with defection, the probability of respondents opting for ‘strengthening’ decreases by 17 percentage points, while opting for ‘implementing’ as is increases by 2, for ‘weakening’ by 9, for ‘stopping’ by 3, and for ‘retracting’ by 2 percentage points.

A.7 Supporting information for moderation by economic burden

A.7.1 Egotropic concerns

	DV: Extent of implementation of Paris agreement (1: strengthen; 2: implement as is; 3: weaken; 4: stop implementing; 5: retract from Paris)											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction	Pain attraction
main												
large polluters: defect	0.811** (0.117)	0.810** (0.118)	0.829** (0.120)	0.951** (0.130)	1.007** (0.145)	1.084** (0.161)	0.296** (0.0427)	0.292** (0.0421)	0.302** (0.0462)	0.299** (0.0481)	0.298** (0.0488)	0.298** (0.0488)
own IHH burden: larger	0.447** (0.108)	0.208** (0.109)	0.422** (0.110)	0.209** (0.128)	0.210** (0.131)	0.111 (0.147)	0.180** (0.0308)	0.159** (0.0365)	0.177** (0.0369)	0.180** (0.0388)	0.068** (0.0371)	0.038 (0.0405)
large polluters: defect x own IHH burden: larger	0.337* (0.145)	0.371* (0.156)	0.330* (0.153)	0.312* (0.175)	0.307* (0.179)	0.413* (0.198)	0.142* (0.0565)	0.150** (0.0560)	0.135* (0.0571)	0.114* (0.0609)	0.145* (0.0564)	0.150** (0.0609)
male		0.367** (0.0728)				0.158 (0.100)		0.160* (0.0284)				0.069* (0.0336)
age: 30-44			0.0709 (0.126)			0.127 (0.207)		0.0526 (0.0482)				0.0459 (0.0630)
age: 45-59			0.298** (0.115)			0.360** (0.201)		0.120** (0.0446)				0.101 (0.0824)
age: 60-74			0.411** (0.121)			0.374* (0.208)		0.157** (0.0458)				0.0997 (0.0647)
age: 75+			0.565** (0.151)			0.343 (0.250)		0.220** (0.0577)				0.0797 (0.0772)
language: French			0.0148 (0.130)			0.0146 (0.194)		0.00230 (0.0520)				0.00142 (0.0610)
language: Italian			0.182 (0.244)			0.0270 (0.413)		0.0664 (0.0509)				-0.0438 (0.132)
Espace Mittelhand			0.160 (0.143)			0.146 (0.203)		0.0561 (0.0531)				0.0601 (0.0631)
Nordwestschweiz			0.328* (0.178)			0.356 (0.244)		0.114* (0.0674)				0.119 (0.0709)
Zürich			0.0009 (0.177)			-0.0998 (0.230)		0.0226 (0.0607)				-0.0208 (0.0724)
Ostschweiz			0.337** (0.183)			0.295 (0.247)		0.125* (0.0703)				0.101 (0.0775)
Zentralschweiz			0.270 (0.192)			0.219 (0.252)		0.196 (0.0734)				0.0099 (0.0807)
Tessin			0.371 (0.277)			0.604 (0.453)		0.369 (0.106)				0.253* (0.142)
economic outlook (egotropic)			-0.0648 (0.0504)			-0.0466 (0.0440)			-0.0119 (0.0248)			-0.0119 (0.0274)
economic outlook (sociotropic)			-0.0271 (0.0822)			-0.112 (0.0837)			-0.0195 (0.0247)			-0.0181 (0.0275)
inc.: 2-4000			0.151 (0.138)			-0.0464 (0.173)		0.0656 (0.0441)				-0.00223 (0.0553)
inc.: 4-6000			0.188* (0.111)			-0.162 (0.168)		0.0849** (0.0433)				-0.0534 (0.0538)
inc.: 6-8000			0.145 (0.123)			-0.0311 (0.165)		0.0481 (0.0461)				-0.0226 (0.0553)
inc.: 8-10000			0.271 (0.165)			-0.0715 (0.233)		0.128* (0.0644)				-0.00229 (0.0757)
inc.: 10-12000			0.566** (0.195)			0.0925 (0.267)		0.221** (0.0822)				0.0299 (0.0856)
inc.: 12-14000			0.195 (0.145)			-0.0105 (0.300)		0.165 (0.145)				0.0530 (0.119)
inc.: 14000+			0.552** (0.205)			-0.278 (0.260)		0.186* (0.0821)				-0.0970 (0.0888)
ENGO: passive member			0.141 (0.0981)			0.109 (0.113)		0.0456 (0.0330)				0.0344 (0.0348)
ENGO: active member			-0.368 (0.372)			-0.694* (0.418)		-0.0913 (0.104)				-0.194* (0.116)
efficacy (PCA)					0.213** (0.0333)	0.110** (0.0368)			0.0852** (0.0124)			0.0396* (0.0121)
risk aversion (5-point)					-0.0105 (0.0487)	-0.0515 (0.0563)			0.0000061 (0.0176)			-0.0151 (0.0180)
political trust (PCA)					-0.0429* (0.0195)	-0.0602** (0.0295)			-0.0232** (0.00740)			-0.0233** (0.00708)
future orientation (PCA)					0.285** (0.0280)	0.0651* (0.0343)			0.102** (0.0110)			0.0118 (0.0119)
fairness expectation (5-point)					-0.0457 (0.0458)	-0.0832 (0.0544)			-0.0181 (0.0172)			-0.0262 (0.0181)
environmental concern (PCA)					-0.217** (0.0110)	-0.147* (0.0347)				-0.0000** (0.0305)		-0.0770** (0.0117)
climate change belief (PCA)					-0.338** (0.0140)	-0.146** (0.0408)				-0.126** (0.0154)		-0.126** (0.0172)
climate change salience (binary)					-0.423** (0.0075)	-0.224* (0.113)				-0.112** (0.0261)		-0.0315* (0.0335)
lft-right (5-point)=2					0.196 (0.160)	0.306* (0.180)				0.0387 (0.0436)		0.0669 (0.0484)
lft-right (5-point)=3					0.126* (0.165)	0.201 (0.143)				0.0636 (0.0463)		0.0204 (0.0508)
lft-right (5-point)=4					0.727** (0.172)	0.620** (0.192)				0.200** (0.0502)		0.139** (0.0556)
lft-right (5-point)=5					1.007** (0.251)	0.695* (0.177)				0.176** (0.0662)		0.264** (0.0923)
Constant							1.795** (0.0274)	1.471** (0.0733)	1.818** (0.0982)	1.963** (0.0897)	1.734** (0.0488)	1.909** (0.170)
cut1	-0.596** (0.0835)	0.0285 (0.197)	-0.714** (0.256)	-1.073** (0.246)	-0.694** (0.180)	-1.160* (0.533)						
cut2	2.460** (0.0955)	3.140** (0.296)	2.372** (0.268)	2.273** (0.251)	3.016** (0.306)	2.868** (0.239)						
cut3	3.712** (0.111)	4.408** (0.213)	3.632** (0.266)	3.630** (0.259)	4.558** (0.304)	4.282** (0.543)						
cut4	4.701** (0.142)	5.415** (0.231)	4.627** (0.287)	4.627** (0.275)	5.671** (0.229)	5.429** (0.562)						
Observations	3124	3059	2973	2952	2859	1968	3124	3059	2973	2952	2859	1968

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.1: Regression of defection treatment indicator, personal burden perception, their interaction, and control variables (in different specifications, as indicated) on implementation ambition of Paris Agreement (5-point scale from strengthen to retract). Models 1-6: ordinal logistic regression. Models 7-12: linear regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	DV: Extent of implementation of Paris agreement (1: strengthen; 2: implement as is; 3: weaken; 4: stop implementing; 5: retract from Paris)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Paris extraction	Paris extraction	Paris extraction	Paris extraction	Paris extraction	Paris extraction	Paris extraction	Paris extraction
main								
large polluters: defect	0.917** (0.132)	1.018** (0.129)	1.024** (0.164)	1.026** (0.162)	0.211** (0.0438)	0.252** (0.0426)	0.268** (0.0485)	0.267** (0.0477)
own HH burden: larger	0.335** (0.116)	0.360** (0.119)	0.113 (0.148)	0.115 (0.148)	0.121** (0.0350)	0.135** (0.0356)	0.0455 (0.0399)	0.0433 (0.0401)
large polluters: defect × own HH burden: larger	0.340* (0.162)	0.241 (0.162)	0.413* (0.201)	0.410* (0.200)	0.118* (0.0549)	0.0848 (0.0552)	0.138* (0.0609)	0.136* (0.0606)
climate change belief (PCA)	-0.581** (0.0485)		-0.346** (0.0656)	-0.346** (0.0498)	-0.192** (0.0171)		-0.0990** (0.0213)	-0.125** (0.0172)
large polluters: defect × climate change belief (PCA)	0.00256 (0.0621)		-0.00055 (0.0732)		-0.0483* (0.0258)		-0.0554* (0.0280)	
environmental concern (PCA)		-0.420** (0.0315)	-0.243** (0.0347)	-0.240** (0.0422)		-0.135** (0.0108)	-0.0771** (0.0116)	-0.0595** (0.0134)
large polluters: defect × environmental concern (PCA)		-0.0104 (0.0402)		-0.00532 (0.0456)		-0.0300* (0.0166)		-0.0379* (0.0172)
efficacy (PCA)			0.110** (0.0368)	0.110** (0.0368)			0.0395** (0.0121)	0.0409** (0.0121)
risk aversion (5-point)			-0.015 (0.0563)	-0.015 (0.0563)			-0.0142 (0.0180)	-0.0152 (0.0180)
political trust (PCA)			-0.0602** (0.0229)	-0.0602** (0.0229)			-0.0253** (0.00779)	-0.0250** (0.00778)
future orientation (PCA)			0.0651* (0.0343)	0.0652* (0.0343)			0.0119 (0.0129)	0.0123 (0.0129)
fairness expectation (5-point)			-0.0832 (0.0546)	-0.0830 (0.0545)			-0.0253 (0.0380)	-0.0260 (0.0380)
male			0.158 (0.109)	0.158 (0.109)			0.0648* (0.0335)	0.0682* (0.0336)
age: 30-44			0.127 (0.207)	0.128 (0.207)			0.0509 (0.0630)	0.0488 (0.0631)
age: 45-59			0.360* (0.201)	0.360* (0.201)			0.0909 (0.0621)	0.101 (0.0625)
age: 60-74			0.374** (0.208)	0.374** (0.208)			0.0963 (0.0643)	0.101 (0.0646)
age: 75+			0.343 (0.250)	0.343 (0.250)			0.0812 (0.0770)	0.0825 (0.0770)
language: French			0.0147 (0.194)	0.0150 (0.194)			0.00112 (0.0610)	0.00364 (0.0613)
language: Italian			0.0271 (0.415)	0.0273 (0.413)			-0.0429 (0.137)	-0.0428 (0.132)
Espace Mittelrand			0.146 (0.203)	0.146 (0.203)			0.0600 (0.0632)	0.0653 (0.0635)
Nordwestschweiz			0.156 (0.245)	0.156 (0.245)			0.129 (0.0771)	0.123 (0.0775)
Zürich			-0.0998 (0.238)	-0.0996 (0.238)			-0.0289 (0.0725)	-0.0266 (0.0728)
Ostschweiz			0.295 (0.247)	0.296 (0.247)			0.101 (0.0779)	0.103 (0.0780)
Zentralschweiz			0.219 (0.252)	0.219 (0.252)			0.0719 (0.0809)	0.0718 (0.0811)
Tessin			0.604 (0.453)	0.605 (0.453)			0.257* (0.144)	0.258* (0.141)
economic outlook (egotropic)			-0.0166 (0.0849)	-0.0164 (0.0849)			-0.0153 (0.0273)	-0.0127 (0.0273)
economic outlook (sociotropic)			-0.112 (0.0837)	-0.112 (0.0837)			-0.0401 (0.0274)	-0.0412 (0.0274)
inc.: 2-4000			-0.0464 (0.173)	-0.0465 (0.173)			-0.0000584 (0.0551)	-0.00178 (0.0551)
inc.: 4-6000			-0.162 (0.168)	-0.162 (0.168)			-0.0538 (0.0537)	-0.0549 (0.0538)
inc.: 6-8000			-0.0311 (0.185)	-0.0317 (0.185)			-0.0235 (0.0584)	-0.0278 (0.0585)
inc.: 8-10000			-0.0714 (0.233)	-0.0708 (0.233)			-0.00124 (0.0736)	-0.00436 (0.0737)
inc.: 10-12000			0.0926 (0.267)	0.0942 (0.268)			0.0386 (0.0856)	0.0406 (0.0859)
inc.: 12-14000			-0.0107 (0.370)	-0.0115 (0.369)			0.0280 (0.118)	0.0459 (0.117)
inc.: 14000+			-0.278 (0.269)	-0.279 (0.269)			-0.103 (0.0884)	-0.0999 (0.0886)
ENGO: passive member			0.109 (0.113)	0.109 (0.113)			0.0352 (0.0350)	0.0361 (0.0350)
ENGO: active member			-0.694* (0.418)	-0.692* (0.418)			-0.190* (0.115)	-0.186 (0.116)
climate change saliency (binary)			-0.224* (0.113)	-0.224* (0.113)			-0.0620* (0.0334)	-0.0595* (0.0334)
left-right (5-point)-2			0.306* (0.180)	0.307* (0.180)			0.0668 (0.0482)	0.0700 (0.0482)
left-right (5-point)-3			0.201 (0.183)	0.202 (0.183)			0.0273 (0.0508)	0.0280 (0.0507)
left-right (5-point)-4			0.630** (0.192)	0.631** (0.192)			0.160* (0.0554)	0.163** (0.0554)
left-right (5-point)-5			0.495* (0.277)	0.495* (0.277)			0.265** (0.0927)	0.263** (0.0928)
Constant					1.769** (0.0276)	1.762** (0.0270)	1.891** (0.170)	1.886** (0.171)
Observations	2816	2746	1968	1968	2816	2746	1968	1968

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A.2: Regression of defection treatment indicator, personal burden perception, their interaction, as well as indicators of climate change belief (models 1, 3, 5, 7) or environmental concern (Models 2, 4, 6, 8) and their interaction with and without inclusion of additional controls (as indicated) on implementation ambition of Paris Agreement (5-point scale from strengthen to retract). Models draw on ordinal logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.7.2 Sociotropic concerns




Figure A.5: Marginal effects for changes in the probability of choosing one of the outcomes with the survey experimental treatment condition of defection by subgroups of perceived burden, benefit, or both of the Swiss economy (coefficient colors) if climate policy *does not* follow the Paris Agreement. Marginal effects based on ordered logit regression of policy preference on treatment dummy, interacted with three-categorical perceived burden extent within subgroups of *not* implementing the Paris Agreement. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors shown. $N = 922$ Appendix Table A.5, model 6, shows corresponding regression results.

DV: Extent of implementation of Paris agreement (1: strengthen; 2: implement as is; 3: weaken; 4: stop implementing; 5: retract from Paris)											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction	Paisi extraction
main											
large polluters: defect	0.982** (0.155)	1.008** (0.159)	1.002** (0.161)	1.072** (0.151)	1.383** (0.188)	1.377** (0.218)	0.309** (0.0496)	0.303** (0.0562)	0.273** (0.0598)	0.409** (0.0527)	0.348** (0.0590)
both	0.783** (0.151)	0.824** (0.158)	0.826** (0.159)	0.569** (0.194)	0.954** (0.183)	0.839** (0.239)	0.267** (0.0483)	0.249** (0.0492)	0.247** (0.0494)	0.128* (0.0529)	0.267** (0.0526)
domestic economy: harm	1.610** (0.266)	1.663** (0.272)	1.630** (0.274)	0.929** (0.281)	1.727** (0.311)	1.148** (0.334)	0.531** (0.0830)	0.545** (0.0836)	0.523** (0.0840)	0.221** (0.0797)	0.494** (0.0865)
large polluters: defect × both	-0.181 (0.216)	-0.106 (0.219)	-0.119 (0.226)	-0.201 (0.271)	-0.122* (0.259)	-0.439 (0.310)	-0.0567 (0.0729)	-0.09010 (0.0725)	-0.0533 (0.0746)	-0.0198 (0.0777)	-0.149* (0.0799)
large polluters: defect × domestic economy: harm	0.431 (0.822)	0.475 (0.828)	0.545* (0.828)	0.799* (0.943)	0.0775 (0.375)	0.535 (0.392)	0.359** (0.125)	0.362** (0.125)	0.405** (0.126)	0.458** (0.119)	0.232* (0.131)
male											
	0.271** (0.103)					0.209 (0.155)	0.189* (0.0365)				0.0813* (0.0413)
age: 30-44		0.0790 (0.181)				0.176 (0.298)		0.0648 (0.0625)			0.0706 (0.0851)
age: 45-59		0.411* (0.172)				0.441 (0.280)		0.176* (0.0590)			0.100 (0.0343)
age: 60-74		0.556** (0.174)				0.396 (0.300)		0.215** (0.0549)			0.0994 (0.0890)
age: 75+		0.752** (0.230)				0.410 (0.361)		0.307** (0.0752)			0.140 (0.100)
language: French		0.0538 (0.203)				0.128 (0.282)		0.00716 (0.0668)			0.0404 (0.0833)
language: Italian		0.106 (0.477)				0.136 (0.560)		0.0447 (0.122)			0.0546 (0.141)
Espace Mittelland		0.179 (0.214)				0.302 (0.300)		0.0568 (0.0695)			0.101 (0.0861)
Nordwestschweiz		0.206 (0.265)				0.342 (0.361)		0.0819 (0.0862)			0.136 (0.104)
Zürich		0.0961 (0.258)				0.212 (0.346)		0.0208 (0.0845)			0.0578 (0.0883)
Ob- und Nordschweiz		0.282 (0.280)				0.376 (0.308)		0.106 (0.0995)			0.127 (0.107)
Zentralschweiz		0.0127 (0.270)				0.294 (0.358)		-0.00018 (0.0895)			0.0707 (0.103)
Tessin		0.235 (0.424)				0.648 (0.441)		0.111 (0.136)			0.237 (0.160)
economic outlook (epitropic)			-0.113* (0.0758)			-0.0621 (0.125)			-0.0021* (0.0272)		-0.0078 (0.0389)
economic outlook (sociotropic)				-0.0790 (0.0837)		-0.174 (0.121)			-0.0324 (0.0302)		-0.0489 (0.0358)
inc.: 2-4000			0.329* (0.167)			0.190 (0.251)		0.107* (0.0594)			0.0552 (0.0780)
inc.: 4-6000			0.113 (0.363)			-0.222 (0.243)		0.0506 (0.0577)			-0.0672 (0.0734)
inc.: 6-8000			0.305* (0.182)			0.0570 (0.270)		0.0901 (0.0644)			-0.0096 (0.0809)
inc.: 8-10000			-0.172 (0.241)			-0.267 (0.364)		-0.0652 (0.0907)			-0.0635 (0.106)
inc.: 10-12000			0.645* (0.264)			0.157 (0.418)		0.225* (0.107)			0.0575 (0.121)
inc.: 12-14000			0.203 (0.477)			-0.101 (0.568)		0.168 (0.178)			0.0153 (0.160)
inc.: 14000+			0.839** (0.279)			-0.0506 (0.360)		0.256* (0.136)			-0.0517 (0.116)
ENGO: passive number			0.0754 (0.142)			-0.00711 (0.164)		0.0090 (0.0422)			0.0121 (0.0483)
ENGO: active number			-0.646 (0.544)			-0.903 (0.772)		-0.148 (0.141)			-0.202 (0.112)
environmental concern (PCA)				-0.201** (0.0459)		-0.102** (0.0515)			-0.0622** (0.0147)		-0.0591* (0.0164)
climate change belief (PCA)				-0.413** (0.0613)		-0.364** (0.0675)			-0.139** (0.0194)		-0.119** (0.0217)
climate change salience (binary)				-0.373** (0.117)		-0.182 (0.181)			-0.115** (0.0316)		-0.0520 (0.0466)
left-right (5-point)=2				0.416* (0.223)		0.537* (0.258)			0.107* (0.0586)		0.124* (0.0659)
left-right (5-point)=3				0.591* (0.217)		0.425 (0.270)			0.140* (0.0645)		0.0784 (0.0721)
left-right (5-point)=4				0.804** (0.235)		0.724** (0.271)			0.215** (0.0656)		0.168* (0.0743)
left-right (5-point)=5				1.010** (0.357)		0.697* (0.414)			0.359** (0.136)		0.240* (0.120)
efficiency (PCA)					0.181** (0.0453)		0.0826 (0.0222)			0.0679** (0.0148)	0.0348* (0.0158)
risk aversion (5-point)					0.0121 (0.0867)		-0.0242 (0.0800)			0.00845 (0.0216)	-0.00184 (0.0208)
political trust (PCA)					-0.0219 (0.0276)		-0.0538 (0.0229)			-0.0179* (0.00977)	-0.0209* (0.0106)
future orientation (PCA)					0.320** (0.0494)		0.114* (0.0495)			0.109** (0.0141)	0.0310* (0.0167)
fairness expectation (5-point)					-0.107 (0.0669)		-0.0608 (0.0823)			-0.0107 (0.0225)	-0.0185 (0.0260)
Constant							1.642** (0.0037)	1.369** (0.0075)	1.879** (0.125)	1.646** (0.0022)	1.744** (0.113)
cut1	-0.352** (0.109)	0.337 (0.294)	-0.862* (0.359)	-0.376 (0.355)	-0.728* (0.345)	-0.232 (0.733)					
cut2	2.942** (0.132)	3.694** (0.330)	2.512** (0.355)	3.590** (0.260)	2.895** (0.356)	3.551** (0.737)					
cut3	4.272** (0.362)	5.040** (0.322)	3.847** (0.370)	5.130** (0.288)	4.350** (0.373)	5.195** (0.748)					
cut4	5.370** (0.294)	6.181** (0.341)	4.973** (0.400)	6.330** (0.324)	5.430** (0.390)	6.289** (0.777)					
Observations	5629	5614	5598	5221	5214	5051	5629	5614	5598	5221	5214

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Regression of defection treatment indicator, Swiss economic burden perception when implementing the Paris Agreement, their interaction and control variables (in different specifications, as indicated) on implementation ambition of Paris Agreement (5-point scale from strengthen to retract). Models 1-6: ordinal logistic regression. Models 7-12: linear regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results for the subgroup that received the question on Swiss economic burden perception when implementing the Paris Agreement.

DV: Extent of implementation of Paris agreement (1: strengthen, 2: implement as is, 3: weaken, 4: stop implementing, 5: retreat from Paris)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Paris interaction	Paris interaction	Paris interaction	Paris interaction	Paris interaction	Paris interaction	Paris interaction	Paris interaction
mean								
large polluters: defect	1.120** (0.172)	1.140** (0.170)	1.425** (0.220)	1.404** (0.221)	0.322** (0.0514)	0.340** (0.0534)	0.381** (0.0634)	0.374** (0.0614)
both	0.779** (0.187)	0.769** (0.172)	0.940** (0.228)	0.929** (0.231)	0.197** (0.0473)	0.211** (0.0491)	0.260** (0.0557)	0.252** (0.0538)
domestic economy: harm	1.170** (0.273)	1.100** (0.277)	1.252** (0.357)	1.201** (0.354)	0.305** (0.0798)	0.335** (0.0796)	0.521** (0.0923)	0.305** (0.0936)
large polluters: defect x both	-0.252 (0.238)	-0.218 (0.244)	-0.484 (0.308)	-0.455 (0.312)	-0.008 (0.0723)	-0.060 (0.0737)	0.113 (0.0870)	-0.101 (0.0877)
large polluters: defect x domestic economy: harm	0.802* (0.342)	0.684* (0.347)	0.391 (0.423)	0.455 (0.427)	0.398** (0.115)	0.384** (0.122)	0.282* (0.138)	0.302* (0.131)
climate change belief (PCA)	-0.548** (0.0698)	-0.548** (0.0698)	-0.302** (0.0912)	-0.361** (0.0879)	-0.162** (0.0217)	-0.162** (0.0217)	-0.0760** (0.0277)	-0.117** (0.0217)
large polluters: defect x climate change belief (PCA)	-0.107 (0.0870)	-0.107 (0.0870)	-0.124 (0.105)	-0.124 (0.105)	-0.0805* (0.0328)	-0.0805* (0.0328)	-0.0903* (0.0353)	-0.0903* (0.0353)
environmental concern (PCA)	-0.390** (0.0455)	-0.390** (0.0455)	-0.191** (0.0514)	-0.170** (0.0640)	-0.118** (0.0140)	-0.107** (0.0163)	-0.0390* (0.0184)	-0.0390* (0.0184)
large polluters: defect x environmental concern (PCA)	-0.0307 (0.0501)	-0.0307 (0.0501)	-0.0307 (0.0501)	-0.0307 (0.0501)	-0.0307 (0.0501)	-0.0307 (0.0501)	-0.0307 (0.0501)	-0.0307 (0.0501)
efficacy (PCA)			0.0830 (0.0525)	0.0846 (0.0524)			0.0350* (0.0159)	0.0368* (0.0159)
risk aversion (5-point)	-0.004 (0.0796)	-0.004 (0.0796)	-0.0226 (0.0800)	-0.0226 (0.0800)			0.000267 (0.0227)	-0.00146 (0.0238)
political trust (PCA)			-0.0512 (0.0330)	-0.0520 (0.0330)			-0.0220* (0.0106)	-0.0229* (0.0105)
future orientation (PCA)			0.117* (0.0498)	0.116* (0.0501)			0.0013* (0.0167)	0.0027* (0.0168)
intense expectation (5-point)			-0.0687 (0.0824)	-0.0603 (0.0826)			-0.0191 (0.0259)	-0.0133 (0.0259)
male			0.136 (0.156)	0.209 (0.156)			0.0722 (0.0450)	0.0967* (0.0450)
age: 30-44			0.193 (0.257)	0.185 (0.258)			0.0815 (0.0947)	0.0803 (0.0950)
age: 45-59			0.440 (0.287)	0.444 (0.288)			0.0997 (0.0828)	0.105 (0.0833)
age: 60-74			0.402 (0.290)	0.406 (0.290)			0.161 (0.0853)	0.169 (0.0861)
age: 75+			0.420 (0.359)	0.421 (0.360)			0.148 (0.108)	0.153 (0.109)
language: French			0.150 (0.284)	0.142 (0.283)			0.0524 (0.0838)	0.0533 (0.0839)
language: Italian			0.151 (0.563)	0.151 (0.568)			0.0669 (0.147)	0.0686 (0.150)
Expos Mittelstand			0.112 (0.301)	0.308 (0.301)			0.104 (0.0863)	0.107 (0.0860)
Nonentrepreneurs			0.354 (0.363)	0.354 (0.364)			0.140 (0.104)	0.146 (0.105)
Zürich			0.219 (0.147)	0.227 (0.147)			0.0554 (0.0987)	0.0513 (0.0981)
Ostschweiz			0.398 (0.372)	0.390 (0.370)			0.136 (0.109)	0.138 (0.109)
Zentralschweiz			0.116 (0.360)	0.311 (0.360)			0.0830 (0.104)	0.0877 (0.104)
Tessin			0.654 (0.155)	0.653 (0.155)			0.240 (0.106)	0.241 (0.106)
economic outlook (egotropic)			-0.0657 (0.124)	-0.0626 (0.124)			-0.0426 (0.0386)	-0.0378 (0.0386)
economic outlook (sociotropic)			-0.176 (0.121)	-0.176 (0.121)			-0.0408 (0.0353)	-0.0336 (0.0356)
inc.: 2-8000			0.194 (0.253)	0.190 (0.252)			0.0579 (0.0756)	0.0530 (0.0756)
inc.: 4-6000			-0.229 (0.241)	-0.221 (0.243)			-0.0733 (0.0730)	-0.0687 (0.0732)
inc.: 6-8000			0.0452 (0.270)	0.0407 (0.269)			-0.0362 (0.0811)	-0.0394 (0.0811)
inc.: 8-10000			-0.264 (0.365)	-0.262 (0.365)			-0.0596 (0.106)	-0.0623 (0.106)
inc.: 10-12000			0.179 (0.418)	0.185 (0.423)			0.0739 (0.124)	0.0810 (0.125)
inc.: 12-14000			-0.150 (0.731)	-0.121 (0.730)			-0.0214 (0.159)	-0.0055 (0.159)
inc.: 14000+			-0.0409 (0.367)	-0.0405 (0.368)			-0.0529 (0.114)	-0.0552 (0.115)
ENGO: positive member			-0.00039 (0.164)	-0.0013 (0.164)			0.0156 (0.0482)	0.0142 (0.0482)
ENGO: active member			-0.787 (0.164)	-0.783 (0.164)			-0.195 (0.111)	-0.187 (0.111)
climate change salient (binary)			-0.174 (0.163)	-0.175 (0.164)			-0.0470 (0.0453)	-0.0459 (0.0456)
left-right (5-point)=2			0.524* (0.150)	0.530* (0.150)			0.116* (0.0653)	0.117* (0.0653)
left-right (5-point)=3			0.435 (0.260)	0.427 (0.260)			0.0860 (0.0719)	0.0797 (0.0714)
left-right (5-point)=4			0.723** (0.270)	0.722** (0.270)			0.130* (0.0741)	0.140* (0.0741)
left-right (5-point)=5			0.680* (0.412)	0.680* (0.414)			0.226* (0.127)	0.230* (0.128)
Constant					1.608** (0.0380)	1.608** (0.0380)	1.721** (0.210)	1.711** (0.217)
ctrl1	-0.570** (0.121)	-0.598** (0.127)	-0.523 (0.724)	-0.524 (0.727)				
ctrl2	5.174** (0.106)	3.002** (0.150)	3.739** (0.738)	3.739** (0.741)				
ctrl3	4.648** (0.193)	4.623** (0.192)	5.145** (0.751)	5.137** (0.753)				
ctrl4	5.506** (0.251)	5.719** (0.251)	6.345** (0.782)	6.328** (0.782)				
Observations	1450	1450	1023	1023	1450	1450	1023	1023

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A.4: Regression of defection treatment indicator, Swiss economic burden perception when implementing the Paris Agreement, their interaction, as well as indicators of climate change belief (models 1, 3, 5, 7) or environmental concern (Models 2, 4, 6, 8) and their interaction with and without inclusion of additional controls (as indicated) on implementation ambition of Paris Agreement (5-point scale from strengthen to retract). Models draw on ordinal logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results for the subgroup that received the question on Swiss economic burden perception when implementing the Paris Agreement.

	DE: Estimation of implementation of Paris agreement (1: strengthen, 2: implement so far, 3: unclear, 4: drop implementing, 5: retract from Paris)															
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)	
	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction
const																
large polluters deficit	0.950** (0.248)	0.920** (0.251)	0.829** (0.249)	1.339** (0.272)	0.911** (0.278)	1.322** (0.286)	0.322** (0.102)	0.329** (0.101)	0.323** (0.102)	0.475** (0.090)	0.322** (0.100)	0.469** (0.090)	0.322** (0.100)	0.469** (0.090)	0.322** (0.100)	0.469** (0.090)
booth	0.123 (0.227)	0.138 (0.236)	0.101 (0.231)	0.0831 (0.259)	0.0424 (0.259)	0.0815 (0.269)	-0.000720 (0.0996)	0.0816 (0.0977)	-0.0146 (0.0823)	0.00340 (0.0776)	-0.0052 (0.0776)	0.00340 (0.0776)	-0.0052 (0.0776)	0.00340 (0.0776)	-0.0052 (0.0776)	0.00340 (0.0776)
domestic economy: harm	-0.002** (0.024)	-0.014** (0.027)	-0.007** (0.026)	-0.079** (0.250)	-0.051** (0.254)	-0.034 (0.276)	-0.023** (0.0796)	-0.209** (0.0796)	-0.151** (0.0814)	-0.149** (0.0762)	-0.229** (0.0820)	-0.149** (0.0762)	-0.229** (0.0820)	-0.149** (0.0762)	-0.229** (0.0820)	-0.149** (0.0762)
large polluters deficit × booth	0.145 (0.295)	0.140 (0.299)	0.222 (0.299)	-0.0115 (0.302)	0.260 (0.300)	0.0003 (0.376)	0.0476 (0.121)	0.0433 (0.120)	0.0000 (0.121)	-0.0406 (0.116)	0.0614 (0.126)	-0.0406 (0.116)	0.0614 (0.126)	-0.0406 (0.116)	0.0614 (0.126)	-0.0406 (0.116)
large polluters deficit × domestic economy: harm	0.679* (0.298)	0.623* (0.300)	0.709* (0.301)	0.379 (0.334)	0.714* (0.340)	0.323 (0.361)	0.179 (0.122)	0.132 (0.120)	0.219* (0.120)	0.00343 (0.116)	0.137 (0.126)	0.00343 (0.116)	0.137 (0.126)	0.00343 (0.116)	0.137 (0.126)	0.00343 (0.116)
nucle		0.551** (0.106)				0.366* (0.162)		0.379* (0.162)								
age: 30-44		-0.044 (0.136)				0.035 (0.111)		0.035 (0.0774)								
age: 45-59		0.29 (0.169)				0.539* (0.161)		0.0007 (0.0607)								
age: 60-74		0.467* (0.184)				0.571* (0.188)		0.136* (0.0721)								
age: 75+		0.620** (0.226)				0.46 (0.207)		0.227* (0.0964)								
language: French		-0.102 (0.276)				-0.0003 (0.296)		-0.026 (0.0822)								
language: Italian		-0.136 (0.342)				-0.111 (0.706)		-0.0061 (0.139)								
Espace littoral		-0.029 (0.215)				-0.035 (0.262)		-0.0254 (0.0965)								
Northeastern		0.318 (0.264)				0.304 (0.264)		0.101 (0.104)								
Zurich		0.0164 (0.264)				-0.277 (0.207)		0.0001 (0.101)								
Ostschweiz		0.222 (0.276)				0.234 (0.276)		0.141 (0.121)								
Zentralschweiz		0.205 (0.292)				0.198 (0.292)		0.134 (0.111)								
Tessin		0.436 (0.278)				0.351 (0.279)		0.203 (0.133)								
economic outlook (logotropic)		-0.008 (0.0065)				0.000 (0.122)		-0.023 (0.0228)								
economic outlook (sociotropic)		0.076 (0.076)				0.00097 (0.119)		0.00113 (0.0582)								
inc.: 2-4000		0.141 (0.106)				-0.250 (0.240)		0.104 (0.060)								
inc.: 4-6000		0.368* (0.163)				-0.278 (0.239)		0.117 (0.0644)								
inc.: 6-8000		0.127 (0.176)				-0.343 (0.260)		0.0457 (0.0671)								
inc.: 9-10000		0.533* (0.225)				-0.228 (0.327)		0.261** (0.090)								
inc.: 10-12000		0.468** (0.276)				-0.041 (0.344)		0.227* (0.118)								
inc.: 12-14000		0.103 (0.402)				-0.062 (0.562)		0.151 (0.306)								
inc.: 14000+		0.379 (0.202)				-0.507 (0.394)		0.128 (0.102)								
ENGOs: positive member		0.221 (0.142)				0.209 (0.166)		0.019 (0.0452)								
ENGOs: active member		-0.171 (0.330)				-0.408 (0.366)		-0.0789 (0.141)								
environmental concern (PCA)						-0.249** (0.0434)		-0.250** (0.050)								
climate change label (PCA)						-0.268** (0.0685)		-0.324** (0.0773)								
climate change salience (binary)						-0.457** (0.142)		-0.269** (0.100)								
left-right (5-point)=2						0.0951 (0.253)		0.212 (0.252)								
left-right (5-point)=3						0.260 (0.253)		0.0865 (0.279)								
left-right (5-point)=4						0.649* (0.269)		0.519* (0.260)								
left-right (5-point)=5						0.990** (0.336)		0.713* (0.361)								
efficiency (PCA)						0.256** (0.0495)		0.101* (0.0509)								
risk aversion (5-point)						-0.036 (0.0741)		-0.023 (0.0640)								
political trust (PCA)						-0.0025* (0.0106)		-0.0734* (0.0196)								
future orientation (PCA)						0.211** (0.0419)		0.0138 (0.0505)								
business expectation (5-point)						0.0772 (0.0640)		-0.0213 (0.0774)								
Constant								1.910** (0.0076)		1.679** (0.125)		1.913** (0.120)		1.818** (0.090)		1.774** (0.200)
χ^2																
cut1		-1.118** (0.196)	-0.435 (0.224)	-0.642* (0.413)	-0.902** (0.318)	-1.111** (0.300)	-0.640 (0.301)									
cut2		1.998** (0.263)	2.712** (0.361)	2.296** (0.410)	2.614** (0.463)	2.396** (0.463)	1.342** (0.193)									
cut3		3.139** (0.216)	3.942** (0.251)	3.402** (0.291)	4.217** (0.451)	3.512** (0.500)	4.819** (0.200)									
cut4		4.097** (0.249)	4.896** (0.301)	4.402** (0.401)	5.275** (0.501)	4.403** (0.501)	6.041** (0.201)									
Observations		1141	1146	1156	1112	1116	962	1101	1106	1105	1112	1104	1104	1104	1104	952

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.5: Regression of defection treatment indicator, Swiss economic burden perception when *not* implementing the Paris Agreement, their interaction and control variables (in different specifications, as indicated) on implementation ambition of Paris Agreement (5-point scale from strengthen to retract). Models 1-6: ordinal logistic regression. Models 7-12: linear regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results for the subgroup that received the question on Swiss economic burden perception when *not* implementing the Paris Agreement.

DV: Extent of implementation of Paris agreement (1: strengthen, 2: implement as is, 3: weaken, 4: stop implementing, 5: retreat from Paris)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction	Paris attraction
Intercept	1.081** (0.262)	1.186** (0.251)	1.313** (0.296)	1.298** (0.296)	0.413** (0.0978)	0.424** (0.0952)	0.440** (0.0899)	0.424** (0.0909)
both	-0.044 (0.257)	0.221 (0.235)	0.058 (0.280)	0.079 (0.296)	-0.020 (0.0784)	0.096 (0.0797)	0.021 (0.0868)	0.012 (0.0862)
domestic economy: harm	-0.721** (0.239)	-0.637** (0.239)	-0.439 (0.276)	-0.448 (0.277)	-0.218** (0.0790)	-0.211** (0.0788)	-0.0937 (0.0848)	-0.0975 (0.0847)
large polluters: defect x both	0.128 (0.340)	-0.124 (0.369)	0.044 (0.378)	0.090 (0.377)	0.0012 (0.118)	-0.040 (0.117)	-0.0282 (0.128)	-0.0408 (0.127)
large polluters: defect x domestic economy: harm	0.441 (0.319)	0.521* (0.314)	0.329 (0.360)	0.346 (0.367)	0.0809 (0.117)	0.145 (0.116)	0.0555 (0.128)	0.0394 (0.128)
climate change belief (PCA)	-0.567** (0.0798)	-0.567** (0.0798)	-0.310** (0.107)	-0.331** (0.0775)	-0.196** (0.0276)	-0.196** (0.0276)	-0.0909** (0.0359)	-0.111** (0.0280)
large polluters: defect x climate change belief (PCA)	0.0271 (0.0863)	0.0271 (0.0863)	-0.0217 (0.112)	-0.0217 (0.112)	-0.0404 (0.0309)	-0.0404 (0.0309)	-0.0436 (0.0428)	-0.0436 (0.0428)
environmental concern (PCA)		-0.397** (0.0456)	-0.251** (0.0512)	-0.239** (0.0609)		-0.131** (0.0137)	-0.0833** (0.0176)	-0.0605** (0.0201)
large polluters: defect x environmental concern (PCA)		-0.0158 (0.0571)		-0.0344 (0.0651)		-0.0427* (0.0241)		-0.0463* (0.0253)
efficacy (PCA)			0.102* (0.0569)	0.103* (0.0569)			0.0337* (0.0191)	0.0350* (0.0190)
risk aversion (5-point)		-0.0426 (0.0840)	-0.0426 (0.0840)	-0.0426 (0.0840)		-0.0393 (0.0277)	-0.0393 (0.0277)	-0.0393 (0.0277)
political trust (PCA)		-0.0757* (0.0339)	-0.0757* (0.0339)	-0.0757* (0.0339)		-0.0285* (0.0116)	-0.0279* (0.0116)	-0.0279* (0.0116)
future orientation (PCA)		0.0141 (0.0565)	0.0141 (0.0565)	0.0141 (0.0565)		-0.00794 (0.0174)	-0.00823 (0.0174)	-0.00823 (0.0174)
intention: expectation (5-point)		-0.0210 (0.0773)	-0.0210 (0.0773)	-0.0210 (0.0773)		-0.00976 (0.0257)	-0.0105 (0.0257)	-0.0105 (0.0257)
male		0.285* (0.162)	0.285* (0.162)	0.285* (0.162)		0.0672* (0.0540)	0.0687* (0.0540)	0.0687* (0.0540)
age: 30-44		0.0316 (0.211)	0.0316 (0.211)	0.0316 (0.211)		0.0102 (0.0579)	0.00552 (0.0579)	0.00552 (0.0579)
age: 45-59		0.528* (0.301)	0.528* (0.301)	0.528* (0.301)		0.146 (0.0957)	0.151 (0.0964)	0.151 (0.0964)
age: 60-74		0.568* (0.158)	0.568* (0.158)	0.568* (0.158)		0.153 (0.0863)	0.155 (0.0863)	0.155 (0.0863)
age: 75+		0.407 (0.357)	0.407 (0.357)	0.407 (0.357)		0.0759 (0.112)	0.0714 (0.112)	0.0714 (0.112)
language: French		-0.0114 (0.287)	-0.0114 (0.287)	-0.0114 (0.287)		-0.0209 (0.0889)	-0.0252 (0.0884)	-0.0252 (0.0884)
language: Italian		-0.110 (0.708)	-0.110 (0.708)	-0.110 (0.708)		-0.181 (0.273)	-0.179 (0.258)	-0.179 (0.258)
Expos: Mittelstand		-0.0312 (0.292)	-0.0312 (0.292)	-0.0312 (0.292)		0.044 (0.0919)	0.00037 (0.0920)	0.00037 (0.0920)
Nonhometeachers		0.383 (0.361)	0.383 (0.361)	0.383 (0.361)		0.0950 (0.115)	0.0956 (0.116)	0.0956 (0.116)
Zürich		-0.279 (0.371)	-0.279 (0.371)	-0.279 (0.371)		-0.0638 (0.110)	-0.0622 (0.111)	-0.0622 (0.111)
Ostschweiz		0.241 (0.390)	0.241 (0.390)	0.241 (0.390)		0.0928 (0.119)	0.0909 (0.120)	0.0909 (0.120)
Zentralschweiz		0.186 (0.397)	0.186 (0.397)	0.186 (0.397)		0.0574 (0.129)	0.0586 (0.130)	0.0586 (0.130)
Tessin		0.359 (0.759)	0.352 (0.751)	0.352 (0.751)		0.241 (0.259)	0.230 (0.247)	0.230 (0.247)
economic outlook (egotropic)		0.0666 (0.122)	0.0667 (0.122)	0.0667 (0.122)		0.0309 (0.0578)	0.0257 (0.0580)	0.0257 (0.0580)
economic outlook (sociotropic)		0.00146 (0.120)	0.00156 (0.120)	0.00156 (0.120)		-0.0144 (0.0428)	-0.0139 (0.0427)	-0.0139 (0.0427)
inc.: 2-4000		-0.259 (0.248)	-0.251 (0.248)	-0.251 (0.248)		-0.0485 (0.0821)	-0.0481 (0.0824)	-0.0481 (0.0824)
inc.: 4-6000		-0.277 (0.230)	-0.278 (0.230)	-0.278 (0.230)		-0.0683 (0.0863)	-0.0717 (0.0863)	-0.0717 (0.0863)
inc.: 6-8000		-0.343 (0.268)	-0.348 (0.268)	-0.348 (0.268)		-0.0872 (0.0862)	-0.0943 (0.0865)	-0.0943 (0.0865)
inc.: 8-10000		-0.225 (0.128)	-0.224 (0.128)	-0.224 (0.128)		-0.0332 (0.110)	-0.0375 (0.109)	-0.0375 (0.109)
inc.: 10-12000		0.0645 (0.344)	0.0683 (0.345)	0.0683 (0.345)		0.0466 (0.114)	0.0434 (0.115)	0.0434 (0.115)
inc.: 12-14000		-0.0501 (0.140)	-0.0429 (0.140)	-0.0429 (0.140)		0.0114 (0.171)	0.0204 (0.170)	0.0204 (0.170)
inc.: 14000+		-0.602 (0.385)	-0.602 (0.385)	-0.602 (0.385)		-0.182 (0.131)	-0.174 (0.131)	-0.174 (0.131)
ENGO: positive number		0.210 (0.167)	0.211 (0.167)	0.211 (0.167)		0.0531 (0.0514)	0.0549 (0.0521)	0.0549 (0.0521)
ENGO: active number		-0.462 (0.194)	-0.451 (0.194)	-0.451 (0.194)		-0.126 (0.156)	-0.128 (0.156)	-0.128 (0.156)
climate change salient (binary)		-0.290* (0.168)	-0.287* (0.168)	-0.287* (0.168)		-0.0866* (0.0519)	-0.0867* (0.0517)	-0.0867* (0.0517)
left-right (5-point)=2		0.213 (0.281)	0.228 (0.281)	0.228 (0.281)		0.0567 (0.0759)	0.0603 (0.0760)	0.0603 (0.0760)
left-right (5-point)=3		0.0894 (0.279)	0.0857 (0.279)	0.0857 (0.279)		0.00061 (0.0772)	0.00541 (0.0769)	0.00541 (0.0769)
left-right (5-point)=4		0.590* (0.290)	0.519* (0.290)	0.519* (0.290)		0.124 (0.0848)	0.138 (0.0852)	0.138 (0.0852)
left-right (5-point)=5		0.718* (0.384)	0.720* (0.385)	0.720* (0.385)		0.279* (0.130)	0.271* (0.130)	0.271* (0.130)
Constant					1.930** (0.0642)	1.860** (0.0641)	1.771** (0.226)	1.770** (0.292)
ctrl1		-1.239** (0.203)	-1.076** (0.196)	-0.648 (0.363)	-0.645 (0.363)			
ctrl2		2.135** (0.286)	2.526** (0.286)	3.148** (0.303)	3.148** (0.303)			
ctrl3		3.507** (0.225)	3.689** (0.225)	4.821** (0.328)	4.826** (0.329)			
ctrl4		4.520** (0.261)	4.720** (0.261)	6.051** (0.367)	6.050** (0.367)			
Observations	1309	1283	922	922	1309	1283	922	922

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A.6: Regression of defection treatment indicator, Swiss economic burden perception when *not* implementing the Paris Agreement, their interaction, as well as indicators of climate change belief (models 1, 3, 5, 7) or environmental concern (Models 2, 4, 6, 8) and their interaction with and without inclusion of additional controls (as indicated) on implementation ambition of Paris Agreement (5-point scale from strengthen to retract). Models draw on ordinal logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Results for the subgroup that received the question on Swiss economic burden perception when *not* implementing the Paris Agreement.

A.7.3 Modeling with generalized ordinal logit

Ordered logistic models rely on a relevant assumption, the proportional odds, or parallel regression assumption (that slope parameters are plausibly parallel at each cutoff) (Long and Freese 2006), while standard statistical tests for this assumption often fail, especially with many observations and covariates. Kim (2003) proposed additional tests to disentangle the statistical from the practical relevance of proportional odds failures, checking whether the ordered logit simplification leads to meaningful differences in predicted probabilities. Following his methodology indicates low concern for the baseline model and for interactive models without control variables. With controls, I find an indication of low to moderate concern. I therefore recheck core substantive findings drawing on a generalized ordered logit model, as this does not impose the constraint of parallel regression (Long and Freese 2006), and allows, e.g., for stronger treatment effects at higher or lower thresholds. Its drawback is a tendency to overfit, modeling flexibility beyond what the limited data I have can support. Models including control variables do, for example, not converge with 5 outcome levels – I therefore collapsed the ‘stop’ and ‘retract’ response options, working now with a four-point scale. While with slightly less nuance, this still allows me to check whether core substantive conclusions are independent of our modeling approach. Appendix Figures A.6 and A.7 report results, drawing on the ‘autofit’ option of general ordinal logistic modeling, where the parallel slopes assumption is selectively given up whenever statistical tests indicate its violation (Williams 2016). Both figures indicate that, also with this much more flexible modeling approach, the core results hold: the treatment decreases choice for compliance, and increases choice for defection among all respondents – and more strongly so for those perceiving a higher ego- or sociotropic burden.




Figure A.6: Marginal effects for changes in the probability of choosing one of the outcomes with the survey experimental treatment condition of defection by subgroups of self-reported burden for the respondent's household if climate policy is implemented (1: above average; 0: at or below average). Marginal effects based on generalized ordered logit regression of policy preference on treatment dummy (with selectively relaxed parallel regression assumption), under inclusion of controls for respondent demographics and attitudes. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors are shown. $N = 1,968$.




Figure A.7: Marginal effects for changes in the probability of choosing one of the outcomes with the survey experimental treatment condition of defection by subgroups of perceived burden, benefit, or both of the Swiss economy (coefficient colors) if climate policy follows the Paris Agreement. Marginal effects based on generalized ordered logit regression (with selectively relaxed parallel regression assumption) of policy preference on treatment dummy, interacted with three-categorical perceived burden extent within subgroups of implementing the Paris Agreement, under inclusion of controls for respondent demographics and attitudes. 95% confidence intervals shown. $N = 1,023$.

A.8 Supporting information for counterbalancing




Figure A.8: Marginal effects for changes in the probability of choosing one of the outcomes with the survey experimental treatment condition of defection by subgroups of climate-change attitudes (first component of PCA index; bottom 25% ‘low’, 25-75 percentile ‘medium’, 75-95 percentile ‘high’, top 5% ‘very high’). Marginal effects are based on ordered logit regression of policy preference on treatment dummy, climate-change attitude category, their interaction, and control variables (see Model 6 of Appendix Table A.7). 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors shown. $N = 2,068$. Results show that support for compliance with the Paris Agreement decreases irrespective of attitude subgroup, albeit from different baselines, and to different extents.

	DV: Extent of implementation of Paris agreement (1: strengthen; 2: implement as is; 3: weaken; 4: stop implementing; 5: retreat from Paris)											
	(1) Paris extraction	(2) Paris extraction	(3) Paris extraction	(4) Paris extraction	(5) Paris extraction	(6) Paris extraction	(7) Paris extraction	(8) Paris extraction	(9) Paris extraction	(10) Paris extraction	(11) Paris extraction	(12) Paris extraction
main	1.110** (0.177)	1.124** (0.220)	1.117** (0.222)	1.140** (0.233)	1.201** (0.225)	1.224** (0.244)	0.524** (0.0791)	0.489** (0.0851)	0.420** (0.0832)	0.438** (0.0881)	0.459** (0.0861)	0.567** (0.0823)
large polluters: defect	-1.626** (0.168)	-0.932** (0.209)	-0.952** (0.210)	-0.796** (0.226)	-0.852** (0.216)	-0.690** (0.240)	-0.537** (0.0553)	-0.270** (0.0627)	-0.273** (0.0607)	-0.221** (0.0653)	-0.252** (0.0629)	-0.350** (0.0604)
medium	-2.354** (0.196)	-1.353** (0.258)	-1.378** (0.261)	-1.180** (0.285)	-1.178** (0.268)	-0.858** (0.302)	-0.741** (0.0620)	-0.352** (0.0780)	-0.358** (0.0763)	-0.293** (0.0831)	-0.308** (0.0791)	-0.461** (0.0715)
very high	-2.770** (0.281)	-1.642** (0.342)	-1.601** (0.347)	-1.457** (0.380)	-1.415** (0.369)	-1.012** (0.417)	-0.869** (0.0801)	-0.431** (0.0889)	-0.421** (0.0894)	-0.353** (0.107)	-0.363** (0.103)	-0.507** (0.100)
large polluters: defect × medium	0.143 (0.211)	0.123 (0.268)	0.178 (0.270)	0.168 (0.286)	0.167 (0.277)	0.044 (0.300)	-0.148* (0.0866)	-0.0750 (0.0988)	-0.0523 (0.0970)	-0.0508 (0.104)	-0.0599 (0.100)	-0.178* (0.0918)
large polluters: defect × high	0.127 (0.243)	0.140 (0.342)	0.119 (0.348)	0.365 (0.368)	0.0124 (0.350)	-0.0297 (0.385)	-0.174* (0.0941)	-0.0615 (0.122)	-0.0598 (0.121)	-0.0169 (0.128)	-0.0909 (0.123)	-0.233* (0.0991)
large polluters: defect × very high	-0.330 (0.361)	-0.325 (0.451)	-0.379 (0.459)	-0.221 (0.504)	-0.314 (0.478)	-0.432 (0.526)	-0.329** (0.116)	-0.197 (0.148)	-0.207 (0.147)	-0.168 (0.160)	-0.178 (0.152)	-0.358** (0.128)
climate change belief (PCA)		-0.375** (0.0668)	-0.391** (0.0698)	-0.335** (0.0761)	-0.366** (0.0723)	-0.378** (0.0797)	-0.134** (0.0240)	-0.138** (0.0236)	-0.116** (0.0257)	-0.122** (0.0239)	-0.122** (0.0253)	-0.358** (0.0572)
large polluters: defect × climate change belief (PCA)		-0.00086 (0.0919)	-0.0182 (0.0933)	-0.0083 (0.102)	0.0105 (0.0970)	0.00718 (0.105)						
male		0.268** (0.0821)			0.161 (0.107)		0.107** (0.0277)					0.0745* (0.0342)
age: 30-44		0.225 (0.148)			0.0863 (0.199)		0.0813* (0.0485)					0.0308 (0.0629)
age: 45-59		0.550** (0.155)			0.353* (0.192)		0.172** (0.0446)					0.114* (0.0619)
age: 60-74		0.503** (0.140)			0.222 (0.200)		0.145** (0.0461)					0.120* (0.0651)
age: 75+		0.407* (0.174)			0.284 (0.230)		0.0941 (0.0587)					0.127* (0.0769)
language: French		0.0231 (0.158)			0.0364 (0.188)		0.00363 (0.0530)					-0.0147 (0.0611)
language: Italian		-0.120 (0.296)			0.0793 (0.388)		-0.0561 (0.112)					-0.01480 (0.133)
Espace Mittelland		0.0865 (0.164)			0.217 (0.199)		0.0304 (0.0545)					0.0678 (0.0639)
Nordwestschweiz		0.285 (0.203)			0.419* (0.241)		0.100 (0.0684)					0.124 (0.0781)
Zürich		0.00243 (0.200)			-0.0127 (0.234)		-0.00687 (0.0655)					0.000878 (0.0732)
Ostschweiz		0.343* (0.209)			0.349 (0.342)		0.115 (0.0717)					0.108 (0.0795)
Zentralschweiz		0.247 (0.214)			0.295 (0.249)		0.0790 (0.0733)					0.0650 (0.0817)
Tessin		0.518 (0.330)			0.528 (0.420)		0.215* (0.118)					0.203 (0.137)
economic outlook (egotropic)			-0.0691 (0.0619)			-0.0465 (0.0626)			-0.0291 (0.0210)			-0.0807 (0.0280)
economic outlook (sociotropic)			-0.139* (0.0687)			-0.131 (0.0834)			-0.0567* (0.0241)			-0.0662* (0.0289)
inc.: 2-4000			0.251* (0.130)			0.00498 (0.105)			0.0042* (0.0432)			0.0148 (0.0541)
inc.: 4-6000			0.235* (0.124)			-0.118 (0.161)			0.0807* (0.0413)			-0.0370 (0.0534)
inc.: 6-8000			0.275* (0.137)			-0.00199 (0.177)			0.0810* (0.0451)			-0.0188 (0.0576)
inc.: 8-10000			0.409** (0.184)			0.4091 (0.228)			0.385** (0.0633)			0.0448 (0.0763)
inc.: 10-12000			0.713** (0.208)			0.228 (0.264)			0.257** (0.0741)			0.0805 (0.0879)
inc.: 12-14000			0.468 (0.328)			0.103 (0.361)			0.223* (0.118)			0.0643 (0.132)
inc.: 14000+			0.458* (0.214)			-0.0911 (0.262)			0.139* (0.0734)			-0.0267 (0.0877)
efficacy (PCA)				0.150** (0.0337)		0.138** (0.0360)				0.0561** (0.0117)		0.0545** (0.0124)
risk aversion (5-point)			-0.0325 (0.0509)			-0.0470 (0.0555)			-0.00569 (0.0172)			-0.00157 (0.0186)
political trust (PCA)			-0.0539** (0.0205)			-0.0452* (0.0225)			-0.0236* (0.00727)			-0.0202* (0.00795)
future orientation (PCA)			0.116** (0.0316)			0.102** (0.0338)			0.0354** (0.0115)			0.0498** (0.0120)
fairness expectation (5-point)				-0.0818* (0.0488)		-0.0678 (0.0545)				-0.0334* (0.0170)		-0.0290 (0.0184)
left-right (5-point)-2					0.344* (0.150)		0.403* (0.175)				0.0992* (0.0410)	0.123** (0.0472)
left-right (5-point)-3					0.493** (0.154)		0.329* (0.177)				0.148** (0.0438)	0.114* (0.0496)
left-right (5-point)-4					0.954** (0.160)		0.795** (0.185)				0.298** (0.0469)	0.257** (0.0542)
left-right (5-point)-5					1.211** (0.238)		0.841** (0.265)				0.462** (0.0840)	0.394** (0.0945)
Constant							2.396** (0.0505)	1.844** (0.0904)	2.242** (0.104)	2.183** (0.0961)	1.865** (0.0641)	2.063** (0.185)
/												
cut1	-2.443** (0.157)	-1.194** (0.276)	-2.279** (0.321)	-2.230** (0.296)	-1.231** (0.225)	-1.550** (0.558)						
cut2	1.015** (0.137)	2.387** (0.275)	1.323** (0.312)	1.419** (0.388)	2.403** (0.221)	2.200** (0.557)						
cut3	2.304** (0.149)	3.820** (0.282)	2.766** (0.318)	2.309** (0.297)	3.873** (0.231)	3.756** (0.561)						
cut4	3.370** (0.176)	4.851** (0.297)	3.826** (0.336)	3.981** (0.314)	4.929** (0.250)	4.860** (0.578)						
Observations	2675	2664	2612	2209	2456	2011	2675	2664	2612	2209	2456	2011

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.7: Regression of defection treatment indicator, four-categorical indicator for climate change preferences, their interaction, with and without inclusion of additional controls (as indicated) on implementation ambition of Paris Agreement (5-point scale from strengthen to retract). Models 1-6 draw on ordinal logistic regression; models 7-12 draw on linear regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

A.9 Differentiating climate change concern and concern for redistribution

Given the interaction effects I report rely on self-reported measures of climate change policy attitudes and concerns for ego- and sociotropic redistribution, one may plausibly worry that these attributes move together. Then, the models might simply capture an overall underlying attitude structure with both. An alternative interpretation of the results then might be that stronger marginal effects for defection both among respondents exhibiting low climate change concern and among respondents reporting high distributional burden stem from subsamples who just ‘do not like or support climate policies’. Under the defection treatment, they might feel they have more justification and fewer negative consequences for their original policy preference.

To disentangle these concerns as best as I can given our correlational design for moderation hypotheses, I conduct a PCA analysis drawing on four vectors of variables: perceived egotropic and perceived sociotropic burden if Switzerland implements its Paris targets¹¹; the economic outlook and income measures; the environmental and climate attitudes measures as well as political ideology; the measures for general worldviews. All these measures are from the Swiss Environmental Panel wave 1.

The PCA yields five dimensions (based on the Kaiser criterion), explaining 54% of the original variance. Appendix Table A.8 presents correlations between input variables and dimensions after orthogonal rotation.

	e(r.L)				
	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5
sociotropic burden (1 low, 5 high)	-.0264762	-.0716044	.6480668	.0766012	-.169479
egotropic burden (1 high, 3 low)	-.0352158	-.0732365	-.5965581	.1316271	-.0297321
personal econ. outlook (1 bad, 5 good)	.0508133	.0234719	-.0895539	.7151099	-.1937425
country econ. outlook (1 bad, 5 good)	-.111828	.2629279	.1791241	.4556061	.1898551
personal income (1 low, 8 high)	.0001879	.072689	-.1024156	-.0970308	.7640499
environm. concern index	.5079448	-.0784795	.0422558	.0091059	-.065736
climate change belief index	.4459782	.0317779	-.0130993	-.030716	-.0139637
climate change saliency (0 no, 1 yes)	.343364	.009688	.0451515	.1185092	.0400577
env. NGO member (0 no, 1 pass., 2 act.)	.252544	-.1372962	.1995918	-.1528461	.2853988
political ideology (1 left, 5 right)	-.2899445	-.1616958	-.1412314	.1076573	.1614449
state intervention index	-.2205097	-.4192055	.0940743	-.0051323	.1249564
risk aversion (1 loving, 5 averse)	-.0000853	-.348432	.1871939	.4113616	.360392
trust in state index	-.0321999	.6430603	-.0115692	.0888562	.1120394
future orientation index	-.4449603	-.0133036	.1263752	-.1149624	-.1602079
fairness belief (1 low, 5 high)	-.1125644	.3891573	.2230662	-.0897394	.1252431

Table A.8: Factor loadings after rotation, retaining five dimensions (based on Kaiser criterion).

¹¹ This implies that I only rely on the random subsample that saw this treatment.

Component 1 mainly loads on environmental and climate attitudes as well as ideology and future orientation. Component 2 mainly loads on general worldviews such as trust in the state, state intervention, and fairness. Component 3 mainly loads on perceived ego- and sociotropic burden. Component 4 mainly loads on personal and country economic outlook. Component 5 mainly loads on personal income.

I am confident this approach allows me to separate underlying attitude structures of respondents *as far as I capture them with the included measures*. Of particular interest are components 1 (dimension capturing climate change belief) and component 3 (dimension capturing ego- and sociotropic burden perceptions).

I proceed with these five dimensions by coding categorical indicators for respondents being in the first quartile ('low'), 25-75% percentile ('medium'), and fourth quartile ('high') on each dimension.¹² Drawing on ordinal logistic regression, I then regress Paris agreement policy preferences on all five dimensions and their interaction with the defection treatment simultaneously.¹³

Appendix Figure A.9 presents marginal means for the defection treatment by subgroups for each dimension.




Figure A.9: Marginal means from ordered logistic regression for the defection treatment by subgroups for each dimension

Importantly, results for dimension 1 (climate policy attitudes) and dimension 3 (perceived burden) mirror the patterns as reported in the main manuscript: First, defection

¹² The perceived burden dimensions are reversed such that high equals high perceived burden.

¹³ Regressions also include controls for sociodemographics. Inclusion or exclusion does not affect results.

occurs in all subgroups. Second, respondents with low climate policy attitudes *as well as* respondents with high perceived burden are more likely to switch from strengthening/implementation to weakening/stopping/retracting. Respondents with high climate policy attitudes *as well as* respondents with low perceived burden are more likely to switch from strengthening to implementation as is, with lower increases in support for weakening/stopping/retracting. Note that these changes are more pronounced for the climate attitude groups compared to the perceived burden groups (while scales are not directly comparable).

Overall, all groups shift towards less implementation, but this shift is more pronounced among respondents with low climate policy attitudes and high perceived burden.

This finding mirrors the dimension mainly capturing high (vs. low) trust/other world-views. The dimensions mainly capturing the general economic outlook and income show no interaction effects.

A.10 Relevance of baseline attitudes vs. treatment effect




Figure A.10: Difference in predicted support by treatment given baseline attitude, or by baseline attitude whether implementing the Paris Agreement burdens own household vs. not given treatment, i.e., linear combination of predicted outcome support probabilities. Baseline preferences economy is both harmed/benefits are omitted. Predictions derived from the ordered logit model as used in Figure 3. Policy options weaken, stop, and retract are collapsed.




Figure A.11: Difference in predicted support by treatment given baseline attitude, or by baseline attitude whether implementing the Paris Agreement harms vs. benefits the economy given treatment, i.e., linear combination of predicted outcome support probabilities. Baseline preferences economy is both harmed/benefits are omitted. Predictions derived from the ordered logit model as used in Figure 3. Policy options weaken, stop, and retract are collapsed.




Figure A.12: Predicted support for population share in support of policy options. Policy options weaken, stop, and retract are collapsed. Predictions derived from the ordered logit model as used in Figure 3. Predictions calculated while extrapolating over the share of the population who believe the economy is harmed by Paris Agreement implementation (x-axis values), distributing evenly over the share who believe it benefits/both.

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B.1 Translated questionnaire of Swiss Environmental Panel Wave 2

Basis for translation: German print version; available in German, French, and Italian from <https://doi.org/10.23662/FORS-DS-1220-2>. Experimentally varied components are indicated in *italics*.

Swiss Environmental Panel

Welcome to the survey!

Is the letter accompanying the questionnaire addressed to you personally?

If not → Please pass the questionnaire to the person to whom the letter is addressed.

It is important to us that exactly this person takes part in the survey.

Thank you very much!

Please complete the questionnaire on your own, without asking other people for advice.

Information about yourself

When were you born?

Please enter your year of birth: _____

Your gender?

☐ Woman

☐ Man

Your views on climate and the environment

1. *Experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups.* **T1:** How do you assess the following statements? **T2:** When you think about the temperatures and precipitation we have had in Switzerland so far this year, how do you assess the following statements?

	strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	partly agree	somewhat agree	strongly agree	don't know
Global climate warming is mainly caused by humans.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Global climate warming poses a major problem for humanity.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
In Switzerland, we will be able to adapt to climate change without having to accept a deterioration in our quality of life.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
I do not believe that global climate warming is actually taking place.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

2. Have you ever heard or read about the Paris Climate Agreement?

- ☐ Yes → continue with Question 3
☐ No → continue with Question 4
☐ Not sure → continue with Question 3

3. Would you be able to explain in broad terms to another person what the Paris Climate Agreement is about?

- ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure

4. Based on what you know about this topic: how much do global greenhouse gas emissions (CO₂, methane, etc.) produced by humanity need to be reduced overall in the period from 2010 to 2050 so that the average temperature on Earth does not increase by more than two degrees? Please indicate your assessment by ticking a point on the scale.

Emissions need not be reduced at all 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
70% 80% 90% 100% Emissions need to be fully reduced

- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

5. In your opinion, how have greenhouse gas emissions (CO₂, methane, etc.) developed in the following sectors in Switzerland since 1990?

	increased	stayed the same	decreased	don't know
Industry	☐	☐	☐	☐
Buildings	☐	☐	☐	☐
Transport	☐	☐	☐	☐
Agriculture	☐	☐	☐	☐
Waste	☐	☐	☐	☐

Information: In the Paris Climate Agreement, concluded at the end of 2015, most countries of the world committed themselves to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions enough so that global warming does not exceed two degrees Celsius. To further reduce the risk of severe damage from climate change, additional efforts are to be undertaken to limit warming to a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius.

The Paris Climate Agreement obliges all member states to set, every five years and on their own initiative, a national greenhouse-gas reduction target and to explain which measures will be used to implement it. Target achievement is reviewed internationally.

Experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, four groups.

T1: empty

T2: In its latest world climate report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC), a body of globally recognized climate scientists, calculated targets for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions compared to the reference year 2010. In order to meet the 2-degree target, global emissions must be reduced by a total of 50%, i.e., to zero, by 2050.

T3: In its latest world climate report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a body of globally recognized climate scientists, calculated targets for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions compared to the reference year 2010. In order to meet the 1.5 degree target, global emissions must be reduced by a total of 100%, i.e. to zero, by 2050.

T4: In its latest world climate report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a body of globally recognized climate scientists, calculated targets for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions compared to the reference year 2010. To meet the 2-degree target, global emissions must be reduced by a total of 50% by 2050. This can only be achieved if industrialized countries such as Switzerland reduce their emissions by 80-90% by 2050.

We would now like to ask for your opinion on the Paris Climate Agreement:

6. From your personal perspective, does the target to which Switzerland committed itself under the Paris Climate Agreement (50% reduction of emissions by 2030, at least 70% by 2050) go too far, not far enough, or is it just right?

- ☐ Much too far
- ☐ Somewhat too far
- ☐ Just right
- ☐ Somewhat not far enough
- ☐ Much not far enough
- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

Information: A new citizens' movement wants to enshrine the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement in the Swiss Federal Constitution through the so-called "Glacier Initiative". Recently, it launched this popular initiative. Switzerland would thereby commit itself to reducing its CO₂ emissions to zero by 2050.

By 2050, the use of petroleum, natural gas, and coal would therefore be prohibited. Two exceptions to the ban are envisaged: if it is technically impossible otherwise, or if a method were developed to safely store CO₂ underground so that it does not enter the atmosphere. Disadvantages incurred by domestic companies compared to foreign competitors would be compensated for.

The collection of signatures is planned for 2019.

7. If you were asked today to sign the "Glacier Initiative", would you do so?

- ☐ Yes, I would sign.
- ☐ No, I would not sign.
- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

8. On a scale from 1 (completely against) to 7 (completely in favor), how strongly are you for or against the “Glacier Initiative”?

Completely against 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely in favor
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐

9. In your view, would it benefit or harm the Swiss economy overall if Switzerland [*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1: implements T2: does not implement*] its target under the Paris Climate Agreement (50% reduction of emissions by 2030, at least 70% by 2050)?

- ☐ Strongly benefit
- ☐ Somewhat benefit
- ☐ Partly, partly
- ☐ Somewhat harm
- ☐ Strongly harm
- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

10. Do you think that Switzerland [*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1: can T2: will*] achieve the goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 and at least 70% by 2050?

- ☐ Certainly achieve
- ☐ Probably achieve
- ☐ Possibly achieve
- ☐ Probably not achieve
- ☐ Certainly not achieve
- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

11. In your opinion, what could prevent the achievement of the target?

	strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	partly agree	somewhat agree	strongly agree	don't know
There is a lack of political will.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Industry is not ready to implement new technical solutions.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Climate-damaging economic sectors are not willing to forego profits in favor of climate protection if necessary.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
People are not willing to change their individual behavior – for example, in the areas of mobility, air travel, and nutrition.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Corresponding measures would be too expensive.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The economy would suffer too much damage.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Our lifestyle would be too strongly restricted.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
The disadvantages in international competition would be too great.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

12. What international consequences would you expect or not expect if Switzerland [*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1: does T2: does not*] reach the goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 and at least 70% by 2050?

	certainly not occur	probably not occur	possibly occur	probably occur	certainly occur	don't know
Switzerland's reputation in the world would suffer.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other countries would restrict their trade with Switzerland (trade sanctions).	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other countries would cooperate less with Switzerland in international bodies.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Other countries would also not reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

13. If it turns out in a few years that large countries such as China, India, and the USA [*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1:*

will achieve *T2*: will not achieve] their announced greenhouse gas reduction targets, what do you think Switzerland should do?

With regard to its own planned measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 and at least 70% by 2050, Switzerland should...

- ☐ further enhance them
- ☐ continue to fully implement them
- ☐ implement them in a weakened form
- ☐ stop them, but continue to participate in the Paris Climate Agreement
- ☐ stop them and withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement
- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

14. The goals of the Paris Climate Agreement can only be achieved if we develop and deploy new technologies on a large scale that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and store them underground. What is your personal opinion on this statement?

	strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	partly agree	somewhat agree	strongly agree	don't know
With this statement, I...	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

15. Do you think that measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Switzerland by 50% by 2030 will lead to an increase or decrease in gasoline, diesel, heating oil, and gas prices in Switzerland?

- ☐ Strong increase
- ☐ Slight increase
- ☐ Unchanged
- ☐ Slight decrease
- ☐ Strong decrease
- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

16. Do you think that measures to reduce Swiss greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 will cause higher, the same, or lower costs for your household than for the average Swiss household?

- ☐ Higher costs
- ☐ Same costs
- ☐ Lower costs
- ☐ Don't know / no opinion

17. Through the development and deployment of new technologies, Switzerland will succeed in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 50% by 2030 and at least 70% by 2050, without the quality of life of the Swiss population

suffering.

	strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	partly agree	somewhat agree	strongly agree	don't know
With this statement, I...	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

18. Switzerland's greenhouse gas emissions can only be reduced by 50% by 2030 and at least 70% by 2050 if economic growth and consumption are strongly restricted.

	strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	partly agree	somewhat agree	strongly agree	don't know
With this statement, I...	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Information: The Paris Climate Agreement allows all member countries two ways to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. On the one hand, they can reduce their emissions domestically. On the other hand, emitters can also finance projects abroad to reduce emissions there (so-called CO₂ compensation). Such a reduction abroad is then counted as if it had been carried out domestically.

A Swiss company could therefore, instead of reducing emissions in Switzerland itself, support a project abroad and reduce emissions there by the same amount. Examples include projects to reforest forests or to convert coal-fired power plants abroad.

19. Could you tell us what you think about the compensation for greenhouse gases abroad?

I consider these CO₂ compensation activities abroad to be...

	strongly disagree	somewhat disagree	partly agree	somewhat agree	strongly agree	don't know
...morally acceptable.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...good for Switzerland's economy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...good for other countries where such compensation projects take place.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...good for achieving Switzerland's reduction targets.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
...good for achieving global climate targets.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

20. If there were a vote today on what share of its commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions Switzerland can fulfill abroad: what maximum share abroad would you support?

All reductions in Switzerland 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

80% 90% 100% All reductions abroad

☐ Don't know / no opinion

Information: Concrete measures to halve Swiss greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 are to be regulated by a new “CO₂ law”. Parliament is debating this intensively. The draft law provides for a strong reduction of emissions in the transport sector. An open point of discussion is emissions from air travel, because these have not yet been regulated.

[*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1: empty T2:* Air travel is responsible for around 15% of Switzerland's total greenhouse gas emissions.] It has therefore been proposed to introduce an air ticket levy in order to make flying more expensive and thereby reduce the extent of air travel and its greenhouse gas emissions.

[*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1: empty T2:* This proposal for an airline ticket tax has received support from both conservative and left-wing green circles.] [*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1: empty T2:* Several European countries have already introduced such an airline ticket tax.] [*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, two groups T1:* Specifically, the following levy has been proposed:

Fr. 12.– for short-haul flights (flight time up to 2.5 hours)

Fr. 30.– for medium-haul flights (flight time from 2.5 to 6 hours)

Fr. 50.– for long-haul flights (flight time from 6 hours)

T2: Specifically, the following levy has been proposed:

Fr. 50.– for short-haul flights (flight time up to 2.5 hours)

Fr. 120.– for medium-haul flights (flight time from 2.5 to 6 hours)

Fr. 200.– for long-haul flights (flight time from 6 hours).] [*experimentally varied, uniformly randomized, three groups T1: empty T2:* The revenue from this tax, several hundred million Swiss francs per year, would be invested in Switzerland for climate change adaptation measures, e.g. in agriculture and in regions of the country that are increasingly exposed to flooding or landslides. *T3:* The revenue from this tax, several hundred million Swiss francs per year, would be used in Switzerland to promote renewable energies (e.g. solar power and wind power).]

21. If you had to vote today in a referendum on the new CO₂ law that includes such an air ticket levy, how would you decide?

☐ Accept the law

☐ Reject the law

☐ Don't know / no opinion

22. On a scale from 1 (completely against) to 7 (completely in favor), how strongly are you for or against this law?

Completely against 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely in favor

□ □ □ □ □ □ □

Conclusion

Do you have any suggestions or comments on the survey topic or the questionnaire? If so, please note them here.

Thank you very much for your participation!