Supplementary Material to "*Fascistville*: Mussolini's New Towns and the Persistence of Neo-Fascism"

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For Online Publication

Appendix A Ancillary Figures

Figure A1: Maps of the New Towns by Year



(a) 1924



(b) 1931



(c) 1936



(d) 1940

Notes: The figures shows the location of the New Towns by the year in which constructions were initiated. Figure (a) displays the location of the New Towns in or before 1924. Figure (b) displays the location of the New Towns initiated in or before 1931. Figure (c) displays the location of the New Towns initiated in or before 1936. Figure (d) displays the location of the New Towns initiated in or before 1940. Data on the construction years are available for 83% of the New Towns.

Figure A2: The Location of the New Towns Planned and not Built



Notes: The figure shows a map of the New Towns planned and not built along with all the other New Towns.

Figure A3: Construction of the New Towns by Year



(a) Initiated New Towns



(b) Completed New Towns

Notes: Figure (a) displays the cumulative number of New Towns initiated in a given year. Figure (b) displays the cumulative number of New Towns completed in a given year. Data on the construction years are available for 83% of the New Towns.

Figure A4: Support for the Neo-fascist Party in 1992 by distance to the New Towns



Notes: The top panel shows the share of votes for the neo-fascist party (MSI) in 1992 for different distance intervals to the nearest New Town. The 0-5km intervals includes the municipalities containing the New Towns. The bottom panel indicates the number of municipalities in each distance intervals to the nearest New Towns. In some cases more New Towns are contained within the same municipality.

Figure A5: Persistence in the Support for Fascism



Notes: The figures show binned scatter plots (30 equally-sized bins) of the electoral support for Fascist Party in 1924 versus the one in 1921. While the left panel employs all the available data, the right panel excludes municipalities that exhibited no votes for the Fascist Party in 1921.

Figure A6: Persistence in the Support for Fascism



Notes: The figure shows the striking positive correlation between the support for Neo-Fascism in 1953 and for Fascism in 1924 across the municipalities that exhibited no votes for the Fascists in 1921 and thus were presumably more likely to be exposed to the Fascist intimidation in the 1924 elections.

Figure A7: The Timing of the Treatment: Robustness

(a) Placebo: Share of Votes for the Neo-fascist Party in 1953



(b) Placebo: Share of Votes for the Neo-fascist Party in 1992



Notes: Each figure shows the estimated coefficients from a regression of the share of votes for the neo-fascist party in 1953 (top panel) and in 1993 on indicator variables that take value one if the construction of a New Town was initiated within 30 kilometers in each year. The figures show the absence of a positive differences in the outcome between the municipalities treated in 1924 or before and those treated right after.

Figure A8: Mussolini's New Towns and the Electoral Support for the Fascist Party in 1924



(a) *Fascist Votes and the New Towns* (b) *Fascist Votes by Distance from the New Towns*

Notes: Panel (a) shows a map of the share of votes for the Fascist Party in 1924 and the location of the Fascist New Towns. Panel (b) shows a histogram of the share of votes for the Fascist Party in 1924 for different distance intervals to the nearest New Town.

Figure A9: The New Towns and the Emergence of the Fascist Party

(a)



(b)



(c)



Notes: The figures show binned scatter plots (100 equal-sized bins). Panel (a) plots the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921 (before the New Towns) against the log distance to the closest New Towns. Panel (b) plots the electoral support in 1924 (during New Town construction) against the log distance to the closest New Towns. Panel (c) plots the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1924 against the log distance to the closest New Town initiated in or before 1924. Distance variables are standardized. The underlying regression takes into account population in 1921 (in logs), the presence of malaria, market access controls, and geographic controls.

Figure A10: Absence of a Link between the New Towns and Voter Turnout



Notes: The figure shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a set of regressions of the electoral turnout in each year on the log of the distance to the New Towns. All regressions include baseline controls.

Figure A11: The Choice of the 30-Kilometers Cutoff



Notes: The figure depicts the estimated t-statistics from estimating equation 2 with different cutoffs. The figure shows that the t-statistic is maximized when the model is estimated with a 30-kilometers cutoff. Estimates are given by the coefficient of interest and standard errors reported in Table B19.

Figure A12: The Evolution of the Support for Fascism and the New Towns

(a) Dummy if New Towns within 10 Kilometers



(b) Dummy if New Towns within 20 Kilometers



(c) Dummy if New Towns within 30 Kilometers



(d) Ln Distance to the Closest New Town



Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficients and 90% confidence intervals, from a set of regressions of the electoral support for the neo-fascist party on a dummy that takes value 1 if a New Town is within 10, 20, or 30 kilometers in panels a), b), and c). Panel d) uses as a variable of interest log-distance to the closest New Towns. Controls include malaria, market access, and agricultural suitability. See Online Appendix E and main text for variables definition and sources.

Figure A13: New Towns Catchment Area and Elevation



Notes: The map shows the absence of a discontinuous change in elevation at the study border. It also shows that other border segments overlap with geographic features and thus are not suitable for a spatial regression discontinuity design.

Figure A14: Absence of Discontinuity in the Density of Observations at the Study Border



Notes: The figure shows the absence of a discrete change in the density of observations across the study border. While this is evidenced by the overlap of the 95% confidence intervals at the border, I also perform a formal test of this hypothesis which provides a t-statistic of 1.2976 and a p-value of 0.1944. Thus, the test rejects the null hypothesis of a discrete change in the density of the number of observations at the study border.

Figure A15: Absence of Discontinuity in Presence of Malaria Swamps at the Study Border



Notes: The figure shows that the dummy taking value one if the municipality was affected by malaria in 1870 takes value zero around the discontinuity. Such a finding suggests that, even if the presence of malarial swamps was the major determinant of the location of the New Towns, it was not a determinant of the location of the study border of the catchment. In turn, strongly supporting the spatial RD identification assumption.

Figure A16: Spatial Regression Discontinuity Estimates by Election



Notes: The figure shows the estimated coefficients and 90% confidence intervals from a set of spatial regression discontinuity regressions employing as cutoff the study border of the New Towns catchment area and as outcomes the share of votes for the neo-fascist party in each elections.

Figure A17: *The New Towns and the Neo-fascist Party: Regression Discontinuity Plots:*

(a) *Votes Share in 1992*



(b) *Votes Share in 1987*



(c) *Votes Share in 1983*



(d) *Votes Share in 1979*



(e) *Votes Share in 1968*



(f) *Votes Share in 1958*



Notes: The figures show the discontinuity in the electoral support for the neo-fascist party at the border of the New Towns catchment over several elections. The x-axis depicts distance to the cutoff in kilometers with positive numbers indicating distance to the study border within the catchment and negative numbers indicating distance to the study border outside the catchment. For ease of visualization and to be consistent with the empirical analysis, plots are drawn within a small distance (forty kilometers) to the cutoff.

Figure A18: Spatial Regression Discontinuity Estimates by Election: Outliers Analysis

(a) *Full Sample*



(b) *Excluding Above 99th Percentile*



(c) *Excluding Above 98th Percentile*



(d) *Excluding Above 96th Percentile*



Notes: The figures show the estimated coefficients and 90% confidence intervals from a set of spatial regression discontinuity regression the share of votes for the neo-fascist party across the study border of the New Towns catchment area with different samples. Panel (a) employs the whole sample. Panel (b) excludes observations above the 99th percentile of the distribution of vote shares. Panel (c) excludes observations above the 98th percentile. Panel (d) excludes observations above the 96th percentile. A comparison of the figures shows that the estimated coefficients for several years become significant once outliers are removed. Panel (b) shows that just by excluding observations above the 99th percentile of the distribution of vote shares the coefficients for 1958 and 1979 become statistically significant. Panel (c) shows that by excluding observations above the 98th percentile the estimated coefficient for 1972 becomes statistically significant. Panel (d) shows that by excluding observations above the 96th percentile the coefficient for 1968 becomes statistically significant. Given that year-to-year oscillations in voting outcomes are not the focus of this study, excluding outliers in those years is appropriate. Therefore, for the years 1953 and 1979, I account for outliers by excluding observations above the 99th percentile. For 1972 and 1968, I exclude respectively observations above the 98th and 96th percentile.

Figure A19: Malarial Swamps in 1870 and the Location of the Fascist New Towns



Notes: The map shows that the location of the New Towns is explained mainly by the presence of malarial swamps.

Appendix B Ancillary Tables and Robustness

Table B1: Number and Shares on votes in 1921 by distance to the New Towns

	$\leq 5KM$	$\leq 10KM$	$\leq 20KM$	$\leq 30KM$
tot votes	137939	288047	704051	1118289
votes share (%)	3	7	16	26
municip. share (%)	1	4	13	24

Notes: The table shows that in the 1921 elections there was a substantial share of votes that were casted in the vicinity of the New Towns. Row 1 reports the total number of votes in the 1921 elections in the municipalities within a given distance (expressed in column headings) by the New Towns. Row 2 reports the share of votes in those municipalities and row 3 reports the share of municipalities by distance cutoff for which the 1921 electoral data are available.

Table B2: Balance Checks: Spatial RDD.

	RD Coefficient	Conventional St. Err.	Conventional P-value	Robust P-value
Population 1921	2942.681	1837.966	.109	.257
Population 1936	2547.18	1944.215	.19	.391
Suitability for Wheat	-26.625	108.963	.807	.864
Caloric Suitability Index	-.061	.109	.576	.971
Average Elevation	-79.464	48.679	.103	.357
Standard Dev. Elevation	-17.127	16.152	.289	.474
Distance to Waterways	1.833	3.551	.606	.82
Malaria Suitability	.012	.023	.599	.844

Notes: Observations are at the municipality level. The table supports the identification assumption of the spatial RD design by showing that geographic and socioeconomic variables measured before the treatment vary smoothly at the study border. The fourth and fifth columns provide the conventional and bias-robust P-values as per Calonico et al. (2014). Estimates are calculated with the optimal bandwidth.

Table B3: New Towns and Neo-fascist Associations

Dependent Variables: Neo-fascist Headquarter within				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	5 KM	10 KM	20 KM	
NT within 10 KM	-0.0081	0.0347	0.0806	
	[0.014]	[0.046]	[0.055]	
Ln (Dist. to NT)				-0.0439**
				[0.021]
Observations	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438
Adjusted R-squared	0.065	0.107	0.258	0.262

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. The table shows that, while the Neo-fascist headquarters are not located in the former New Towns, they are located in their proximity. The outcome is a dummy taking value one if a headquarter of a Neo-fascist association (*Casapound*) is within the distance indicated in column heading. Each regression includes malaria controls, market access controls, and the log of population in 2001. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B4: New Towns and Political Attitudes. Individual-Level Analysis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Stronger Leader	Immigrants are a Threat to Identity/Culture	Immigrants are a Threat to Employment
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.0463***	-0.0681***	-0.0788***
	[0.015]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of respondents	5484	5484	5484
# of municipalities	1513	1513	1513
Adjusted R-squared	0.0566	0.0771	0.0852

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The surveys were conducted in 2001 and 2008. The coefficients are the average marginal effects from an OLS regression weighted using survey weights. Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest provincial capital, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, and a measure of market access in 1921. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self-employment, and atypical employment. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets. For specifications with control variables see Online Appendix Table B15.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B5: The Timing of the New Towns and Electoral Outcomes

Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party:							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	1921	1924					
	Placebo					*Placebo*	*Placebo*
Ln (Dist to NT)	0.2784***	-0.2402***					-0.2219***
	[0.093]	[0.077]					[0.073]
Ln (Dist. to NT until 1924)			-0.2858***	-0.2375***	-0.1504*		
			[0.078]	[0.080]	[0.083]		
Ln (Dist. to NT after 1924)				-0.1122	0.0232		
				[0.082]	[0.080]		
Ln (Dist to NT Unknown Year)					-0.3467***		
					[0.101]		
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT)						-0.1199	-0.0722
						[0.080]	[0.068]
Observations	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057
Adjusted R-squared	0.070	0.059	0.099	0.108	0.155	0.017	0.064

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B6: Internal Norms versus External Factors

Dependent Variable: Ever voted for the neo-fascist party (2001)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Pr(Yes)	
Parental-based Ln(Avg Dist NT)	-0.3461***		-0.1672*
	[0.099]		[0.095]
Location-based Ln(Avg Dist NT)		-0.2626***	-0.1467*
		[0.058]	[0.086]
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	No	No	No
Other Individual Controls	No	No	No
Non Migrant Only	No	No	No
# of respondents	2728	2729	2728
# of municipalities	250	250	250
Pseudo R-squared	0.0405	0.0430	0.0449

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The displayed coefficients are estimated with a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. Parental-based Ln(Avg Dist NT) is the log of the average distance to the closest New Town in the region where the respondent's father was at the age of 14. Location-based Ln(Avg Dist NT) is the log of the average distance to the closest New Town in the region where the respondent is. To control for precision, the regressions also control for the standard deviation of the distance to the closest New Town in fathers region (column 1), respondent's region (column 2), or both (column 3). All other controls and sample used are explained in the notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B7: Vertical Transmission: Mediation Analysis

Dependent Variables: Ever voted for the Neo Fascist Party				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A:			
	Pr(Father=Yes)	Pr(Mother=Yes)	Pr(Either=Yes)	Pr(Both=Yes)
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.1102*	-0.1299*	-0.1078*	-0.1360*
	[0.060]	[0.071]	[0.059]	[0.073]
	Panel B: Prob(Child=Yes)			
Mediator Col Heading	1.5583***	1.4423***	1.4926***	1.5593***
	[0.143]	[0.199]	[0.150]	[0.192]
Total Effect Mediated	0.374	0.332	0.372	0.351

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The displayed coefficients are estimated with a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. Panel A uses as an outcome the one indicated in column heading. Panel B uses as an outcome the answer to the question whether the respondent has ever voted for the Neo-fascist party. All regressions exclude movers and include all the individual controls and the sample explained in the notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B8: The New Towns and the Electoral Support for the Fascist Party in 1924

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for the Neo-fascist party in 1992						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln (Dist. to Abandoned NT)	-0.2850***	-0.2338***	-0.2131***	-0.2346***	-0.2125***	-0.1676***
	[0.061]	[0.065]	[0.065]	[0.064]	[0.065]	[0.060]
Ln (Dist. to not Abandoned NT)						-0.1207**
						[0.049]
Observations	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438
Adjusted R-squared	0.081	0.099	0.124	0.128	0.137	0.145
Malaria Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B9: Robustness to Controlling for the Suitability for Malaria: Short-term Effect

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party in 1924						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	FP '24	FP '24	FP '24	FP '24	FP '24	FP '24
Ln (Dist. to NT until 1924)	-0.2858***	-0.3159***	-0.2676***	-0.2059*	-0.2365**	-0.2342**
	[0.078]	[0.075]	[0.090]	[0.111]	[0.108]	[0.107]
FP '21		0.1773***	0.1731***	0.1804***	0.1730***	0.1723***
		[0.061]	[0.058]	[0.058]	[0.056]	[0.055]
Observations	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057
Adjusted R-squared	0.099	0.132	0.151	0.162	0.175	0.175
Malaria Suitability	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Ln Population 1921	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B10: Robustness to Controlling for the Suitability for Malaria: Long-term Effect

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Neo FP '92	Neo FP '92	Neo FP '92	Neo FP '92	Neo FP '92	Neo FP '92
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.2663***	-0.1791***	-0.1847***	-0.1894***	-0.1665***	
	[0.050]	[0.058]	[0.053]	[0.053]	[0.056]	
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT)						0.1430**
						[0.066]
Observations	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438
Adjusted R-squared	0.067	0.098	0.119	0.122	0.129	0.130
Malaria Suitability	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B11: Mussolini's New Towns and the Emergence of the Neo-fascist Party

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1948						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.2319***	-0.1409***	-0.1361***	-0.1403***	-0.1404***	
	[0.027]	[0.036]	[0.037]	[0.034]	[0.035]	
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT)						0.0731**
						[0.032]
Observations	6,664	6,664	6,664	6,664	6,664	6,664
Adjusted R-squared	0.049	0.074	0.082	0.083	0.083	0.078
Malaria Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B12: Robustness to Taking into Account Spatial Correlation: Short-term Effect

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party in 1924						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln (Dist. to NT until 1924)	-0.2858***	-0.3159***	-0.2466**	-0.2488***	-0.2573***	-0.2517***
	[0.106]	[0.103]	[0.098]	[0.083]	[0.088]	[0.088]
FP '21		0.1773***	0.1761***	0.1720***	0.1667***	0.1660***
		[0.061]	[0.051]	[0.037]	[0.040]	[0.040]
Observations	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057	2,057
R-squared	0.099	0.133	0.164	0.168	0.178	0.180
Malaria Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Ln Population 1921	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Conley (1999)'s standard errors with a 100 km-distance cutoff in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B13: Robustness to Taking into Account Spatial Correlation: Long-term Effect

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.2664***	-0.2159***	-0.2013***	-0.2080***	-0.1773***	
	[0.060]	[0.072]	[0.064]	[0.066]	[0.067]	
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT)						0.1469*
						[0.089]
Observations	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438
R-squared	0.067	0.087	0.119	0.120	0.129	0.128
Malaria Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Conley (1999)'s standard errors with a 100 km-distance cutoff in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B14: New Towns and Preferences for Fascism: No Controls

Dependent Variable: Should Have the Right to Publicly Manifest (2004)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
		Other Groups						
	Fascists	Communists	Muslims	Homosexuals	Racists	Against the President	Against the Pope	Divide North from South
	-0.0325***	0.0099	-0.0029	0.0062	-0.0118	0.0116	-0.0143	0.0771***
	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.011]	[0.015]
# of respondents	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
# of municipalities	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240
Pseudo R-squared	0.401	0.431	0.376	0.367	0.353	0.422	0.449	0.284

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The coefficients displayed are the average marginal effects from a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. Each regression takes into account the answers for all the remaining groups and excludes other controls. See the main text and appendices for variable definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B15: New Towns and Political Attitudes. Individual-Level Analysis. Robustness to the Exclusion of Possibly Endogenous Control Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Stronger Leader	Immigrants are a Threat to Identity/Culture	Employment
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.0372***	-0.0490**	-0.0864***
	[0.013]	[0.023]	[0.022]
Municipality Controls	No	No	No
Individual Controls	No	No	No
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of respondents	5484	5484	5484
# of municipalities	1513	1513	1513
Adjusted R-squared	0.0170	0.00232	0.00727

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The surveys were conducted in 2001 and 2008. The coefficients are the average marginal effects from an OLS regression weighted using survey weights. The table shows robustness to a specification with no endogenous control variables. For specifications with control variables see Table B4. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B16: New Towns and Racial Resentment

Dependent Variable: Should Have the Right to Publicly Manifest (2004)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Communists	Muslims	Homosexuals	Racists	Against the President	Against the Pope	Divide North from South
Ln (Dist. to NT)	0.0074	-0.0022	0.0151	-0.0288**	0.0101	-0.0168	0.0575***
	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.016]
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migration FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of respondents	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455	1455
# of municipalities	240	240	240	240	240	240	240
Pseudo R-squared	0.384	0.388	0.410	0.310	0.449	0.471	0.284

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The displayed coefficients are the average marginal effects from a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the respondent is in the same region in which his or her father at the age of 14. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self-employed, and atypical job. Additional individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector in which his or her father was employed when the respondent was 14 years old, and a set of dummy for the sector in which the head of the household is employed. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B17: New Towns and the Persistence of Neo Fascism. Individual-Level Analysis.

Dependent Variable: Ever voted for the Neo Fascist Party				
	(1) Pr(Yes)	(2) Pr(Yes)	(3) Pr(Yes)	(4) Pr(Yes)
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.0269**	-0.0217*	-0.0230**	-0.0215*
	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Lived under Fascism		-0.0181		-0.0138
		[0.013]		[0.022]
Lived under Fascism		0.0685		0.0450
		[0.055]		[0.085]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × School-Age in Fascism			-0.0174	-0.0053
			[0.014]	[0.024]
School-Age in Fascism			0.0889*	0.0464
			[0.053]	[0.087]
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migration FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of respondents	2730	2730	2730	2730
# of municipalities	250	250	250	250
Pseudo R-squared	0.0461	0.0468	0.0471	0.0473

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The displayed coefficients are the average marginal effects from a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. The variable "Lived under Fascism" is a dummy taking value one if the respondent was born before the end of the Fascist Regime (= 1 for 951 respondents in the sample). The variable School-Age in Fascism is a dummy taking value one if the respondent was of school-age (age $\in [6, 13]$) during the Fascist Regime (= 1 for 613 respondents in the sample). Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the respondent is in the same region in which his or her father was at the age of 14. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self-employed, and atypical job. Additional individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector in which his or her father was employed when the respondent was 14 years old, and a set of dummy for the sector in which the head of the household is employed. The Neo Fascist Party took part to the elections for the last time in 1992, so the sample is restricted to those who had the right to vote in 1992. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B18: The Timing of the Treatment: Placebos

Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the (Neo) Fascist Party in the year:													
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
	Placebo		*Placebo*										
	1921	1924	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979	1983	1987	1992
$NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-24)}$	-0.5453**	0.6573***	-0.0419	-0.3086	-0.0192	0.2216	0.0904	0.4647	0.4324	0.4362	0.1691	-0.3119	0.0852
	[0.249]	[0.167]	[0.088]	[0.244]	[0.449]	[0.428]	[0.404]	[0.329]	[0.312]	[0.354]	[0.307]	[0.327]	[0.583]
Observations	2,264	2,264	2,125	2,120	2,127	2,124	2,257	2,259	2,262	2,257	2,261	2,259	2,263
Adjusted R-2	0.026	0.033	0.003	0.039	0.022	0.027	0.021	0.061	0.053	0.034	0.014	0.010	0.012

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B19: The Timing of the Treatment: Wider Radius

Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Fascist Party 1924										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
$NewTown^{15km}_{(1923-24)}$	0.3241									
	[0.340]									
$NewTown^{20km}_{(1923-24)}$		0.4881*								
		[0.282]								
$NewTown^{25km}_{(1923-24)}$			0.5515***							
			[0.178]							
$NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-24)}$				0.6570***						
				[0.167]						
$NewTown^{35km}_{(1923-24)}$					0.6800***					
					[0.244]					
$NewTown^{40km}_{(1923-24)}$						0.5674**				
						[0.223]				
$NewTown^{45km}_{(1923-24)}$							0.3800*			
							[0.200]			
$NewTown^{50km}_{(1923-24)}$								0.3971*		
								[0.219]		
$NewTown^{55km}_{(1923-24)}$									0.2750	
									[0.198]	
$NewTown^{60km}_{(1923-24)}$										0.1382
										[0.161]
Observations	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263	2,263
Number of Treated Obs.	19	39	63	82	102	113	140	162	184	197
Adjusted R-squared	0.009	0.013	0.023	0.033	0.041	0.048	0.055	0.057	0.053	0.053

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Each regression includes a dummy that takes value one if a New Town was initiated within the relevant radius between 1923 and 1926, and a dummy that takes value one if it the New Towns was initiated in within the relevant radius in any other year. Standardized coefficients are reported. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets. Estimated t-statistics are depicted in Figure A11.

*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B20: The Evolution of the Support for Neo-Fascism and the New Towns

Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for the Neo-fascist party in the year											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	1948	1953	1958	1963	1968	1972	1976	1979	1983	1987	1992
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.1435***	-0.2289***	-0.1988***	-0.1999***	-0.1938***	-0.2321***	-0.2328***	-0.2277***	-0.1918***	-0.1272**	-0.2272***
	[0.034]	[0.044]	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.070]	[0.064]	[0.060]	[0.068]	[0.051]	[0.055]
Observations	6,877	6,988	7,021	7,023	7,702	7,658	7,726	7,728	7,746	7,740	7,758
Adjusted R-squared	0.076	0.148	0.101	0.110	0.082	0.172	0.161	0.129	0.071	0.035	0.097

Notes: The table shows the coefficients depicted in Figure 3, which are estimated with a set of regressions of the electoral support for the neo-fascist party on the distance to the closest New Town. Observations are at municipality level. Change in the number of observations across regressions are due to data availability. Each regression controls for malaria, market access, and agricultural suitability. Standardized coefficients are reported. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.

*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

B.1 Falsification test: Spatial RD before the New Towns

As a falsification test, it would be ideal to perform the spatial RDD performed in Section 5.1.1 using as placebo outcomes electoral support for the Fascists before the construction of the New Towns. Unfortunately, there are no observation in the study area for the 1924 elections and for 1921 there are only 9 observations in the study area. In order to use the 1921 data, I employ broader definitions of study area and study border.

Municipalities surrounded by the catchment and the coast may have benefited from infrastructure, especially transportation. Thus, I now include them in the study area as treated municipalities. Given that areas outside those borders received much more limited infrastructure investments,[1] as a study border I now employ the whole western border of the catchment area. Specifically, I add to the study border also the north-west segment and the south-east one (see Figure 4 in Section 5.1.1). Table B21 explores this broader definition of study area and cutoff.

The first two columns of Table B21 employ as a placebo outcome the electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921 with polynomials of distance of order one and two, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 employ the electoral support for the neo-fascist party in 1948, the first election in which they were running. Reassuringly, columns 1 and 2 show that the RD estimates are actually negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, columns 3 and 4 show that for the relevant outcomes the estimated coefficient is positive and significant, at least with the conventional inference.

Table B21: The New Towns and the Votes Share for the Neo-fascist Party: Spatial RDD.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for				
	Fascist Party 1921 *(before)*		Neo-FP 1948 *(after)*	
RD Estimate	-0.0507	-0.319	0.0199	0.0184
Conventional Std. Error	0.257	0.339	0.008	0.010
Conventional p-value	0.843	0.346	0.019	0.072
Robust p-value	0.528	0.245	0.169	0.247
Order Loc. Poly.	1	2	1	2
Effective N. Obs.	29	44	24	38
Observations	138	138	138	138
Bandwidth KM	17.959	26.685	16.705	24.397

Notes: The table displays the estimates of the spatial regression discontinuity specification. Each column employs as an outcome the share of votes for the fascist party in 1921 (before the constructions) in columns 1 and 2, and for the neo-fascist party in 1948, in columns 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 3 employ a local linear regression model. Columns 2 and 4 employ a local quadratic regression model. Estimates are based on the optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014), which is reported in the table for each outcome and each specification and calculated using all the observations. The effective number of observations is the number of municipalities in the optimal bandwidth. Conventional standard errors are reported. Conventional and bias-robust p-values are reported.

[1] For instance, in the whole province of Campobasso (north-west of the catchment) new roads were less than 30 kilometers vis-à-vis the 350 kilometers inside the catchment (Tassinari, 1939, pag. 114).

Table B22: Robustness to Restricting the Sample

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992						
	(1) Baseline	(2) No Lazio	(3) No Apulia	(4) No Sardinia	(5) South & Island	(6) Center & North
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.1833***	-0.1403***	-0.1857***	-0.1830***	-0.1173*	-0.0410*
	[0.059]	[0.051]	[0.060]	[0.060]	[0.069]	[0.023]
Observations	7,446	7,089	7,212	7,203	3,229	4,217
R-squared	0.111	0.106	0.090	0.119	0.049	0.032
Malaria Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Column 1 reports baseline estimates. Column 2-4 exclude each region indicated in column headings. Column 5 and 6 restrict the analysis within South-Islands and Center-North regions, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets in columns 1-4. Given the limited number of clusters, in columns 5 and 6 standard errors are adjusted for spatial correlation using Conley (1999) adjustment with 180-kilometers cutoff.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B23: Spatial RDD. Robustness to Using Broader Catchment Segment.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable:	Share of Votes for Neo-fascist Party in year:					
	1992	1983	1979	1968	1958	1953
	Panel A: *polynomial of order one*					
RD Estimate	0.0442	0.0332	0.0296	0.0224	0.0297	0.0452
Observations	444	444	431	406	414	425
Effective N. Obs.	97	80	69	77	91	70
Conventional Std. Error	0.011	0.010	0.008	0.008	0.013	0.012
Conventional p-value	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.006	0.020	0.000
Robust p-value	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.047	0.000
Bandwidth KM	15.275	12.619	11.350	13.480	15.556	11.831
	Panel B: *polynomial of order two*					
RD Estimate	0.0443	0.0367	0.0381	0.0227	0.0274	0.0623
Observations	444	444	431	406	414	425
Effective N. Obs.	89	104	116	137	135	119
Conventional Std. Error	0.013	0.013	0.010	0.009	0.015	0.020
Conventional p-value	0.001	0.006	0.000	0.011	0.071	0.002
Robust p-value	0.005	0.011	0.000	0.009	0.109	0.003
Bandwidth KM	14.237	17.332	19.259	24.670	24.882	20.902

Notes: The table displays the estimates of the spatial regression discontinuity specification. Differently from Table 4 this Table includes a broader cutoff that, in addition to the segment indicated in figure A14, it also includes south-eastern and the north-western segments of the catchment, which are not use in the main specification as they coincide with two rivers. Each column employs as an outcome the share of votes for the neo-fascist party in the relevant year. The top panel employs a local linear regression model. The bottom panel employs a local quadratic regression model. Estimates are based on the optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014), which is reported in the table for each outcome and each specification and calculated using all the observations. The effective number of observations is the number of municipalities in the optimal bandwidth. Conventional standard errors are reported. Conventional and bias-robust p-values are reported.

Table B24: Preferences for Fascism: Robustness to Sample Cuts

	Should have the right to publicly manifest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	No Far North		No Far Municip.		Macro Region FE	
	Fascists	Divide North/South	Fascists	Divide North/South	Fascists	Divide North/South
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.0346**	0.0382**	-0.0364**	0.0302	-0.0214*	0.0331*
	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.013]	[0.017]
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migration FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of respondents	1091	1091	1100	1100	1455	1455
# of municipalities	169	169	174	174	240	240
Pseudo R-squared	0.416	0.354	0.428	0.310	0.425	0.331

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. Columns 1 and 2 exclude places in the "far north" (above the 75th percentile of latitude). Columns 3 and 4 exclude municipalities far away from the towns (distance above the 75th percentile, which is 71.4 kilometers). Columns 5 and 6 include NUTS 1 regional fixed effects. The displayed coefficients are the average marginal effects from a Probit regression weighted using survey weights. Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes on value one if the respondent is in the same region in which his or her father at the age of 14. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self-employed, and atypical job. Additional individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector in which his or her father was employed when the respondent was 14 years old, and a set of dummy for the sector in which the head of the household is employed. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B25: Mussolini's New Towns and the Persistence of the Neo-fascist Party: Robustness to using Average Votes Share across all Elections

Dependent Variable: Average Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party 1948-1992						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.3570***	-0.2629***	-0.2498***	-0.2312***	-0.1939***	
	[0.047]	[0.063]	[0.060]	[0.058]	[0.059]	
Ln (Dist to Placebo NT)						0.1493***
						[0.045]
Observations	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438	7,438
Adjusted R-squared	0.122	0.159	0.188	0.194	0.208	0.204
Malaria Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table B26: New Towns and Votes for *Fratelli d'Italia*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	2013	2018	Average 2013-18
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.0270	-0.0178	-0.0286
	[0.031]	[0.060]	[0.046]
Observations	7,432	7,432	7,432
Adjusted R-squared	0.036	0.008	0.028
Malaria Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Market Access Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Geographic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at the municipality level. Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Appendix C Additional Results

C.1 New Towns, New Markets

Table C27: The New Towns and Market Access

Dependent Variable: Share of Votes for Neo Fascist Party in 1992							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.2073***	-0.1958***	-0.2201***	-0.1798***	-0.2091***	-0.2445***	-0.3204***
	[0.054]	[0.055]	[0.051]	[0.055]	[0.052]	[0.056]	[0.075]
Gwth Mkt Access 1861-1871	-0.1373***						
	[0.042]						
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1861-1871	0.0057						
	[0.040]						
Gwth Mkt Access 1871-1881		-0.1148**					
		[0.047]					
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1871-1881		0.0554					
		[0.042]					
Gwth Mkt Access 1871-1881			0.1547***				
			[0.054]				
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1881-1901			-0.0099				
			[0.044]				
Gwth Mkt Access 1901-1911				-0.1459***			
				[0.046]			
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1901-1911				-0.0527			
				[0.048]			
Gwth Mkt Access 1911-1921					-0.1849***		
					[0.047]		
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1911-1921					-0.0006		
					[0.029]		
Gwth Mkt Access 1921-1936						0.0206	0.0932
						[0.053]	[0.071]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Gwth Mkt Access 1921-1936						-0.0814**	-0.1318**
						[0.033]	[0.055]
Dist.to NT $\geq$ 20 km							Yes
Observations	7,760	7,760	7,760	7,760	7,760	7,760	6,745
Adjusted R-squared	0.108	0.107	0.116	0.114	0.117	0.106	0.091

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. All regressions include as controls the log of market access in 1861, the log of population in 1991, and malaria prevalence in 1881. The last column excludes municipalities within 20 kilometers from the closest New Town. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

The significant interaction between distance from the New Towns and the change in market access may be due to an effect on citizens' beliefs that took place during the fascist period. If this is the case, then the interaction term should be significant only if interacted with growth in market access in the relevant period but not before.[2] I investigate this hypothesis in Table C27. As a falsification test, in columns from 1 to 4 I investigate whether the interaction between growth in market access in previous years and the distance to the New Towns can explain differences in the support for the neo-fascist party in recent times. As evident from the table, the interaction term is statistically indistinguishable from zero in any census year before the policy. In line with the hypothesis, the interaction term becomes statistically significant precisely over the fascist period. Such finding strongly support the channel that the perception of improved living standards favored the fascist political views over the long term.

Finally, the last column investigates the robustness of the finding to the exclusion of municipalities within 20 kilometers to the closest New Town. Reassuringly the estimated

[2] Growth in market access in subsequent periods would be endogenous to the events that took place over the fascist period.

Figure C20: The New Towns and Growth in Market Access Over Time

(a) Neo-Fascist Party Votes 1992



(b) Neo-Fascist Party Votes 1948



Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficient from a set of regressions of the share of votes for the neo-fascist party in 1992 (Panel a) and in 1948 (Panel b) on the interaction between distance to the closest New Town and the growth in market access in each year indicated on the horizontal axis. There is a clear reduction in the value of the interaction term that takes place specifically over the period of the New Towns constructions. Panel (a) shows that the interaction term turns from zero to negative precisely over the Fascist period. Panel (b) shows that the interaction term turns from positive to zero precisely over the Fascist period. This negative change in the interaction term right at the time of the New Towns construction suggests that the change in market access in the proximity of the New Towns was a mediating mechanism that may have influenced the effect of the infrastructures.

coefficient remains statistically significant. The coefficient of the interaction terms in columns 5 and 6 suggest that a one-standards deviation reduction in market access growth over the relevant years may reduce the relevance of the New Towns in explaining differences in the support for the Neo Fascist Party in 1992 by up to 40%. These findings support the hypothesis that citizens' perception that Fascism is an important mechanism though which political views may persistently change.

The set of interaction coefficients using 1992 neo-fascist votes as an outcome, is depicted in Figure C20, Panel (a). For completeness, Panel (b) shows the same interaction terms using as an outcome 1948 neo-fascist votes. In this case, the interaction terms are positive before the relevant period, suggesting that increases in market access nearby the towns attenuated their effect on the votes for the neo-fascist party in 1948. Importantly, also in this case and precisely in the Fascist period there is a sudden decrease in the value interaction term, which from positive becomes null, in turn suggesting that market access in the proximity of the New Towns was a mediating mechanism that may have influenced the effect of the infrastructures on long-term political outcomes.

C.2 Migration, Population Growth, and the New Towns

The New Towns were predominantly built in areas uninhabited due to the presence of malarial swamps (see Figure A19), which were populated with citizens from other regions (mainly Veneto). The magnitude of this increment in population is debated (Treves, 1980). Using data from population censuses, I empirically investigate its statistical significance.

Table C28 shows the estimates from regressing population growth over the period of the Fascist Regime on the distance to the New Towns. Column 1 employs as an outcome the growth in population between 1921 and 1936.[3] The coefficient is negative, yet statistically insignificant.In column 2, I restrict the sample excluding municipalities that are within 20 kilometers from the closest New Town. Using this approach, I exclude municipalities that were directly affected by the in-migration due to the foundation of the New Towns. Within the restricted sample, differences in population growth are not statistically significant from zero.

Given that the Mussolini ruled until 1943, I perform the same exercise using as an outcome growth in population from 1921 until 1951. Column 3 shows that even considering a longer period of time, population growth is significantly larger in places near the New Towns. Column 4 performs the same sample restriction of column 2. In this restricted sample, population growth is not statistically different from zero. The results shown in this section suggest that the exclusion of municipalities within 20 kilometers from the closest New Town should minimize concerns on the potentially confounding effect of migration to the New Towns.

C.3 Life under the Regime, Schooling, and the New Towns

The effect of the New Towns on political attitudes and beliefs may be stronger for population cohorts who actually experienced life under Fascism. For instance, the direct experience of the foundation of the New Towns may have instilled a favorable memory of the Fascist dictatorship that has persisted until the present day. Such an effect may also be due to indoctrination at school, which one cannot exclude having been stronger in the proximity of the Fascist towns. In the following, I explore these hypotheses.

Table C29 examines preferences for fascism by the same approach as Table 6. In column

[3] The Fascist Party was in power from 1922 to 1943.

Table C28: New Towns and Population Growth

Dependent Variables: Population Growth over the years:				
	(1) 1921-36	(2) 1921-36	(3) 1921-51	(4) 1921-51
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.1061	-0.0580	-0.0869**	0.0430
	[0.078]	[0.082]	[0.039]	[0.053]
Observations	7,762	6,747	7,762	6,747
Adjusted R-squared	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.001
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dist.to NT $\geq$ 20 km	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Standardized coefficients are reported. Baseline controls include an indicator variable for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access based on population in 1921, and distance to the closest provincial capital. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

1, I report for comparison the result from column 1 of Table 6. In column 2, I interact the distance to the closest New Town with the dummy "Lived under Fascism", which takes value 1 for respondents born before the end of the Fascist regime (1944). In line with the hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant, meaning that the link between New Towns and preferences for fascism is stronger among people who actually lived under the Fascist dictatorship. This effect may be driven by the direct effect of the New Towns, or possibly by stronger Fascist indoctrination at school in the proximity of the New Towns.

In column 3, I investigate this possibility by interacting the distance to the closest New Town with the dummy "School-Age in Fascism", which takes value 1 for respondents aged 6 to 13 (the compulsory schooling age at that time) during the Fascist regime. The coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant.

Column 4 regresses both the foregoing interaction terms at once. Interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction term with "Lived under Fascism" increases in magnitude and statistical significance, whereas that of the interaction with "School-Age in Fascism" changes in sign and remains statistically insignificant. This result does not support the hypothesis that indoctrination at school is the main mechanism through which the New Towns influenced political and cultural attitudes.[4] In the following, I further explore the hypothesis taking as outcomes direct measures of political attitudes.

In Table C30, I investigate the role of the experience of life under the dictatorship and indoctrination at school on other political attitudes in tune with Fascist views. In column 1, the outcome is the measure of preferences for a stronger leader in politics. Interestingly, life under the dictatorship does not seem to matter here, as is indicated by the statistical insignificance of

[4] Albeit less precisely estimated, the findings are qualitatively similar if the outcome variable is the answer to the question "Have you ever voted for the neo-fascist party?" The results are illustrated in Online Appendix Table B17, where the lack of precision of the estimated coefficients may be due to the low propensity of respondents to reveal their voting choices.

Table C29: Life under Fascism, the New Towns, and Attitudes towards the Fascists.

The Fascists should have the right to publicly manifest				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.0395***	-0.0319**	-0.0375***	-0.0323**
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.013]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Lived under Fascism		-0.0491*		-0.0743**
		[0.027]		[0.035]
Lived under Fascism		0.1027		0.1997
		[0.108]		[0.136]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × School-Age in Fascism			-0.0242	0.0447
			[0.031]	[0.041]
School-Age in Fascism			0.0511	-0.1794
			[0.123]	[0.156]
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Migration FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of respondents	1455	1455	1455	1455
# of municipalities	240	240	240	240
Pseudo R-squared	0.417	0.420	0.417	0.420

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The coefficients are the average marginal effects from a Probit regression weighted using sample weights. The variable "Lived under Fascism" is a dummy taking value 1 for respondents born before the end of the Fascist regime (307 respondents in the sample). The variable "School-Age in Fascism" is a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent was of school-age (age $\in [6, 13]$) during the Fascist regime (166 respondents in the sample). Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest provincial capital, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, a measure of market access in 1921. Migrant dummy takes value 1 for respondents who are in the same region as their father at the age of 14. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self-, and atypical employment. Additional individual controls include a set of dummies for the sector in which the respondent is employed (agriculture, service, industry, public administration), a set of dummies for the sector of employment of father when respondent was 14 years old, and a set of dummies for the sector in which the head of the household is employed. See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table C30: Life under Fascism, the New Towns, and Political Attitudes.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Stronger Leader	Immigrants are a Threat to Identity/Culture	Employment
Ln (Dist. to NT)	-0.0482***	-0.0576**	-0.0762***
	[0.017]	[0.025]	[0.024]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × Lived under Fascism	-0.0630	0.0246	0.0557
	[0.043]	[0.049]	[0.051]
Lived under Fascism	0.2493	-0.1356	-0.2303
	[0.166]	[0.195]	[0.201]
Ln (Dist. to NT) × School-Age in Fascism	0.1121**	-0.0906*	-0.0922*
	[0.052]	[0.054]	[0.055]
School-Age in Fascism	-0.2967	0.5120**	0.5117**
	[0.197]	[0.210]	[0.223]
Municipality Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
# of respondents	5484	5484	5484
# of municipalities	1513	1513	1513
Adjusted R-squared	0.0577	0.0807	0.0873

Notes: Observations are at the individual level. The surveys were conducted in 2001 and 2008. The coefficients are the average marginal effects from an OLS regression weighted using survey weights. The variable "Lived under Fascism" is a dummy taking value 1 for respondents born before the end of the Fascist regime (1445 respondents in the sample). The variable School-Age in Fascism is a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent was of school-age (age $\in [6, 13]$) during the regime (850 respondents in the sample). Municipality controls include the log of population in 2001, distance to the closest capital of the province, a dummy for the presence of malaria in 1870, and a measure of market access in 1921. Individual controls include age, years of education, gender, a dummy for married, number of children, a dummy for employed, and dummy variables for salaried, self-, and atypical employment. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

both the interaction term and the linear term of the variable "Lived under Fascism". By contrast, the interaction term of "School-Age in Fascism" and distance to the New Towns is actually positive and significant, suggesting that indoctrination at school was potentially different in the proximity of the New Towns, but with a negative effect on preference for a stronger leader. A possible explanation could be that the presence of authoritarian teachers in the Fascist schools may have counteracted the inculcation of strong-leader principles.

In columns 2 and 3, I explore the interaction of the New Towns with the indoctrination-at-school effect and the life-under-fascism effect, on the two measures of intolerance of immigrants. Interestingly, while the effect of life under fascism is not significant, the role of school indoctrination is negative and significant, suggesting that the effect of indoctrination at school reduced tolerance for immigrants (in general) and that the effect was particularly strong in the areas of the Fascist New Towns. This finding may indicate that the racial laws implemented by the Regime, by influencing the composition of teachers, classmates, and curricula, had persistent effects on tolerance for immigrants.

C.4 Additional Evidence and Discussion on Migration

To populate the New Towns, the new settlers were recruited directly. Recruitment was conducted predominantly in the Veneto region (Pennacchi and Caracciolo, 2003; Protasi and Sonnino, 2003; Snowden, 2008; Treves, 1976), which had a valuable medical advantage: a long history of malaria exposure, so that farmers from malarial areas there had experience in dealing with the disease, strategies of protection, and some acquired immunity (Snowden, 2008, p. 167). Given the limited data on migration patterns, I study differences in voting outcomes within Veneto between malarial and non-malarial locations to capture potential differences in the political composition of the new town settlers (Online Appendix Table C31).

If malarial areas in Veneto exhibited strong previous support for the Fascists, then even if settlers had been selected randomly in malarial areas, they might have been more likely to favor fascist views. Instead, column 1 shows that in 1921 there were no systematic electoral differences between malarial and non-malarial places in Veneto.

Snowden (2008) also indicates that Veneto was a Catholic region and thus people there may have been more deferential to authority. However, column 2 shows that in 1921 there were no systematic differences in electoral support for the Catholics in 1921. If anything, the coefficient is negative, suggesting that the settlers may have been less in favor of the Catholic views.

Still, the settlers could have been selected based on support for the Fascists. If that had been the case, the migration of settlers from Veneto should have induced a smaller Fascist vote in malarial than non-malarial areas within Veneto. Given that the migration from Veneto started in 1921 (Treves, 1976), the decline in electoral support could have emerged already between 1921 and 1924. Column 3 investigates this aspect, taking as outcome the Fascist Party's share of the vote in 1924 and controlling for the share in 1921. The coefficient for malaria in that case is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that there was no decrease in the electoral support for the fascists due to emigration of the New Town settlers.

To consider the potential effect of migration in later periods, column 4 takes as outcome the share of votes for the neo-fascist party in 1948, controlling for the share in 1921. The regression also controls for distance to the closest New Town planned but not built (there was one in the region), which may have induced resentment and a decrease in support not due to migration. The estimated coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from zero. In view of the exceptionally

weak support for the neo-fascist party in 1948, column 5 employs as outcome the vote share in 1953. Also in this case, the estimated coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Table C31: New Towns Settlers from the Veneto Region and Electoral Support

	Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for:				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	FP 1921	Catholics '21	FP 1924	Neo-FP 1948	Neo-FP 1953
Malaria 1881	0.0494	-0.0299	0.1031	-0.0377	-0.0269
	[0.131]	[0.022]	[0.145]	[0.035]	[0.092]
Observations	429	429	429	429	429
R-squared	0.002	0.006	0.181	0.080	0.037
Fascist Party 1921	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Catholics 1921	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Observations are at the municipality-level. The Table shows the absence of significant differences in the levels and changes in the support for the Fascist, Catholic Party, or neo-fascist party between malarial and non-malarial places within Veneto. Given that most New Towns settlers were from malaria areas in the Veneto region, the results suggest the absence of preexisting greater support for the Fascists among the settlers. Outcome variables are standardized. Columns 4 and 5 control for distance to New Towns planned but not built (there is one in the region). See the main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Given the small number of provinces in Veneto, standard errors are adjusted for spatial correlation by using the approach developed by Conley (1999) and a 20-km cutoff (results unaffected by the choice of the cutoff).
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Appendix D The Timing of the Treatment: Empirical Model

Consider the model given by[5]

$$FP_{24} = \alpha + \gamma \mathbb{D}_{(1923-24)} + \phi \mathbb{D}_{(1925-26)} + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

Where FP_{24} is the share of votes for the Fascist Party in 1924 in each municipality (subscript omitted), $\mathbb{D}_{(1923-24)}$ is an indicator variable that takes value one if a New Town was built within a given range (for instance, 30 kilometers) from each municipality between 1923 and 1924, while $\mathbb{D}_{(1925-26)}$ takes value one if the construction started between 1925 and 1926, thus right after the 1924 elections.

The parameter γ measures the difference in the electoral support for the Fascist Party in the 1924 elections in the municipalities treated right before the elections relative to the control group. The parameter ϕ measures the support for the fascists in 1924 from the municipalities treated *after* the elections, relative to the control group. In other words, the parameter ϕ is a measure of the selection bias associated with the location of the New Towns. To see this point, consider the case in which the locations of the New Towns took place in areas that already exhibited larger support for the Fascist Party. Then, the estimated ϕ would be positive. In contrast, if the location of the New Towns was chosen so as to target places that exhibited lower support for the Fascist Party, then the estimate of ϕ would be negative.

[5] For ease of exposition, but without loss of generality, I do not consider control variables.

To derive the estimated model of equation (2), I add and subtract $\phi \mathbb{D}_{(1923-24)}$ to the right hand side of equation (1). The result comes from noting that $\mathbb{D}_{(1923-24)} + \mathbb{D}_{(1925-26)} = \mathbb{D}_{(1923-26)}$ and defining $\beta \equiv (\gamma - \phi)$.

D.1 The Timing of the Treatment: Results

I estimate the following specification,

$$FP_{24,i} = \alpha + \beta NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-24),i} + \phi NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-26),i} + \theta \mathbf{X} + \epsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where $FP_{24,i}$ is the share of votes for the Fascist Party in 1924 in municipality i, $NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-24),i}$ is a dummy that takes value 1 if a New Town was initiated within 30 kilometers from the municipality in 1923 or 1924, while $NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-26)}$ takes value 1 if the construction started between 1923 and 1926.[6] To restrict the control group to municipalities where no New Towns were built within 30 kilometers, $\mathbf{X}$ includes a dummy taking value 1 if New Towns were built within 30 kilometers in any other year outside the interval from 1923 to 1926. In addition, depending on the specification, it includes electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921.[7] The coefficient of interest, β, measures whether there is a significant difference in the difference between municipalities treated immediately before the elections (1923 or 1924) and the control group, versus those treated in 1925 or 1926 and the control group. The coefficient ϕ is an estimate of the differences in the average vote share for the municipalities in the proximity of the New Towns initiated in the years from 1923 until 1926, relative to the control group (see Online Appendix Section D). The results are illustrated in Table D32.

Column 1 of Table D32 shows the coefficients from estimating equation (2) using as an outcome electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1924. In line with the hypothesis, the estimate of β is positive and statistically significant. In other words, municipalities exposed to the construction of the New Towns in the years 1923 and 1924 exhibited more than 65% of a standard deviation greater support for the Fascist Party than those exposed to construction immediately *after* the elections. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for ϕ is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero, again suggesting that, if anything, New Towns were built in areas where support for the Fascists was low.

Column 2 shows that the estimated coefficient is higher when one controls for the Fascist vote in the 1921 elections. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the construction of the New Towns induced an increase in the electoral support for the Fascist Party over the period 1921-that is greater than that of the municipalities that would be treated in 1925 and 1926. Moreover, the statistical insignificance of the estimate of ϕ indicates that these municipalities exhibited no differential trend with respect to the control group. Column 3 excludes municipalities within a 10-kilometers radius from the New Towns. The coefficient is positive and significant, further suggesting that settling patterns in the towns are unlikely to explain the findings, which are explained also by the local populations inhabiting surrounding areas. Column 4 employs as a placebo outcome electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921. The estimate of β is negative,

[6] The 30-kilometer radius is chosen because it is the distance that maximizes the t-statistic of the coefficient of interest — see Online Appendix Table B19 and its graphical counterpart depicted in Figure A11 for alternative cutoffs.

[7] The difference in electoral support between 1921 and 1924 is not an appropriate outcome variable, because these two variables are not directly comparable (see Section 3).

again suggesting that the New Towns were initiated before the elections in areas where support for the Fascists was weak.

Table D32: The Timing of the Treatment: Regression Analysis

Dependent Variables: Share of Votes for				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Fascist Party '24			*Placebo* FP '21
$NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-24)}$	0.6570***	0.7309***	0.8482***	-0.5454**
	[0.167]	[0.187]	[0.179]	[0.249]
$NewTown^{30km}_{(1923-26)}$	-0.1794	-0.1341	-0.1543	-0.3342
	[0.160]	[0.179]	[0.178]	[0.257]
FP '21		Yes	Yes	
Dist.to NT$\geq 10KM$			Yes	
Observations	2,264	2,264	2,197	2,264
Adjusted R-squared	0.033	0.052	0.052	0.026

Notes: Observations are at municipality level. Each regression includes a dummy that takes value 1 if a New Town was initiated within 30 kilometers in any other year. Standardized coefficients are reported. See main text and appendices for variables definitions and sources. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in brackets.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Appendix E Data Description, Sources, and Variables Definitions

Table E33: Summary statistics for major municipality-level variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Neo-fasc. '48	0.017	0.035	0	0.727	7084
Neo-fasc. '53	0.044	0.049	0	0.513	7195
Neo-fasc. '58	0.032	0.036	0	0.489	7244
Neo-fasc. '63	0.035	0.037	0	0.456	7238
Neo-fasc. '68	0.029	0.032	0	0.466	7932
Neo-fasc. '72	0.055	0.047	0	0.474	7890
Neo-fasc. '76	0.042	0.035	0	0.416	7959
Neo-fasc. '79	0.037	0.029	0	0.357	7960
Neo-fasc. '83	0.049	0.033	0	0.373	7983
Neo-fasc. '87	0.045	0.03	0	0.493	7977
Neo-fasc. '92	0.04	0.03	0	0.425	7998
FP '21	0.168	0.201	0	1	3710
FP '24	0.599	0.279	0	1	3650
Ln (Dist. to NT)	3.91	0.830	-1.076	5.33	8003
Ln Population 1921	7.845	0.974	4.06	13.555	7450
Ln Population 1931	8.012	0.962	4.804	13.96	6849
Ln Population 1951	7.952	1.036	4.304	14.317	7471
Malaria Prevalence in 1870	0.301	0.459	0	1	8003
Distance Major Urban Centers	28266.426	15817.435	0	209798.172	8003
Market Access 1921	171315.072	41531.94	53508.183	344320.129	7762
Caloric Suitability Index	4185.134	777.093	0	5636.359	8003
Land Suitability for Wheat	733.779	482.879	0	2180	8000

Notes: Neo-fasc. and FP are the share of votes for the neo-fascist party and the Fascist Party, respectively. FP '21 refers to the share of votes for the Fascist Party's coalition in 1921. Ln (Dist. to NT) is the log of the distance to the closest New Town.

E.1 Measures of Political and Cultural Values

Preference for Fascism: Based on the answer to the question "There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the fascists?" taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if "Permit" and 0 if "Prohibited".

Preference for Communism: Based on the answer to the question "There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the communists?" taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if "Permit" and 0 if "Prohibited".

Preference for the President of the Republic: Based on the answer to the question "There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding who manifests against the President of the Republic?" taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if "Permit" and 0 if "Prohibited".

Preference for Homosexuals: Based on the answer to the question "There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the homosexuals?" taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if "Permit" and 0 if "Prohibited".

Preference for the Pope: Based on the answer to the question "There are groups of people

whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding who manifests against the Pope?" taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if “Permit" and 0 if “Prohibited”.

Preference for Muslims: Based on the answer to the question "There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the Muslims?" taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if “Permit" and 0 if “Prohibited”.

Preference for National Unity: Based on the answer to the question “There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding who wants the secession of the North from the rest of Italy?" Coded 1 if “Permit" and 0 if “Prohibited”.

Preference for Racists: Based on the answer to the question “There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the racists?" taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if “Permit" and 0 if “Prohibited”.

Stronger Leader: Based on the answer to the question: “Now, I shall read some opinions often people hold on politics and economics. Please, tell me how much do you agree with each of them? Today Italy needs a stronger leader.” Taken from the survey ITANES 2001 C6.8. Coded 0 if “Disagree completely”, 1 if “ Agree a little”, 2 if “Agree fairly”, and 3 if “Agree completely”. The variable is also based on the question from ITANES 2008 “Now, I am going to read some opinions on politics and the economy that people sometimes express. Could you please tell me how much do you agree (not at all, a little, fairly much, very much) with each of them? Italy needs a strong leader nowadays” question D007_03. Coded 0 if “not at all”, 1 if “a little” 2 if “fairly much”, and 3 if “very much”.

Immigrants are a Threat to Identity/Culture: Based on the answer to the question: “Now, I shall read some opinions often people hold on politics and economics. Please, tell me how much do you agree with each of them? Immigrants are a threat to our culture and identity.” Taken from the survey ITANES 2001 C10.7. Coded 0 if “Disagree completely”, 1 if “ Agree a little”, 2 if “Agree fairly”, and 3 if “Agree completely”. The variable is also based on the question from ITANES 2008 “Now, I am going to read some opinions on politics and the economy that people sometimes express. Could you please tell me how much do you agree (not at all, a little, fairly much, very much) with each of them? Immigrants are a threat to our culture ” question D007_10. Coded 0 if “not at all”, 1 if “a little” 2 if “fairly much”, and 3 if “very much”.

Immigrants are a Threat to Employment: Based on the answer to the question: “Now, I shall read some opinions often people hold on politics and economics. Please, tell me how much do you agree with each of them? Immigrants are a threat to employment.” Taken from the survey ITANES 2001 C10.8. Coded 0 if “Disagree completely”, 1 if “ Agree a little”, 2 if “Agree fairly”, and 3 if “Agree completely”. The variable is also based on the question from ITANES 2008 “Now, I am going to read some opinions on politics and the economy that people sometimes express. Could you please tell me how much do you agree (not at all, a little, fairly much, very much) with each of them? Immigrants are a threat to Italians? employment” question D007_11.

Coded 0 if “not at all”, 1 if “a little” 2 if “fairly much”, and 3 if “very much”.

Table E34: Summary Statistics, Individual Survey Data (2004).

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Fascists	0.475	0.5	0	1	1455
Muslims	0.547	0.498	0	1	1455
Homosexuals	0.621	0.485	0	1	1455
Communists	0.699	0.459	0	1	1455
Against the President	0.478	0.5	0	1	1455
Against the Pope	0.391	0.488	0	1	1455
North \ South Divide	0.412	0.492	0	1	1455
Racists	0.302	0.459	0	1	1455

Notes: Individual Survey Data from ITANES 2004. Based on the answer to the question “There are groups of people whose opinions many people do not like. For each of these groups, tell me if you think they should be allowed or forbidden to publicly manifest. How do you think, for example, regarding the ...?” taken from the survey ITANES Panel 2001-2006, wave 2004. Coded 1 if “Permit" and 0 if “Prohibited”

Voted for the Neo-fascist Party: Based on the answer to the question “As you may know, in 1994 there was a big change in the Italian political system: some old parties disappeared or changed their names. Can you please tell me for which of the following old parties you voted at least once and for which you never voted? Movimento sociale italiano.” Coded 1 if “ At least once” and 0 if “Never”. From ITANES 2001, question E4.

Father/Mother Voted for the Neo-fascist Party: Based on the answer to the question “Did your father tend to vote for a specific party? Which one? And your mother?" Coded 1 if “MSI”, and 0 otherwise. From ITANES 2001, question E2.

Table E36: Summary Statistics, Individual Survey Data (2001).

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Voted for Neo-fascist party	0.157	0.364	0	1	2729
Father voted for Neo-fascist party	0.083	0.276	0	1	1890
Mother voted for Neo-fascist party	0.046	0.208	0	1	1890
Same Region as Father at the age of 14	0.814	0.389	0	1	2729
Male Dummy	0.494	0.5	0	1	2729
Age	50.357	15.451	27	96	2729
Married Dummy	0.684	0.465	0	1	2729
Number of Children	1.476	1.241	0	9	2729
Years of Education	9.548	4.249	0	17	2729
No Employed	0.503	0.5	0	1	2729
Salary Job	0.701	0.458	0	1	2729
Self-Employed	0.264	0.441	0	1	2729
Atypical Job	0.034	0.182	0	1	2729
Works in Agriculture	0.091	0.287	0	1	2729
Works in Industry	0.329	0.47	0	1	2729
Works in Services	0.297	0.457	0	1	2729
Works in Public Administration	0.257	0.437	0	1	2729
Head of Household in Agriculture	0.012	0.109	0	1	2729
Head of Household in Industry	0.059	0.236	0	1	2729
Head of Household in Services	0.06	0.237	0	1	2729
Head of Household in Public Administration	0.045	0.207	0	1	2729
Father in Agriculture when Respondent was 14	0.235	0.424	0	1	2729
Father in Industry when Respondent was 14	0.311	0.463	0	1	2729
Father in Services when Respondent was 14	0.154	0.361	0	1	2729
Father in Public Admin. when Respondent was 14	0.153	0.36	0	1	2729

Notes: Individual survey data from ITANES 2001. First three variables are based on the answer to the question "Have you ever voted for the MSI?", "Has your father ever voted for the MSI?", "Has your mother ever voted for the MSI?".

Table E35: Cross-correlation table, Individual Survey Data (2004)

Variables	Fascists	Muslims	Homosexuals	Communists	Against the President	Against the Pope	Racists	Divide North from South
Fascists	1.000							
Muslims	0.429	1.000						
Homosexuals	0.383	0.542	1.000					
Communists	0.527	0.494	0.481	1.000				
Against the President	0.443	0.411	0.440	0.436	1.000			
Against the Pope	0.427	0.484	0.439	0.412	0.649	1.000		
Racists	0.528	0.388	0.347	0.347	0.452	0.481	1.000	
Divide North from South	0.436	0.352	0.361	0.339	0.450	0.450	0.445	1.000

Notes: See Online Appendix for variables definition and sources. All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.

E.2 Municipality-level Variables

Log of the distance to the New Towns. The natural logarithm of the geodesic distance, in kilometers, between the centroid of the municipality and the closest New Town whose construction (i) has been ascertained; (ii) was completed during the fascist period (1922-43); and (iii) was located within contemporary Italian borders. The total number of New Towns is 147. There are 16 New Towns, considered *sub judice* in Pennacchi and Caracciolo (2003), for which it is controversial whether they meet the requirements of the definition of a New Town. To make sure that these 16 uncertain New Towns are not driving the results, they are not considered in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, one New Town of the sample was completed in 1919, thus before the Fascist period and it is also excluded. Finally, the coordinates of 1 of the ascertained New Towns are unavailable, 4 of them were located outside of current Italian borders (in the provinces of Zara and Pola), and 3 of them were completed after the fall of the regime or were not completed at all. Thus, the distance to the New Towns is calculated on the remaining 122. I addition, there are 15 New Towns listed in Pennacchi and Caracciolo (2003) as not built. Protasi and Sonnino (2003) explain that the foundations were not undertaken because of the advent of WWII. However, historical documents show that 4 of these 15 were built at least in part and thus are excluded from the analysis of the placebo New Towns. Furthermore, the coordinates of 6 of these New Towns are unavailable. I use the coordinates of the remaining ones for calculating the distance to the location of the New Towns planned but not built, which I use for placebos.

Electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1921. The Fascist Party took part to the 1921 elections as a part of larger political entities (i.e. lists). I measure the 1921 popular support for the Fascist Party by employing the share of votes for such lists. Such lists are indicated in the volume *Statistica delle Elezioni Generali Politiche per la XXVI Legislatura (15 Maggio 1921)*, Ministero dell'Economia Nazionale - Direzione Generale di Statistica, 1924; and in Leoni (1971). More specifically, the following political parties belong to the Fascists: *Fasci Italiani di Combattimento*, *Partito Fascista*. Moreover, as explained in (Leoni, 1971, p. 276) and the above-mentioned Ministry of Economics' volume, the Fascists were part of the lists *Blocco Nazionale* and *Alleanza Nazionale*. In addition, the Ministry of Economics' volume, at page XL, indicates that the Fascists were also in the lists that were characterized by the emblem of Fascism (the so called *fascio littorio*) in their symbol. By manually searching through the lists' symbols of the volume, I find that the following lists are characterized by the Fascist emblem: *Blocco Costituzionale, Blocco di Difesa Nazionale, Unione Nazionale* (but only in Roma, Padova, Treviso, and not in Catanzaro, Zara, Catania — the results do not depend on this finer distinction), *Fascio Democratico, Blocco Democratico, Concentrazione Liberale di Belluno, Concentrazione Liberale Udinese, Blocco Nazionale Triestino, Blocco Nazionale Istriano*. I measure the popular support for the Fascist Party in the elections of 1921 by employing the sum of the share of votes for all of such lists in each municipality.

Electoral support for the Fascist Party in 1924. In the 1924 elections, in addition to the official Fascist Party list (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*) the fascists presented some "side lists" which were: *Lista Nazionale*, *Partito Fascista Dissidente*, and *Lista Nazionale Bis* (see *Compendio delle Statistiche elettorali italiane dal 1848 al 1934*, Roma, 1946). I measure the support for the fascists in 1924 as the share of votes for such lists.

Electoral support for the Catholics in 1921. Sum of the 1921 share of votes for the *Partito Popolare Italiano*, *Partito Popolare Dissidente*, *Popolari Dissidenti*, and *Partito Cristiano del Lavoro*. The Catholic ideology of these parties is indicated in the volume *Statistica delle Elezioni Generali Politiche per la XXVI Legislatura (15 Maggio 1921)*, Ministero dell'Economia

Nazionale - Direzione Generale di Statistica, 1924.

Electoral support for parties of the Socialist and Communist area in 1921. Sum of the 1921 share of votes for extreme left-wing parties, which are the *Partito Socialista Ufficiale*, *Partito Comunista d'Italia*, *Partito Comunista*, *Partito Socialista Autonomo*, *Partito Socialista Indipendente*, *Partito Socialista Riformista*, *Partito Sindacalista Repubblicano*, *Partito Repubblicano*. The "extremist" ideology of these parties is indicated in the volume *Statistica delle Elezioni Generali Politiche per la XXVI Legislatura (15 Maggio 1921)*, Ministero dell'Economia Nazionale - Direzione Generale di Statistica, 1924.

Electoral support for the Liberal Party in 1921. Share of votes for the *Partito Liberale* and for the *Concentrazione Liberale Udinese*, *Unione Costituzionale*, *Partito Costituzionale*, *Blocco Nazionale d'Avanguardia*, and *Blocchisti Dissidenti* (Leoni, 1971, p.277).

Electoral support for agrarian parties in 1921. SUm of the share of votes for the *Partito Agrario* and for the *Partito Agrario Nazionale*.

Electoral support for democratic-reformists parties in 1921. Share of votes for the *Partito Demo-riformista*, *Partito Democratico Riformista*, *Partito Radicale Riformista*, *Partito Riformista di Messina*.

Caloric Suitability Index. The index is a measure of suitability for agriculture based on the average potential agricultural output (measured in calories) across productive crops by cell of size 5' $\times$ 5'. Data source: Galor and Özak (2016), Galor and Özak (2015). I calculate the average Caloric Suitability across the grid cells within each municipality using ArcGIS.

Suitability for wheat production. Wheat potential yield per hectare from the FAO GAEZ' v3 methodology with low inputs and rain-fed conditions. I calculate the average wheat suitability across the grid cells within each municipality using ArcGIS.

Median Elevation. Median elevation in the municipality calculated using ArcGIS software. Data source: Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation (GTOPO30).

Standard Deviation of Elevation. Standard deviation of elevation in the municipality calculated using ArcGIS software. Data source: Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation (GTOPO30).

Elevation range. Difference between the maximum and the minimum elevation in the municipality. Data source: ISTAT.

Distance to water. Minimum distance to the coastline and rivers.

Malaria in 1870. Digitized map of malaria prevalence in Italy in 1870 from Torelli (1882), see Figure A19. The variable takes value one if the centroid of the municipality is less than 5 kilometers away from malarial zones.

Malaria Suitability. Temperature suitability for *Plasmodium falciparum* transmission from Gething et al. (2011), averaged within the border of each municipality. The temperature data employed by Gething et al. (2011) is a time series across an average year (1950-2000) for a grid of approximately 1km.

Distance to Major Urban Centers. Distance between the centroid of the municipality and the closest provincial capital as of 2011.

Market Access. For each municipality i, market access is given by $\sum_{j \neq i} \frac{Pop_j}{d_{i,j}}$, where Pop_j is the population in municipality j and $d_{i,j}$ is the distance between municipality i and j (Harris,

1954).

New Fascist Province 1927. A dummy taking value one if the municipality is within one of the 17 provinces created by the Fascist Regime in 1927, Gorizia, Matera, Nuoro, Pescara, Pistoia, Ragusa, Rieti, Savona, Terni, Varese, Vercelli, Viterbo. Source: *Regio Decreto Legislativo del 2 gennaio 1927 n. 1*.

Neo-fascist Headquarter. A dummy taking value one if the municipality is within 5 KM, 10 KM, or 20 KM (depending on the specification) from the closest headquarter of the neo-fascist association *Casapound*. Data on *Casapound* headquarters' location have been geocoded from the addresses of the 161 headquarters indicated by the official website of the organization (*casapounditalia.org*, accessed January 2021).

Days of Bombings. Municipality-level number of days of bombing attacks carried out by the Allied Forces in Italy during the WWII from the Theater History of Operations Reports. The data are provided by Gagliarducci et al. (2020). They distinguish between bombings with German target and non-German targets. They classify a bombing attack "as having a German target if it falls in one of the following categories: direct cooperation with ground forces; troop concentrations; radar installations; gun emplacements; weapon launching sites; tactical targets; supply dumps; tracks and marshaling yards; moving trains; highways and vehicles; and transportation facilities" (Gagliarducci et al., 2020, p. 31). While they classify infrastructural facilities as German targets, they also distinguish the days of bombings targeting infrastructures, which I use to distinguish bombings targeting infrastructures from the rest.

E.3 Individual-level Names Databases

Names of Settlers and Non-Settlers in Fascistville Settlers database source: "ONC, Ispettorato agro pontino: poderi". Non-settlers database source: "Questura di Latina: sorvegliati, confinati, internati." The databases are available online *www.archiviodistatolatina.beniculturali.it* last accessed May 2021. Nationalistic names are those that are considered patriotic, pro-war, or pro-colonial expantion by Pivato (1999) (pp. 205-223). Patriotic names are: "roma, trieste, triest, venez, torino, venezia, oberd, obered, trent,redent, irredento , redentina, vienna, prussia , bismark, berlin, italo, itala, italia, italino, italico, italiade, italiano, italie, patria, italie, annita, annitta, anita, rosalino, garibaldi, mazzini, umbert, vittor, nullo, mentana, menotti, ricciotti, dannunz, annita." Pro-war names are: "esercito, alpino, alpina, alpinolo, guerrino, guerrina, trincea, cecchino, alleanza, redento, irredento, dalmazio, dalmazia, dalmato, dalmata, fiume, istria, sebenico, zara, gorizia, gorizio, udine, udina, udino, oslavia, oderzo, tolmino,tolmina, postumia, tarcento, gradisca, zaro, istriano, adriatico, adria, adrio, isonzo, isonzio, isonza, livenza, adamello, brennero, carnio, carsio, dolomiti, podgora, stelvio, stelvia, seraievo, belgio, belgia, belga, belgica, liegio, ardenna, marna, marnio, verdun, lusitania, serbia, cadorno, diaz, jofre, sauro, saura, vilson, wilson, vilsa, wilsa, vilso, vilson." Pro-colonial expansion names are: "califf, kalif, khalif, sultan, desert, duna, adem, algeri, algerina, egizia, egiziano, egizio, nilo, suez, afro, afra, affro, affra, afric, asmar, eritr, ritreo, monkullo, dogali, dogalina, adua, addu, aduo, adus, ambal, alagi, makall, tosell, baldisser, gallian, menelik, tait, negus, raas, libia, libio, libino, libina, novara, novaro, tripol, ciren, derna, derno, bengasi, sirte, mentana, ainzara, zara, zuara, rodi, egeo, egea, armeni, armeno, vittorio, dannunzio, dannunzino." Given the interest in measuring preexisting proto-fascist ideology, names that were made popular by Fascism are not considered. In any case, the main name of this sort is "Benito", which is not present in the sample.

Fascists versus Non-Fascists Police Records Individuals are coded as fascists if they were

registered by the police after the collapse of the Regime (1943) and their "political color" indicated by the police is given by "fascists, *ex collaborazionista* (former collaborator of the Nazi-fascists)" and the political color is not given by any of the following: "communist, socialist, Slavic irredentist, left-wing party sympathizer, antifascist, anarchist". Non-settlers are coded as non-fascists if they were registered by the police during the regime or if their "political color" indicated by the police is given by any of the following: "communist, socialist, left-wing parties sympathizer, antifascist, *repubblicano*, anti-nationalist, opponent of the Regime, anarchist"

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