Online Appendices for: 'Outcome isn't Everything: Electoral Consequences of Implementing or Withdrawing Unpopular Policies'

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Online Appendix A: Data compilation robustness

In this Appendix, we first test how robust our results are to changes in the main estimation sample construction. All results in Table A1 to A8 are estimated using the identical regression specification and variables as in the main paper. Then, we present some descriptive information on the distribution of political parties responsible for proposals that are implemented and withdrawn in Table A9.

In the main analysis, we only included school closure proposals if the school was located in a precinct that we could observe for at least three elections without the border of the precinct changing. Table A1 shows the estimates when we instead only use precincts that remained unchanged between all five elections we study (Panel A) or when we include all precincts independent of the number of observations (Panel B). When only including precincts that are unchanged between all five elections we find a similar effect on voting when the school closure is decided even though the standard errors increase compared to our main results. Moreover, the estimate for proposal withdrawal increases in effect size (at a p-value below 0.05). This reinforces the conclusion made from the main analysis that incumbents lose electoral support after presenting a school closure proposal, even when not implementing it. In panel B our results are nearly identical to the ones presented in the main paper.

To address the concerns that the party deciding to close a school might differ from the party that originally proposed the idea we run two robustness checks. First, in Table A2 we only include an affected school if the same party was incumbent during the proposal and the decision to close. Second,

in Table A3 we exclude all precincts in municipalities where a change in the incumbent party occurred at any of the elections following the proposal that we observe. Under this specification, both estimates for the decision to close a school or withdraw a proposal, are even larger in size than our main results.

Further, in the main analysis we assume that if a proposal occurs during an election year, the proposal was made before the local election was held in September. In Table A4 we instead exclude these cases and the results stay the same. Table A5 shows the estimates when excluding the precincts where two schools are proposed to be closed during the same election cycle. The point estimates are almost identical for all variables and the p-value increases slightly for the withdrawal coefficient to p=0.052. However, as the number of observations included in this analysis is fewer, the statistical power is also lower. Therefore, the similarity in effect size leads us to the conclusion that our results are not driven by the excluded cases.

In the main estimation sample, we include precincts that are affected by a school closure proposal during the first election period in our data. We run an estimation when only including cases that are also observed before the proposal in Table A6, showing that results are highly comparable to our main ones. Table A7 shows the main analysis, examining the proposals from the Social Democrats (Panel A) and the largest center-right party, the Moderate Party (Panel B), separately. In both subsamples, the estimated coefficients for closure and withdrawal are negative, although the latter does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, in these regressions, the statistical power is lower and we conclude that the effects are similar for the largest party from each of the two political blocs in Swedish politics.

A potential problem is that our results are influenced by voters moving in and out of precincts over time. In Table A8 we present the results when

excluding all precincts that ever experienced a 10% increase or decrease in eligible voters between two consecutive elections. Effect sizes stay very close to the results in the main paper but uncertainty increases around the estimate for proposal withdrawal with a p-value of 0.056. Again, this could be explained by the lower number of observations included. We further address the issue of changing voter composition over time in Appendix C by analyzing three voter characteristics aggregated per precinct.

Finally, Table A9 shows the distribution of policy proposals in our main estimation sample that result in closure or withdrawal, categorized by political parties. The distribution of parties appears nearly identical in both subsamples. Consequently, we can conclude that proposals from different parties have a similar likelihood of ending in closure or withdrawal.

Table A1: Different minimum number of observations per precinct

	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Only precincts unchanged between 2002-2018		
Proposal (all outcomes)	-1.018***	
	(0.332)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.373
		(0.558)
Decision to close		-1.020**
		(0.447)
Proposal withdrawn		-1.092**
		(0.512)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	317	317
# of observations	1585	1585
Panel B: All precincts		
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.849***	
	(0.227)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.574*
		(0.346)
Decision to close		-1.005***
		(0.313)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.705**
		(0.354)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	860	860
# of observations	2987	2987

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Panel A only includes precincts observed for all elections between 2002 and 2018. Panel B includes all precincts independent of the number of observations. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2: Exclude cases where the incumbent party has changed between proposal and closure

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.992***	
	(0.268)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.461
		(0.527)
Decision to close		-1.188***
		(0.371)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.774**
		(0.389)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	557	557
# of observations	2360	2360

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Exclude cases where the incumbent party has changed after the proposal

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-1.425***	
	(0.356)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.325
		(0.512)
Decision to close		-1.568***
		(0.485)
Proposal withdrawn		-1.413**
		(0.556)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	361	361
# of observations	1514	1514

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Exclude proposals that occur during election years

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.907***	
	(0.274)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.442
		(0.554)
Decision to close		-1.005***
		(0.378)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.829**
		(0.408)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	522	522
# of observations	2197	2197

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Exclude precincts with multiple school closure at the same period

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.919***	
	(0.265)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.455
		(0.437)
Decision to close		-1.098***
		(0.369)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.762*
		(0.391)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	567	567
# of observations	2424	2424

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Exclude precincts without any untreated periods

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.927***	
	(0.256)	
Proposal (before decision)		0.169
		(0.408)
Decision to close		-1.166***
		(0.357)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.774**
		(0.389)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	442	442
# of observations	1946	1946

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Separating effect for political parties

	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Social Democrats		
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.863**	
	(0.351)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.918*
		(0.521)
Decision to close		-1.126**
		(0.489)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.456
		(0.508)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	374	374
# of observations	1579	1579
Panel B: Moderate Party		
Proposal (all outcomes)	-1.315***	
	(0.427)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.739
		(0.879)
Decision to close		-1.895***
		(0.543)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.763
		(0.676)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	141	141
# of observations	608	608

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Panel A only includes cases where the Social democrats were incumbent at the election period of the proposal. Panel B only includes cases where the Moderate Party was incumbent at the election period of the proposal. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Exclude precincts where the number of eligible voters ever changes by more than +/- 10 percent between two consecutive elections

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.910***	
	(0.266)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.354
		(0.413)
Decision to close		-1.101***
		(0.372)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.756*
		(0.394)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	520	520
# of observations	2198	2198

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Distribution of incumbent parties for proposals in main estimation sample

	Proposals that ends in:			
	Closure		Withdrawal	
Incumbent Party	#	%	#	%
Social Democrats	249	65%	125	57%
The Moderate Party	84	22%	57	26%
Centre Party	37	10%	29	13%
The Liberals	8	2%	6	3%
Christian Democrats	3	1%	0	0%
The Green Party	0	0%	1	0%
Total	381	100%	218	100%

Notes: The number and share of proposals made when each party was incumbent in the main estimation sample. Percentages do not always add up to 100 due to rounding.

Online Appendix B: Regression specification robustness

An alternative estimation strategy is to use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. As discussed in the main paper, the relatively common practice of changing precinct borders between elections leads to a lot of missing data when matching election results over time. Information is lost when including all precincts separately, treated and untreated, and requiring them to be geographically unchanged over several elections.

There are about 6000 precincts in each election. To be included in our DiD analysis we have two requirements. First, a precinct border needs to be unchanged for three consecutive elections (as in the main estimation sample). Second, there need to be at least two precincts within a municipality that we can observe at an election. Under these conditions, 4672 precincts remain in the estimation sample.

For each election and precinct, we use information on the vote shares for the eight parties represented in the the Swedish national parliament. As we want to compare the vote share for the same party in each precinct over time, we include one observation per the eight parties for each precinct and election. Specifically, we estimate the following regression,

$$Y_{i,p,m,t} = \alpha_{i,p} + \beta_{p,m,t} + \gamma * S_{i,p,m,t} + \delta * C_{i,p,m,t} + \theta * W_{i,p,m,t} + \epsilon_{i,p,m,t}, \quad (1)$$

where $Y_{i,p,m,t}$ measure the vote share for the party p in precinct i located in municipality m in election-year t. The precincts-by-party fixed effects are represented by $\alpha_{i,p}$ and account for time-invariant factors that are cor-

related with election results for party p in precinct i. As we only want to exploit within municipality variation for the same party we include party-by-municipality-by-election fixed effects, $\beta_{p,m,t}$, that capture all common shocks to election results for a party within each municipality and election. Therefore, incumbency effects or municipality-wide reforms that affect all precincts similarly in a municipality are accounted for by $\beta_{p,m,t}$. Any remaining variation in the outcome variable can only arise from within municipality differences over time between precincts for the specific parties. The indicator $S_{i,p,m,t}$ takes the value 1 if a school closure proposal has been made for a school in i while party p was incumbent but before the decision to close the school has been made, otherwise it is 0. If instead the decision to close the school has been taken $C_{i,p,m,t}$ takes the value 1 for the party incumbent when the proposal was made and 0 otherwise. Finally, if there has been a proposal while party p was incumbent that never was implemented $W_{i,p,m,t}$ takes the value 1 and otherwise 0. Any remaining variation is captured by the unobserved component $\epsilon_{i,p,m,t}$

In Table B1 we present the results when estimating equation 1. The estimated effect sizes are similar to our main results. Uncertainty around the estimate when a proposal is withdrawn increases slightly, which yields a higher p-value (p=0.060). However, when including all precincts separately we lose information about voting trends in unaffected precincts where the border of the precincts has changed over time. We therefore conclude that the estimates point in the same direction as our main results.

Our main identifying assumption is that in the absence of any school closure proposal, the difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school would remain the same between the affected precinct and the rest of the municipality. A way of loosening this assumption is to allow for a linear

Table B1: Difference-in-differences results, excluding precincts with fewer than three observations

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.966***	
	(0.259)	
Proposal (before decision)		-0.557
		(0.439)
Decision to close		-1.240***
		(0.363)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.708*
		(0.376)
Precinct-by-party FE	YES	YES
Party-by-municipality-by-election FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	37376	37376
# of observations	148352	148352

Notes: Dependent variable: Vote shares for the parties expressed in percentage points. Standard errors clustered at the precinct-by-party level in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

or quadratic trend in the outcome variable over time. Table B2 presents the estimate when we first include a linear precinct-specific trend and then a quadratic trend to our main specification. Results are similar to the ones presented in the main paper, which strengthens our belief that the estimated effect is not driven by trends in the outcome variable.

Table B3 presents the full regression output from the regression used to create the coefficient plot presented in Figure 3 in the main paper.

Table B2: Precinct specific time trends

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.904***	-0.915***		
	(0.329)	(0.331)		
Proposal (before decision)			-0.158	-0.169
			(0.425)	(0.427)
Decision to close			-1.138**	-1.168**
			(0.449)	(0.466)
Proposal withdrawn			-0.970*	-0.994*
			(0.553)	(0.544)
Precinct FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Precinct specific linear time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Precinct specific quadratic time trend	NO	YES	NO	YES
# of precincts	599	599	599	599
# of observations	2541	2541	2541	2541

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B3: Separating effect for post-treatment periods

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes), first election	-1.143***	
	(0.260)	
Proposal (all outcomes), second election	-0.713**	
	(0.283)	
Proposal (all outcomes), third or later elections	-0.767**	
	(0.320)	
Proposal (before decision), first election		-0.490
		(0.428)
Proposal (before decision), second election		-0.013
		(0.941)
Decision to close, first election		-1.347***
		(0.359)
Decision to close, second election		-0.853**
		(0.371)
Decision to close, third or later elections		-0.868**
		(0.430)
Proposal withdrawn, first election		-1.018**
		(0.396)
Proposal withdrawn, second election		-0.700
		(0.450)
Proposal withdrawn, third or later elections		-0.331
		(0.507)
Precinct FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	599	599
# of observations	2541	2541

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Online Appendix C: Voter composition robustness

In this Appendix, we address concerns that our results may be influenced by compositional shifts over time in the electorate within precincts affected by school closure proposals.

In Table A8 we excluded precincts that have experienced larger shifts in the number of voters between two elections from the analysis. However, even if the number of voters stays fairly constant over time the characteristics of voters could change. To test if such shifts occur, we combine our main estimation sample with information on voter characteristics aggregated per precinct that covers a) the mean annual income, b) the share of highly educated, and c) the share of foreign-born in each precinct[1]. When analyzing this data, we use the same regression specification as for our main results. For each of the three demographic measures, we generate a variable that measures how the demographics differ in each precinct, compared to the rest of the municipality for every election. Each of the new variables is then regressed on an indicator for school closure proposal while controlling for time-invariant differences through precinct fixed effects. In these regressions, we only include the 160 school closure proposals from our main estimation sample that occurred prior to the 2014 or 2018 election[2]. If school closure proposals are systematically associated with compositional changes within precincts, we expect that the coefficients for the school closure proposal in-

[1]The information originates from Statistics Sweden but was originally obtained for another project.

[2]As we need to observe each precinct prior to the proposal to estimate an effect, we cannot include precincts affected already in 2010.

dicator are statistically significant. The results from these regressions are presented in Table C1.

For two of the three measures we find no statistically significant effect of school closure proposal and the effect sizes are quite small. For mean annual income, the estimated coefficient indicates that the average resident in a precinct affected by a school closure proposal has about 1200 SEK (roughly US$ 110) higher annual income after the proposal is made, compared to before and when controlling for the trend in the rest of the municipality. Similarly, the share of highly educated residents increased only by about 0.1 percentage points in these precincts compared to before the proposal was made. For the share of residents born outside of Sweden, the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant but still small. The increase is estimated to be on average about half a percentage point after the proposal compared to before. We believe that this association is explained by the refugee crises in Europe, during which Sweden received a large number of asylum applications. Urban areas within a municipality receive a larger number of asylum seekers and are less likely to experience school closure proposals.

To see if these demographic variables affect the estimated relationships with support for the incumbent party we add them as control variables. In Table C2 we re-run the main regression specification used in the main paper but restrict the sample to only include the 160 school closure proposals made in 2010 or 2014. Then, we run the same regressions with the difference in mean annual income, the share of highly educated, and the share of foreign-born in the precinct and the rest of the municipality as control variables (columns 2 and 4). When comparing the estimate from the regression with and without the control variables, we only see minor differences. In sum-

mary, we find no support for the explanation that changes in any of these three aggregated measures of voter characteristics, following a school closure proposal, drive the results.

Table C1: Effect of school closure proposals on demographic variables

	(1) Income	(2) Education	(3) Foreign born
Proposal (all outcomes)	1207.072	0.121	-0.565***
	(789.151)	(0.113)	(0.145)
Precinct FE	YES	YES	YES
# of precincts	160	160	160
# of observations	467	467	467

Notes: Dependent variable: In the first column the difference in mean income between the precinct and the rest of the municipality is used. In the second and third columns it is the difference in the share of inhabitants in the precinct with a degree from higher education (column 2) and who are foreign born (column 3), expressed as percentage points. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C2: Main results with controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-1.068***	-1.137***		
	(0.379)	(0.392)		
Proposal (before decision)			-0.055	-0.119
			(0.483)	(0.508)
Decision to close			-1.233**	-1.267**
			(0.551)	(0.559)
Proposal withdrawn			-1.085*	-1.225**
			(0.581)	(0.592)
Precinct FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control variables	NO	YES	NO	YES
# of precincts	160	160	160	160
# of observations	467	467	467	467

Notes: Dependent variable: Difference in vote share for the party proposing to close a school in the precinct and the rest of the municipality, expressed in percentage points. The included control variables in columns (2) and (4) are measures of the difference in mean annual income, the share of highly educated, and the share of foreign-born in the precinct and the rest of the municipality. The sample is restricted to observations from 2010 and onwards and only includes precincts where the proposal was made after 2010. Standard errors are clustered per precinct in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Online Appendix D: Matching of precincts robustness

In the main paper, we adopt a conservative strategy when matching precincts over time. When the borders of a precinct change between two subsequent elections we only consider the precincts as comparable if the geographical area they cover overlaps to at least 90%. In this Appendix, we present the results using an alternative approach where we use the precinct borders from the election in 2018 and create synthetic versions of the same precincts for all previous elections based on the geographical area coverage. A benefit of such an alternative method is that no information is disregarded when precinct borders are redrawn. However, it relies on the assumption that voters in precincts from earlier elections are distributed proportionally to the area size across subunits corresponding to different precincts in the 2018 election.

To achieve the matching we follow the method developed by Eckert et al. (2020)[3]. In short, we compute the share of the area of each precinct from the 2018 election that corresponds to a precinct in a previous election. Using these shares we calculate the weight used when aggregating precincts from earlier elections to create syntactic versions of the precincts from 2018. Following Eckert et al. (2020), we disregard areas where the overlap between two precincts is less than 10 square meters. We also disregard cases where a precinct from earlier elections belongs to another municipality than the 2018

[3]See Bischof and Valentim (2022) for a recent example of the same method being applied in a similar case as ours.

precinct[4].

Using this sample of weighted precincts, we re-run the difference-in-differences model specification from equation 1 described in Appendix B with one addition. If we observe all (synthetic) precincts in all elections, we remove all precincts affected by a school closure proposal from the control group for other school closure proposals. That is if a school is proposed to be closed in a precinct when, for example, the Social Democrats are incumbent, the same precinct will not be included in the control group of another school that is proposed to be closed in the same municipality when another party is incumbent. The results are presented in Table D1.

Further, we separate the effects of closing a school and withdrawing the proposal depending on the number of elections that have elapsed since the decision and present the results in Table D2.

The results are in line with the ones presented in the main text. The estimated coefficients are slightly smaller and indicate a 0.9 percentage point decrease in vote share for the party that either takes the decision to close a school or withdraws the proposal in the following election. Overall, even with a very different matching strategy of precincts over time, we are able to draw the same conclusion.

As discussed in the main text, it is possible that a school closure proposal affects voters living outside the precincts where the school is located, leading to spill-over effects. Using the newly constructed sample of synthetic

[4]The last restriction applies to very few cases as precincts should follow the municipality borders. Precincts that matched with different municipalities seemed to be remote areas (woods and lakes) where no people lived. These cases are probably artifacts from different methods used by Sweden Statistics when creating the shape files of precincts across elections.

Table D1: Difference-in-differences results, weighted sample

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.632***	
	(0.193)	
Proposal (before decision)		0.088
		(0.351)
Decision to close		-0.761***
		(0.263)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.533*
		(0.285)
Precinct-by-party FE	YES	YES
Party-by-municipality-by-election FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	41138	41138
# of observations	205690	205690

Notes: Dependent variable: Vote shares for the parties expressed in percentage points. Standard errors clustered at the precinct-by-party level in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

and time-invariant precincts we can address this. Initially, we identified all precincts adjacent to precincts that experienced a school closure proposal[5]. Then, if a precinct is a neighbor to an affected precinct it is removed from the estimation sample and thus the control group[6]. The sample is then analyzed using the same difference-in-difference design as above and the results are presented in Tables D3 and D4.

The estimated effect sizes are smaller using this sample compared to the results when neighboring precincts are included. In Table D3 the effect of withdrawing a proposal is not statistically significant and the effect sizes

[5]Restricting adjacent precincts to only include precincts from the same municipality.

[6]If two precincts that both are affected by a school closure proposals are neighbors, we include the precinct where the proposal happens first and exclude the other. If the proposals are made during the same election period both precincts are included.

Table D2: Difference-in-differences results, weighted sample, separating effects over elections

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes), first election	-0.842***	
	(0.202)	
Proposal (all outcomes), second election	-0.439**	
	(0.219)	
Proposal (all outcomes), third or later elections	-0.518**	
	(0.257)	
Proposal (before decision), first election		0.076
		(0.355)
Proposal (before decision), second election		-0.122
		(1.408)
Decision to close, first election		-0.948***
		(0.281)
Decision to close, second election		-0.469
		(0.291)
Decision to close, third or later elections		-0.786**
		(0.351)
Proposal withdrawn, first election		-0.909***
		(0.291)
Proposal withdrawn, second election		-0.479
		(0.330)
Proposal withdrawn, third or later elections		0.013
		(0.385)
Precinct-by-party FE	YES	YES
Party-by-municipality-by-election FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	41138	41138
# of observations	205690	205690

Notes: Dependent variable: Vote shares for the parties expressed in percentage points. Standard errors clustered at the precinct-by-party level in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

when separating the effect for different elections in Table D4 are smaller and have larger standard errors.

We believe that there are three plausible explanations for these results. First, considering all adjacent precincts as contaminated by the school closure proposals might be overly cautious. If we drop precincts that are adjacent but mostly unaffected by the school closure proposals we risk excluding the precincts that constitute the best control units. Assuming that precincts close to each other are more similar than precincts further away means that excluding neighboring precincts yields a less comparable group of control precincts. Second, removing all adjacent precincts in less populated municipalities means removing a fairly large share of the total number of precincts leading to few precincts in the control group.

Third, it is possible that instead of negative spill-over effects, there are positive ones. If neighboring precincts have a school, they might react positively that a school in the other precinct is proposed to be closed and not the school located in their precincts. While we cannot exclude any of these explanations, we believe that excluding neighboring precincts is likely to exclude a large share of the observations and the most relevant control units.

Table D3: Difference-in-differences results, weighted sample, no neighboring precincts

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes)	-0.456*	
	(0.243)	
Proposal (before decision)		0.337
		(0.404)
Decision to close		-0.588*
		(0.322)
Proposal withdrawn		-0.351
		(0.349)
Precinct-by-party FE	YES	YES
Party-by-municipality-by-election FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	28345	28345
# of observations	141725	141725

Notes: Dependent variable: Vote shares for the parties expressed in percentage points. Standard errors clustered at the precinct-by-party level in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table D4: Difference-in-differences results, weighted sample, no neighboring precincts, separating effects over elections

	(1)	(2)
Proposal (all outcomes), first election	-0.607**	
	(0.247)	
Proposal (all outcomes), second election	-0.236	
	(0.277)	
Proposal (all outcomes), third or later elections	-0.479	
	(0.320)	
Proposal (before decision), first election		0.309
		(0.409)
Proposal (before decision), second election		-0.049
		(1.500)
Decision to close, first election		-0.710**
		(0.344)
Decision to close, second election		-0.247
		(0.360)
Decision to close, third or later elections		-0.769*
		(0.415)
Proposal withdrawn, first election		-0.645*
		(0.340)
Proposal withdrawn, second election		-0.368
		(0.389)
Proposal withdrawn, third or later elections		0.060
		(0.478)
Precinct-by-party FE	YES	YES
Party-by-municipality-by-election FE	YES	YES
# of precincts	28345	28345
# of observations	141725	141725

Notes: Dependent variable: Vote shares for the parties expressed in percentage points. Standard errors clustered at the precinct-by-party level in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

References

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