

Online Appendix

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OA.1 Trump’s Covid stance

Guntermann and Lenz (2022) examined why knowledge of Trump’s Covid stances was low. They write: “Among the top 20% of respondents on this measure [non-Covid knowledge of candidate stances], those voting for Biden saw Biden as more pro-mask than Trump 96% of the time. In contrast, those voting for Trump did so only 63% of the time. People who did not support either candidate but had high knowledge did so 86% of the time. These findings are consistent with knowledgeable Trump voters engaging in motivated reasoning, projecting, or cheerleading. Clearly, lack of knowledge is not the only problem.”

Summaries of news articles and Trump quotes on masks through Aug. 19

April 7: “I don’t think I’m going to be doing it. I think wearing a face mask as I greet presidents, prime ministers, dictators, kings, queens, I don’t know. Somehow, I don’t see it for myself,” adding, “I just don’t.” The larger historical and political context of the President’s remarks should be unpacked, but let’s stop for a moment and reflect on the personal mindset Trump revealed with them. Under his watch, the pandemic is running out of control in the US. America has perhaps been among the worst in the world in its response, even as he demands praise and appreciation. As death, grief, and suffering pooled around him, Trump’s thoughts turned to the optics of meeting people “sitting in the Oval Office behind that great resolute desk.” Who, in his right mind, would pause in the face of this pandemic to consider visiting dignitaries – including dictators, mind you – and how a medical mask might spoil his look? Aside from anything else, we all know that foreign delegations won’t be arriving at the White House any time soon. And if, by chance, it happened, the president should insist he be photographed wearing a mask if only to show his solidarity with and concern for others. (The first lady, perhaps less concerned about a mask messing her hair, encourages their use).⁹ April 28: Despite CDC guidance that Americans should wear face masks in public to avoid spreading Covid-19, President Donald Trump joked about a man who wore one at the White House on Tuesday and Vice President Mike Pence refused to wear one while meeting doctors and patients at the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota. At one point, as Trump asked Ali Mills, the vice president of a family-owned contracting company from Pennsylvania to speak, he invited her husband and co-worker to join her on stage, and joked about the fact that he had worn a mask earlier. “Put that mask on, the way you had it,” Trump said to the man. As the president shook his head and smiled, some in the room laughed. (After the event, Mills explained in an email that her husband, who “has a great passion for President Trump,” has a Trump 2020 mask, which he showed the president before the event.)¹⁰ May 27: Mr. Trump retweeted a post from Fox News political analyst Brit Hume showing a picture of Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, wearing sunglasses and a black mask that covered much of his face at a Memorial Day ceremony. “This might help explain why Trump doesn’t like to wear a mask in public,” Hume wrote.¹¹ June 28: “The mask is a double-edged sword,” he told The Wall Street Journal. He explained they might make wearers “a little cocky” and neglect other public

⁹<https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/07/opinions/trump-mask-coronavirus-dantonio/index.html>

¹⁰<https://theintercept.com/2020/04/28/trump-mocks-mans-mask-white-house-pence-refuses-wear-one-mayo-clinic/>

¹¹<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-mocks-joe-biden-wear-face-mask-public/>

health guidelines, such as not touching their faces.¹² July 10: Miami-Dade mayor demands masks in public. But not for Trump¹³ July 11: “I think when you’re in a hospital, especially in that particular setting, where you’re talking to a lot of soldiers and people that, in some cases, just got off the operating tables, I think it’s a great thing to wear a mask.” July 12: “I’ve never been against masks but I do believe they have a time and a place.”¹⁴ July 16: Republican governors break from Trump amid growing calls for mask mandates . . . More and more, Republican politicians are mandating masks statewide, breaking from President Donald Trump who still resists the idea even though he finally wore one in public, once, last weekend. . . . President Trump’s resistance trickles down to his supporters, Pepper says, and makes it harder for businesses to enforce mask rules. . . . White House press secretary Kayleigh McEnany on Thursday rejected the idea of national mask mandate, saying, “We leave it to localities to make the decisions with regards to face coverings, and CDC guidelines remain the same today, recommended but not required.”¹⁵ July 16: Speaking to Fox Business Network last week, Mr Trump said: “I’m all for mask” . . . The change of tone came as the US recorded 66,528 coronavirus cases on Saturday, a new daily record. But speaking to Fox News on Friday, Mr Trump said he didn’t agree with a national mask mandate, saying people should have a “certain freedom”. He also said he took issue with people touching their faces after taking their mask off. “They put their finger on the mask, and they take them off, and then they start touching their eyes and touching their nose and their mouth. And then they don’t know how they caught it?” he said.¹⁶ July 17: Atlanta mayor: Trump broke city’s mask rule, ignored science. July 21: “It will probably, unfortunately, get worse before it gets better. Something I don’t like to say about things, but that’s the way it is. It’s what we have.” “I have no problem with masks. I view it this way: Anything that can potentially help, is a good thing. I have no problem. I carry it. I wear it. You saw me wearing it a number of times, and I’ll continue.”¹⁷ July 29: Amid Virus Surge, Republicans Abruptly Urge Masks Despite Trump’s Resistance. Masks became a political cause for some in the early months of the pandemic. A growing set of Republican leaders are suddenly pushing Americans to wear them. . . . Protesters marched on the State Capitol in Texas, holding signs declaring that masks equal “medical tyranny.” Lawsuits filed in Florida courts argue that mask laws violate constitutional rights. President Trump mocked former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. for wearing a mask and has rarely worn one himself.¹⁸ August 3: President Donald Trump on Monday sent a campaign email, typically used for soliciting donations, to make a different request of his supporters: consider wearing a mask. “We are all in this together, and while I know there has been some confusion surrounding the usage of face masks, I think it’s something we should all try to do when we are not able to be socially distanced from others,” the email, sent by the Trump campaign and signed by the

¹²<https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/28/politics/donald-trump-coronavirus-fallout/index.html>

¹³<https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article244135532.html>

¹⁴<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53378439>

¹⁵<https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/republican-governors-break-trump-amid-growing-calls-mask/story?id=71818051>

¹⁶<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53453468>

¹⁷<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-masks.html>

¹⁸<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/us/coronavirus-masks.html>

President, read.¹⁹ August 13: Trump attacks Biden for calling on governors to mandate masks.²⁰ August 13: “We have urged Americans to wear masks. We’ve been saying wear them when it’s appropriate,” Trump said. “Maybe they’re great and maybe they’re just good, maybe they’re not so good. But frankly what do you have to lose? You have nothing to lose.” However, Trump claimed that Biden “wants to shut down our economy and close our schools and grind society to a halt.” “We’ll defeat this virus, but not by hiding in our basements, he’s got to come out of his basement. We’ll defeat this virus through a common sense mitigation effort, shielding those at highest risk and unleashing America’s medical and scientific genius.”²¹

OA.2 Analyses of Attrition

As with any study using panel data, we must be concerned about attrition. We address attrition in two ways. First, we consider how respondents to the first wave compare to respondents who made it to the second wave in Table OA1 on the variables we use in our analyses. There are three clear differences: older respondents are more likely to participate in the second wave, respondents who knew more about the candidates’ positions in the first wave were more likely to make it to the second wave, and those who were more personally affected by the virus were less likely to participate in the second wave. While we might expect the respondents who were more personally affected by the virus and did not participate in the second wave to have abandoned Trump more, we would also expect those who were older (because they are more at risk) and those who knew more about the candidates’ positions to have shifted away from Trump more. Thus, attrition is not systematically related to variables we would expect to influence our results.

Second, we can estimate regression models on the respondents who did complete our second wave interview and then, using only variables from the first wave, forecast how respondents would have behaved if they had taken our follow-up survey. We can then compare forecasts for those who did and did not take the follow-up survey. Of course, this exercise assumes the statistical models capture all the relevant variables, do so with the right functional form, and that none of these variables interact with attrition, all strong assumptions. Nevertheless, we think the exercise is useful. We first run models of learning, which include only wave one variables, and calculate predicted values for respondents who only participated in the first wave and for respondents who participated in both waves, allowing us to compare how likely each type of respondent is to learn. We then run models of knowledge of relative positions in the second wave. Finally, we run models of abandoning Trump, operationalized as voting against Trump or as lowering relative candidate ratings. All models include the partisanship as a social identity scale, the proportion of correct relative candidate placements on the 14 issues with those questions, dummy variables for whether the respondent or a family member had a positive Covid test prior to the first wave and for

¹⁹<https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/03/politics/trump-masks-campaign-email/index.html>

²⁰<https://www.pressherald.com/2020/08/13/trump-attacks-biden-for-calling-on-governors-to-mandate-masks/>

²¹<https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/13/trump-calls-bidens-coronavirus-plan-unscientific-rejects-call-for-national-mask-mandate.html>

whether a family member died from the virus as well as demographic controls (age, gender, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, household income, and unemployment).

Figure OA1 shows that respondents who were reinterviewed are not systematically different on each variable from those who were not. They were slightly more likely to learn relative positions on masks and closing businesses, but slightly less likely to learn on the WHO. They were slightly more likely to know on each of the three issues. They were slightly less likely to vote against him, but slightly more likely to lower their relations. This analysis suggests we are thus unlikely to be significantly underestimating or overestimating how much Trump supporters shifted away from him after he adopted his unpopular stance.

Table OA1: Demographic Characteristics of Trump Voters in First and Second Waves

	Panel Study	Benchmark
Sample	First Wave	Second Wave
N	3,704	983
Gender		
Female	52	55
Age		
18-24	12	4
25-34	17	13
35-49	27	20
50-64	26	35
65+	18	28
Race		
Non-Hispanic White	80	84
Black	15	11
Asian + Other	7	7
Hispanic	10	6
Education		
No College	57	59
Bachelor's Degree	23	28
Graduate Degree	20	13
Income		
<\$20k	23	25
\$20k-\$39k	43	45
\$40k-\$59k	25	25
\$60k-\$79k	10	6
\$80k+	0	0
Candidate Support Variables		
Voted for Trump	40	42
Relative Candidate Ratings	-0.1	-0.2
Coronavirus Variables		
More or Much More Coronavirus Testing	66	70
More or Much More to Make People Stay at Home	70	72
More or Much More to Protect from the Coronavirus	70	73
Agree with Mandatory Masks in Public	70	70
Agree with Closing Non-Essential Businesses	50	50
Agree with WHO Membership	54	54
Knew Candidate Positions on Mandatory Masks in Public	42	50
Knew Candidate Positions on Closing Non-Essential Businesses	43	52
Knew Candidate Positions on WHO Membership	50	63
Positive Covid Test (self, friend or family)	28	21
Covid Death (friend or family)	15	9

Note: Except for the N row, cell entries provide the percentage of first wave and second wave in each category.




Figure OA1: Distributions of predicted values from models of learning and shifting away from Trump among respondents who were reinterviewed and among those who were not

OA.3 Policy Questions

Table OA2: Agree/disagree questions. These are the issues for which we have both respondents' own positions as well as their perceptions of the candidates' positions. Respondents were asked whether they and the candidates agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with each item.

Issue	Statement
Improve Position of Blacks	The government should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of Blacks
Gay Marriage Ban	A constitutional amendment banning same sex marriages
Lower Taxes	Lowering federal taxes
Abortion	Restrictions on whether a woman can get an abortion
Background Checks for Guns	Strengthening background checks to prevent guns from being sold to people with criminal records or mental illness
CO2	Restricting the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) factories can emit
Muslim Ban	Preventing any Muslim who is not a US citizen from entering the country
Repeal ACA	Repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
WHO	The United States should be part of the World Health Organization (WHO)
Mexico Wall	Building a wall along the Mexican border
Masks in Public	Requiring people to wear masks in public to slow the spread of the coronavirus
Free Trade	Increasing free trade with other countries
Income Gap	Reducing the size of the income gap between rich and poor Americans
Close Businesses	Closing non-essential businesses to slow the spread of the coronavirus

Table OA3: Other agree/disagree questions. For these questions, respondents were asked whether they strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each policy statement.

Issue	Statement
Work Permit	Allowing existing illegal immigrants to obtain a work permit to stay in the US
Taxes on High Incomes	Increasing taxes on households with very high incomes
No Favors for Blacks	Blacks should work their way up without any special favors
Health Insurance	Requiring people to have health insurance
Late Abortion Restrictions	Restrictions on abortions in the last three months of pregnancy
Early Abortion Restrictions	Restrictions on abortions in the first three months of pregnancy
Deportations	Deporting all people who entered the US illegally back to their country of origin
Roe v Wade	Appointing judges to the Supreme Court who would overturn the Roe v Wade decision that allowed abortion
White Advantage	White people in the US have advantages because of the color of their skin
Affirmative Action	Affirmative action to help Blacks

Table OA4: Government effort questions. Note: for these questions, respondents were asked whether the government should put much more effort, somewhat more effort, the same amount of effort, somewhat less effort or much less effort than than now into achieving each policy goal.


Issue	Statement
Hiring Illegal Immigrants	Stopping employers from hiring illegal immigrants
Coronavirus Testing	Coronavirus Testing
Protecting the environment	Protecting the environment
Stay at Home	Making sure people with the coronavirus stay at home
Protect from Coronavirus	Protecting Americans from the coronavirus
Protect Air	Protecting the air we breathe

Table OA5: Government spending questions. For these questions, respondents were asked whether the government should spend much more, somewhat more, the same amount, somewhat less or much less than than now on achieving each policy goal.

Issue	Statement
Alternative Energies	Developing alternative sources of energy that do not depend on oil
Health care	Health care
Health care Assistance	Health care assistance to people who cannot afford health insurance
Assistance to the Poor	Assistance to poor people
Helping Blacks	Helping Black Americans get ahead

OA.4 Post-Election Virus Attitudes

(a) How much effort do you want from the federal government on ...



(b) Respondent view on ...




Figure OA2: Initial Trump voters' views on coronavirus policies in the August 2020 wave of the panel survey. This figure shows that many Trump voters disagreed with Trump on the thrust of government policy. In the top panels, the symbols indicate as follows: ++ 'much more than now,' + 'somewhat more than now,' = 'the same as now,' - 'somewhat less than now,' -- 'much less than now.'

OA.5 Descriptive Statistics

Table OA6: Study Demographic Data Compared to Census

	Panel Study	Benchmark
Sample	Lucid	ACS 2019
N	983	12,686,854
Gender		
Female	55	51
Age		
18-24	4	12
25-34	13	18
35-49	20	25
50-64	35	25
65+	28	20
Race		
Non-Hispanic White	84	64
Black	11	12
Asian + Other	7	8
Hispanic	6	16
Education		
No College	59	71
Bachelor's Degree	28	19
Graduate Degree	13	11
Income		
<\$20k	25	13
\$20k-\$39k	45	16
\$40k-\$59k	25	15
\$60k-\$79k	6	12
\$80k+	0	44

Note: Except for the N row, cell entries provide the percentage of each sample present in each demographic category. In a few cases age and income categories were inconsistent across surveys and were either combined or averaged across other categories. We excluded respondents from the ACS 2019 under 18. We use the 2019 five-year ACS, rather than the 2020, because of Census warnings about Covid-19 interfering with the 2020 ACS. We weight the ACS sample.

Table OA7: Descriptive statistics for initial Trump voters

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Trump vote post	409	0.861	0.347	0	1
Trump vs Biden ratings pre	406	0.853	0.189	0.000	1.000
Trump vs Biden ratings post	407	0.843	0.207	0.000	1.000
Coronavirus scale pre	409	0.605	0.261	0.000	1.000
Coronavirus scale post	409	0.573	0.269	0.000	1.000
Party identification scale	409	0.832	0.245	0.000	1.000
Aid to blacks scale	409	0.348	0.234	0.000	0.900
Immigration scale	409	0.254	0.211	0.000	1.000
Redistribution scale	409	0.598	0.242	0.000	1.000
Healthcare scale	409	0.501	0.195	0.000	1.000
Environmental scale	409	0.636	0.255	0.000	1.000
Abortion scale	409	0.329	0.281	0.000	1.000
Additional attention check 1	408	0.402	0.491	0	1
Additional attention check 2	409	0.863	0.344	0	1
Additional attention check 3	404	0.913	0.282	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden masks positions	409	0.367	0.483	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden close businesses positions	409	0.418	0.494	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden WHO positions	409	0.274	0.446	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden Covid positions index	409	1.059	0.988	0	3
Positive coronavirus test	409	0.291	0.455	0	1

Table OA8: Descriptive statistics for all respondents

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Trump vote pre	983	0.416	0.493	0	1
Trump vote post	983	0.380	0.486	0	1
Trump vs Biden ratings pre	977	0.485	0.378	0.000	1.000
Trump vs Biden ratings post	980	0.468	0.388	0.000	1.000
Coronavirus scale pre	983	0.746	0.248	0.000	1.000
Coronavirus scale post	983	0.732	0.258	0.000	1.000
Party identification scale	983	0.491	0.387	0.000	1.000
Aid to blacks scale	983	0.531	0.273	0.000	1.000
Immigration scale	983	0.473	0.294	0.000	1.000
Redistribution scale	983	0.737	0.235	0.000	1.000
Healthcare scale	983	0.660	0.230	0.000	1.000
Environmental scale	983	0.760	0.242	0.000	1.000
Abortion scale	983	0.493	0.313	0.000	1.000
Additional attention check 1	979	0.385	0.487	0	1
Additional attention check 2	983	0.870	0.337	0	1
Additional attention check 3	967	0.937	0.243	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden masks positions	983	0.301	0.459	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden close businesses positions	983	0.347	0.476	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden WHO positions	983	0.227	0.419	0	1
Learned Trump and Biden Covid positions index	983	0.875	0.983	0	3
Positive coronavirus test	983	0.311	0.463	0	1

OA.6 Attention and Knowledge of Stances

It’s possible that respondents aren’t reporting that Biden supported more aggressive policies on Covid than Trump because of low attention to the survey, a chronic problem on online surveys. Respondents may have known Biden’s and Trump’s stances, but not reported them accurately because they weren’t paying attention to the survey. We took steps to address this in our first wave by only interviewing respondents who passed an attention screen. But attention remains a concern, since it would lower rates of apparent knowledge. In this section, we report on additional robustness checks to attention. We asked three attention check questions in the second wave survey. Two relatively easy ones and one very hard one. Regardless of how we cut the data, however, we don’t find much higher knowledge of Biden’s and Trump’s stances among respondents who pass these attention checks.

Before we show these checks, we remind the reader that Figure 3(b) showed the percent of initial Trump voters who disagreed with him and who placed Biden as pursuing a more aggressive Covid-19 policy than Trump in August and November. To summarize these again:

- On mandatory masks, 19% of initial Trump voters who disagreed with him placed Biden as more supportive of masks in August and 40% did so after the election. On closing non-essential businesses, these percentages are 19% and 43%. On the WHO, these are 27% and 41%.
- Among all initial Trump voters, these are 30% vs. 50%, 44% vs. 66%, and 56% vs. 65%.
- Among all respondents, these are 50% vs. 67%, 52% vs. 68%, and 63% vs. 71%.

To check whether these increase with apparent attention, we first use two additional attention check questions in the second wave survey, which were relatively easy. 87% and 94% passed these:

- Among all initial Trump voters who initially disagreed with him, these percentages placing Biden to the left of Trump on masks closing nonessential businesses, and the WHO are 19% vs. 42%, 18% vs. 49%, and 28% vs. 44%.
- Among all initial Trump voters, these percentages are 32% vs. 52%, 45% vs. 70%, and 59% vs. 69%.
- Among all respondents, these are 51% vs. 69%, 53% vs. 70%, and 65% vs. 74%.

We also asked a hard attention check that only 39% passed. Here we do find somewhat higher levels of knowledge, but still low given the magnitude of the crisis—not much above chance for initial Trump voters who initially disagreed with him:

- Among all initial Trump voters who initially disagreed with him, the percentages placing Biden to the left of Trump on masks, closing nonessential businesses, and the WHO are 22% vs. 46%, 15% vs. 48%, and 41% vs. 56%.
- Among all initial Trump voters, these percentages are 35% vs. 59%, 47% vs. 70%, and 66% vs. 74%.
- Among all respondents, these are 54% vs. 73%, 55% vs. 73%, and 70% vs. 77%.

OA.7 Guess Correction

We briefly reference guess correction on whether people place Biden to the left of Trump on each of our three Covid policy issues. The guess correction equation applied is Percent Correct - Percent Incorrect * (Number Correct Response Options/Number Incorrect Response Options). It assumes that (a) all wrong answers are guesses and that (b) guessers distribute their guesses uniformly over response options. In this case, wrong answers are sometimes projection, especially on masks, for initial Trump voters. If we ignore skipping, there are three correct response options out of nine possible responses. If we incorporate skipping, it's 3/12. Among all respondents, these calculations suggest around 55%-60% had a sense for the candidate stances across the three issues, fairly typical of candidate stances more generally.

OA.8 Analyses Using Weights

In this section, we repeat figures from the main text, except analyses are weighted. We create weights by raking on the margins of age, gender, education, race, and Hispanic ethnicity using the American Community Survey. We first create weights for the first wave, then create weights for the second wave after applying first-wave weights.




Figure OA3: Weighted Trump voters' views on coronavirus policies (weighted)




Figure OA4: Weighted knowledge of the candidates' positions on Covid issues among Trump supporters who disagreed with him on each issue (weighted)




Figure OA5: Weighted learning category among initial Trump supporters who disagreed with Trump on each issue (weighted)




Figure OA6: Weighted shifting away from Trump vote among initial Trump voters who disagreed with him on Covid policies by whether they learned they disagree with him




Figure OA7: Reactions to Trump’s positions on each issue among Trump voters who disagreed with him. This figure considers whether Trump voters decided to vote against him. It shows that learning and abandoning Trump was one of the least common reactions on each issue.






Figure OA8: Weighted reactions to Trump's positions on each issue among Trump voters who disagreed with him. Shifting away from Trump is assessed using relative candidate ratings. This figure shows that learning and shifting away from Trump was one of the least common reactions on each issue.

OA.9 Additional Regression Estimates

This section presents regression tables that offer robustness checks on the main regressions in the paper.

Table OA9: Does Learning Lead to Voting on Three Coronavirus Policy Issues—Comparison to Those Who Never Learn. Each column shows a separate least-squares regression with standard errors in parentheses.

	DV: Vote for Trump		
	Mandatory Masks	Close Businesses	WHO Membership
(Intercept)	0.985 [0.762, 1.209]	1.069 [0.807, 1.331]	0.934 [0.616, 1.253]
Learned Stance on the Policy	−0.103 [−0.228, 0.022]	−0.116 [−0.222, −0.010]	−0.033 [−0.198, 0.133]
Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.052 [−0.126, 0.022]	−0.132 [−0.241, −0.024]	0.047 [−0.150, 0.244]
Partisanship Scale	0.151 [−0.026, 0.327]	0.138 [−0.072, 0.349]	0.124 [−0.127, 0.375]
Attitudes about Aiding Blacks	−0.178 [−0.341, −0.015]	−0.211 [−0.406, −0.015]	−0.218 [−0.434, −0.002]
Attitudes about Immigration	−0.016 [−0.188, 0.157]	−0.074 [−0.289, 0.142]	−0.091 [−0.339, 0.157]
Attitudes about Redistribution	−0.010 [−0.194, 0.174]	0.067 [−0.128, 0.262]	0.046 [−0.183, 0.275]
Attitudes about Healthcare	−0.094 [−0.332, 0.144]	−0.153 [−0.467, 0.160]	0.035 [−0.249, 0.318]
Attitudes about Environment	−0.019 [−0.186, 0.149]	−0.067 [−0.253, 0.118]	−0.210 [−0.456, 0.036]
Attitudes about Abortion	−0.030 [−0.142, 0.082]	−0.057 [−0.201, 0.088]	0.060 [−0.084, 0.204]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Support for Covid Policy Pre	0.078 [−0.072, 0.229]	0.162 [−0.004, 0.329]	0.116 [−0.102, 0.333]
Num.Obs.	281	230	181
R2	0.096	0.126	0.106

Note:

This table shows the results of separately regressing November vote (the lagged dependent variable) on an indicator for whether they learned the candidate stances on each of these issues (0/1, relative measure), their attitude on each respective issue in August, and the interaction. Trump vote coded Biden 0, 0.5 Other/No vote, and Trump 1. All variables coded 0-1. The number of observations varies across the regressions because the number of respondents who don't know the stances in August varies.

Table OA10: Does Learning Lead to Voting on Three Coronavirus Policy Issues—Comparison to Those Who Never Learn. Each column shows a separate least-squares regression.

	DV: Vote for Trump		
	Mandatory Masks	Close Businesses	WHO Membership
(Intercept)	0.354 [0.185, 0.524]	0.283 [0.116, 0.451]	0.214 [0.034, 0.395]
Learned Stance on the Policy	-0.074 [-0.228, 0.079]	-0.001 [-0.109, 0.107]	-0.139 [-0.284, 0.005]
Support for Covid Policy Pre	-0.017 [-0.093, 0.060]	-0.029 [-0.107, 0.049]	-0.010 [-0.137, 0.116]
Lagged DV	0.571 [0.438, 0.704]	0.596 [0.477, 0.714]	0.600 [0.457, 0.743]
Partisanship Scale	0.177 [0.058, 0.296]	0.187 [0.061, 0.314]	0.164 [0.013, 0.315]
Attitudes about Aiding Blacks	-0.153 [-0.284, -0.022]	-0.184 [-0.324, -0.043]	-0.185 [-0.339, -0.032]
Attitudes about Immigration	-0.040 [-0.152, 0.072]	-0.047 [-0.179, 0.085]	-0.062 [-0.206, 0.081]
Attitudes about Redistribution	0.021 [-0.129, 0.171]	0.163 [0.007, 0.320]	0.118 [-0.056, 0.292]
Attitudes about Healthcare	-0.118 [-0.284, 0.048]	-0.113 [-0.300, 0.073]	0.024 [-0.163, 0.211]
Attitudes about Environment	-0.031 [-0.174, 0.112]	-0.127 [-0.273, 0.019]	-0.141 [-0.327, 0.044]
Attitudes about Abortion	-0.047 [-0.132, 0.038]	-0.050 [-0.149, 0.048]	0.045 [-0.060, 0.150]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Support for Covid Policy Pre	0.011 [-0.124, 0.146]	0.026 [-0.095, 0.147]	0.088 [-0.062, 0.239]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Lagged DV	0.027 [-0.089, 0.144]	-0.015 [-0.118, 0.088]	0.129 [0.009, 0.248]
Num.Obs.	485	469	361
R2	0.677	0.666	0.675

Note: This table shows the results of separately regressing November vote on August vote (the lagged dependent variable), an indicator variable (0/1) for whether they learned the candidate stances on each of these issues, their attitude on that issue in August (0/1, relative measure), and the relevant interactions. Trump vote coded Biden 0, 0.5 Other/No vote, and Trump 1. The number of observations varies across the regressions because the number of respondents who don't know the stances in August varies.

Table OA11: Does Learning Lead to Shifting Away from Trump on Three Coronavirus Policy Issues—Comparison to Those Who Never Learn. Each column shows a separate least-squares regression with standard errors in parentheses.

	DV: Relative Candidate Ratings		
	Mandatory Masks	Close Businesses	WHO Membership
(Intercept)	0.039 [−0.033, 0.111]	0.050 [−0.007, 0.107]	0.076 [−0.008, 0.159]
Learned Stance on the Policy	0.023 [−0.096, 0.142]	0.012 [−0.068, 0.093]	−0.100 [−0.204, 0.004]
Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.001 [−0.065, 0.063]	−0.026 [−0.083, 0.031]	−0.011 [−0.084, 0.062]
Lagged DV	0.912 [0.845, 0.979]	0.891 [0.829, 0.954]	0.848 [0.764, 0.931]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.058 [−0.161, 0.045]	−0.056 [−0.140, 0.028]	−0.013 [−0.112, 0.086]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Lagged DV	−0.003 [−0.100, 0.094]	0.043 [−0.040, 0.127]	0.144 [0.047, 0.240]
Num.Obs.	483	467	359
R2	0.776	0.779	0.770

Note: This table shows the results of separately regressing November relative candidate ratings on August ratings (the lagged dependent variable), an indicator variable (0/1) for whether they learned the candidate stances on each issue (0/1, relative measure), their attitude on each respective issue in August, and the relevant interactions. All variables coded 0-1. The number of observations varies across the regressions because the number of respondents who don't know the stances in August varies.

Table OA12: Does Learning Lead to Shifting Away from Trump on Three Coronavirus Policy Issues—Comparison to Those Who Never Learn. Each column shows a separate least-squares regression with standard errors in parentheses.

	DV: Relative Candidate Ratings		
	Mandatory Masks	Close Businesses	WHO Membership
(Intercept)	0.039 [−0.033, 0.111]	0.050 [−0.007, 0.107]	0.076 [−0.008, 0.159]
Learned Stance on the Policy	0.023 [−0.096, 0.142]	0.012 [−0.068, 0.093]	−0.100 [−0.204, 0.004]
Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.001 [−0.065, 0.063]	−0.026 [−0.083, 0.031]	−0.011 [−0.084, 0.062]
Lagged DV	0.912 [0.845, 0.979]	0.891 [0.829, 0.954]	0.848 [0.764, 0.931]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.058 [−0.161, 0.045]	−0.056 [−0.140, 0.028]	−0.013 [−0.112, 0.086]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Lagged DV	−0.003 [−0.100, 0.094]	0.043 [−0.040, 0.127]	0.144 [0.047, 0.240]
Num.Obs.	483	467	359
R2	0.776	0.779	0.770

Note: This table shows the results of separately regressing November (post-election) candidate ratings on August (post-election) candidate ratings (the lagged dependent variable), an indicator variable (0/1) for whether they learned the candidate stances on each issue (0/1, relative measure), their attitude on each respective issue in August, and the relevant interactions. All variables coded 0-1. The number of observations varies across the regressions because the number of respondents who don't know the stances in August varies.

Table OA13: Does Learning Lead to Shifting Away from Trump on Three Coronavirus Policy Issues—Comparison to Those Who Never Learn. Each column shows a separate least-squares regression with standard errors in parentheses.

	DV: Relative Candidate Ratings		
	Mandatory Masks	Close Businesses	WHO Membership
(Intercept)	0.215 [0.081, 0.348]	0.312 [0.140, 0.484]	0.249 [0.047, 0.451]
Learned Stance on the Policy	0.090 [−0.195, 0.374]	−0.082 [−0.354, 0.190]	−0.083 [−0.361, 0.196]
Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.028 [−0.102, 0.047]	−0.090 [−0.175, −0.005]	−0.027 [−0.134, 0.079]
Lagged DV	0.754 [0.628, 0.880]	0.659 [0.484, 0.835]	0.679 [0.496, 0.863]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.013 [−0.129, 0.103]	0.065 [−0.053, 0.182]	0.018 [−0.105, 0.140]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Lagged DV	−0.109 [−0.391, 0.173]	0.084 [−0.194, 0.362]	0.129 [−0.143, 0.400]
Num.Obs.	277	226	179
R2	0.411	0.417	0.451

Note: This table shows the results of separately regressing November (post-election) candidate ratings on August (post-election) candidate ratings (the lagged dependent variable), an indicator variable (0/1) for whether they learned the candidate stances on each issue (0/1, relative measure), their attitude on each respective issue in August, and the relevant interactions. All variables coded 0-1. The number of observations varies across the regressions because the number of respondents who don't know the stances in August varies.

Table OA14: Does Learning Lead to Shifting Away from Trump on Three Coronavirus Policy Issues—Comparison to Those Who Never Learn. Each column shows a separate least-squares regression with standard errors in parentheses.

	DV: Relative Candidate Ratings		
	Mandatory Masks	Close Businesses	WHO Membership
(Intercept)	0.039 [−0.033, 0.111]	0.050 [−0.007, 0.107]	0.076 [−0.008, 0.159]
Learned Stance on the Policy	0.023 [−0.096, 0.142]	0.012 [−0.068, 0.093]	−0.100 [−0.204, 0.004]
Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.001 [−0.065, 0.063]	−0.026 [−0.083, 0.031]	−0.011 [−0.084, 0.062]
Lagged DV	0.912 [0.845, 0.979]	0.891 [0.829, 0.954]	0.848 [0.764, 0.931]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Support for Covid Policy Pre	−0.058 [−0.161, 0.045]	−0.056 [−0.140, 0.028]	−0.013 [−0.112, 0.086]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Lagged DV	−0.003 [−0.100, 0.094]	0.043 [−0.040, 0.127]	0.144 [0.047, 0.240]
Num.Obs.	483	467	359
R2	0.776	0.779	0.770

Note: This table shows the results of separately regressing November (post-election) candidate ratings on August (post-election) candidate ratings (the lagged dependent variable), an indicator variable (0/1) for whether they learned the candidate stances on each issue (0/1, relative measure), their attitude on each respective issue in August, and the relevant interactions. All variables coded 0-1. The number of observations varies across the regressions because the number of respondents who don't know the stances in August varies.

Table OA15: Does Learning Lead to Voting on Three Coronavirus Policy Issues—Comparison to All Other Respondents. Each column shows a separate least-squares regression.

	DV: Vote for Trump		
	Mandatory Masks	Close Businesses	WHO Membership
(Intercept)	0.277 [0.169, 0.386]	0.277 [0.165, 0.389]	0.293 [0.186, 0.400]
Learned Stance on the Policy	-0.012 [-0.137, 0.113]	-0.028 [-0.125, 0.070]	-0.122 [-0.232, -0.012]
Support for Covid Policy Pre	-0.011 [-0.064, 0.042]	-0.055 [-0.102, -0.007]	-0.016 [-0.077, 0.044]
Lagged DV	0.666 [0.582, 0.749]	0.656 [0.574, 0.738]	0.630 [0.546, 0.715]
Partisanship Scale	0.134 [0.052, 0.216]	0.133 [0.051, 0.216]	0.141 [0.058, 0.225]
Attitudes about Aiding Blacks	-0.061 [-0.146, 0.023]	-0.058 [-0.142, 0.027]	-0.072 [-0.156, 0.012]
Attitudes about Immigration	-0.045 [-0.118, 0.028]	-0.049 [-0.124, 0.025]	-0.054 [-0.130, 0.021]
Attitudes about Redistribution	-0.001 [-0.111, 0.109]	0.011 [-0.099, 0.122]	0.009 [-0.101, 0.120]
Attitudes about Healthcare	-0.139 [-0.257, -0.021]	-0.134 [-0.251, -0.018]	-0.153 [-0.276, -0.030]
Attitudes about Environment	-0.023 [-0.123, 0.077]	-0.009 [-0.107, 0.089]	-0.022 [-0.125, 0.080]
Attitudes about Abortion	-0.029 [-0.085, 0.027]	-0.024 [-0.081, 0.032]	-0.020 [-0.078, 0.037]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Support for Covid Policy Pre	-0.014 [-0.136, 0.108]	0.038 [-0.064, 0.140]	0.088 [-0.021, 0.197]
Learned Stance on the Policy X Lagged DV	-0.024 [-0.104, 0.056]	-0.017 [-0.104, 0.070]	0.085 [-0.004, 0.175]
Num.Obs.	971	978	973
R2	0.779	0.776	0.774

Note: This table shows the results of separately regressing November vote on August vote (the lagged dependent variable), an indicator variable (0/1) for whether they learned the candidate stances on each issue, their attitude on that issue in August (relative measure), and the relevant interactions. Trump vote coded Biden 0, 0.5 Other/No vote, and Trump 1. The number of observations varies across the regressions because the number of respondents who don't know the stances in August varies.

Covid Scale Effects




Figure OA9: Regressions exploring whether initial Trump voters shift away from him because of their Covid views. Using our six-item Covid policy scale, this figure presents regressions of post-election vote choice and relative candidate ratings on the August Covid policy scale. In the vote choice models, post-election vote choice is coded Trump 1, Biden or other 0, and non-votes 0.5. The minimal control models include the seven-point party identification scale. The full control models include the seven-point party identification and the six other non-Covid policy scales. The models with relative candidate ratings as the dependent variable also include lagged candidate ratings. 68 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals shown. Ns are for the vote regressions.

Policy Scale Effects (Covid and Six Non-Covid Scales)

Covid Scale Effects





Figure OA10: Regressions exploring whether all voters shifted votes because of their Covid views. Using our six-item Covid policy scale, this figure presents regressions of post-election vote choice and relative candidate ratings on the August Covid policy scale. In the vote choice models, post-election vote choice is coded Trump 1, Biden or other 0, and non-votes 0.5. The minimal control models include the seven-point party identification scale. The full control models include the seven-point party identification and the six other non-Covid policy scales. All models include the lagged dependent variable. Biden or other 0, and Non-Votes 0.5. 68 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals shown. Ns are for the vote regressions.

OA.10 Covid Views and Knowledge of Candidate Positions Among Biden Voters

(a) How Much Effort Do You Want From the Federal Government on ...



(b) Respondent View on ...




Figure OA11: Biden voters' views on Coronavirus policies and their knowledge of Trump and Biden's stances. This figure shows that most initial Biden voters agreed with Biden on the thrust of government policy.




Figure OA12: Biden Voters' Knowledge of Trump and Biden's Stances by Biden supporters who disagreed with him on each Covid policy.

OA.11 Learning and Voting Analyses Among Biden Voters




Figure OA13: Learning category among initial Biden supporters who disagreed with Biden on each issue. This figure shows that many Biden voters who disagreed with him on Covid policy learned that they disagreed with him during the campaign.




Figure OA14: Percent of initial Biden supporters who disagreed with him on Covid policy and who shifted away from him by learning category. The figure shows that between 13 and 50 percent did so by not voting for him and between 27 and 50 percent did so by shifting their relative candidate ratings (i.e., becoming more favorable towards Trump).

OA.12 Coronavirus Policy Views by Race and Ethnicity

The following two figures consider whether support for policies to fight the coronavirus was equally high among different racial and ethnic groups. Figure OA15 compares the views of Black and White respondents, while Figure OA16 compares the views of respondents who are Hispanic to respondents who are not Hispanic. Both figures show that, prior to the 2020 election, there was strong support for policies to fight the coronavirus across ethnic and racial groups.




Figure OA15: Coronavirus policy views of black and white respondents




Figure OA16: Coronavirus policy views of Hispanic and non-Hispanic respondents

OA.13 Results Among Trump Supporters Who Disagreed with Trump in Both Survey Waves

Learning Among Trump Voters Who Disagreed with Trump in Both Survey Waves




Figure OA17: Learning category among initial Trump supporters who disagreed with Trump in both survey waves. This figure shows that many Trump voters who disagreed with him on Covid policy in both waves learned that they disagreed with him during the campaign.

Shifting away from Trump among Trump Supporters Who Disagreed with Trump in Both Survey Waves




Figure OA18: Percent of Trump supporters who disagreed with him on Covid policy in both waves who shifted away from him by learning category. It shows that only a minority of learners shifted away from Trump on each issue. Shifting away is also not consistently higher among learners, suggesting that Trump voters who shifted away from him did not do so because they learned they disagreed with him on each issue.

OA.14 Scale Reliabilities

Table OA16: Policy Scale Reliabilities

Scale	Pre election alpha	Post-election alpha
Attitudes towards Blacks	0.80	0.85
Redistribution	0.77	0.82
Abortion	0.80	0.83
The Environment	0.83	0.88
Immigration	0.78	0.84
Health Care	0.60	0.71
Covid-19 Policy	0.84	0.86

OA.15 Who Were the Learners and Who Shifted away from Trump?

In this section, we seek to determine what kinds of voters learned and abandoned Trump. We consider several plausible correlates of learning and shifting away from Trump. First, having a stronger party identification may increase voters' likelihood of staying with the same party regardless of what happens and of rationalizing that choice. We therefore include the most complete measure of party identification intensity, the partisanship as a social identification scale developed by Huddy and Bankert (2017), which is an additive scale of eight partisanship items (see Table OA18 for a list). Respondents with higher political knowledge may also be more likely to learn or punish their candidate. We thus also include the mean (across issues) level of knowledge of the candidates' positions. Another plausible correlate of learning and abandoning Trump is being personally affected by the coronavirus. We thus include a dummy variable identifying respondents who had had a positive Covid test, either them personally or a close friend or family member as well as another for those with a close friend or family member who died from the virus.

To identify voters who learned and who abandoned Trump, we regress dummy variables indicating learning (as opposed to not changing candidate placements or projecting) and shifting away from Trump using linear probability models on the partisanship as a social identity scale, an overall candidate position knowledge scale, two measures of importance (coronavirus death among close friends and family, positive coronavirus test for self or close friends and family), and basic demographics. Table OA17 shows the results.

Table OA17: Regression models for learning about Covid stances and shifting away from Trump

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Learned Masks	Learned Businesses	Learned WHO	Shifted Vote	Shifted Away Ratings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
PID Social Identity Scale	−0.12 (0.10)	−0.04 (0.14)	−0.07 (0.13)	−0.05 (0.07)	−0.25*** (0.08)
Candidate Position Knowledge	0.34*** (0.12)	0.16 (0.18)	0.19 (0.18)	−0.24*** (0.08)	−0.12 (0.10)
Coronavirus Death	−0.01 (0.13)	0.18 (0.17)	−0.20 (0.17)	0.16* (0.09)	−0.06 (0.11)
Coronavirus Test	−0.01 (0.08)	−0.07 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)	−0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)
Age	−0.01** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	−0.01** (0.004)	−0.003* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Male	−0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.10)	0.11 (0.10)	−0.001 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)
Asian	0.29* (0.17)	0.25 (0.20)	−0.31 (0.20)	0.13 (0.11)	0.09 (0.14)
Black	−0.24 (0.21)	−0.21 (0.28)	−0.002 (0.22)	−0.17 (0.14)	0.30* (0.17)
Other	−0.28 (0.22)	−0.73 (0.53)	−0.58* (0.31)	−0.16 (0.15)	0.11 (0.18)
Hispanic	−0.27 (0.17)	−0.11 (0.22)	−0.09 (0.20)	0.21* (0.11)	0.17 (0.14)
College Education	0.13 (0.08)	−0.002 (0.11)	−0.0000 (0.11)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)
Graduate Education	0.05 (0.10)	−0.09 (0.15)	−0.20 (0.16)	−0.01 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)
Household Income	−0.0005 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	−0.01* (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
Unemployed	−0.16** (0.07)	−0.005 (0.10)	0.06 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.05)	0.08 (0.06)
Intercept	0.64*** (0.16)	0.32 (0.22)	0.57** (0.24)	0.51*** (0.11)	0.24* (0.13)
Observations	228	139	108	262	262
R ²	0.12	0.07	0.16	0.14	0.08
Adjusted R ²	0.06	−0.03	0.03	0.09	0.03
Residual Std. Error	0.47	0.51	0.47	0.34	0.42

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Notes: These are OLS models with dummy variables for learning and shifting away from Trump (using both vote choice and changes in candidate ratings) regressed on partisan attachment, two variables for being personally affected by Covid, knowledge of the candidates' positions, and demographics.

OA.16 Partisanship as a Social Identity Questions

Table OA18: Partisanship as a social identity questions. These statements are from Huddy and Bankert 2017. For these questions, respondents were asked about their agreement with each statement with respect to their party.

Statement
I am interested in what other people think about this party.
When people criticize this party, it feels like a personal insult.
I have a lot in common with other supporters of this party.
If this party does badly in opinion polls, my day is ruined.
When I meet someone who supports this party, I feel connected with this person.
When I speak about this party, I refer to them as "my party."
When people praise this party, it makes me feel good.