

Supplementary Materials

Section A. Weighting the KONDA Data

The median population weight is 1,765, ranging between 832 and 5,896.¹ Table A1 shows the effect of weighting on education. The top panel presents the unweighted distribution of education by year, while the bottom panel presents the weighted distribution of education by year. The bottom panel education distribution is equivalent to TURKSTAT data by construction. Comparing the two panels clearly reveals that high school graduates were over-represented in the KONDA Barometer data set before weighting, especially for men. This over-education bias was stronger in earlier years. Since we pool years to increase the number of observations from different years, weighting is even more crucial for studies like ours.

Table A1 Comparison of Barometer education distribution before and after weights applied (whole sample)

	Barometer, adults (unweighted)			
	Men, LTHS	Men, HSG	Women, LTHS	Women, HSG
2012	52%	48%	67%	33%
2013	51%	49%	65%	35%
2014	50%	50%	65%	35%
2015	50%	50%	65%	35%
2016	48%	52%	62%	38%
2017	47%	53%	62%	38%
2018	46%	54%	60%	40%
	Barometer, adults (weighted)			
	Men, LTHS	Men, HSG	Women, LTHS	Women, HSG
2012	58%	42%	70%	30%
2013	57%	43%	68%	32%
2014	56%	44%	67%	33%
2015	54%	46%	65%	35%
2016	53%	47%	64%	36%
2017	52%	48%	62%	38%
2018	50%	50%	61%	39%

Notes. LTHS: less than high school graduates. HSG: high school or above graduates.


¹ The corresponding balancing weights range between 0.531 and 2.851, with a median of 0.994.

Table A2 Comparing Administrative and Survey Data for Public Sector Employment (whole sample)

	Administrative data			Barometer
	Civil Servants	Public Sector	18-64 Population	Civil servants
2012	2,459,240	3,159,028	47,244,871	2,451,471
2013	2,541,681	3,239,221	48,039,723	2,477,523
2014	2,755,970	3,372,806	48,729,159	2,600,883
2015	2,822,518	3,431,697	49,408,294	2,675,020
2016	2,928,353	3,622,150	50,263,595	2,666,421
2017	2,838,824	3,589,817	50,965,700	2,907,832
2018	2,861,891	4,130,839	51,778,789	2,991,886

Notes. Sources: Administrative data: SBB (2021a). Survey data: Barometer Surveys, 2012-18. Population weights are applied for Barometer estimates. Administrative employment data is from mid-point in the year (June 30th).

Figure A1 Number of observations by year of birth (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey)



Source. Konda Barometer Surveys, 2012-18. *Notes.* Data is not weighted. The increase in the share of others in the bottom panel after the mid-1980s holds even after weighing the data.

Section B. Extra Descriptive Statistics


Table B1. Ethnic and religious identity of survey respondents aged between 23 & 49

Ethnicity				religion		religiosity			Religion & religiosity			headscarf	
year	Turk	Kurd + Zaza	Arab + other	Sunni	not- Sunni	not religious	religious excl. highly religious	Highly religious	not Sunni or religious	Sunnis excl. highly religious	highly religious Sunnis	no	yes
2012	0.820	0.133	0.048	0.919	0.081	0.323	0.595	0.083	0.354	0.567	0.079	0.370	0.630
2013	0.794	0.160	0.045	0.932	0.068	0.291	0.613	0.096	0.316	0.592	0.092	0.369	0.631
2014	0.798	0.160	0.042	0.924	0.076	0.298	0.601	0.101	0.328	0.575	0.097	0.369	0.631
2015	0.771	0.183	0.046	0.924	0.076	0.308	0.589	0.103	0.333	0.568	0.100	0.386	0.614
2016	0.786	0.164	0.050	0.921	0.079	0.274	0.623	0.104	0.304	0.597	0.099	0.368	0.632
2017	0.773	0.170	0.058	0.914	0.086	0.311	0.604	0.085	0.340	0.578	0.081	0.407	0.593
2018	0.772	0.174	0.054	0.924	0.076	0.310	0.592	0.099	0.335	0.569	0.096	0.401	0.599


Notes. Population weights are applied. We only report female respondents' answers to the headscarf question; this question is not asked to single male respondents.

Figure B1 Ratio of university degrees by birth year and religiosity

Panel A: Women born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey)



Panel B: Men born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey)



Note: Source Konda Barometer Surveys, 2012-18.

Section C. Potential Avenues for Favoritism

In Turkey, most civil servants are recruited through the centrally administered Public Servant Selection Exam (KPSS). However, there are mechanisms that can allow for favoritism in recruitment. First, KPSS and other public examinations conducted between 2010 and 2014 might not be entirely fair. There are ongoing criminal investigations on exams conducted by the official Student Measuring, Selection and Placement Center (ÖSYM) between 2010 and 2014, including KPSS, exams for police and military schools, and exams for recruitments of petty officers, judges, and prosecutors (Tahincioğlu, 2021b). The former head of the ÖSYM and ÖSYM personnel are accused of leaking exam questions and answers to the persons affiliated with the religious Gülen Cult, which had strong ties with the AKP government and significant influence in the government bureaucracy until at least 2013 (Tahincioğlu, 2021a). Although there was a purge of suspected Gülenists from the bureaucracy following the anti-AKP, pro- Gülen July 2016 coup attempt, those who had earlier switched their allegiance from the cult to the party likely kept their jobs.²

Second, a portion of the recruitment in public jobs also requires interviews. These recruitments include positions in the Treasury, Foreign Affairs, academia, military, and police departments. Additionally, interviews are also used to recruit teachers for temporary positions. A survey conducted in two public universities shows that 78% of the academic and non-academic staff believe that “the job interviews (in respondents’ universities) are not fair” (Yılmaz & Çakıcı, 2021). Third, mayors have significant control over the recruitment of municipal employees (Çörekçioğlu, 2021). Indeed, Meşe (2011) reports that municipalities are used for creating employment opportunities for potential voters, especially during the pre-election periods.

² Following the military coup attempt in 2016, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım said that “those who did not deliberately support this organization after December 17 [2013, the date of the first significant fallout between the Gulen movement and AKP] should not worry... However, there are no excuses after December 17” (*Diken*, 16 August 2016).

In addition to favoritism in public sector employment, the AKP government implemented various policies that would support the growth of enterprises owned by the pious Sunni population or located in areas with larger shares of the pious Sunni population. These policies presumably generate job opportunities for the in-group through the employment of like-minded people. A key policy tool used by the AKP government is the abuse of public procurement contracts to create and sustain a loyal business clientele. Examining a dataset of 49,355 high-value procurements during 2004-2011, Ceviker Gurakar (2016) finds that politically connected firms win the majority of the procurement contracts awarded through less competitive tender procedures. Since public procurement accounts for about 8.5% of Turkey's GDP, favoritism in this area could have substantial inter-group redistributive effects through firm activity.

Another channel is politically motivated lending by public banks. Bircan and Saka (2021) find that bank lending is higher in provinces with an AKP-aligned mayor. Moreover, political lending significantly negatively affects economic activity in non-aligned provinces. These findings suggest that provinces with a larger share of opposition voters, where pious people are disproportionately few, may be suffering economic setbacks due to politically motivated redistribution.

The allocation of public investments provides another channel. Examining data for public fixed capital investments in 2005-2012, which stands for roughly 5 percent of Turkey's GDP, Luca and Rodriguez (2015) find that while socioeconomic factors remained the most relevant predictors of investment, the government also channeled public expenditures to reward its core constituencies. Marschall et al. (2015) find that the government-run public housing agency TOKİ concentrated its expenditures and the number of units built—in provinces with AKP mayors. This

resulted in more subsidized public housing in provinces with more pious individuals and more construction contracts for politically affiliated firms and jobs for party supporters.

AKP's trade policies favoring trade with Muslim-majority countries also boosted the growth of enterprises owned by pious Sunnis. The average share of exports to Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries (excluding Iraq) in Turkey's total exports significantly increased from 15.2% in 1998-2002 to 18.3% in 2003-2010 and 23.5% in 2011-2019. Lo Turco and Maggioni (2018) note that between 2003 and 2009, the AKP government signed 10 trade agreements, mostly with Muslim countries. They estimate that the firms in regions with a higher share of MÜSİAD (a business organization promoting capitalism with Islamic values) membership were more likely to enter export markets with new regional trade agreements with Muslim countries. Moreover, during this period, firms from provinces with a larger share of religious population were more likely to export products to destinations with a greater Muslim population.

Lastly, during AKP's term in office both the central government and the municipalities developed various tools to distribute social assistance, most of which involved discretionary selection of recipients. There is some evidence for politically motivated selection, even for the more rule-based conditional cash transfer program (Aytaç, 2014).

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
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
Section D. Composition of Civil Servants by Occupation

Most civil servants are recruited via the centrally administered Public Servant Selection Exam (KPSS). Figure D1 provides a rough breakdown of civil servants by occupation. The continual expansion of public employment and the purge after the 2016 coup attempt are visible in panel A. Figure D1 panel B shows that Ministry of National Education (MONE) and Ministry of Health employ at least half of all civil servants after 2010 for years with consistent data. Permanent positions in these ministries are not recruited via interviews. However, a potential route to recruit in-groups is to disproportionately expand the employment favored by pious Sunni individuals, such as imams and religious education teachers. Police forces are also known to have disproportionate appeal to conservatives. In Figure D1 Panel B the only occupation visibly expanding its share is health personnel (including doctors, nurses, health aides, etc.). Imams and academics also experienced faster than average increases in their numbers (55 and 62 percent versus 40 percent). Between 2010 and 2020, health and education staff account for 64 percent of the increase in the size of civil servants. The case Ministry of National Education (MONE) deserves further scrutiny because it is by far the largest employer in Turkey and employs a significant number of religious education teachers. The number of teachers employed in the religious education directorate expanded rapidly starting in 2012 education reform, increasing the ratio from 2% in 2009 to 10% in 2020.

Figure D1 Civil Servants by Occupations
Panel A: Number of civil servants




Panel B: Percentage of Civil Servants




Notes. We derived data from annual reports of various public institutions (SBB, 2021b; DSİ, 2021; YÖK, 2021; Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2020; Ministry of Justice, 2021; Ministry of Health, 2021; MONE, 2021a; 2021b) and except for armed forces that we derived armed forces personnel total from various news resources (My Memur 2018; Sözcü 01 Nisan 2016; Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı 2020; Sayıştay Başkanlığı 2021; NTV 1 September 2015; Cumhuriyet 2 September 2014). The armed forces data includes the gendarmerie. We linearly interpolate missing data for Ministry of Health for years 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 and for municipality workers in 2020. Many administrative reports also contain data from previous years.

Figure D2 MONE staff by education directorates

Panel A: Absolute number of MONE staff by education directorates



Panel B: Percentage of MONE staff by education directorates



Source. MONE (2021a; 2021b). Note. We cannot reach MONE annual reports prior to 2010.

Administrative Data Sources

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Section E. Robustness Analysis

In this section, we examine whether the probability of PS cohorts getting employed in private high-status jobs improved for younger cohorts who entered the job market during the AKP period. We combined “manager and clerk in the private sector,” “merchant, industrialist, businessman” and “self-employed professional (doctors, architects, lawyers, etc.)” to create a private high-status jobs category. Table E1 shows the OLS and reduced form estimations for private high-status jobs.

Table E1 Determinants of private high-status jobs in Turkey (2012-2018, Age 23-49), OLS Regressions - *Dependent variable: Employment in private high-status jobs*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
PS	-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.031*** (0.004)	-0.033*** (0.004)			
PS × BY1981-89	-0.002 (0.005)	0.013* (0.008)	-0.017** (0.007)			
PS × BY1990-95	0.029*** (0.006)	0.057*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.007)			
PSP				-0.043** (0.021)	-0.053* (0.028)	-0.037* (0.021)
PSP × BY1981-89				-0.058** (0.023)	-0.053* (0.031)	-0.051* (0.030)
PSP × BY1990-95				0.003 (0.053)	0.080 (0.051)	-0.050 (0.072)
BY1981-89	0.007 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.019* (0.010)	0.045** (0.018)	0.036 (0.024)	0.046* (0.024)
BY1990-95	-0.025** (0.010)	-0.050*** (0.011)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.040)	-0.089** (0.037)	0.043 (0.059)
Adj. R-Square	0.113	0.075	0.128	0.108	0.072	0.120
Sample Size	110,115	54,025	56,090	87,451	42,928	44,523
NUTS1 regions fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5 regions × survey year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. PS=Pious Sunnis; PSP= Proportion of the pious Sunni population in an individual's province of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. Population weights are applied. ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.10$. We also control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school, and university graduates), Kurd dummy, gender, the birth year, and the square of the birth year. In regressions (4)–(6), we lose observations because of missing place-of-birth data and those born outside Turkey.

Our estimations show that the probability of PS men getting employed high-status private jobs also improved for the 1990-95 generation. However, we do not find a significant improvement in women's employment in private high-status jobs. This is consistent with Cindoğlu (2011)'s findings that discrimination against women with headscarves also exists in the private sector, even in enterprises owned by pious entrepreneurs. We indeed find that the $PS \times B80-89$ interaction term is significantly negative. The growing job opportunities in the public sector might be pulling the high-skilled PS women to the public sector from the private sector. The interaction terms for PS women are also negative in our reduced form estimates.

Next, we exclude Kurds from our estimations in Table 3 to examine whether any discrimination against the Kurdish population biased our results. As seen in the top panel of Table E2, the magnitude and significance of the estimated coefficients are similar to those in Table 3. We also analyze the effect of the post-coup attempt (of July 2016) environment on public sector employment by adding interaction terms for that period. These results, available in the bottom panel of Table E2, are mainly similar to our OLS estimations in Table 3. However, the coefficient for the $PS \times BY1981-89 \times \text{Post-coup}$ interaction term is significantly negative for women. This shows that PS women's probability of being employed in the public sector declined following the Gülenist coup attempt in July 2016. This might reflect the layoffs of female public employees suspected of belonging to the Gülen cult, who might not have been replaced with new PS female employees.

Table E2 Determinants of employment and post-coup controlled (2012-2018, Age 23-49), OLS Regressions – *Dependent variable: Public sector employment.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Excluding Kurds</i>	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
PS	-0.001 (0.003)	0.015*** (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)			
PS × BY1981-89	0.014*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)			
PS × BY1990-95	0.037*** (0.006)	0.017* (0.009)	0.054*** (0.007)			
PSP				0.008 (0.021)	0.016 (0.032)	-0.007 (0.018)
PSP × BY1981-89				0.066** (0.032)	0.067 (0.053)	0.061*** (0.023)
PSP × BY1990-95				0.075 (0.052)	0.014 (0.070)	0.133** (0.051)
BY1981-89	0.000 (0.005)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.035 (0.040)	-0.032* (0.016)
BY1990-95	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.046*** (0.009)	-0.056 (0.036)	-0.012 (0.050)	-0.096*** (0.034)
Adj. R-Square	0.166	0.153	0.181	0.174	0.158	0.190
Sample Size	92,610	45,275	47,335	73,729	36,058	37,671
<i>Control for post-coup attempt</i>						
PS	-0.005 (0.004)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.004)			
PS × BY1981-89	0.020*** (0.004)	0.012** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)			
PS × BY1990-95	0.041*** (0.008)	0.020* (0.011)	0.055*** (0.010)			
PS × post-coup	0.009 (0.008)	0.005 (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)			
PS × BY1981-89 × post-coup	-0.014** (0.007)	0.002 (0.010)	-0.032*** (0.012)			
PS × BY1990-95 × post-coup	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.017)			
BY1981-89	0.000 (0.005)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)			
BY1990-95	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.046*** (0.009)			
Adj. R-Square	0.171	0.159	0.185			
Sample Size	110,115	54,025	56,090			

Notes. PS=Pious Sunnis; PSP= Proportion of the pious Sunni population in an individual's province of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. Population weights are applied. ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.10. We also control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school, and university graduates), gender, the birth year, the square of the birth year, NUTS1 regions, and interaction of five broad regions and survey years. In addition,

we control for the Kurd dummy and interaction between cohorts and the post-coup dummy in the estimations in which we control for the post-coup attempt.

Table E3 Determinants of employment and employment in all and non-agricultural jobs in Turkey (2012-2018, Age 23-49), OLS Regressions

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Employment			Employment in non-agriculture		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
PS	-0.059*** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.095*** (0.007)	-0.061*** (0.005)	-0.013* (0.007)	-0.098*** (0.007)
PS × BY1981-89	0.013* (0.007)	0.036*** (0.006)	-0.009 (0.011)	0.012* (0.007)	0.037*** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.011)
PS × BY1990-95	0.103*** (0.011)	0.115*** (0.014)	0.073*** (0.012)	0.103*** (0.011)	0.123*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.011)
BY1981-89	0.014** (0.006)	0.018** (0.007)	0.017 (0.012)	0.017** (0.007)	0.019** (0.008)	0.018 (0.012)
BY1990-95	-0.063*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.015)	-0.059*** (0.014)	-0.059*** (0.011)	-0.053*** (0.014)	-0.056*** (0.014)
Adj. R-Square	0.435	0.076	0.214	0.377	0.081	0.231
Sample Size	110,115	54,025	56,090	110,115	54,025	56,090
NUTS1 regions fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5 regions × survey year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. PS=Pious Sunnis. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. Population weights are applied. ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.10$. We also control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school, and university graduates), Kurd dummy, gender, the birth year, and the square of the birth year.

In Table E3, we examine the changes in PS cohorts' probability of getting employed in all jobs and non-agricultural jobs. The interaction terms show that the probability of being employed in both all and non-agricultural jobs significantly improved for PS men born in 1981-89 and 1990-95. The coefficient for PS×BY1990-95 is also significantly positive for women at the 5% level. The coefficient for PS×BY1980-89 is negative, indicating that the employment opportunities did not improve for PS women in the 1980-89 generation.

In Table E4, we examine whether PS cohorts' probability of getting employed improved by benefitting from IV-2SLS regressions. We instrument our PS, PS×BY1981-89, PS×BY1990-95 by Hometown PS share and their interaction terms (PSP×BY1981-89, PSP×BY1990-95) as

used in our reduced form estimates. For public employment, the signs of coefficients for PS×BY1981-89, PS×BY1990-95 are similar to those in our main estimates in Table 3. The magnitudes of the coefficients are larger for interaction terms. For private high-status jobs, the signs for PS for women and men and PS×BY1981-89 for women are negative and significant at 5%, similar to Table E1. However, the signs for PS×BY1990-95 for both women and men and PS×BY1981-89 for men are not significant at 10% level.

Table E4 Determinants of employment and employment in all and non-agricultural jobs in Turkey (2012-2018, Age 23-49), IV-2SLS Regressions

<i>Dependent variable</i>	Public employment			Private high-status jobs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
PS	-0.001 (0.014)	0.006 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.057*** (0.017)	-0.065** (0.031)	-0.054*** (0.018)
PS × BY1981-89	0.090*** (0.019)	0.113*** (0.031)	0.065*** (0.022)	-0.068*** (0.025)	-0.068 (0.044)	-0.060** (0.026)
PS × BY1990-95	0.088*** (0.027)	0.098** (0.042)	0.080** (0.033)	0.004 (0.037)	0.087 (0.070)	-0.038 (0.040)
BY1981-89	-0.064*** (0.013)	-0.072*** (0.020)	-0.051*** (0.016)	0.034** (0.017)	0.016 (0.028)	0.045** (0.019)
BY1990-95	-0.099*** (0.017)	-0.092*** (0.025)	-0.100*** (0.022)	-0.066*** (0.023)	-0.163*** (0.041)	0.008 (0.027)
Adj. R-Square	0.170	0.153	0.189	0.101	0.062	0.118
Sample Size	87,451	42,928	44,523	87,451	42,928	44,523
NUTS1 regions fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5 regions × survey year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) for underidentification (p-value)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic for weak identification	539.444	228.950	273.150	539.444	228.950	273.150

Notes. PS=Pious Sunnis. Robust standard errors are used. Population weights are applied. ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.10. We also control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school, and university graduates), Kurd dummy, gender, and birth year. The square of the birth year is omitted due to multicollinearity. We lose observations because of missing place-of-birth data and those born outside Turkey.

Table E5 Determinants of public sector jobs in Turkey (employed only, 2012-2018, Age 23-49), OLS Regressions - *Dependent variable: Public sector employment.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
PS	0.009* (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.009)			
PS × BY1981-89	0.017** (0.007)	0.013* (0.007)	0.033** (0.016)			
PS × BY1990-95	0.037*** (0.009)	0.016* (0.010)	0.078*** (0.018)			
PSP				-0.008 (0.033)	0.001 (0.031)	-0.027 (0.068)
PSP × BY1981-89				0.130*** (0.039)	0.118** (0.047)	0.167*** (0.060)
PSP × BY1990-95				0.117* (0.061)	0.106 (0.067)	0.056 (0.105)
BY1981-89	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.084*** (0.029)	-0.075** (0.036)	-0.112** (0.043)
BY1990-95	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.086* (0.044)	-0.070 (0.048)	-0.069 (0.071)
Middle school degree	0.023*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.010)
High school degree	0.085*** (0.009)	0.078*** (0.009)	0.118*** (0.015)	0.086*** (0.009)	0.078*** (0.009)	0.122*** (0.015)
Tertiary degree	0.368*** (0.041)	0.350*** (0.040)	0.417*** (0.045)	0.379*** (0.041)	0.360*** (0.040)	0.432*** (0.048)
Kurd	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.013)
Women	0.034*** (0.004)			0.034*** (0.005)		
Adj. R-Square	0.201	0.184	0.209	0.209	0.191	0.221
Sample Size	59,240	45,839	13,401	46,947	36,457	10,490
NUTS1 regions fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5 regions × survey year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. PS=Pious Sunnis; PSP= Proportion of the pious Sunni population in an individual's province of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. We also control for the birth year and the square of the birth year. Population weights are applied. ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.10. In regressions (4)-(6), we lose observations due to missing place of birth data and those who were born outside Turkey.

Table E5 shows the OLS results for the sample that only includes employed individuals. The coefficients for $PS \times BY_{1990-95}$ for women and all employed are significantly positive at 5%, consistent with Table 3. The coefficients for $PS \times BY_{1981-89}$ and $PS \times BY_{1990-95}$ for men are positively significant at 10%. In the hometown estimations, the coefficients for $PSP \times BY_{1981-89}$ are positive and significant at 5%, while the coefficients for $PSP \times BY_{1990-95}$ for all and women are insignificant. However, Table 3 presents more accurate results as the probability of public sector employment also influences whether an individual is unemployed.


Table E6 reflects OLS results for the sample that only includes those in the labor force (employed, unemployed, and looking for jobs). The coefficients for $PS \times BY_{1981-89}$ and $PS \times BY_{1990-95}$ are significantly positive in the OLS regressions. Quasi-Event study results (OLS) in Figure E1 also provide results similar to those in Figure 2. In Table E6, in the hometown estimations, the coefficients for $PSP \times BY_{1981-89}$ are significantly positive for all and men at 5% and significantly positive for women at 10%. The coefficients for $PS \times BY_{1990-95}$ are insignificant at 10%. However, Table 3 presents more accurate results regarding our research question, as probability in public employment also influences participation in the labor markets.

Table E6 Determinants of public sector jobs in Turkey (labor force only, 2012-2018, Age 23-49), OLS Regressions - *Dependent variable: Public sector employment.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
PS	0.007 (0.004)	0.013*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.010)			
PS × BY1981-89	0.018*** (0.006)	0.013** (0.006)	0.035** (0.015)			
PS × BY1990-95	0.039*** (0.009)	0.023*** (0.008)	0.063*** (0.015)			
PSP				-0.010 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.030)	0.000 (0.064)
PSP × BY1981-89				0.119*** (0.035)	0.110** (0.043)	0.125** (0.058)
PSP × BY1990-95				0.095 (0.070)	0.082 (0.071)	-0.004 (0.102)
BY1981-89	0.000 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.000 (0.011)	-0.070** (0.026)	-0.067** (0.033)	-0.072* (0.040)
BY1990-95	-0.028*** (0.009)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.054** (0.021)	-0.069 (0.047)	-0.053 (0.049)	-0.016 (0.065)
Middle school degree	0.025*** (0.003)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.036*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.003)	0.042*** (0.010)
High school degree	0.082*** (0.009)	0.075*** (0.008)	0.114*** (0.015)	0.083*** (0.009)	0.075*** (0.009)	0.120*** (0.015)
Tertiary degree	0.337*** (0.036)	0.324*** (0.036)	0.377*** (0.039)	0.347*** (0.036)	0.333*** (0.035)	0.391*** (0.040)
Kurd	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)	0.003 (0.012)
Women	0.023*** (0.003)			0.023*** (0.004)		
Adj. R-Square	0.181	0.17	0.182	0.188	0.177	0.193
Sample Size	65,153	49,764	15,389	51,588	39,569	12,019
NUTS1 regions fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5 regions × survey year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. PS=Pious Sunnis; PSP= Proportion of the pious Sunni population in an individual's province of birth. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. We also control for the birth year and the square of the birth year. Population weights are applied. ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.10. In regressions (4)-(6), we lose observations due to missing place of the birth data and those born outside Turkey.

Figure E1 Quasi-Event study results (OLS) by birth year (public sector employment, in labor force only)



Notes. The base year is 1977. The vertical axis shows the results of interaction between pious Sunni dummy and the birth year for both sexes and headscarf wearing women. We control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school, and university graduates), Kurd dummy, NUTS1 regions, and interaction of five broad regions and survey years. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. Population weights are applied. The lines show confidence intervals at 5%.

Section F. Kurdish interaction terms

In this section, we incorporate Kurds dummy, similar to pious Sunnis, using cohort interaction terms in OLS regressions (Table F1). The coefficients for PS, PS×BY1981-89, and PS×BY1990-95 are very similar to our OLS estimations in Table 3. The interaction terms for Kurds indicate that the probability of employment in the public sector improved for younger Kurdish cohorts. We also estimate the impact of the Peace Process between the Turkish State and PKK using Kurd×Peace, Kurd×BY1981-89×Peace and Kurd×BY1990-95×Peace interaction terms. We define the peace period as between January 2013 and June 2015. We consider that the Peace Process started in 2013 as on December 28, 2012, Erdoğan indicated that there had been ongoing talks between the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and Abdullah Öcalan on a TV interview and ended in July 2015 with the killings of 2 police officers in Şanlıurfa.

The signs for Kurds and their interaction terms are mainly similar when the peace period is controlled. The interaction terms for peace are insignificant except for the negative sign for Kurd×BY1990-95×Peace in regressions for women, indicating that the probability of being employed was worse for the Kurdish women born in 1990-95 during the peace process.

This seemingly counterintuitive result, along with the signs for Kurd and their interaction terms, should be interpreted cautiously. The share of people who identify themselves as “Kurd” (or “Zaza”) among civil servants fluctuates significantly depending on the political changes, affecting different cohorts differently. Table F2 shows that the share of civil servants identifying as Kurds was 12.4% in the 1963-1979 cohort during the final six months of the Peace Process. This declined to 8.2% in the next six months following the end of the Peace Process and further to 6.3% after the coup attempt in 2016. On the other hand, the share of civil servants who indicated that they were Kurds in the 1980-1995 cohort temporarily increased during the first months after

the end of the Peace Process. These fluctuations are likely to due to changes in the responses of younger and older cohorts to the ethnicity question rather than the actual changes in the ethnic composition in the public sector. This might create a bias that affects the results in Table F1.

Table F1 Determinants of employment with variables for Kurds (2012-2018, Age 23-49), OLS Regressions - *Dependent variable: Public sector employment.*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
PS	-0.002 (0.003)	0.012** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.012** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.005)
BY1981-89	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.005)
PS × BY1981-89	0.016*** (0.004)	0.013** (0.006)	0.013** (0.006)	0.015*** (0.004)	0.013** (0.006)	0.013** (0.006)
BY1990-95	-0.034*** (0.007)	-0.014* (0.008)	-0.050*** (0.008)	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.050*** (0.008)
PS × BY1990-95	0.037*** (0.006)	0.018** (0.008)	0.052*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.017** (0.008)	0.051*** (0.007)
Kurd	-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.003)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.007*** (0.003)
Kurd × BY1981-89	0.016*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.010** (0.004)
Kurd × BY1990-95	0.032*** (0.006)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.009)
Kurd × peace				0.004 (0.008)	0.006 (0.010)	0.003 (0.008)
Kurd × BY1981-89 × peace				-0.002 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.000 (0.009)
Kurd × BY1990-95 × peace				-0.010 (0.014)	0.010 (0.019)	-0.032** (0.014)
Adj. R-Square	0.171	0.159	0.185	0.171	0.159	0.185
Sample Size	110,115	54,025	56,090	110,115	54,025	56,090
NUTS1 regions fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
5 regions × survey year effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes. PS=Pious Sunnis. Standard errors are clustered at the province level. Population weights are applied. ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.10$. We also control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school, and university graduates), gender, and the birth cohort. In addition, we control for interaction between cohorts and the peace period dummy.

The end of the Peace Process did not have a similar effect on the responses to religiosity questions. The share of PS amongst civil servants was 56.3% in the first half of 2015 and 56.6% in the second half of 2015, showing only a minor change. Table F2 reflects the impact of the Gülenist coup attempt.

Table F2 Share of people who identify themselves as “Kurd” or “Zaza” amongst civil servants during different periods (%; Age: 23-49)

<i>Cohort</i>	Last 6 months of the Peace Process (January-June 2015)	First 6 months after the end of the Peace Process (August-December 2015)	First 6 months after the coup attempt (August-December 2016)	First 4 months after the end of the emergency state (September-November 2018)
1963-1979	12.4	8.2	6.3	7.4
1980-1995	12.9	15.1	12.1	11.5

Notes. Population weights are applied. KONDA did not conduct Barometer surveys in July 2015, July 2016, July 2018, August 2018, and December 2018. KONDA Barometer data was used for all other months.