

Electronic supplementary material for

“Run, graduate, run: Internationally mobile students’
reactions to changing political landscapes in Europe”

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Table S.1: Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics

	Short description	N	min	max	mean	std.dev.
Stay rates						
$SR^{I,all}$	Overall education permit outflows ($N^{E,X}$) over stayer pop. (demographic equality)	34,333	0	1	0.0805	0.1810
$SR^{I,work}$	Education permit outflows to work ($N^{E,W}$) over stayer pop. (demographic equality)	31,544	0	1	0.0464	0.1251
$SR^{II,l=1}$	Overall education permit outflows ($N^{E,X}$) over stayer pop. (inflows in t-1)	30,383	0	1	0.0806	0.1752
$SR^{II,l=2}$	Overall education permit outflows ($N^{E,X}$) over stayer pop. (inflows in t-2)	28,178	0	1	0.0835	0.1785
$SR^{II,l=3}$	Overall education permit outflows ($N^{E,X}$) over stayer pop. (inflows in t-3)	26,150	0	1	0.0899	0.1899
$SR^{II,mix}$	Overall education permit outflows ($N^{E,X}$) over stayer pop. (avg. inflows in last 3 years)	26,352	0	1	0.0831	0.1688
Political dynamics: Immigration policy and voter preference dynamics						
IPD (any)	Share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years	34,333	0	1	0.3851	0.1753
IPD (severe)	Share of severely restr. immigration policy changes during the previous three years	34,333	0	0.2857	0.0660	0.0630
Median Right	Median voter (respondent) located in right half of a 10-point scale (1: left; 10: right)	34,333	0	1	0.0910	0.2876
Centre share	Share of respondents located in the centre (points 4 to 7) of a 10-point scale	34,333	0.4626	0.7775	0.6330	0.0708
Extr. Left share	Share of respondents located at the extreme left (points 1 & 2) of a 10-point scale	34,333	0.0339	0.2216	0.1042	0.0407
Extr. Right share	Share of respondents located at the extreme right (points 9 & 10) of a 10-point scale	34,333	0.0097	0.2179	0.0861	0.0477
Fringe dominance (ratio)	Ratio of fringe preference for the extreme right over the extreme left	34,333	0.1348	4.0938	0.9258	0.6500
Fringe dominance (categ.)	Five categories, based on dominance ratio: strong left dominance (below 0.5, 24.7%), intermediate left dominance (0.5 to 0.9, 35.3%), balanced (0.9 to 1.1, 15.7%), intermediate right dominance (1.1 to 2, 15.7%), strong right dominance (above 2, 8.7%)	34,333	1	5	-	-
Election year	Parliamentary election year indicator	34,333	0	1	0.2612	0.4393
Election turnout	Parliamentary election turnout (in %) as proxy for high-stake elections (zero: no election, non-zero: actual turnout), mean and std. dev. refer to non-zero outcomes	34,333	0	92.95	66.05	12.67
Gravity and migration environment controls						
Distance	Log of distance between capitals	34,333	5.1245	9.8826	8.6572	0.6290
Population (D)	Log population in the destination country	34,333	12.6699	18.2332	15.9226	1.4278
Population (O)	Log population in the origin country	34,333	10.3233	21.0545	15.8156	2.0290
GDP pc (D)	Log GDP per capita in the destination country	34,333	9.7165	11.6681	10.4533	0.3726
GDP pc (O)	Log GDP per capita in the origin country	34,333	6.4024	11.8610	8.9938	1.1222
Unemployment (D)	Unemployment rate in the destination country	34,333	0.0220	0.2750	0.0928	0.0477
Common language	Bilateral indicator for common official language	34,333	1	1	0.0663	0.2489
Colonial relation	Bilateral indicator for colonial relationship after 1945	34,333	0	1	0.0173	0.1304
Migrant stocks	Bilateral migrant stocks in 2000 (ihs transf.)	34,333	0	15.2063	3.9769	3.4055
New permits	Newly issued permits without those for education purposes (ihs transf.)	34,333	7.3092	14.0756	10.8303	1.5441
Immigration	Overall immigration (net domestic returnees, ihs transf.)	34,333	6.9660	14.2100	10.4516	1.6101
Recession	Binary indicator if GDP pc in a destination country is lower than in the previous year	31,399	0	1	0.1153	0.3194
Immigration concern	Share of respondents mentioning immigration as an issue for the destination country	31,399	0.0035	0.6792	0.1407	0.1243
Refugee population	Log refugee population in the destination country	24,000	2.7726	13.4142	8.6127	2.3385
Climatic differences	Absolute difference between destination and origin in terms of months inside the moderate temperature interval	24,000	0	12	2.1742	1.7922
GDP ratio	Destination GDP per capita over origin country GDP per capita	24,000	0.1332	140.6279	8.5859	11.3982
Unemployment ratio	Destination unemployment rate over origin country unemployment rate	24,000	0.1165	168.1429	3.1407	7.1315
90/10 ratio	Inequality measure, based on income deciles	24,000	4.7857	19.6250	9.1920	2.9804
Multilat. resist.	Multilateral bilateral pull term, yearly average of distance weighted GDP in all other destinations	24,000	1.7301	44.8548	8.2951	6.8468

Note: Reported sample sizes refer to the preferred specifications. 'ihs' indicates an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.

Table S.2: Group-specific immigration policy changes during the previous three years

	Stay rate: Overall		Stay rate: Employment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Restriction target group				
all	−0.0045 (0.0036)	−0.0052 (0.0039)	0.0006 (0.0027)	0.0008 (0.0030)
irregular & refugees	0.0158*** (0.0050)	0.0171*** (0.0054)	0.0075* (0.0041)	0.0087* (0.0046)
family members	−0.0290*** (0.0037)	−0.0318*** (0.0040)	−0.0088*** (0.0028)	−0.0102*** (0.0033)
workers	0.0050 (0.0060)	0.0065 (0.0065)	−0.0124** (0.0050)	−0.0138** (0.0056)
entrepreneurs	−0.0227*** (0.0083)	−0.0245*** (0.0091)	0.0103* (0.0059)	0.0111* (0.0066)
int. students	−0.0124*** (0.0037)	−0.0137*** (0.0040)	−0.0035 (0.0026)	−0.0040 (0.0029)
other	−0.0049 (0.0043)	−0.0051 (0.0046)	−0.0021 (0.0033)	−0.0024 (0.0036)
Observations	34,333	31,399	31,544	28,000
FE				
D, O, Year	yes	yes	yes	yes
O × Year	no	yes	no	yes

Note: Reported average marginal effects originate from Poisson models, featuring the complete set of gravity and migration environment controls. Samples draw on 27 destination countries and 144 countries of origin. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table S.3: Voter preference dynamics (without immigration policy dynamics)

	Stay rate: Overall		Stay rate: Employment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre relocation				
Median Right	−0.0170*** (0.0042)	−0.0190*** (0.0045)	−0.0052 (0.0036)	−0.0057 (0.0040)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre expansion				
Centre share	0.1143** (0.0453)	0.1282*** (0.0484)	0.1372*** (0.0339)	0.1544*** (0.0376)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe expansion				
Extr. Left share	−0.2833*** (0.0788)	−0.3137*** (0.0846)	−0.1866*** (0.0599)	−0.2137*** (0.0655)
Extr. Right share	0.2302*** (0.0668)	0.2573*** (0.0723)	0.0614 (0.0574)	0.0923 (0.0646)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe dominance				
Left (strong)	−0.0433*** (0.0072)	−0.0478*** (0.0080)	−0.0307*** (0.0075)	−0.0354*** (0.0087)
Left (intermed.)	−0.0381*** (0.0062)	−0.0419*** (0.0068)	−0.0299*** (0.0066)	−0.0342*** (0.0075)
Right (intermed.)	−0.0115** (0.0054)	−0.0125** (0.0058)	−0.0108** (0.0049)	−0.0124** (0.0053)
Right (strong)	−0.0459*** (0.0083)	−0.0511*** (0.0089)	−0.0146 (0.0081)	−0.0146 (0.0089)
Observations	34,333	31,399	31,544	28,000
Fixed Effects				
D, O, Year	yes	yes	yes	yes
O×Year	no	yes	no	yes

Note: Reported average marginal effects originate from Poisson models, featuring the complete set of gravity and migration environment controls. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S.4: Political fringe dominance in minimum support samples

	Stay rate: Overall				Stay rate: Employment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Left (strong)	−0.0419*** (0.00685)	−0.0464*** (0.00766)	−0.0516*** (0.0150)	−0.0618*** (0.0174)	−0.0297*** (0.00741)	−0.0344*** (0.00852)	−0.0430** (0.0177)	−0.0540** (0.0215)
Left (intermed.)	−0.0373*** (0.00584)	−0.0412*** (0.00643)	−0.0332*** (0.00825)	−0.0394*** (0.00945)	−0.0292*** (0.00642)	−0.0334*** (0.00728)	−0.0367*** (0.0129)	−0.0458*** (0.0157)
Right (intermed.)	−0.0132** (0.00536)	−0.0144** (0.00573)	−0.0186** (0.00747)	−0.0218*** (0.00844)	−0.0110** (0.00478)	−0.0125** (0.00523)	−0.0234** (0.00994)	−0.0292** (0.0119)
Right (strong)	−0.0494*** (0.00794)	−0.0549*** (0.00860)	−0.0454*** (0.0117)	−0.0553*** (0.0133)	−0.0143* (0.00786)	−0.0159* (0.00866)	−0.0317** (0.0130)	−0.0402*** (0.0156)
IPD: Restr. share	−0.0343*** (0.00620)	−0.0375*** (0.00666)	0.000395 (0.0108)	0.00246 (0.0123)	−0.00495 (0.00513)	−0.00523 (0.00562)	0.0179** (0.00819)	0.0245*** (0.00936)
Observations	34,198	31,209	22,219	18,846	31,410	27,864	20,326	16,634
Fixed Effects								
D, O, Year	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
O×Year	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Support restriction	1%	1%	5%	5%	1%	1%	5%	5%

Note: Samples are restricted to include only observations where support for the political fringes amounts to at least one or five percent, respectively. Reported average marginal effects originate from Poisson models, featuring the complete set of gravity and migration environment controls. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) represent the share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S.5: Salience of voter preference dynamics around the centre (employment stay rate)

	Voter preference dynamic (VPD)							
	Centre relocation (Median Right)				Centre expansion (Centre share)			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	VPD	IPD	VPD	IPD	VPD	IPD	VPD	IPD
Election year								
no	-0.0042 (0.0045)	-0.0057 (0.0067)			0.1085** (0.0439)	-0.0023 (0.0063)		
yes	-0.0128** (0.0052)	-0.0269*** (0.0085)	-0.0119*** (0.0054)	-0.0337*** (0.0088)	0.1379*** (0.0358)	-0.0198** (0.0085)	0.1686*** (0.0375)	-0.0248*** (0.0088)
Next election in								
1 year			-0.0136*** (0.0047)	-0.0596*** (0.0095)		0.1465***	-0.0531*** (0.0436)	(0.0095)
2 years			-0.0100 (0.0077)	0.0246** (0.0113)			0.1077** (0.0483)	0.0376*** (0.0105)
3 years			0.0261*** (0.0098)	0.0176* (0.0101)			0.1512*** (0.0505)	0.0271** (0.0106)
Observations	28,000		26,114		28,000		26,114	

Note: Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) are represented as the share of restrictive policy changes during the previous three years. Average marginal effects from Poisson models are reported. All specifications feature the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S.6: Salience of voter preference dynamics in the fringes

	Stay rate: Overall			Stay rate: Employment		
	(1)			(2)		
	No	Yes	Δ	No	Yes	Δ
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe expansion						
Extr. Left share	-0.2458*** (0.0942)	-0.2778*** (0.0822)	0.32 [0.5715]	-0.1591** (0.0760)	-0.2155*** (0.0652)	1.62 [0.2025]
Extr. Right share	0.2872*** (0.0792)	0.2566*** (0.0744)	0.50 [0.4807]	0.1600** (0.0704)	0.0806 (0.0634)	4.85 [0.0277]
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0202*** (0.0078)	-0.0477*** (0.0105)	4.68 [0.0305]	0.0044 (0.0067)	-0.0193** (0.0083)	5.94 [0.0148]
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe dominance						
Left (strong)	-0.0414*** (0.0078)	-0.0773*** (0.0140)	9.35 [0.0022]	-0.0249*** (0.0075)	-0.0636*** (0.0139)	12.79 [0.0003]
Left (intermed.)	-0.0393*** (0.0068)	-0.0583*** (0.0127)	2.63 [0.1048]	-0.0243*** (0.0062)	-0.0596*** (0.0129)	10.55 [0.0012]
Right (intermed.)	-0.0094 (0.0065)	-0.0395*** (0.0134)	4.14 [0.0418]	-0.0032 (0.0052)	-0.0582*** (0.0132)	16.63 [0.0000]
Right (strong)	-0.0494*** (0.0094)	-0.0731*** (0.0141)	3.44 [0.0635]	-0.0046 (0.0097)	-0.0473*** (0.0137)	10.02 [0.0015]
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0313*** (0.0080)	-0.0567*** (0.0115)	3.44 [0.0636]	-0.0013 (0.0068)	-0.0281*** (0.0088)	6.94 [0.0084]
Observations	29,560			26,144		

Note: Columns labelled Δ report results (test statistic and corresponding p-value in brackets) from χ^2 tests (H_0 : AMEs are equal) for effect difference across election and non-election years. Average marginal effects from Poisson models are reported. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) represent the share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years. All specifications feature the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S.7: Results for stay rates based on cohort matching

	Stay rate: Overall					Stay rate: Employment				
	SR^I	$SR^{II,l=1}$	$SR^{II,l=2}$	$SR^{II,l=3}$	$SR^{III,mixed}$	SR^I	$SR^{II,l=1}$	$SR^{II,l=2}$	$SR^{II,l=3}$	$SR^{III,mixed}$
Voter preference dynamic: Centre relocation										
Median Right	-0.0234*** (0.0043)	-0.0223*** (0.0037)	-0.0229*** (0.0041)	-0.0162*** (0.0052)	-0.0158*** (0.0043)	-0.0075* (0.0039)	-0.0085** (0.0034)	-0.0029 (0.0046)	-0.0093* (0.0052)	0.0014 (0.0041)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0446*** (0.0068)	-0.0311*** (0.0063)	0.0145* (0.0077)	0.0187** (0.0084)	0.0125* (0.0073)	-0.0144** (0.0056)	0.0002 (0.0057)	0.0136* (0.0070)	0.0058 (0.0071)	0.0067 (0.0059)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre expansion										
Centre share	0.1182** (0.0480)	0.1401*** (0.0469)	0.4110*** (0.0541)	0.2342*** (0.0577)	0.3023*** (0.0503)	-0.0089 (0.0055)	0.0047 (0.0055)	0.0322*** (0.0073)	0.0200*** (0.0077)	0.0210*** (0.0062)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0369*** (0.0065)	-0.0248*** (0.0061)	0.0338*** (0.0076)	0.0295*** (0.0087)	0.0266*** (0.0073)	0.1488*** (0.0378)	0.1358*** (0.0367)	0.3906*** (0.0449)	0.2764*** (0.0458)	0.2914*** (0.0410)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe expansion										
Ext. Left share	-0.2644*** (0.0847)	-0.2537*** (0.0810)	-0.5692*** (0.0880)	-0.5352*** (0.0965)	-0.5618*** (0.0833)	-0.2016*** (0.0680)	-0.1721*** (0.0636)	-0.4792*** (0.0768)	-0.4598*** (0.0797)	-0.4729*** (0.0669)
Ext. Right share	0.2262*** (0.0728)	0.0400 (0.0701)	-0.0891 (0.0846)	0.0612 (0.0853)	0.0170 (0.0775)	0.0848 (0.0646)	0.0252 (0.0647)	-0.3141*** (0.0791)	-0.2399*** (0.0757)	-0.1873*** (0.0702)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0319*** (0.0064)	-0.0222*** (0.0060)	0.0348*** (0.0077)	0.0343*** (0.0088)	0.0296*** (0.0073)	-0.0053 (0.0056)	0.0067 (0.0056)	0.0316*** (0.0074)	0.0236*** (0.0078)	0.0237*** (0.0062)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe dominance										
Left (strong)	-0.0467*** (0.0077)	-0.0192*** (0.0060)	-0.0259*** (0.0066)	-0.0141** (0.0069)	-0.0214*** (0.0065)	-0.0347*** (0.0086)	-0.0251*** (0.0062)	-0.0146** (0.0061)	-0.0121** (0.0059)	-0.0180*** (0.0054)
Left (intermed.)	-0.0419*** (0.0065)	-0.0289*** (0.0048)	-0.0278*** (0.0053)	-0.0170*** (0.0055)	-0.0266*** (0.0052)	-0.0338*** (0.0074)	-0.0310*** (0.0055)	-0.0228*** (0.0048)	-0.0194*** (0.0046)	-0.0251*** (0.0046)
Right (intermed.)	-0.0149*** (0.0058)	-0.0096* (0.0050)	-0.0132*** (0.0050)	0.0090 (0.0058)	-0.0049 (0.0048)	-0.0127** (0.0053)	-0.0168*** (0.0045)	-0.0032 (0.0048)	0.0110** (0.0052)	0.0020 (0.0041)
Right (strong)	-0.0546*** (0.0086)	-0.0404*** (0.0064)	-0.0399*** (0.0071)	-0.0264*** (0.0078)	-0.0272*** (0.0073)	-0.0156* (0.0088)	-0.0133 (0.0082)	-0.0055 (0.0082)	-0.0151** (0.0073)	0.0025 (0.0084)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0398*** (0.0065)	-0.0277*** (0.0061)	0.0148* (0.0076)	0.0223*** (0.0084)	0.0140* (0.0072)	-0.0059 (0.0056)	0.0056 (0.0056)	0.0170** (0.0070)	0.0121* (0.0073)	0.0111* (0.0060)
Obs.	31,399	30,383	28,178	26,150	26,352	28,000	27,462	25,560	24,401	24,558

Note: Cohort matching approaches, used to derive SR^{II} and SR^{III} , utilise previous inflows into the education permit category as a proxy for the stayer population. Average marginal effects are obtained from Poisson estimations. All specifications feature the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) represent the share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S.8: Sample composition and low incidence cases

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre relocation						
Median Right	−0.0234*** (0.0043)	−0.0179*** (0.0037)	−0.0213** (0.0090)	−0.0428*** (0.0079)	−0.0487*** (0.0093)	−0.0218** (0.0106)
IPD: Restr. share	−0.0446*** (0.0068)	−0.0313*** (0.0051)	−0.0742*** (0.0099)	−0.0654*** (0.0107)	−0.0822*** (0.0125)	−0.0800*** (0.0115)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre expansion						
Centre share	0.1182** (0.0480)	0.1573*** (0.0386)	0.1681* (0.0875)	0.3014*** (0.0881)	0.2696*** (0.1023)	0.2204** (0.0991)
IPD: Restr. share	−0.0369*** (0.0065)	−0.0254*** (0.0048)	−0.0673*** (0.0095)	−0.0510*** (0.0103)	−0.0659*** (0.0120)	−0.0722*** (0.0110)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe expansion						
Ext. Left share	−0.2644*** (0.0847)	−0.3066*** (0.0702)	−0.6793*** (0.1616)	−0.6509*** (0.1600)	−0.6708*** (0.1852)	−0.9068*** (0.1903)
Ext. Right share	0.2262*** (0.0728)	0.1309** (0.0570)	0.6180*** (0.1281)	0.2739** (0.1276)	0.3705** (0.1515)	0.6232*** (0.1427)
IPD: Restr. share	−0.0319*** (0.0064)	−0.0213*** (0.0048)	−0.0569*** (0.0091)	−0.0434*** (0.0100)	−0.0569*** (0.0118)	−0.0594*** (0.0107)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe dominance						
Left (strong)	−0.0467*** (0.0077)	−0.0393*** (0.0056)	−0.1162*** (0.0114)	−0.0926*** (0.0108)	−0.1076*** (0.0127)	−0.1347*** (0.0134)
Left (intermed.)	−0.0419*** (0.0065)	−0.0365*** (0.0049)	−0.1004*** (0.0105)	−0.0814*** (0.0097)	−0.0887*** (0.0113)	−0.1164*** (0.0126)
Right (intermed.)	−0.0149*** (0.0058)	−0.0133*** (0.0041)	−0.0161* (0.0089)	−0.0205** (0.0088)	−0.0285*** (0.0104)	−0.0136 (0.0103)
Right (strong)	−0.0546*** (0.0086)	−0.0430*** (0.0066)	−0.0809*** (0.0138)	−0.0886*** (0.0133)	−0.1029*** (0.0158)	−0.0855*** (0.0161)
IPD: Restr. share	−0.0398*** (0.0065)	−0.0269*** (0.0049)	−0.0580*** (0.0093)	−0.0518*** (0.0102)	−0.0679*** (0.0121)	−0.0627*** (0.0109)
Obs	31,399	30,349	12,397	13,238	12,082	9,921
Sample restr.	None	SR < 1	den. ≥ 5	mean den. ≥ 5	max stayers ≥ 3	all

Note: Average marginal effects are obtained from Poisson estimations for overall stay rates. All specifications feature the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) represent the share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S.9: Alternative standard errors (overall stay rate)

	standard errors				
			cluster level		
	AME	robust	D	D,O	D×O
Voter preference dynamic: Centre relocation					
Median Right	−0.0234	(0.0047)***	(0.0114)**	(0.0113)**	(0.0043)***
Voter preference dynamic: Centre expansion					
Centre share	0.1182	(0.0457)**	(0.1713)	(0.1706)	(0.0480)**
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe expansion					
Ext. Left share	−0.2644	(0.0765)***	(0.4126)	(0.4124)	(0.0847)***
Ext. Right share	0.2262	(0.0746)***	(0.1722)	(0.1725)	(0.0728)***
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe dominance					
Left (strong)	−0.0467	(0.0076)***	(0.0223)**	(0.0222)**	(0.0077)***
Left (intermed.)	−0.0419	(0.0065)***	(0.0207)**	(0.0207)**	(0.0065)***
Right (intermed.)	−0.0149	(0.0059)**	(0.0106)	(0.0105)	(0.0058)**
Right (strong)	−0.0546	(0.0084)***	(0.0242)**	(0.0240)**	(0.0086)***

Note: All specifications feature the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls, as well as the immigration policy dynamics measure. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Sample size is 31,399. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S.10: Alternative fixed effects specifications

	Stay rate: Overall				Stay rate: Employment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre relocation								
Median Right	-0.0364*** (0.0078)	-0.0364*** (0.0078)	-0.0404*** (0.0076)	-0.0409*** (0.0073)	-0.0157** (0.0073)	-0.0155** (0.0072)	-0.0152** (0.0076)	-0.0154** (0.0071)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0699*** (0.0119)	-0.0796*** (0.0118)	-0.0754*** (0.0121)	-0.0818*** (0.0117)	-0.0267** (0.0105)	-0.0319*** (0.0101)	-0.0282*** (0.0108)	-0.0325*** (0.0102)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre expansion								
Centre share	0.2049** (0.0851)	0.2050** (0.0836)	0.2299*** (0.0861)	0.2028** (0.0828)	0.2912*** (0.0703)	0.3344*** (0.0699)	0.3014*** (0.0717)	0.3019*** (0.0700)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0576*** (0.0113)	-0.0674*** (0.0113)	-0.0618*** (0.0115)	-0.0682*** (0.0112)	-0.0157 (0.0103)	-0.0196** (0.0098)	-0.0170 (0.0105)	-0.0209** (0.0099)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe expansion								
Ext. Left share	-0.4758*** (0.1485)	-0.5100*** (0.1479)	-0.5160*** (0.1498)	-0.4989*** (0.1456)	-0.3935*** (0.1238)	-0.4541*** (0.1212)	-0.4176*** (0.1256)	-0.4405*** (0.1194)
Ext. Right share	0.3480*** (0.1269)	0.4100*** (0.1262)	0.3488*** (0.1289)	0.3995*** (0.1247)	0.0615 (0.1177)	0.1081 (0.1156)	0.0737 (0.1200)	0.1295 (0.1166)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0489*** (0.0112)	-0.0581*** (0.0112)	-0.0525*** (0.0114)	-0.0588*** (0.0111)	-0.0100 (0.0105)	-0.0135 (0.0100)	-0.0106 (0.0107)	-0.0137 (0.0100)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe dominance								
Left (strong)	-0.0788*** (0.0129)	-0.0822*** (0.0135)	-0.0773*** (0.0128)	-0.0803*** (0.0130)	-0.0613*** (0.0151)	-0.0649*** (0.0149)	-0.0620*** (0.0153)	-0.0641*** (0.0152)
Left (intermed.)	-0.0709*** (0.0111)	-0.0725*** (0.0114)	-0.0697*** (0.0110)	-0.0710*** (0.0110)	-0.0606*** (0.0132)	-0.0636*** (0.0129)	-0.0618*** (0.0133)	-0.0628*** (0.0131)
Right (intermed.)	-0.0226** (0.0101)	-0.0185* (0.0102)	-0.0243** (0.0102)	-0.0240** (0.0097)	-0.0222** (0.0099)	-0.0234** (0.0094)	-0.0231** (0.0100)	-0.0229** (0.0093)
Right (strong)	-0.0877*** (0.0149)	-0.0867*** (0.0151)	-0.0871*** (0.0149)	-0.0875*** (0.0146)	-0.0302* (0.0163)	-0.0314* (0.0161)	-0.0286* (0.0166)	-0.0303* (0.0156)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0604*** (0.0114)	-0.0692*** (0.0113)	-0.0654*** (0.0116)	-0.0706*** (0.0112)	-0.0110 (0.0104)	-0.0158 (0.0099)	-0.0121 (0.0107)	-0.0160 (0.0100)
Observations	18,338	17,951	17,951	17,951	15,370	14,892	14,892	14,892
Fixed Effects								
Year	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
D, O	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
O×Year	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
D×O	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	no	no

Note: All specifications contain feasible gravity and migration environment controls. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) represent the share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S.11: Potentially endogenous preferences around the centre

	Stay rate: Overall				Stay rate: Employment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre relocation								
Median Right	-0.0234*** (0.0043)	-0.0238*** (0.0042)	-0.0231*** (0.0043)	-0.0234*** (0.0042)	-0.0075* (0.0039)	-0.0077** (0.0039)	-0.0077** (0.0039)	-0.0077** (0.0039)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0446*** (0.0068)	-0.0482*** (0.0068)	-0.0424*** (0.0068)	-0.0462*** (0.0068)	-0.0144** (0.0056)	-0.0175*** (0.0057)	-0.0139** (0.0056)	-0.0171*** (0.0057)
Immigration concerns		0.0848*** (0.0163)		0.0775*** (0.0166)		0.0533*** (0.0131)		0.0514*** (0.0133)
Recession			-0.0201*** (0.0055)	-0.0164*** (0.0058)			-0.0065 (0.0044)	-0.0040 (0.0046)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre expansion								
Centre share	0.1182** (0.0480)	0.1134** (0.0479)	0.1460*** (0.0483)	0.1384*** (0.0483)	0.1488*** (0.0378)	0.1412*** (0.0378)	0.1566*** (0.0380)	0.1475*** (0.0380)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0369*** (0.0065)	-0.0404*** (0.0065)	-0.0342*** (0.0065)	-0.0377*** (0.0065)	-0.0089 (0.0055)	-0.0119** (0.0055)	-0.0080 (0.0055)	-0.0111** (0.0055)
Immigration concerns		0.0813*** (0.0162)		0.0723*** (0.0165)		0.0495*** (0.0131)		0.0464*** (0.0133)
Recession			-0.0238*** (0.0056)	-0.0205*** (0.0483)			-0.0086* (0.0043)	-0.0064 (0.0046)
Observations	31,399	31,399	31,399	31,399	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000

Note: Reported average marginal effects originate from Poisson models, featuring the complete feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) represent the share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S.12: Potentially endogenous preferences in the fringes

	Stay rate: Overall				Stay rate: Employment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe expansion								
Extr. Left share	-0.2644*** (0.0847)	-0.2402*** (0.0837)	-0.2768*** (0.0845)	-0.2539*** (0.0837)	-0.2016*** (0.0680)	-0.1742** (0.0682)	-0.2037*** (0.0680)	-0.1768*** (0.0684)
Extr. Right share	0.2262*** (0.0728)	0.2268*** (0.0721)	0.2116*** (0.0726)	0.2137*** (0.0721)	0.0848 (0.0646)	0.0823 (0.0640)	0.0845 (0.0643)	0.0820 (0.0638)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0319*** (0.0064)	-0.0353*** (0.0064)	-0.0295*** (0.0064)	-0.0330*** (0.0064)	-0.0053 (0.0056)	-0.0088 (0.0057)	-0.0048 (0.0056)	-0.0083 (0.0057)
Immigration concerns		0.0784*** (0.0161)		0.0704*** (0.0164)		0.0467*** (0.0132)		0.0445*** (0.0135)
Recession			-0.0209*** (0.0056)	-0.0175*** (0.0058)			-0.0066 (0.0044)	-0.0044 (0.0046)
Voter preference dynamic: Fringe dominance								
Left (strong)	-0.0467*** (0.0077)	-0.0463*** (0.0076)	-0.0449*** (0.0075)	-0.0450*** (0.0074)	-0.0347*** (0.0086)	-0.0335*** (0.0082)	-0.0343*** (0.0085)	-0.0336*** (0.0082)
Left (intermed.)	-0.0419*** (0.0065)	-0.0426*** (0.0065)	-0.0407*** (0.0063)	-0.0416*** (0.0063)	-0.0338*** (0.0074)	-0.0339*** (0.0071)	-0.0336*** (0.0073)	-0.0340*** (0.0071)
Right (intermed.)	-0.0149*** (0.0058)	-0.0161*** (0.0057)	-0.0145** (0.0057)	-0.0157*** (0.0057)	-0.0127** (0.0053)	-0.0134** (0.0052)	-0.0127** (0.0053)	-0.0134** (0.0052)
Right (strong)	-0.0546*** (0.0086)	-0.0511*** (0.0085)	-0.0538*** (0.0084)	-0.0507*** (0.0084)	-0.0156* (0.0088)	-0.0119 (0.0088)	-0.0156* (0.0087)	-0.0118 (0.0089)
IPD: Restr. share	-0.0398*** (0.0065)	-0.0421*** (0.0065)	-0.0381*** (0.0066)	-0.0406*** (0.0066)	-0.0059 (0.0056)	-0.0089 (0.0056)	-0.0057 (0.0056)	-0.0090 (0.0056)
Immigration concerns		0.0692*** (0.0160)		0.0639*** (0.0164)		0.0561*** (0.0131)		0.0564*** (0.0133)
Recession			-0.0156*** (0.0060)	-0.0125** (0.0062)			-0.0023 (0.0049)	0.0007 (0.0052)
Observations	31,399	31,399	31,399	31,399	28,000	28,000	28,000	28,000

Note: Reported average marginal effects originate from Poisson models, featuring the complete feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) represent the share of restrictive immigration policy changes during the previous three years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table S.13: Extended gravity models for voter preferences around the centre (overall stay rate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Voter preference dynamic: Centre relocation									
Median Right	-0.0235*** (0.0043)	-0.0195*** (0.0044)	-0.0344*** (0.0038)	-0.0236*** (0.0043)	-0.0348*** (0.0039)	-0.0298*** (0.0038)	-0.0315*** (0.0040)	-0.0315*** (0.0040)	-0.0340*** (0.0038)
IPD	-0.0448*** (0.0068)	-0.0512*** (0.0070)	-0.0391*** (0.0070)	-0.0447*** (0.0068)	-0.0377*** (0.0071)	-0.0391*** (0.0071)	-0.0471*** (0.0076)	-0.0472*** (0.0077)	-0.0387*** (0.0072)
Refugee pop. [†]		0.0206*** (0.0033)					0.0262*** (0.0036)	0.0261*** (0.0036)	
Climate diff.			-0.0009 (0.0011)				-0.0007 (0.0011)	-0.0006 (0.0011)	
GDP ratio (D/O)				0.0015*** (0.0004)			0.0020*** (0.0005)	0.0020*** (0.0005)	
UE ratio (D/O)					-0.0005 (0.0007)		-0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	
90/10 ratio (D)						-0.0002 (0.0017)	-0.0030* (0.0018)	-0.0030* (0.0018)	
Voter preference dynamic: Centre expansion									
Centre share	0.1177** (0.0479)	0.0822* (0.0494)	0.0228 (0.0505)	0.1191** (0.0480)	0.0156 (0.0504)	0.0339 (0.0489)	-0.0759 (0.0557)	-0.0754 (0.0558)	0.0239 (0.0509)
IPD	-0.0370*** (0.0065)	-0.0453*** (0.0067)	-0.0270*** (0.0068)	-0.0370*** (0.0065)	-0.0254*** (0.0069)	-0.0300*** (0.0070)	-0.0348*** (0.0077)	-0.0350*** (0.0077)	-0.0273*** (0.0072)
Refugee pop. [†]		0.0214*** (0.0033)					0.0280*** (0.0036)	0.0279*** (0.0036)	
Climate diff.			-0.0009 (0.0011)				-0.0007 (0.0011)	-0.0007 (0.0011)	
GDP ratio (D/O)				0.0015*** (0.0004)			0.0020*** (0.0005)	0.0020*** (0.0005)	
UE ratio (D/O)					-0.0005 (0.0007)		-0.0002 (0.0006)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	
90/10 ratio (D)						-0.0005 (0.0018)	-0.0046** (0.0019)	-0.0045** (0.0019)	
Multilat. resist.	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no
Obs.	31,399	31,399	24,683	31,399	24,351	27,463	24,000	24,000	24,000

Note: Reported results are average marginal effects from Poisson estimations. All specifications feature the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Time-varying factors are lagged by one year. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) are represented by the share of restrictive policies over the previous three years. [†] denotes variables entering after log or inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table S.14: Extended gravity models for fringe dominance (overall stay rate)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Left (strong)	−0.0467*** (0.0078)	−0.0443*** (0.0076)	−0.0302*** (0.0077)	−0.0460*** (0.0077)	−0.0318*** (0.0077)	−0.0497*** (0.0084)	−0.0219*** (0.0073)	−0.0219*** (0.0073)	−0.0311*** (0.0076)
Left (interm.)	−0.0420*** (0.0066)	−0.0391*** (0.0064)	−0.0231*** (0.0064)	−0.0414*** (0.0065)	−0.0243*** (0.0065)	−0.0436*** (0.0073)	−0.0169*** (0.0061)	−0.0169*** (0.0061)	−0.0234*** (0.0064)
Right (interm.)	−0.0150*** (0.0058)	−0.0125** (0.0057)	−0.0236*** (0.0059)	−0.0146** (0.0058)	−0.0249*** (0.0059)	−0.0357*** (0.0067)	−0.0168*** (0.0056)	−0.0169*** (0.0056)	−0.0240*** (0.0059)
Right (strong)	−0.0549*** (0.0086)	−0.0455*** (0.0086)	−0.0664*** (0.0076)	−0.0544*** (0.0086)	−0.0682*** (0.0078)	−0.0773*** (0.0092)	−0.0586*** (0.0068)	−0.0587*** (0.0069)	−0.0661*** (0.0077)
IPD	−0.0400*** (0.0065)	−0.0455*** (0.0068)	−0.0320*** (0.0069)	−0.0399*** (0.0065)	−0.0305*** (0.0070)	−0.0330*** (0.0070)	−0.0373*** (0.0076)	−0.0374*** (0.0076)	−0.0320*** (0.0072)
Distance [†]	−0.0511*** (0.0113)	−0.0323*** (0.0077)	−0.0329*** (0.0079)	−0.0319*** (0.0077)	−0.0318*** (0.0079)	−0.0321*** (0.0076)	−0.0294*** (0.0078)	−0.0408*** (0.0119)	−0.0310*** (0.0078)
Population (D) [†]	0.3234*** (0.0795)	0.4207*** (0.0800)	0.3814*** (0.1037)	0.3104*** (0.0797)	0.4073*** (0.1043)	0.3532*** (0.0884)	0.4462*** (0.1046)	0.4502*** (0.1047)	0.3818*** (0.1033)
GDP pc (D) [†]	−0.0274 (0.0231)	−0.0076 (0.0224)	−0.0151 (0.0274)	−0.0533** (0.0228)	−0.0116 (0.0276)	−0.0001 (0.0263)	−0.0168 (0.0283)	−0.0105 (0.0292)	−0.0125 (0.0272)
Unemp. (D)	0.0564 (0.0777)	0.0152 (0.0792)	−0.0160 (0.0786)	0.0477 (0.0777)	0.0024 (0.0804)	0.0427 (0.0797)	−0.0128 (0.0841)	−0.0119 (0.0842)	−0.0141 (0.0780)
Language	0.0406*** (0.0072)	0.0410*** (0.0072)	0.0344*** (0.0071)	0.0387*** (0.0072)	0.0335*** (0.0072)	0.0361*** (0.0070)	0.0309*** (0.0070)	0.0307*** (0.0071)	0.0337*** (0.0071)
Col. rel.	0.0483*** (0.0126)	0.0488*** (0.0126)	0.0515*** (0.0125)	0.0507*** (0.0129)	0.0494*** (0.0123)	0.0498*** (0.0124)	0.0534*** (0.0129)	0.0531*** (0.0129)	0.0498*** (0.0124)
Mig. stock [†]	0.0045*** (0.0009)	0.0047*** (0.0009)	0.0042*** (0.0009)	0.0045*** (0.0009)	0.0046*** (0.0010)	0.0043*** (0.0009)	0.0041*** (0.0009)	0.0040*** (0.0010)	0.0044*** (0.0010)
New permits [†]	0.0045 (0.0033)	0.0073** (0.0033)	0.0245*** (0.0046)	0.0045 (0.0033)	0.0238*** (0.0046)	0.0155*** (0.0041)	0.0280*** (0.0045)	0.0280*** (0.0045)	0.0236*** (0.0046)
Immigration [†]	0.0078* (0.0042)	0.0034 (0.0041)	−0.0041 (0.0049)	0.0080* (0.0042)	−0.0039 (0.0050)	−0.0043 (0.0043)	−0.0076* (0.0046)	−0.0075 (0.0046)	−0.0048 (0.0050)
Refugee pop. [†]		0.0170*** (0.0034)					0.0209*** (0.0037)	0.0208*** (0.0037)	
Climate diff.			−0.0010 (0.0011)				−0.0008 (0.0011)	−0.0007 (0.0011)	
GDP ratio (D/O)				0.0014*** (0.0004)			0.0020*** (0.0005)	0.0019*** (0.0005)	
UE ratio (D/O)					−0.0005 (0.0007)		−0.0002 (0.0006)	−0.0002 (0.0006)	
90/10 ratio (D)						−0.0034** (0.0017)	−0.0064*** (0.0018)	−0.0063*** (0.0018)	
Multilat. resist.	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes	no
Obs.	31,399	31,399	24,683	31,399	24,351	27,463	24,000	24,000	24,000

Note: Reported results are average marginal effects from Poisson estimations. All specifications feature the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls. Time-varying factors are lagged by one year. Immigration policy dynamics (IPD) are represented by the share of restrictive policies over the previous three years. [†] denotes variables entering after log or inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Fixed effects included: destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year. Standard errors are clustered on the destination-origin level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure S.1: Overall stay rates for all origins, by destination country (2009-2019)




Figure S.2: Employment stay rates for all origins, by destination country (2009-2019)






Figure S.3: Origin-specific overall stay rates for Top-6 destinations (2018)




Note: Depicted overall stay rates apply the demographic equality approach to infer the population of potential graduates.

Figure S.4: Origin-specific employment stay rates for Top-6 destinations (2018)




Note: Depicted employment stay rates are based on the demographic equality approach to infer the population of potential graduates.

Figure S.5: Political dominance and immigration policy dynamics




Note: Dominance is measured as the ratio of respondents taking extreme positions on the right end (nine or ten) over those at the left end (one or two) of the scale of the Eurobarometer item. One corresponds to perfectly balanced political preferences. The minimum and maximum across all countries and years are 0.22 and 3.04, respectively; the mean amounts to 0.99. The share of immigration policy restrictions is based on DEMIG data; a value of 0.5 signals a situation where yearly immigration policy tightenings and relaxations are balanced, one corresponds to a case where all changes are restrictive. The average across all countries and years is 0.38.

Figure S.6: Fringe support across origin country GDP




Note: Average marginal effects across origin country GDP per capita levels are derived by introducing a complete set of interactions between a quartile indicator and all explanatory variables in the main specification (34,333 observations). 95% confidence intervals are displayed.

Figure S.7: Average marginal effects of political fringe dominance




Note: Average marginal effects of the ratio of extreme right versus left positions in the political spectrum are depicted over the area of support (with 95% confidence intervals). They are obtained from a Poisson model featuring the ratio in a cubic specification to allow functional flexibility.

Figure S.8: Bootstrapped average marginal effects




Note: Reported kernel densities of average marginal effects are based on 500 bootstrap replications. The simple replication design is based on random draws with replacement, assuming all observations originate from one integrated destination. The model specifications include the full set of feasible gravity and migration environment controls, and the IPD variable. Fixed effects include destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year FEs. For centre expansion, a sign reversal is observed in 0.6% of the cases; for intermediate right dominance, a sign reversal is documented in 0.4% of the cases.

Figure S.9: Voter preferences and immigration concerns



Note: Average marginal effects are derived from Poisson models with a complete interaction of political preference dynamics and immigration concerns and are reported over the area of support up to the 90th percentile (with 95% confidence intervals). All results are based on samples with 31,399 observations and feature the complete set of gravity and migration environment controls, as well as the preferred FE specification.

Figure S.10: Median voter preference across destination-origin GDP ratios



Note: Solid vertical line represents the median GDP ratio (4.05); the dashed line corresponds to the GDP ratio's mean (8.47). Average marginal effects are derived from a Poisson model with the feasible set of gravity and migration environment controls using an exponential interaction of the median voter preference indicator and the ratio of destination and origin GDP per capita. Fixed effects include destination, origin, year, and origin-by-year FEs. 95% confidence intervals are displayed.