


Appendix (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)


1.1 Additional Figures

Figure A.1: Social capital proxies by macro-region of origin



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of contemporary social capital proxies across the four Italian macro-regions.

Figure A.2: Social capital proxies by macro-region of origin



Notes: This figure shows the distribution of historical social capital proxies across the four Italian macro-regions.

1.2 Experiment Instructions (translated from Italian)

Welcome to today's experiment and thank you for your participation! Please follow the instructions as we guide you through today's experiment. Please do not use the mouse or keyboard before you are asked to do so. I will read this written text to explain the rules of the experiment, how to interact with the computer program

you are going to use, and to ensure that all participants in each sessions of this experiment receive the same information. If you have doubts, raise your hand and an experimenter will help you by answering you privately. We ask everyone to avoid talking with each other or to look at the screens of other participants for the entire duration of the experiment.

The experiment is conducted to study how people make decisions under specific conditions. You will receive 5 euros for showing up today and you can earn more euros with your participation. We remind you that participation in this experiment is voluntary. After the details of the experiment will be explained, you can decide to leave the laboratory. In this case, however, you will only receive 5 euros. All the decisions you make during the experiment will be remunerated and will remain completely anonymous. Your name will not be included or associated with the data collected in this experiment. During the experiment, your decisions will be rewarded with the experimental currency unit ECU. Your final score in ECU will be converted into Euros at a change of $2 \text{ ECU} = 1 \text{ Euro}$. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash, individually and anonymously.

This experiment will take place in different phases: 1) In phase 1, we will ask you to answer to a questionnaire. Please use the mouse to select or the keyboard to write your answer. 2) In the second phase, you will interact with some participants of today's session and make decisions. Please only use your mouse in this phase. 3) In the third and final phase, we will make few further questions. Again, you may use the mouse or the keyboard to provide your answers.

Phase 1: Questionnaire 1 Please use the mouse or the keyboard to indicate your answer:

1. Gender: a. M b. F
2. Citizenship: a. Italian b. Other European c. Other
3. Field of study: a. Economics b. STEM c. Law/Political Science d. Other
4. Year of enrollment:
5. What is the educational level of your parents

- (a) Father
 - i. Elementary school or lower
 - ii. High school
 - iii. College
 - iv. Master or PhD

- (b) Mother
 - i. Elementary school or lower
 - ii. High school
 - iii. College
 - iv. Master or PhD

- 6. Did you attend a game theory class? a. Yes b. No
- 7. Do you have a part-time job? a. Yes b. No
- 8. Are you involved in any charity or volunteering group? a. Yes b. No
- 9. In which Italian region did you attend elementary school?
- 10. In which Italian region did you attend high school?

Thank you! The first phase of the experiment is now over. Please click continue to proceed to phase 2.

Phase 2: Interaction

Groups In this phase you will take some decisions as members of a group. The software with which you are about to interact will assign each of you, randomly and anonymously, in one of three groups: A, B, or C. Once assigned to a group, you will remain there for the duration of the experiment. To the 10 ECU you received for showing-up today, 15 more ECUs will be added for players A and B, while C players will receive 10 additional ECUs. Before interacting with each other, the software will randomly and anonymously match each member of a group A with a member of a group B. On the right side of the screen, the software will display the geographic area of the other participant to whom you have been paired.

Offers After the formation of pairs, each player A can offer an amount between 0 and 13 ECU to the player B to which s/he was paired. Player B, before knowing the possible offer of player A, will decide which minimum offer to accept (from 1 to 13 ECU). In other words, Player B must indicate, for each possible offer of a player A, whether he is willing to accept it or not.

Earnings If player B accepts the sum offered by player A:

1. 15 ECU are added to the initial endowment of player A, for a total of 40 ECU, and the sum offered to player B is subtracted
2. 4 ECUs are subtracted from the initial endowment of player B, for a total of 20 ECU, and the sum offered by player A is added
3. 1 ECUs is subtracted from the initial endowment of all C players.

Warning! IF ANOTHER A PLAYER offers a sum and the B player to whom s/he has been paired accepts, each C player will suffer an additional loss of 1 ECU. **IF ALL PLAYERS A** decide to offer a sum and **IF ALL PLAYERS B** accept them, each player C will suffer a total loss of 9 ECU. If Player B rejects the sum offered by Player A:

1. 1 ECU is subtracted from the initial endowment of Player A for a total of 14 ECUs
2. Player B keeps his endowment of 15 ECUs
3. Player C keeps his endowment of 10 ECUs

Table [A.1](#) lists all possible combinations that each player can face after A and B decisions.

Player A's offer	Player B accepts			Player B rejects		
	Player A gets	Player B gets	Every Player C	Player A gets	Player B gets	Every Player C
0	25	25	Does not lose	25	25	Does not lose
1	37	22	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
2	36	23	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
3	35	24	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
4	34	25	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
5	33	26	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
6	32	27	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
7	31	28	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
8	30	29	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
9	29	30	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
10	28	31	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
11	27	32	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
12	26	33	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose
13	25	34	Loses 1	24	25	Does not lose

Table A.1: Table of A and B players payoffs.

Table [A.2](#) lists Player C possible payoffs conditional on Players A and B decisions.

	Every Player C gets
None of Players B is accepting offers	20 ECU
If one Player B accepts a Player A offer	19 ECU
If two Player B accept a Player A offer	18 ECU
If three Player B accept a Player A offer	17 ECU
If four Player B accept a Player A offer	16 ECU
If five Player B accept a Player A offer	15 ECU
If six Player B accept a Player A offer	14 ECU
If seven Player B accept a Player A offer	13 ECU
If eight Player B accept a Player A offer	12 ECU
If nine Player B accept a Player A offer	11 ECU

Table A.2: Table of C players payoffs.

When you are ready, please press continue to start the actual experiment!

Phase 3: Final questions Thank you! The experiment is now over. Before proceeding with the payment, we kindly ask you to answer the following extra questions. When you are ready, please click continue and use your mouse and keyboard to answer.

Questionnaire 2

1. On a scale of 1 (very little) to 4 (very much), how would you define your attitude to trust
 - (a) your relatives
 - (b) your neighborhood
 - (c) your friends
 - (d) people you just met
 - (e) people from another region
 - (f) people from another country
 - (g) people from another religion
2. On a scale of 1 (not at all strange) to 4 (very strange), how did you perceive the information about the region of origin of A and B players?
3. In phase 2 of the experiment, you were chosen as a member of GROUP A and had to choose whether to offer a member of GROUP B a sum of money that would have resulted in a cost for members of GROUP C. On a scale from 1 (very little) to 4 (very much), how much did your counterpart's region of origin influence your choices?
4. If the computer had selected you into the opposite group B, would you have accepted the offer that you made as an A player?
5. On a scale of 1 (very little) to 4 (very much), for each of the following areas, do you think that corruption is a major problem in the municipality where you grew up?

- (a) In politics
 - (b) In the business environment
 - (c) In the culture and values of society
 - (d) In your personal life
6. In the town where you grew up, in case of need for medical treatment, it is normal for people to contact a relative, a friend, or an acquaintance who works in the sector and offer favors or gifts to speed up or improve the quality of the service received?
7. In the town where you grew up, when a person is looking for a job, it is normal to contact a relative, a friend, or an acquaintance who works in a prominent position and offer favors or gifts to speed up or facilitate access to the labor market?
8. In the town where you grew up, when a person must solve a problem with the police, it is normal to contact a relative, a friend, or an acquaintance who works in a position to guarantee the sector and offer favors or gifts to speed up or to improve the quality of service received?

Thank you for participating! Today's experiment is over. Please stay at your desk while we will call you one at a time to proceed with the payment.

1.3 Supplementary results

In this appendix we report supplementary results. First, we show that the our main findings are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable when we use a linear probability model rather than a probit estimation. Second, we discuss the role of framing and report the results of additional experimental sessions where the game was presented with a non-neutral language.

Linear models and continuous variables Table A.3 reports probit regressions comparable to those shown in Table 6, but that also include individual control variables (i.e. participant’s gender, degree, parents’ degree, field of study, and macro-region of origin). Table A.4 and Table A.5 report OLS regressions with “citizen” offers and “public official” minimum acceptance thresholds as dependent variable, with and without individual control variables, respectively. Similarly, Table A.6 and Table A.7 report linear probability OLS estimates of the experimental conditions on the dependent variable (*Bribery*), with and without individual control variables, respectively.

Table A.3: Probit marginal treatment effects on the probability of engaging in corruption

<i>Panel A: Citizens</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.028 (0.415)		0.061 (0.394)	0.005 (0.929)	-0.032 (0.779)
<i>In-group</i>		0.049 (0.368)	0.075 (0.316)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.068 (0.560)		
Observations	97	98	97	64	21
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel B: Officials</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.237 (0.004)		0.343 (0.002)	0.330 (0.008)	0.094 (0.486)
<i>In-group</i>		-0.049 (0.717)	0.193 (0.100)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.266 (0.054)		
Observations	97	97	97	65	32
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel C: All</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.137 (0.000)		0.174 (0.008)	0.157 (0.030)	0.096 (0.051)
<i>In-group</i>		-0.015 (0.802)	0.062 (0.187)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.097 (0.308)		
Observations	194	194	194	129	65
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table reports the estimated probit marginal effects of a change in the experimental conditions on measures of corruption as dependent variable, with p-values reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been clustered within session. The variable *Info* is equal to one when participants were informed about the geographic origin of their paired counterpart, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable *In-group* is equal to one when participants were paired with another participant originating from the same macro-region. In Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when an individual playing as a “Citizen” makes at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel B the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when an individual playing as an “Official” accepted at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel C the dependent variable pools Panel A and Panel B’s dependent variables. Individual control variables include participants’ gender, age, parents’ education, field of study, and macro-region of origin.

Table A.4: Experimental condition effects on “citizens” offers and “officials” minimum accepted offers

<i>Panel A: Citizens</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.135 (0.753)		0.533 (0.459)	0.533 (0.455)	-0.305 (0.474)
<i>In-group</i>		0.461 (0.282)	0.988 (0.128)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.838 (0.336)		
Constant	5.639 (0.000)	5.569 (0.000)	5.200 (0.000)	5.200 (0.000)	6.188 (0.000)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
<i>Panel B: Officials</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-0.841 (0.015)		-1.200 (0.037)	-1.200 (0.036)	-0.184 (0.847)
<i>In-group</i>		0.261 (0.714)	-0.475 (0.203)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			1.016 (0.422)		
Constant	5.389 (0.000)	4.769 (0.000)	5.600 (0.000)	5.600 (0.000)	5.125 (0.000)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
Sample	Officials	Officials	Officials	Officials	Officials
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group

Notes: This table reports the estimated OLS coefficients of a change in the experimental conditions on measures of corruption as dependent variable, with p-values reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been clustered within session. The variable *Info* is equal to one when participants were informed about the geographic origin of their paired counterpart, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable *In-group* is equal to one when participants were paired with another participant originating from the same macro-region. In Panel A the dependent variable is a continuous variable representing the bribe offered by a “citizen”. In Panel B the dependent variable is a continuous variable representing the minimum accepted bribe set by a “public official”. Individual control variables include participants’ gender, age, parents’ education, field of study, and macro-region of origin.

Table A.5: Experimental condition effects on “citizens” offers and “officials” minimum accepted offers

<i>Panel A: Citizens</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.069 (0.851)		0.508 (0.412)	0.194 (0.694)	-0.315 (0.627)
<i>In-group</i>		0.435 (0.239)	1.010 (0.021)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.945 (0.229)		
Constant	1.931 (0.000)	2.000 (.)	1.492 (0.031)	1.806 (0.004)	9.169 (0.002)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
R^2	0.086	0.090	0.096	0.147	0.202
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel B: Officials</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-1.042 (0.001)		-1.257 (0.015)	-1.268 (0.014)	-0.541 (0.564)
<i>In-group</i>		0.552 (0.368)	-0.042 (0.929)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			0.744 (0.532)		
Constant	5.704 (0.000)	4.962 (0.000)	5.794 (0.000)	6.054 (0.000)	4.090 (0.000)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
R-squared	0.182	0.150	0.193	0.185	0.318
Sample	Officials	Officials	Officials	Officials	Officials
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table reports the estimated OLS coefficients of a change in the experimental conditions on measures of corruption as dependent variable, with p-values reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been clustered within session. The variable *Info* is equal to one when participants were informed about the geographic origin of their paired counterpart, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable *In-group* is equal to one when participants were paired with another participant originating from the same macro-region. In Panel A the dependent variable is a continuous variable representing the bribe offered by a “citizen”. In Panel B the dependent variable is a continuous variable representing the minimum accepted bribe set by a “public official”. Individual control variables include participants’ gender, age, parents’ education, field of study, and macro-region of origin.

Table A.6: Experimental condition effect on the probability of engaging in corruption, linear probability model

<i>Panel A: Citizens</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.013 (0.810)		0.028 (0.782)	0.028 (0.781)	0.011 (0.854)
<i>In-group</i>		0.049 (0.391)	0.063 (0.603)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.017 (0.900)		
Constant	0.778 (0.000)	0.769 (0.000)	0.750 (0.000)	0.750 (0.000)	0.813 (0.000)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
R-squared	0.000	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.000
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
<i>Panel B: Officials</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.229 (0.033)		0.339 (0.038)	0.339 (0.037)	0.040 (0.820)
<i>In-group</i>		-0.051 (0.719)	0.163 (0.217)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.298 (0.247)		
Constant	0.222 (0.011)	0.385 (0.002)	0.150 (0.218)	0.150 (0.215)	0.312 (0.001)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
<i>Panel C: All</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.121 (0.003)		0.183 (0.007)	0.183 (0.007)	0.026 (0.792)
<i>In-group</i>		-0.001 (0.988)	0.113 (0.145)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.158 (0.256)		
Constant	0.500 (0.000)	0.577 (0.000)	0.450 (0.000)	0.450 (0.000)	0.563 (0.000)
Observations	196	196	196	130	66
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group

Notes: This table reports the linear probability OLS estimated effects of a change in the experimental conditions on measures of corruption as dependent variable, with p-values reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been clustered within session. The variable *Info* is equal to one when participants were informed about the geographic origin of their paired counterpart, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable *In-group* is equal to one when participants were paired with another participant originating from the same macro-region. In Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when an individual playing as a “Citizen” makes at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel B the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when an individual playing as an “Official” accepted at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel C the dependent variable pools Panel A and Panel B’s dependent variables. Individual control variables include participants’ gender, age, parents’ education, field of study, and macro-region of origin.

Table A.7: Experimental condition effect on the probability of engaging in corruption, linear probability model

<i>Panel A: Citizens</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.027 (0.452)		0.058 (0.471)	0.007 (0.915)	0.018 (0.815)
<i>In-group</i>	0.040	0.080 (0.368)	(0.386)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.058 (0.606)		
Constant	-0.027 (0.452)	-0.000 (1.000)	-0.058 (0.471)	-0.007 (0.915)	1.020 (0.018)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
R-squared	0.112	0.113	0.115	0.188	0.194
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel B: Officials</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.229 (0.033)		0.339 (0.038)	0.339 (0.037)	0.040 (0.820)
<i>In-group</i>		-0.051 (0.719)	0.163 (0.217)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.298 (0.247)		
Constant	0.222 (0.011)	0.385 (0.002)	0.150 (0.218)	0.150 (0.215)	0.312 (0.001)
Observations	98	98	98	65	33
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel C: All</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	0.121 (0.003)		0.183 (0.007)	0.183 (0.007)	0.026 (0.792)
<i>In-group</i>		-0.001 (0.988)	0.113 (0.145)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.158 (0.256)		
Constant	0.500 (0.000)	0.577 (0.000)	0.450 (0.000)	0.450 (0.000)	0.563 (0.000)
Observations	196	196	196	130	66
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table reports the linear probability OLS estimated effects of a change in the experimental conditions on measures of corruption as dependent variable, with p-values reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been clustered within session. The variable *Info* is equal to one when participants were informed about the geographic origin of their paired counterpart, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable *In-group* is equal to one when participants were paired with another participant originating from the same macro-region. In Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when an individual playing as a “Citizen” makes at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel B the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when an individual playing as an “Official” accepted at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel C the dependent variable pools Panel A and Panel B’s dependent variables. Individual control variables include participants’ gender, age, parents’ education, field of study, and macro-region of origin.

1.4 Framed experiment

We report here the results of the experimental sessions where we used a non-neutral frame. Tables A.8, A.9, A.10, and A.11 are the equivalent of Tables 6, A.3, 4, and 5, respectively, where the former refer to the sessions where we used a non-neutral framing.

Table A.8: Probit marginal treatment effects on the probability of engaging in corruption (framed experiment)

<i>Panel A: Citizens</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-0.167 (0.247)		-0.233 (0.057)	-0.242 (0.057)	-0.075 (0.746)
<i>In-group</i>		0.067 (0.631)	0.008 (0.965)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			0.148 (0.452)		
Observations	72	72	72	46	26
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
<i>Panel B: Officials</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-0.139 (0.032)		-0.103 (0.428)	-0.092 (0.423)	-0.275 (0.154)
<i>In-group</i>		0.079 (0.561)	0.165 (0.424)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.107 (0.526)		
Observations	72	72	72	46	26
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
<i>Panel C: All</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-0.153 (0.027)		-0.171 (0.069)	-0.167 (0.072)	-0.175 (0.142)
<i>In-group</i>		0.073 (0.506)	0.102 (0.438)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			0.003 (0.985)		
Observations	144	144	144	92	52
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group

Notes: This table reports the estimated probit marginal effects of a change in the experimental conditions on measures of corruption as dependent variable, with p-values reported in parentheses. The estimates refer to experimental sessions with a non-neutral framing. Standard errors have been clustered within session. The variable *Info* is equal to one when participants were informed about the geographic origin of their paired counterpart, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable *In-group* is equal to one when participants were paired with another participant originating from the same macro-region. In Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when an individual playing as a “Citizen” makes at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel B the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when an individual playing as an “Official” accepted at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel C the dependent variable pools Panel A and Panel B’s dependent variables.

Table A.9: Probit marginal treatment effects on the probability of engaging in corruption (framed experiment)

<i>Panel A: Citizens</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-0.086 (0.279)		-0.114 (0.329)	0.004 (0.983)	-0.222 (0.113)
<i>In-group</i>		0.067 (0.631)	0.057 (0.611)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			0.031 (0.844)		
Observations	72	72	72	45	20
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel B: Officials</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-0.136 (0.114)		-0.080 (0.479)	-0.090 (0.422)	-0.046 (0.843)
<i>In-group</i>		0.001 (0.991)	0.096 (0.488)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.135 (0.198)		
Observations	72	72	72	44	17
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Panel C: All</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Info</i>	-0.092 (0.122)		-0.087 (0.160)	-0.069 (0.338)	-0.179 (0.018)
<i>In-group</i>		0.046 (0.616)	0.091 (0.448)		
<i>Info*In-group</i>			-0.046 (0.712)		
Observations	144	144	144	92	52
Treatment	Pooled	Pooled	Pooled	Out-group	In-group
Individual controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table reports the estimated probit marginal effects of a change in the experimental conditions on measures of corruption as dependent variable, with p-values reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been clustered within session. The variable *Info* is equal to one when participants were informed about the geographic origin of their paired counterpart, and equal to zero otherwise. The variable *In-group* is equal to one when participants were paired with another participant originating from the same macro-region. In Panel A the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when an individual playing as a “Citizen” makes at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel B the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when an individual playing as an “Official” accepted at least the equilibrium offer, and zero otherwise. In Panel C the dependent variable pools Panel A and Panel B’s dependent variables. Individual control variables include participants’ gender, age, parents’ education, field of study, and macro-region of origin.

Table A.10: Civic capital and probability to engage in corruption in framed experiment. Stand-alone effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Car thefts</i>	8.919 (0.159)	8.199 (0.620)	11.75 (0.800)
<i>Graduates share</i>	-0.263 (0.640)	-0.569 (0.476)	-0.129 (0.889)
<i>Non-profit organizations</i>	0.108 (0.799)	0.127 (0.802)	0.356 (0.431)
<i>Organ donation</i>	0.103 (0.195)	0.0715 (0.460)	0.0815 (0.369)
<i>Share of recycling</i>	-0.000 (0.710)	-0.002 (0.157)	-0.000 (0.680)
<i>Tax compliance</i>	0.066 (0.887)	0.0450 (0.931)	0.464 (0.414)
<i>Volunteering</i>	0.0268 (0.730)	0.0344 (0.688)	0.154 (0.073)
Observations	144	144	144
Individual controls	×	✓	✓
Geographic controls	×	×	✓

Notes: This table reports, for each panel, the estimated marginal effects of a stand-alone probit regression of a contemporary measure of social capital on the participants probability to engage in corruption in the framed version of the experiment, with p-values reported in parentheses. In all models the dependent variable is *Bribery*. Standard errors have been clustered within session. Individual control variables include: (i) gender; (ii) parents' education; (iii) being graduate; (iv) field of study; (v) self-declared membership to any charity. Geographic controls include: (a) the share of mountainous territory; (b) the difference in elevation with respect to the sea level; (c) average soil ruggedness; (d) whether a municipality is on the coast.

Table A.11: Predicting the probability to engage in corruption in framed experiment with historical proxies of civic capital. Stand-alone effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Social openness</i>	0.013 (0.723)	-0.009 (0.823)	0.011 (0.796)
<i>Social closure</i>	0.085 (0.234)	0.130 (0.047)	0.147 (0.060)
<i>Political instability</i>	0.001 (0.802)	0.003 (0.358)	0.006 (0.196)
Observations	144	144	144
Individual controls	×	✓	✓
Geographic controls	×	×	✓

Notes: This table reports, for each panel, the estimated marginal effect of a stand-alone probit regression of a historical measure of social capital on the participants probability to engage in corruption in the framed version of the experiment, with p-values reported in parentheses. In all models the dependent variable is *Bribery*. Standard errors have been clustered within session. Individual control variables include: (i) gender; (ii) parents' education; (iii) being graduate; (iv) field of study; (v) self-declared membership to any charity. Geographic controls include: (a) the share of mountainous territory; (b) the difference in elevation with respect to the sea level; (c) average soil ruggedness; (d) whether a municipality is on the coast.