

Online Supplementary Material: Data Preprocessing and Validation

Dataset Compilation and Structure

The two datasets are linked by matching an individual's name, gender, and year of birth. Because the CPED codes an individual's work experience over time, I am able to identify individuals' political positions while they were serving as foundation board members.

Table S1: DESCRIPTION OF LINKED DATASET

Year	Yearbook	RICF	Board Dataset (%Population)	#Board Mbr (Turnover)	#Political elites (Turnover)
2010	2,200	2,040	591 (27.88%)	7,923 (-)	68 (-)
2011	2,614	2,430	2,287 (90.68%)	27,589 (74.36%)	141 (55.32%)
2012	3,029	2,880	2,540 (85.97%)	30,313 (31.60%)	138 (25.36%)
2013	3,549	3,344	3,156 (91.57%)	36,553 (29.11%)	150 (24%)
2014	4,117	4,233	3,577 (85.68%)	35,515 (21.53%)	147 (11.56%)
2015	4,784	4,895	3,454 (71.37%)	36,595 (31.14%)	139 (17.99%)

Notes: The table suggests data from 2011-2015 are of good quality with respect to the consistency of turnover rate and board dataset completion. Yearbook = *2017 China Statistical Yearbook* by National Bureau of Statistics of China (2017); RICE = Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundations by Ma et al. (2017); Mbr = Member. Population is calculated as the average number of foundations recorded by Yearbook and RICE (e.g., for 2010, $27.88\% = 591 / (\frac{2200+2040}{2}) \cdot 100\%$).

Table S1 presents the structure of the linked dataset for this study. If we take the year 2013 as an example, the table presents the following: the *2017 China Statistical Yearbook* (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2017) shows that there are 3,549 foundations in China, the RICE records 3,344 foundations, and the average population is 3,446.5 (i.e., $\frac{3549+3344}{2}$) foundations. I have the board member information of 3,156 foundations, which accounts for 91.57% of the average population. There are 36,553 unique board members, and 29.11% of them are new

Table S2: PANEL STRUCTURE OF DATASET BY YEARS SITTING ON BOARD AND HOLDING THE SAME POLITICAL AFFILIATION


		Years on foundations' boards					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Years holding the same political affiliation while on board	1	55 (100%)	14 (29.2%)	7 (14.9%)	8 (12.9%)	7 (9.6%)	91 (31.9%)
	2	–	34 (70.8%)	7 (14.9%)	15 (24.2%)	13 (17.8%)	69 (24.2%)
	3	–	–	33 (70.2%)	6 (9.7%)	11 (15.1%)	50 (17.5%)
	4	–	–	–	33 (53.2%)	6 (8.2%)	39 (13.7%)
	5	–	–	–	–	36 (49.3%)	36 (12.6%)
	Total*	55 (19.3%)	48 (16.8%)	47 (16.5%)	62 (21.8%)	73 (25.6%)	285 (100%)

Note: Nearly half the political elites did not change their political or governmental affiliations while serving on foundations' boards. The table shows the counts of political elites by the years they stayed on foundations' boards and held the same political affiliation. For example, a government official stayed on a foundation's board for 5 years, was CCP for the first two years, PC for the second two years, and CYL for the last year, in which case she generates two counts for the 5-year-stay and 2-year-hold category, and one count for the 5-year-stay and 1-year-hold category. *Percentages are by row, all other percentages are by column.

additions. There are 150 foundation trustees who also are political leaders, and 24% of them are new additions.

Figure S1 and Table S2 present more details on the dataset's structure. As the figure shows, the within-category variations are small, but turnover rates are large. The table shows that nearly half of the political elites did not change their political or governmental affiliations while serving on foundations' boards and that the observations are distributed fairly evenly with respect to the amount of time the political elites remained on a board and held the same position. In general, the analysis of the data structure suggests that, although the dataset is a panel, a fixed- or random-effect regression is not appropriate if we use the original position categories (e.g., the CCP and CYL) as independent variables.

Figure S1: PANEL STRUCTURE OF THE DATASET



Notes: Each line on the Y-axis represents a political elite. As the figure shows, within-category variations are small, but turnover rates are high. CCP = Chinese Communist Party; CYL = Communist Youth League; MO = Mass Organization; PC = People's Congress; PCC = Political Consultative Conference; CSOE = Central state-owned enterprise; LSOE = Local state-owned enterprise.

Data Validation

I validated the linked dataset's quality manually based on two considerations: disambiguating people and identifying political or governmental backgrounds. By manually checking five 50-observation bootstrap samples, the precision of identifying records with the same name, gender, and birth year as belonging to the same person is 83.2% and that of identifying political or governmental background is 77.2%. Existing network studies rarely report these numbers of accuracy, so it is difficult to make comparisons. But I checked the misidentified records and found that they tended to be for less known and inactive individuals. Therefore, these misidentified records should generate limited influence on the analysis because these people tend to be isolated individuals who will not appear in the networks I am studying anyway. I used the records from 2011 to 2015 in the final analysis because they are more consistent and are of higher quality with respect to sample size and turnover rates (Table S1). The turnover rate for 2012 is the highest, suggesting that the political system had already begun to prearrange some postings before the year of a presidential change (i.e., 2013). There are flaws in the dataset, yet I made the utmost effort to minimize their impact.

Qualitative Member Checking of Findings

Following the member checking procedures described earlier, I conducted a series of interviews and focus groups. Table S3 lists the key informants and activities. The fieldwork generally confirmed the findings, and two cases are worth highlighting.

I interviewed a key informant who is a faculty member at the Central School of Communist Youth League (CSCYL). The CSCYL is the highest research and educational center of the CYL system that was established in 1948 to train CYL cadres and students. The informant agreed that CYL cadres are required to “keep grassroots,” but he is confused by the finding that CYL leaders are the most connected political elites in the civil society network because Xi has criticized them as “being out of touch with the people.”

Table S3: KEY INFORMANTS AND FIELDWORK ACTIVITIES

Date	ID	Informant / Activity Background
2019/05	1	Current faculty member of a university affiliated think-tank.
2019/06	2	Current faculty member of a university affiliated think-tank.
2019/06	3	Current faculty member of a university affiliated think-tank.
2019/06	4	Presentation and focus group in a prestigious university in Beijing, group size 30 people, audience mainly from universities and think-tanks.
2019/07	5	Current faculty member of a prestigious university in Beijing.
2019/07	6	Former cadre in the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
2019/07	5	Current faculty member of a prestigious university in Beijing.
2019/07	7	Presentation and focus group in a prestigious university in Beijing, group size 15 people, audience mainly from the Party and Youth League's cadre education system.
2019/08	8	Current faculty member of the Central School of Communist Youth League.
2019/08	7	Former cadre in the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The CSCYL faculty member concurred with my explanation that their perception of Xi's critiques and the results do not actually conflict. Being a CYL cadre can help an individual obtain a substantial "age advantage" later in his political career. Moreover, as this paper finds, cadres with previous CYL experience were significantly favored in the political network during Hu's presidency. These circumstances do not mean that "the current CYL cadres have been out of touch with the people" but instead may encourage "political opportunism"—this is what the CCP Central Committee fears (Kou and Tsai 2014).

I also interviewed another key informant who was a cadre at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (also known as the Central Party School). The Central Party School is the highest research and educational center of the CCP system and was established in

1933 to train future and incumbent CCP officials. He confirmed the results for the CYL, MO, CSOE, and School leaders. He particularly emphasized that intellectuals (i.e., the School category), especially political science scholars, began to assume more important roles under Xi's administration (e.g., Wang Huning, one of the CCP's top leaders and an influential political theorist).

Online Supplementary Material: Additional Tables and Figures

Table S4: LEADING POSITIONS (I.E., CADRES) IN CHINA'S CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM

Rank	Name	Example Positions
<i>National</i>		
1	State Leader (<i>guojiaji zhengzhi</i>)	General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Premier of the State Council
2	State Deputy (<i>guojiaji fuzhi</i>)	Members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Vice Chair of the Political Consultative Conference
<i>National or Provincial</i>		
3	Province/Ministry Head (<i>shengbuji zhengzhi</i>)	First Secretary of the Communist Youth League, Chair of national mass organizations (e.g., All-China Federation of Trade Unions), Chair of a Provincial-level People's Congress
4	Province/Ministry Deputy (<i>shengbuji fuzhi</i>)	Deputy Secretary of Party Committees of Provinces, Vice Chair of a Provincial-level People's Congress, Presidents of key state universities (e.g., Peking University)
<i>Provincial or Municipal</i>		
5	Bureau/Department Head (<i>tingjuji zhengzhi</i>)	Party Secretary of prefecture-level cities, President of provincial universities, Chair of People's Congress of prefecture-level cities
6	Bureau/Department Deputy (<i>tingjuji fuzhi</i>)	Deputy Party Secretary of Prefecture-level cities, Deputy Chairs of provincial mass organizations (e.g., All-China Women's Federation)
<i>County</i>		
7	Division/County Head (<i>xianchuji zhengzhi</i>)	Party Secretary of counties, Party Secretary of districts of prefecture-level cities, Chair of County-level People's Political Consultative Conference
8	Division/County Deputy (<i>xianchuji fuzhi</i>)	Members of county-level Party Standing Committee, Vice Mayor of counties
<i>Township</i>		
9	Section/Township Head (<i>xiangkeji zhengzhi</i>)	Party Secretary of towns, Chair of township-level People's Political Consultative Conference
10	Section/Township Deputy (<i>xiangkeji fuzhi</i>)	Deputy Heads of county-level party or government organizations

Source: PRC National People's Congress (2005, Article 16), Kou and Tsai (2014, 157), and Chan and Li (2007, 393).

Table S5: BRIDGING CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITY: DIFFERENTIATED EMBEDDEDNESS OF CHINESE POLITICAL ELITES

		Civil society embeddedness (<i>horizontal connection</i>)	Political embeddedness (<i>vertical connection</i>)
Embeddedness of political elites	Strong	CYL (<i>excellent state-agents for mobilizing civic power</i>)	MO, School, State Council (<i>excellent access points to political power</i>)
	Weak	LSOE, CSOE Judiciary, State Council (<i>marginalized state-agents in civil society</i>)	CYL, CSOE (<i>ineffective access points to political power</i>)

Notes: CYL = Communist Youth League; MO = Mass Organization; PC = People's Congress; PCC = Political Consultative Conference; CSOE = Central state-owned enterprise; LSOE = Local state-owned enterprise.

Table S6: PATTERNS OF LINKAGE BETWEEN CHINESE POLITICAL ELITES

Linkage	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
State Council–CCP	27% (21)	25% (20)	15% (6.0)	21% (6.0)	21% (8.0)
State Council	13% (10)	11% (9.0)	12% 5.0	–	–
PC–State Council	10% (8.0)	–	–	–	–
CCP	–	10% (8.0)	–	–	–
PC–CCP	–	13% (10)	–	–	–
PCC–State Council	–	–	15% (6.0)	10% (3.0)	–
PCC–CCP	–	–	–	17% (5.0)	10% (4.0)
<i>Cross category</i>	71% (56)	72% (57)	76% (31)	86% (25)	85% (33)

Notes: Showing links above 10% of total connections. Raw counts are in parentheses. CCP = Chinese Communist Party; PC = People's Congress; PCC = Political Consultative Conference.

Table S7: ROBUSTNESS CHECK: EXCLUDING ALL-CHINA WOMEN'S FEDERATION CASES

	Nonprofit Embeddedness		Political Embeddedness	
	<i>Hu</i>	<i>Xi</i>	<i>Hu</i>	<i>Xi</i>
<i>Political Affiliation</i>				
CCP	−0.044 (0.13)	−0.0053 (0.090)	0.24 (0.24)	0.046 (0.060)
CYL	1.1* (0.67)	1.2*** (0.40)	−0.31 (0.27)	−0.21** (0.11)
CYL Exp.	0.12 (0.18)	0.16 (0.10)	0.44** (0.19)	0.089 (0.056)
Judicial	0.026 (0.17)	−0.12* (0.071)	−0.62 (0.53)	0.11 (0.16)
LSOE	−0.12 (0.11)	−0.16** (0.075)	0.17 (0.25)	0.10 (0.12)
MO	0.090 (0.27)	−0.072 (0.11)	0.25 (0.36)	0.28** (0.12)
PCC	0.043 (0.091)	−0.061 (0.074)	−0.25 (0.21)	0.0046 (0.074)
SC	0.12 (0.17)	−0.10 (0.079)	−0.10 (0.23)	0.031 (0.056)
CSOE	0.085 (0.20)	−0.22** (0.11)	0.082 (0.24)	−0.23** (0.12)
School	0.098 (0.14)	0.19 (0.14)	−0.27 (0.23)	0.16* (0.088)
<i>Controls</i>				
Male	0.024 (0.13)	−0.16 (0.14)	−0.31 (0.22)	−0.25*** (0.097)
Education	0.023 (0.025)	−0.036 (0.023)	−0.041 (0.063)	0.016 (0.018)
Cadre rank	0.0063 (0.022)	−0.011 (0.011)	−0.045 (0.031)	−0.014 (0.011)
Age	−0.056 (0.049)	−0.079** (0.031)	−0.014 (0.070)	−0.026 (0.027)
Board size	0.73*** (0.027)	0.78*** (0.023)	0.099** (0.050)	0.10*** (0.019)
Embed. diversity	0.15*** (0.050)	0.029 (0.032)	−0.99*** (0.096)	−0.44*** (0.029)
<i>#Observations</i>	272	426	272	426
<i>Adj. R²</i>	0.52	0.71	0.57	0.57

Notes: Dependent variable = Network degree. PC is the base group for political affiliation. Network degree, age, board size, and embeddedness diversity are transformed to z-scores. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses (Snijders and Borgatti 1999). χ^2 column shows the Wald test results. CCP = Chinese Communist Party; CYL = Communist Youth League; CYL Exp. = Cadres with previous CYL work experience; MO = Mass Organization; PC = People's Congress; PCC = Political Consultative Conference; CSOE = Central state-owned enterprise; LSOE = Local state-owned enterprise. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, two-tailed tests.

Figure S2: A SAMPLE OF LINKED DATASET

Foundation ID	Year	Name	Gender	Birth Year	Position	
54	2011	XKJ	M	1973	Morgan Stanley Huaxin Securities C	
67	2015	XKJ	M	1973	Shanghai Municipal Investment Grc	
67	2014	XKJ	M	1973	Shanghai Tower Construction & De	
67	2013	XKJ	M	1973	Morgan Stanley Huaxin Securities C	
67	2012	XKJ	M	1973	Morgan Stanley Huaxin Securities C	
67	2011	XKJ	M	1973	Morgan Stanley Huaxin Securities C	
138	2014	XKJ	M	1973	Shanghai Tower Construction & De	
138	2013	XKJ	M	1973	Morgan Stanley Huaxin Securities C	
138	2012	XKJ	M	1973	Morgan Stanley Huaxin Securities C	
138	2011	XKJ	M	1973	Morgan Stanley Huaxin Securities C	
250	2013	CJS	M	1956	Federation of Social Science Assoxi	
250	2012	CJS	M	1956	Federation of Social Science Assoxi	
250	2011	CJS	M	1956	Ministry/ Department/Bureau of W	
250	2010	CJS	M	1956	State Council	
1387	2012	CJS	M	1956	Federation of Social Science Assoxi	
1387	2013	CJS	M	1956	Federation of Social Science Assoxi	
1387	2014	CJS	M	1956	Work Committee for Departments	
1387	2015	CJS	M	1956	Work Committee for Departments	
253	2015	LXM	M	1951	Politburo / Standing Committee, Pc	
253	2013	LXM	M	1951	Politburo / Standing Committee, Pc	
253	2012	LXM	M	1951	Politburo / Standing Committee, Pc	
253	2011	LXM	M	1951	Major Projects Construction Headq	
253	2010	LXM	M	1951	Major Projects Construction Headq	
554	2015	LXM	M	1951	Politburo / Standing Committee	
554	2014	LXM	M	1951	Politburo / Standing Committee	
554	2013	LXM	M	1951	Politburo / Standing Committee	

Notes: The final linked dataset of Ma et al. (2017) and Jiang (2018) can track a political elite's foundation membership and political position in a given year. For example, the political elite CJS were on two foundations' boards (i.e., Foundation ID 250 and 1387) between 2010 and 2015, and he changed his primary position four times during the same time period.

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