

Appendix for “Your Silence Speaks Volumes: Weak
States and Strategic Absence in the UN General
Assembly”

January 8, 2024

1 Article 19 Information

Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, countries that have failed to pay sufficient dues for two years are considered in arrears and eligible for disenfranchisement. Table 1 shows the countries that fell into this status between 1990 and 2021. Countries in arrears may request exemptions from this procedure. The Committee on Contributions reviews exemption requests and makes recommendations about whether countries should be granted exemptions. The General Assembly may also grant exemption requests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Country	Years in Arrears	Requested Exemptions	Granted Exemptions
Afghanistan	2002	0	0
Angola	1994	0	0
Benin	1992, 2004	0	0
Bolivia	2019	1	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1997-99	1	1
Burkina Faso	1993-94	0	0
Burundi	1995-2004	5	4
Cambodia	1991-93, 98-99	1	1
Cabo Verde	1998, 2000, 2004	0	0
Central African Republic	1991-2014	12	12
Chad	1991-98, 2000, 02, 04-05, 09	0	0
Comoros	1993-2021	18	17
Congo	1991, 97-2000	0	0
DRC	1999, 2003	1	0
Djibouti	2000, 03	0	0
Dominican Republic	1990-96	1	0
Dominica	1997-2000	0	0
Ecuador	2000	0	0
Equatorial Guinea	1990-99	0	0
Gabon	2019	1	1
Gambia	1991-2000	0	0
Georgia	1998-2005	7	7
Grenada	1997-2000	0	0
Guatemala	1990-1996	0	0
Guinea	1999-2001	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	1993-2017	13	12
Haiti	1992, 1994, 2000	0	0
Honduras	1998	0	0
Iraq	1995-2005	3	1
Kenya	1992	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	1997-2003	1	1
Liberia	1990-2011	8	8
Libya	2017, 2019	2	2
Madagascar	2000	0	0
Malawi	2004	0	0
Mali	1992-96	0	0
Mauritania	1992, 94-96, 99, 2000, 02, 04	0	0
Moldova	1997-2005	7	6
Mongolia	1999	0	0
Nicaragua	1990, 99	0	0
Niger	1992-93, 95, 98-2006	3	3
Palau	2019	1	1
Rwanda	1997, 99, 2000	0	0
Saint Lucia	2000	0	0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2000	0	0
Sao Tome and Principe	1990-2021	12	12
Seychelles	1997-2002	0	0
Sierra Leone	1990-1996, 99-2000	0	0
Soloman Islands	1994	0	0
Somalia	1993-2021	13	12
South Africa	1990-1994	0	0
Tajikistan	1997-2008	11	9
Togo	1997-2000	0	0
Turkmenistan	1999-2000	0	0
Uzbekistan	2001-2002	0	0
Vanuatu	1998-2003	0	0
Venezuela	2020	0	0
Vietnam	2019	1	1
Yemen	1994, 2000, 12, 14-15	0	0
Yugoslavia	1993	1	0

Table 1: Countries Eligible for Article 19 Sanctions (1990-2021)

2 Details on Strategic Absence

Our concept of strategic absence implies that a country is choosing to skip a specific vote due to the politics surrounding the proposed resolution. To identify such instances, we began by collecting data on the specific date each resolution was passed. This data is included in the BSV roll-call voting data, but upon examination, we determined that many resolution dates in the data set were the date that the UN published information about the resolution rather than the date of the vote. RAs collected new data on the precise date of the resolution, resulting in the re-coding of resolution date for approximately 1000 resolutions between 1990 and 2021. We then created a binary indicator of whether a country was absent for a vote on a date that it was present for voting on other resolutions.

Our proxy for strategic absence has some limitations. First, we do not pick up cases where a country chooses this strategy on a day where the UN discusses only one resolution. This event is most likely to occur when the UNGA votes on a resolution during the spring, as is often the case for special sessions. Our measure thus omits some of these “most likely” cases for strategic absence, such as the votes related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, we cannot distinguish between cases where exogenous factors cause a delegation to miss a vote and where a skipped vote is intentional. We partially address this latter concern by incorporating new data from Fjelstul, Hug, and Kilby (2023) on retroactive reported voting. We also investigate the validity of our coding by looking at the content of every resolution that has more than 20 strategic absences. Appendix Table 2 and Table 3 display these resolutions.

As an additional robustness test, we construct a secondary measure of strategic absence that indicates when a country misses a vote on a day where it has already shown up and voted on a resolution. This fine-grained measure eliminates cases where a country might be late due to exogenous circumstances like traffic. However, by construction, it also means

that no country can be strategically absent from the first vote of the day.

Date	Resolution Number	New Topic	Description
1990 - 12 December	R/45/78A	Environment	Antarctica Treaty
1990 - 12 December	R/45/75B	Environment	Antarctica Treaty and South Africa
1991 - 6 December		Environment	Antarctica Treaty
1991 - 6 December		Environment	South Africa and Antarctica Treaty
1991 - 9 December		Palestinian Refugees	Demand that Israel desist from occupation
1991 - 9 December		Palestinian Refugees	Urges all Member States to provide aid
1992 - 9 December	R/47/57	Environment	Antarctica Treaty
1992 - 11 December	R/47/63A	Condemnations/Demands of Israel	Declares Israel's occupation of Golan illegal
1992 - 11 December	R/47/65	Oceans	Universal participation in UNCLOS
1992 - 14 December	Middle East Peace General	Support for peace process	
1992 - 14 December	Israel Occupied Territory Issues	Illegality of Israel's occupation	
1992 - 14 December	Condemnations/Demands of Israel	Deplores arbitrary detention or imprisonment	
1992 - 14 December	Israel Occupied Territory Issues	Requests Israel respect the Geneva Convention	
1992 - 14 December	Jerusalem	Jerusalem jurisdiction	
1992 - 20 December	Palestinian Rights	Committee on Inalienable Rights of Pal People	
1993 - 16 December		Environment	Question of Antarctica
1993 - 20 December	R/48/145	ME/Europe - HR	Critique of Iran for human rights violations
1993 - 20 December	R/48/147	HR Non ME/Europe	Critique of Sudan for human rights violations
1993 - 20 December	R/48/158a, b, c, d	Palestine/Rights	Committee on Inalienable Rights of Pal People
1994 - 14 December		Palestinian Rights	Committee on the Inalienable Rights of Pal People
1994 - 9 December		Oceans	Draft articles on non-navigational uses of ocean
1995 - 12 December	R/50/70a	Nuclear Tests	Urges cessation of all nuclear testing
1997 - 11 November	R/52/24	Miscellaneous	Restitution of cultural property to country of origin
1998 - 4 December	R/53/77h	Nuclear Disarmament General	No nuclear weapons in Central/Eastern Europe
1999 - 1 December	R/54/37	Jerusalem	Illegality of Israeli laws/jurisdiction on Jerusalem
1999 - 1 December	R/54/38	Syria/Golan	Calls on Israel to withdraw from Golan
2001 - 21 December	R/56/214a	Lebanon	Israel should abide by UN resolutions re: Lebanon
2001 - 21 December	R/56/216	Administrative	Cooperation between the UN and OSCE
2001 - 21 December		UN Interim Force in Lebanon	Financing for UNIFIL
2002 - 20 December		Administration - Cooperation between the UN and OSCE	
2003 - 4 November		IAEA	Report of the IAEA
2003 - 23 December	R/58/244	Miscellaneous	Institute for Advancement for Women
2003 - 23 December	R/58/240	Oceans	States should become parties to UNCLOS
2004 - 10 December		Decolonization	Question of Western Sahara
2006 - 14 December		Palestine General	Assistance to the Palestinian people
2006 - 14 December		Decolonization	Question of Western Sahara
2006 - 20 December		Oceans	UNCLOS
2006 - 22 December		UN Interim Force in Lebanon	Financing UNIFIL
2008 - 5 December		Oceans	UNCLOS
2011 - 18 November		Human Rights Non ME/Europe	Libya restoration to Human Rights Council

Table 2: UNGA resolutions with more than 20 strategic absences (1999-2014)

Date	Resolution Number	New Topic	Description
2018 - 6 December	R/73/88	Afghanistan Crimea ICJ Chemical Weapons League of Arab States	Situation in Afghanistan
2018 - 17 December	R/73/194		Problem of the militarization of Crimea
2018 - 20 December	R/73/257		ICJ decision concerning Mexican nationals
2018 - 20 December	R/73/258		Cooperation between the UN and Org for Proh of Chemical Weapons
2018 - 22 December	R/73/267	Crimea Program planning Inter-religious dialogue Crimea Afghanistan	Cooperation between the UN and the League for Arab States
2019 - 18 December	R/74/168		Situation of human rights in Crimea
2019 - 27 December	R/74/251		Program planning
2020 - 2 December	R/75/26		Inter-religious dialogue
2020 - 7 December	R/75/29	Inter-religious dialogue Crimea Ocean	Problem of the militarization of Crimea
2020 - 10 December	R/75/90		Situation in Afghanistan
2021 - 9 December	R/76/69		Inter-religious dialogue
2021 - 9 December	R/76/70		Problem of the militarization of Crimea
2021 - 9 December	R/76/72		UNCLOS

Table 3: UNGA resolutions with more than 20 strategic absences (2015-2021)

3 Robustness Tests

<i>Dependent variable: Strategic Absence (Narrow Version)</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hypothesis 1						
Important Vote	0.306*** (0.086)	0.265** (0.087)	0.203* (0.089)	0.312*** (0.082)	0.277*** (0.084)	0.186* (0.089)
US Ally	-0.822*** (0.220)	-0.383* (0.180)	-0.831*** (0.192)	-0.818*** (0.221)	-0.381* (0.180)	-0.831*** (0.192)
US Ally * Important Vote	-0.573*** (0.163)	-0.543*** (0.163)	-0.411* (0.194)	-0.588*** (0.163)	-0.554*** (0.163)	-0.411* (0.195)
Hypothesis 2a						
US Yes - Russia No	0.450** (0.148)	0.476** (0.157)	0.331* (0.146)			
Hypothesis 2b						
Russia Yes - US No				-0.307*** (0.085)	-0.271** (0.087)	-0.269** (0.092)
Russian Ally	0.391 (0.255)	0.598* (0.279)	0.349 (0.228)	0.392 (0.254)	0.598* (0.279)	0.350 (0.228)
Vote Margin	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.049* (0.025)	-0.066* (0.030)	-0.073** (0.026)	-0.081** (0.026)	-0.092** (0.030)
Abstentions	0.126*** (0.027)	0.126*** (0.029)	0.133*** (0.034)	0.106*** (0.028)	0.109*** (0.030)	0.110** (0.036)
Article 19 Eligibility	0.329 (0.171)	-0.401 (0.211)	0.039 (0.174)	0.336* (0.170)	-0.394 (0.211)	0.044 (0.174)
Preference Similarity to US	-0.001 (0.125)	0.010 (0.113)	-0.393* (0.190)	-0.029 (0.127)	-0.016 (0.114)	-0.427* (0.192)
Preference Similarity to Russia	-0.114 (0.094)	-0.128 (0.096)	0.171 (0.176)	-0.086 (0.094)	-0.101 (0.096)	0.204 (0.176)
Middle East	-0.162 (0.118)	-0.123 (0.123)	-0.119 (0.133)	-0.160 (0.114)	-0.130 (0.119)	-0.109 (0.129)
Human Rights	-0.110 (0.086)	-0.102 (0.089)	-0.059 (0.094)	-0.086 (0.085)	-0.075 (0.087)	-0.040 (0.093)
Arms Control/Disarmament	-0.050 (0.089)	-0.044 (0.094)	0.017 (0.107)	-0.099 (0.091)	-0.091 (0.096)	-0.040 (0.108)
Economic Development	-0.423*** (0.091)	-0.383*** (0.094)	-0.428*** (0.128)	-0.370*** (0.088)	-0.337*** (0.091)	-0.378** (0.124)
Nuclear Weapons/Materials	-0.306*** (0.093)	-0.302** (0.101)	-0.276* (0.111)	-0.416*** (0.101)	-0.402*** (0.108)	-0.350** (0.119)
Colonialism	0.018 (0.070)	0.035 (0.072)	0.126 (0.082)	0.005 (0.071)	0.021 (0.072)	0.117 (0.082)
GDP (logged)		-0.295*** (0.039)			-0.295*** (0.039)	
GDP Per Capita (logged)		-0.100 (0.070)			-0.100 (0.070)	
Delegation Size (logged)			-0.750*** (0.097)			-0.752*** (0.097)
Time	-0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.018 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.010)
Number of Observations	441417	406486	316935	441417	406486	316935
Clustered SEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 4: *Geopolitics and Strategic Absences (Narrow Coding of Strategic Absence)*- The table shows the results of pooled logistic regressions estimating the effect of important votes and ties to the United States (hypothesis 1) and competing principals (hypotheses 2a and 2b) on strategic absence. Standard errors are clustered by resolution and country.

<i>Dependent variable: Strategic Absence</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
US Yes - Russia No	0.530*** (0.125)	0.542*** (0.132)	0.384** (0.131)			
Russia Yes - US No				-0.334*** (0.069)	-0.318*** (0.071)	-0.323*** (0.076)
US Ally	-0.640** (0.235)	-0.141 (0.179)	-0.667*** (0.200)	-0.636** (0.235)	-0.138 (0.179)	-0.667*** (0.201)
Important Vote	0.218** (0.069)	0.174* (0.070)	0.132 (0.076)	0.230*** (0.067)	0.185** (0.069)	0.110 (0.078)
US Ally * Important Vote	-0.499*** (0.131)	-0.470*** (0.133)	-0.390* (0.162)	-0.518*** (0.131)	-0.484*** (0.134)	-0.390* (0.162)
Russian Ally	0.261 (0.263)	0.479 (0.289)	0.213 (0.236)	0.261 (0.263)	0.479 (0.289)	0.213 (0.236)
Vote Margin	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.020)	-0.024 (0.024)	-0.046* (0.020)	-0.052* (0.020)	-0.055* (0.024)
Abstentions	0.086*** (0.021)	0.088*** (0.022)	0.099*** (0.026)	0.063** (0.022)	0.066** (0.024)	0.072* (0.028)
Article 19 Eligibility	0.623** (0.202)	-0.223 (0.235)	0.222 (0.214)	0.625** (0.202)	-0.223 (0.235)	0.223 (0.215)
Preference Similarity to US	0.233 (0.373)	0.913* (0.371)	0.551 (0.317)	0.242 (0.375)	0.923* (0.372)	0.563 (0.316)
Preference Similarity to Russia	-0.366 (0.355)	-0.994** (0.367)	-0.757* (0.297)	-0.375 (0.357)	-1.004** (0.368)	-0.769** (0.297)
Middle East	0.074 (0.099)	0.113 (0.103)	0.050 (0.112)	0.084 (0.096)	0.120 (0.100)	0.072 (0.109)
Human Rights	-0.129 (0.066)	-0.123 (0.070)	-0.098 (0.078)	-0.099 (0.065)	-0.090 (0.068)	-0.076 (0.076)
Arms Control/Disarmament	0.027 (0.065)	0.025 (0.071)	0.072 (0.078)	-0.026 (0.066)	-0.029 (0.072)	0.006 (0.079)
Economic Development	-0.352*** (0.073)	-0.313*** (0.075)	-0.252** (0.092)	-0.287*** (0.070)	-0.252*** (0.073)	-0.183* (0.088)
Nuclear Weapons/Materials	-0.277*** (0.073)	-0.276*** (0.079)	-0.324*** (0.083)	-0.386*** (0.080)	-0.376*** (0.085)	-0.404*** (0.091)
Colonialism	-0.037 (0.057)	-0.020 (0.058)	0.014 (0.069)	-0.053 (0.057)	-0.037 (0.059)	0.006 (0.068)
GDP (logged)		-0.311*** (0.038)			-0.311*** (0.038)	
GDP Per Capita (logged)		-0.157* (0.069)			-0.157* (0.069)	
Delegation Size (logged)			-0.784*** (0.095)			-0.785*** (0.095)
Number of Observations	441417	406486	316935	441417	406486	316935
Clustered SEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 5: *Geopolitics and Strategic Absences (Year-Fixed Effects Model)*- The table shows the results of pooled logistic regressions estimating the effect of important votes and ties to the United States (hypothesis 1) and competing principals (hypotheses 2a and 2b) on strategic absence. Standard errors are clustered by resolution and country.

<i>Dependent variable: Strategic Absence</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hypothesis 1						
US Ally	-0.662** (0.226)	-0.183 (0.178)	-0.675*** (0.196)	-0.663** (0.226)	-0.184 (0.178)	-0.675*** (0.197)
Important Vote	0.214** (0.071)	0.181* (0.071)	0.097 (0.077)	0.244*** (0.070)	0.209** (0.070)	0.110 (0.076)
US Ally * Important Vote	-0.505*** (0.132)	-0.483*** (0.134)	-0.392* (0.162)	-0.516*** (0.132)	-0.491*** (0.134)	-0.390* (0.162)
Hypothesis 2a US Yes - China No						
	0.552*** (0.117)	0.536*** (0.122)	0.477*** (0.138)			
Hypothesis 2b China Yes - US No						
				-0.362*** (0.070)	-0.343*** (0.072)	-0.323*** (0.078)
Chinese Ally	0.738*** (0.130)		0.530*** (0.135)	0.733*** (0.131)		0.530*** (0.136)
Vote Margin	-0.0003 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.018 (0.024)	-0.068** (0.022)	-0.074** (0.023)	-0.079** (0.026)
Abstentions	0.091*** (0.022)	0.092*** (0.023)	0.097*** (0.027)	0.085*** (0.022)	0.087*** (0.024)	0.090** (0.028)
Article 19 Eligibility	0.648*** (0.192)	-0.159 (0.231)	0.278 (0.201)	0.648*** (0.192)	-0.159 (0.230)	0.280 (0.201)
Preference Similarity to US	-0.177 (0.128)	-0.203 (0.113)	-0.370** (0.127)	-0.177 (0.128)	-0.205 (0.113)	-0.377** (0.127)
Preference Similarity to China	0.049 (0.078)	0.113 (0.081)	0.176 (0.093)	0.048 (0.078)	0.113 (0.081)	0.182* (0.093)
Middle East	0.087 (0.101)	0.129 (0.105)	0.065 (0.114)	0.177 (0.102)	0.213* (0.107)	0.159 (0.116)
Human Rights	-0.181* (0.074)	-0.178* (0.076)	-0.115 (0.080)	-0.148* (0.071)	-0.144* (0.073)	-0.078 (0.077)
Arms Control/Disarmament	-0.009 (0.069)	-0.011 (0.074)	0.069 (0.080)	-0.038 (0.068)	-0.040 (0.074)	0.038 (0.079)
Economic Development	-0.309*** (0.071)	-0.273*** (0.074)	-0.210* (0.092)	-0.228*** (0.068)	-0.196** (0.071)	-0.121 (0.088)
Nuclear Weapons/Materials	-0.282*** (0.076)	-0.286*** (0.082)	-0.317*** (0.085)	-0.353*** (0.079)	-0.346*** (0.085)	-0.347*** (0.087)
Colonialism	-0.050 (0.057)	-0.035 (0.059)	0.015 (0.070)	-0.037 (0.056)	-0.024 (0.058)	0.027 (0.068)
GDP (logged)		-0.307*** (0.038)			-0.307*** (0.038)	
GDP Per Capita (logged)		-0.154* (0.067)			-0.153* (0.067)	
Delegation Size (logged)			-0.788*** (0.097)			-0.788*** (0.097)
Time	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.009)	-0.012* (0.005)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.009)
Number of Observations	441417	406486	316935	441417	406486	316935
Clustered SEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 6: *Geopolitics and Strategic Absences (US-China)*- The table shows the results of pooled logistic regressions estimating the effect of important votes and ties to the United States (hypothesis 1) and competing principals (hypotheses 2a and 2b) on strategic absence. Standard errors are clustered by resolution and country.

<i>Dependent variable: Abstain</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
US Ally	−0.025 (0.086)	−0.159 (0.081)	−0.092 (0.086)	−0.025 (0.086)	−0.159 (0.081)	−0.092 (0.086)
Important Vote	0.124 (0.067)	0.139 (0.071)	0.111 (0.079)	0.131* (0.066)	0.148* (0.070)	0.114 (0.075)
US Ally * Important Vote	−0.335* (0.151)	−0.349* (0.158)	−0.292 (0.162)	−0.336* (0.151)	−0.351* (0.158)	−0.292 (0.162)
China Yes - US No				−0.001 (0.108)	−0.016 (0.111)	−0.009 (0.112)
	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.162)	(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.162)
Chinese Ally	0.814*** (0.077)		0.845*** (0.083)	0.814*** (0.077)		0.845*** (0.083)
Vote Margin	−0.005 (0.027)	−0.009 (0.029)	−0.004 (0.029)	−0.007 (0.034)	−0.015 (0.035)	−0.007 (0.035)
Abstentions	1.373*** (0.074)	1.385*** (0.077)	1.369*** (0.078)	1.373*** (0.073)	1.386*** (0.076)	1.369*** (0.078)
Article 19 Eligibility	−0.359 (0.186)	−0.164 (0.182)	−0.183 (0.194)	−0.359 (0.186)	−0.165 (0.182)	−0.183 (0.194)
Preference Similarity to US	0.800*** (0.082)	0.743*** (0.077)	0.667*** (0.062)	0.799*** (0.081)	0.743*** (0.076)	0.666*** (0.063)
Preference Similarity to China	0.033 (0.037)	0.056 (0.035)	0.121*** (0.021)	0.033 (0.035)	0.057 (0.034)	0.122*** (0.021)
Middle East	0.052 (0.084)	0.065 (0.087)	0.043 (0.088)	0.047 (0.080)	0.062 (0.083)	0.043 (0.081)
Human Rights	−0.016 (0.023)	−0.008 (0.024)	−0.0003 (0.025)	−0.013 (0.024)	−0.004 (0.026)	0.001 (0.028)
Arms Control/Disarmament	−0.039 (0.039)	−0.035 (0.043)	−0.025 (0.052)	−0.038 (0.039)	−0.035 (0.043)	−0.025 (0.052)
Economic Development	0.025 (0.032)	0.030 (0.033)	0.023 (0.045)	0.023 (0.025)	0.029 (0.027)	0.022 (0.036)
Nuclear Weapons/Materials	0.023 (0.055)	0.014 (0.056)	0.006 (0.064)	0.020 (0.069)	0.006 (0.070)	0.003 (0.074)
Colonialism	0.017 (0.039)	0.005 (0.041)	0.018 (0.049)	0.016 (0.041)	0.004 (0.044)	0.017 (0.053)
GDP (logged)		0.097*** (0.017)			0.098*** (0.017)	
GDP Per Capita (logged)		−0.012 (0.026)			−0.012 (0.026)	
Delegation Size (logged)			0.172*** (0.044)			0.172*** (0.044)
Time	−0.016*** (0.003)	−0.018*** (0.003)	−0.015*** (0.003)	−0.016*** (0.003)	−0.018*** (0.003)	−0.015*** (0.003)
Number of Observations	441417	406486	316935	441417	406486	316935
Clustered SEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 7: *Geopolitics and Abstentions (US-China)*- The table shows the results of pooled logistic regressions estimating the effect of important votes and ties to the United States (hypothesis 1) and competing principals (hypotheses 2a and 2b) on abstaining from voting. Standard errors are clustered by resolution and country.

	<i>Dependent Variable: Strategic Absence</i>			<i>Dependent Variable: Abstain</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Other Strategic Absences	0.968*** (0.042)	0.996*** (0.043)	0.974*** (0.040)	0.013 (0.021)	0.024 (0.023)	0.036* (0.018)
Vote Margin	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.029)	-0.011 (0.031)
Abstentions	0.020 (0.015)	0.017 (0.016)	0.012 (0.013)	1.264*** (0.061)	1.298*** (0.068)	1.386*** (0.082)
Article 19 Eligibility	0.547* (0.213)	-0.264 (0.233)	-0.165 (0.240)	-0.999*** (0.289)	-0.284 (0.290)	-0.227 (0.151)
Middle East	-0.005 (0.083)	0.040 (0.087)	0.053 (0.091)	0.021 (0.075)	0.035 (0.082)	0.031 (0.093)
Human Rights	-0.044 (0.047)	-0.053 (0.051)	-0.071 (0.054)	-0.003 (0.031)	0.005 (0.034)	-0.004 (0.028)
Arms Control/Disarmament	-0.034 (0.050)	-0.041 (0.055)	-0.045 (0.057)	-0.005 (0.033)	-0.010 (0.039)	-0.043 (0.039)
Economic Development	-0.070* (0.029)	-0.066* (0.033)	-0.059 (0.035)	0.002 (0.024)	0.014 (0.028)	0.033 (0.033)
Nuclear Weapons/Materials	-0.082 (0.056)	-0.088 (0.063)	-0.107 (0.066)	0.005 (0.054)	0.0004 (0.057)	0.018 (0.072)
Colonialism	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.038)	-0.022 (0.040)	0.011 (0.038)	0.002 (0.043)	-0.002 (0.049)
GDP (logged)		-0.282*** (0.038)	-0.317*** (0.039)		0.084*** (0.025)	0.090*** (0.016)
GDP Per Capita (logged)		-0.217*** (0.057)	-0.156* (0.070)		0.231*** (0.038)	-0.002 (0.027)
US Ally			-0.154 (0.181)			-0.113 (0.080)
Important Vote			0.101 (0.052)			0.162* (0.077)
US Ally * Important Vote			-0.462*** (0.134)			-0.360* (0.158)
Russian Ally			0.480 (0.298)			0.404** (0.136)
Russia Yes, US No			-0.076 (0.046)			0.020 (0.076)
Preference Similarity to Russia			0.001 (0.062)			0.045 (0.037)
Preference Similarity to US			-0.089 (0.099)			0.745*** (0.065)
Time	-0.001 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	0.0005 (0.002)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.002)
Number of Observations	458159	419101	406485	458159	419101	406485
Clustered SEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 8: *Coordination and Strategic Absences/Abstentions*- The table shows the results of pooled logistic regressions estimating the effect of other states' strategic absences and abstentions on strategic absence (Models 1-3) and abstaining from voting (Models 4-6). Standard errors are clustered by resolution and country.