

Supporting Information for “Zombies Ahead: Explaining the Rise of Low-Quality Election Monitoring”

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1 Visualizing Middle-Quality Monitors




Figure A1: **Count of monitored elections by organization type, including middle-quality groups, 2000-2020.** We see that middle-quality observers in this group monitored more elections annually in the early 2000s compared to low-quality monitoring groups. Low-quality groups quickly caught up with the activity level of middle-quality groups during the 2000s, monitoring a similar number of elections each year.

2 Ties to China

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	−0.32** (0.13)	−0.31** (0.13)	−0.23** (0.10)	−0.23** (0.10)	−0.18* (0.11)	−0.17 (0.11)		
Exports to China (lagged)	0.13 (0.15)		−0.05 (0.11)		−0.04 (0.11)		−0.06 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.11)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	−0.97*** (0.32)	−0.80** (0.37)	−0.73*** (0.23)	−0.70*** (0.26)	−0.71*** (0.26)	−0.65** (0.29)	−1.07*** (0.18)	−0.97*** (0.20)
Regional IGOs with China (lagged)		0.04 (0.03)		0.00 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.42*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					−0.33 (0.41)	−0.31 (0.41)		−0.44 (0.41)
First Multiparty Election					0.06 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)		0.07 (0.09)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)		−0.00* (0.00)
R ²	0.16	0.16	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.16	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31
Num. obs.	997	1005	869	875	843	845	869	843

Table A1: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020**, Controlling for Ties to China instead of Russia. Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3 Bottom/Top Quartiles of Election–Year Observations for Key Explanatory Variables

In this section, we consider which countries’ election–years are most “treated” with membership in authoritarian ROs and ties to Russia. For the former, Table A2 lists the countries that appear in the lowest quartile for the RO democracy score variable. For the latter, Tables A3-A4 present the countries that appear in the top quartiles for the variables that measure ties to Russia: export dependence on Russia and the number of regional organization memberships shared with Russia.

São Tomé & Príncipe	Mauritius	Kyrgyzstan
Equatorial Guinea	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Mauritania	Algeria	Kazakhstan
Ghana	Tunisia	Mongolia
Cameroon	Libya	India
Gabon	Sudan	Bhutan
Central African Republic	Iran	Pakistan
Chad	Iraq	Bangladesh
Congo - Brazzaville	Egypt	Sri Lanka
Uganda	Lebanon	Nepal
Kenya	Jordan	Thailand
Tanzania	Yemen	Cambodia
Burundi	Kuwait	Laos
Rwanda	Bahrain	Vietnam
Djibouti	Oman	Malaysia
Ethiopia	Afghanistan	Philippines
Zambia	Turkmenistan	Indonesia
Comoros	Tajikistan	

Table A2: **Countries in the Bottom Quartile of RO Democracy Score for at least One Election–Year.**

Cuba	Bulgaria	Guinea
Jamaica	Moldova	Malawi
Ecuador	Romania	Turkey
Brazil	Estonia	Afghanistan
Paraguay	Latvia	Turkmenistan
Uruguay	Lithuania	Tajikistan
Poland	Ukraine	Kyrgyzstan
Hungary	Belarus	Uzbekistan
Czechia	Armenia	Kazakhstan
Slovakia	Georgia	Mongolia
Croatia	Azerbaijan	Sri Lanka
Yugoslavia	Finland	
Cyprus	Mauritania	

Table A3: **Countries in the Top Quartile of Export Dependence on Russia for at least One Election–Year.**

Poland	Azerbaijan	Mongolia
Albania	Finland	India
Yugoslavia	Iran	Bhutan
Cyprus	Turkey	Pakistan
Bulgaria	Iraq	Bangladesh
Moldova	Jordan	Sri Lanka
Romania	Kuwait	Nepal
Estonia	Bahrain	Thailand
Latvia	Afghanistan	Cambodia
Lithuania	Turkmenistan	Laos
Ukraine	Tajikistan	Malaysia
Belarus	Kyrgyzstan	Philippines
Armenia	Uzbekistan	Indonesia
Georgia	Kazakhstan	

Table A4: **Countries in the Top Quartile of RO Co-memberships with Russia for One Election–Year.**

4 Organizations Coded as High- and Low-Quality

ANFREL	IRI
Carter Center	NDI
The Commonwealth	OAS
EISA	OSCE ODIHR
ENEMO	OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
EU Commission	PACE
EU Parliament	UN

Table A5: **High-Quality International Election Observers.** This list is adapted from Simpser and Donno (2012).

A-WEB	EAC	NATO
ACE	EAE0	NATO PA
ACP	EASF	Nordic Council
ACP-EU JPA	ECCAS	OAIC
AF	ECDHR	OAU
AFRIC	ECO	OHCHR
Agora	ECOWAS Parliament	OIC
AMU	EMC	PABSEC
ANDE	Entente	PAWP
AoEOM	ESISC	Progressive International
APA	EurAsEC	RADDHO
Arab Parliament	European Geopolitical Forum	SA HRDN
ASEAN	FAI	SAARC
Belarus-Russia Union PA	FEMBoSA	SAARC HRF
BSEC	FIDH	SADC
CAPDI	FOSCAO	SADC CNGO
CAPSDD	FoSLA	SADC ECF
CARICOM	GERDDES	SADC ESN
CEELA	Goree Institute	SADC LA
CEGPM	GUAM	SATUCC
CEIP	IACOPM	SCO
CELAC	IAPE	Shalestone
CEMAC	ICAPP	Silba
CENSAD	ICGLR PF	TACDB
CEPGL	IDEE	TAF
CICA	IESC	TC
CIFRA	IGAD	TurkPA
CIS	IHRC	UEMOA
CIS-EMO	IMIE	UNASUR
COMESA	IOC	UNPO
COPA	IPA CIS	UPL
COPPAL	IPA on Orthodoxy	USIP
CPLP	ISfHR	VFP
CSTO	KTS	WCC
CSTO PA	Marmara Group Foundation	World Peace Council
DWF	MISA	

Table A6: **Low-Quality International Election Observers.** This list of abbreviated organization names includes organizations that have not signed the Declaratiof of Principles of International Election Observer (DOP), which is our primary indicator of whether a group is low-quality.

5 Robustness Checks

5.1 Alternative Low-Quality Coding: >2/3 Reports Missing

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.13)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	1.09*** (0.40)		1.08*** (0.34)		1.00*** (0.34)		1.10*** (0.34)	1.01*** (0.34)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-0.41 (0.38)	-0.05 (0.47)	-0.25 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.38)	-0.27 (0.30)	-0.09 (0.40)	-0.45 (0.29)	-0.35 (0.31)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.08** (0.03)		0.05* (0.03)		0.05* (0.03)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.32*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.04)	0.33*** (0.04)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.81* (0.44)	-0.76* (0.44)		-0.85* (0.43)
First Multiparty Election					0.02 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)		0.03 (0.08)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)		-0.00** (0.00)
R ²	0.24	0.25	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Adj. R ²	0.23	0.25	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34
Num. obs.	983	999	857	870	831	840	857	831

Table A7: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (missing reports or short statements), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5.2 Alternative DV: Number of Low-Quality Groups Hosted

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-1.10*** (0.41)	-1.09** (0.43)	-0.90** (0.36)	-0.92** (0.37)	-0.93** (0.39)	-1.00** (0.42)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	2.26 (1.78)		1.94 (1.77)		1.81 (1.76)		2.08 (1.74)	1.88 (1.73)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-2.00 (1.31)	-0.56 (1.68)	-1.41 (1.03)	-0.56 (1.46)	-1.05 (1.04)	-0.11 (1.48)	-2.65** (1.09)	-2.35** (1.13)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.27** (0.14)		0.17 (0.12)		0.17 (0.13)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			1.15*** (0.14)	1.18*** (0.16)	1.18*** (0.15)	1.20*** (0.16)	1.18*** (0.15)	1.20*** (0.15)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.32 (1.01)	-0.02 (1.01)		-0.92 (1.02)
First Multiparty Election					-0.03 (0.20)	0.06 (0.21)		0.02 (0.21)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
R ²	0.18	0.22	0.34	0.36	0.34	0.37	0.33	0.33
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.21	0.33	0.36	0.33	0.36	0.32	0.32
Num. obs.	988	1005	861	875	835	845	861	835

Table A8: **Correlates of Hosting More Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5.3 Alternative Democracy (and Election Quality) Measures

Table A9 presents results using Polity 2 scores. Polity scores are not our preferred measure, in part because they are not as sensitive to year-over-year changes as the Polyarchy scores from the V-Dem project. This difference could explain why we do not find a relationship between country democracy score and hosting at least one low-quality observer when we use Polity data to measure the level of democracy.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (Polity lagged)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.90** (0.40)		0.81*** (0.30)		0.80*** (0.29)		0.76*** (0.28)	0.80*** (0.28)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	−0.99*** (0.33)	−0.59 (0.50)	−0.71*** (0.24)	−0.57 (0.37)	−0.70*** (0.27)	−0.59 (0.39)	−0.80*** (0.21)	−0.73*** (0.24)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.08*** (0.03)		0.04* (0.02)		0.04* (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.41*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (Polity lagged)					−0.02** (0.01)	−0.02** (0.01)		−0.02** (0.01)
First Multiparty Election					0.04 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)		0.04 (0.08)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00* (0.00)		−0.00** (0.00)
R ²	0.15	0.17	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.31
Adj. R ²	0.14	0.17	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30
Num. obs.	947	964	826	840	802	811	861	802

Table A9: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2018.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A10 presents results where the NELDA indicator of whether media organizations exhibited pro-government bias before an election replaces our country democracy score. We think it is possible that the government taking control of the media to promote ruling party candidates is one of the more important aspects of the quality of electoral democracy that predicts the presence of low-quality observers. We do find some evidence that pro-government media bias predicts the invitation of low-quality observers.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Media Report Bias Pre-election	0.09** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.84** (0.38)		0.77*** (0.29)		0.72** (0.28)		0.76*** (0.28)	0.74*** (0.28)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-1.03*** (0.30)	-0.61 (0.45)	-0.79*** (0.20)	-0.62** (0.31)	-0.74*** (0.22)	-0.56* (0.33)	-0.80*** (0.21)	-0.73*** (0.22)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.08** (0.03)		0.04** (0.02)		0.04* (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.42*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.47 (0.39)	-0.41 (0.40)		-0.43 (0.40)
First Multiparty Election					0.10 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)		0.07 (0.09)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
R ²	0.16	0.18	0.32	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.32	0.32
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.17	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.31
Num. obs.	920	934	804	817	784	794	861	835

Table A10: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A11 presents results using a dichotomous indicator of whether countries are democratic, rather than the continuous Polyarchy index, to test Hypothesis 1. We use the dichotomous democracy measure from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013), who code countries as democratic if they have political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and a minimal level of suffrage. When we use this dichotomous democracy measure, we find no statistically significant association between democracy and the likelihood of hosting low quality observers.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (categorical, lagged)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.80** (0.40)		0.71** (0.29)		0.70** (0.28)		0.76*** (0.28)	0.74*** (0.28)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-0.91*** (0.34)	-0.46 (0.44)	-0.69*** (0.23)	-0.53 (0.32)	-0.64** (0.25)	-0.47 (0.34)	-0.80*** (0.21)	-0.73*** (0.22)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.07** (0.03)		0.04* (0.02)		0.04* (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.42*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.41 (0.40)	-0.36 (0.40)		-0.43 (0.40)
First Multiparty Election					0.07 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)		0.07 (0.09)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
R ²	0.16	0.18	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.17	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31
Num. obs.	986	995	859	867	833	841	861	835

Table A11: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5.4 Alternative Specification: Logistic Regression

Table A12 presents our main results when we use logistic regression, rather than linear probability models. The results are robust to using logistic regression.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-1.39** (0.64)	-1.32** (0.67)	-1.25** (0.57)	-1.22** (0.59)	-0.94 (0.62)	-0.90 (0.64)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	3.84* (2.01)		4.58** (2.03)		4.54** (1.98)		4.70** (2.00)	4.55** (1.95)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-3.24* (1.74)	-1.71 (2.26)	-2.70* (1.49)	-2.25 (1.87)	-2.70 (1.67)	-2.30 (2.00)	-4.47*** (1.23)	-4.04*** (1.34)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.36** (0.15)		0.23* (0.12)		0.22* (0.13)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			1.92*** (0.23)	1.94*** (0.23)	1.90*** (0.23)	1.91*** (0.23)	1.95*** (0.23)	1.91*** (0.23)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-2.09 (2.52)	-1.92 (2.53)		-2.79 (2.52)
First Multiparty Election					0.29 (0.46)	0.42 (0.48)		0.34 (0.46)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
AIC	1155.64	1154.78	882.28	889.93	864.12	870.08	885.88	864.82
Log Likelihood	-568.82	-568.39	-431.14	-434.96	-419.06	-422.04	-433.94	-420.41
Deviance	1137.64	1136.78	862.28	869.93	838.12	844.08	867.88	840.82
Num. obs.	988	1005	861	875	835	845	861	835

Table A12: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on logistic regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

5.5 Excluding First Election for Each Country

Table A13 presents the results after dropping the first election for each of the 130 countries in our dataset (within the range of years covered in the dataset). Because the *Previously Hosted Low-Quality Observers* variable is missing for most countries' first elections—due to lack of information about which groups, if any, monitored those countries' elections prior to the year the country enters our dataset—we verify that excluding these elections altogether does not significantly alter the results of our analyses. We find that our results are not sensitive to excluding countries' first elections in our dataset.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	−0.32** (0.14)	−0.31** (0.15)	−0.22** (0.10)	−0.22** (0.10)	−0.17 (0.11)	−0.17 (0.11)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	1.17*** (0.44)		1.00*** (0.27)		1.00*** (0.26)		1.04*** (0.28)	1.02*** (0.26)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	−0.76** (0.37)	−0.50 (0.50)	−0.53** (0.25)	−0.47 (0.34)	−0.53* (0.28)	−0.48 (0.36)	−0.85*** (0.21)	−0.77*** (0.23)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.07** (0.03)		0.04* (0.02)		0.03 (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.39*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.39*** (0.05)	0.39*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.39*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					−0.32 (0.40)	−0.27 (0.41)		−0.43 (0.40)
First Multiparty Election					0.05 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)		0.07 (0.09)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)		−0.00** (0.00)
R ²	0.19	0.20	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32
Adj. R ²	0.18	0.19	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.31
Num. obs.	863	877	844	858	818	828	844	818

Table A13: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

6 Additional Analyses Related to the Effect of Democracy

6.1 Introducing a Democracy-Squared Term

We did not hypothesize a non-linear relationship between country democracy score (lagged) and the likelihood of hosting low-quality monitors. As an extension of our main analyses, we consider the possibility of a non-linear relationship by including a democracy (lagged) squared term. We do find strong evidence that in fact, countries in the middle of the distribution of democracy scores have the greatest predicted probability of hosting low-quality observers. This finding generally holds when we classify low-quality observers as non-DOP endorsers (Table A14) or as organizations with more than 50% missing reports or short statements (Table A15). The effect is visualized in Figures A2 and A3. Though the relationship is parabolic, there is still a greater likelihood of deeply authoritarian regimes hosting low-quality observers compared to their highly democratic counterparts.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-1.92** (0.90)	-1.81* (0.93)	-1.43** (0.71)	-1.40* (0.73)	-1.24 (0.79)	-1.21 (0.80)		
Democracy (lagged) Squared	-2.25*** (0.60)	-1.96*** (0.59)	-1.37*** (0.45)	-1.26*** (0.46)	-1.56*** (0.50)	-1.50*** (0.51)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.80** (0.38)		0.73** (0.28)		0.75*** (0.29)		0.76*** (0.28)	0.74*** (0.28)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-0.80** (0.36)	-0.46 (0.45)	-0.56** (0.25)	-0.45 (0.33)	-0.52* (0.28)	-0.41 (0.35)	-0.80*** (0.21)	-0.73*** (0.22)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.07** (0.03)		0.04* (0.02)		0.04 (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.40*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.04)	0.39*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.39 (0.41)	-0.35 (0.41)		-0.43 (0.40)
First Multiparty Election					0.10 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)		0.07 (0.09)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
R ²	0.18	0.20	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.32
Adj. R ²	0.18	0.19	0.32	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.31
Num. obs.	988	1005	861	875	835	845	861	835

Table A14: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Figure A2: **Predicted Probability of Hosting Low-Quality Observers Across Different Levels of Democracy.** Low-quality observers are identified in this figure as non-DOP signatories.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-1.36 (0.95)	-1.28 (0.98)	-1.07 (0.92)	-1.06 (0.95)	-0.56 (1.02)	-0.54 (1.07)		
Democracy (lagged) Squared	-1.99*** (0.70)	-1.73** (0.71)	-1.55** (0.70)	-1.43** (0.71)	-1.60** (0.76)	-1.55** (0.78)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	1.01** (0.39)		1.14*** (0.37)		1.07*** (0.37)		1.16*** (0.36)	1.05*** (0.36)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-0.45 (0.38)	-0.15 (0.46)	-0.36 (0.30)	-0.24 (0.41)	-0.33 (0.32)	-0.20 (0.42)	-0.53* (0.32)	-0.41 (0.34)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.07** (0.03)		0.05* (0.03)		0.05 (0.03)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.24*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.85* (0.44)	-0.80* (0.44)		-0.84** (0.42)
First Multiparty Election					0.07 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)		0.03 (0.07)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00** (0.00)
R ²	0.35	0.35	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.41
Adj. R ²	0.34	0.35	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.41
Num. obs.	983	999	857	870	831	840	857	831

Table A15: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (missing reports or short statements), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Figure A3: **Predicted Probability of Hosting Low-Quality Observers Across Different Levels of Democracy.** Low-quality observers are identified in this figure as having missing reports or short statements.

6.2 Main Models with Democracy Time Trend Interaction

We did not initially hypothesize that the relationship between countries' levels of democracy and the likelihood of hosting low-quality observers would change over time, but there may be good reason to expect time trends. If awareness of which groups are low-quality spread over time, more democratic countries that initially allowed these groups to monitor their elections may have ceased hosting them in later years, for example. Table A16 presents results for our main analyses where we include the interaction of democracy scores (lagged) and year. We do see some evidence that the relationship between democracy and hosting low-quality observers is weak in the early 2000s and becomes more pronounced in the 2010s. This can be seen most clearly in Figure A4.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	76.55*** (23.11)	58.65** (23.61)	52.92*** (19.66)	36.76* (19.30)	48.51** (20.03)	32.91* (19.64)		
Year	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	1.00*** (0.34)		0.90*** (0.30)		0.88*** (0.28)		0.76*** (0.28)	0.74*** (0.28)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-0.91*** (0.31)	-0.73* (0.43)	-0.62** (0.25)	-0.55 (0.34)	-0.67** (0.28)	-0.61* (0.37)	-0.80*** (0.21)	-0.73*** (0.22)
Democracy (lagged) X Year	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)		
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.06* (0.03)		0.03 (0.02)		0.03 (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.35*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.42*** (0.05)	0.41*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.20 (0.41)	-0.18 (0.41)		-0.43 (0.40)
First Multiparty Election					0.09 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)		0.07 (0.09)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
R ²	0.25	0.25	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.32	0.32
Adj. R ²	0.24	0.25	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.31	0.31
Num. obs.	988	1005	861	875	835	845	861	835

Table A16: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Figure A4: **Predicted Probability of Hosting Low-Quality Observers Across Different Levels of Democracy in Different Years.** Low-quality observers are identified in this figure as non-DOP signatories.

7 Combining Middle- and Low-Quality Observers

Table A17 presents the correlates of hosting at least one low-quality *or* middle-quality observer group. In other words, it presents the correlates of hosting at least one non-high-quality observer group. The results suggest that ties to Russia are significantly associated with hosting at least one non-high-quality group, whereas a country's level of democracy and regional IGO democracy scores are not significant predictors of hosting at least one group from this broadened category.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	−0.20 (0.14)	−0.18 (0.14)	−0.16 (0.13)	−0.15 (0.13)	−0.05 (0.14)	−0.05 (0.14)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.92** (0.40)		0.99*** (0.36)		0.95*** (0.35)		1.02*** (0.36)	0.95*** (0.35)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	−0.50 (0.38)	−0.12 (0.48)	−0.43 (0.29)	−0.25 (0.41)	−0.43 (0.32)	−0.25 (0.43)	−0.65** (0.31)	−0.51 (0.33)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.08** (0.03)		0.05* (0.03)		0.05* (0.03)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.26*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					−0.69* (0.40)	−0.63 (0.40)		−0.72* (0.39)
First Multiparty Election					0.10* (0.05)	0.13** (0.06)		0.10* (0.05)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)		−0.00*** (0.00)
R ²	0.31	0.33	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.39	0.40
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.32	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.38	0.39
Num. obs.	983	999	857	870	831	840	857	831

Table A17: **Correlates of Hosting Low- or Medium-Quality Monitors, 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

8 Other Additional Analyses

8.1 Subset of Elections with High-Quality Observers Present

As an extension of the main analyses, we consider whether countries that invite both high- and low-quality observers might be operating under a different logic than other countries that mainly invite low-quality observers. Table A18 presents results of our analyses for the subset of elections where high quality observers were hosted. We find that among countries which invite high-quality observers, ties to Russia are still consistently associated with hosting low-quality observers. The effect of authoritarian regional organization memberships is also relatively consistent, whereas we see that level of democracy is no longer a significant predictor of propensity to invite low-quality observers across all specifications.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-0.24 (0.16)	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.15)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.79* (0.42)		0.71** (0.33)		0.70** (0.34)		0.75** (0.33)	0.72** (0.33)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	-1.03*** (0.37)	-0.51 (0.56)	-0.72** (0.29)	-0.41 (0.42)	-0.66** (0.34)	-0.38 (0.46)	-0.94*** (0.28)	-0.88*** (0.31)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.09** (0.04)		0.06** (0.03)		0.05* (0.03)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.39*** (0.06)	0.39*** (0.06)	0.39*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.39*** (0.06)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-0.48 (0.39)	-0.43 (0.38)		-0.60 (0.38)
First Multiparty Election					-0.11 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)		-0.09 (0.10)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)
R ²	0.18	0.21	0.33	0.34	0.32	0.34	0.32	0.32
Adj. R ²	0.17	0.20	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.31
Num. obs.	604	619	529	541	508	516	529	508

Table A18: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

8.2 Alternative Specification: Country Fixed Effects

Table A19 presents results controlling for country fixed effects, rather than region fixed effects. In these models, we assess whether changes within countries over time in our explanatory variables explain changes in the likelihood of hosting at least one low-quality observer (non-DOP signatory). Our findings here are mixed, though we also do not have many repeated observations for some countries. These results still suggest that joining more ROs with Russia is associated with a greater likelihood of hosting a low-quality observer. Sur-

prisingly, the sign on exports to Russia has flipped, and is no longer significantly associated with hosting at least one low-quality observer in most models.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-0.20 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.25)	-0.34 (0.26)	-0.28 (0.26)	-0.12 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.25)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	-1.62*** (0.63)		-0.77 (0.69)		-0.61 (0.64)		-0.79 (0.69)	-0.62 (0.64)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	0.91 (0.82)	0.43 (0.82)	0.64 (0.81)	0.26 (0.80)	1.06 (0.77)	0.69 (0.77)	0.49 (0.82)	1.02 (0.77)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.19*** (0.06)		0.18*** (0.07)		0.15* (0.08)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.11* (0.06)	0.10* (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.10* (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-1.17 (0.73)	-1.19 (0.75)		-1.26* (0.73)
First Multiparty Election					0.09 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)		0.10 (0.08)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)		0.00*** (0.00)
R ²	0.45	0.46	0.50	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.50	0.52
Adj. R ²	0.37	0.38	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.45	0.41	0.43
Num. obs.	988	1005	861	875	835	845	861	835

Table A19: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for country fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

8.3 Alternative Specification: Including Year Fixed Effects

Table A20 presents results controlling for year fixed effects, in addition to region fixed effects (from the baseline). Our results are largely consistent with the models in the main text. Only the relationship between co-memberships with Russia and hosting at least one low-quality observer is significantly attenuated.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	−0.33*** (0.12)	−0.32** (0.12)	−0.26** (0.11)	−0.26** (0.11)	−0.15 (0.11)	−0.15 (0.11)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.89** (0.35)		0.86*** (0.27)		0.85*** (0.26)		0.90*** (0.27)	0.86*** (0.26)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	−0.82** (0.32)	−0.64 (0.44)	−0.53** (0.26)	−0.50 (0.36)	−0.65** (0.29)	−0.65* (0.38)	−0.89*** (0.22)	−0.86*** (0.23)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.06* (0.03)		0.03 (0.02)		0.03 (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.36*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.35*** (0.05)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					0.02 (0.38)	0.01 (0.38)		−0.06 (0.38)
First Multiparty Election					0.08 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)		0.09 (0.09)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)		−0.00*** (0.00)
R ²	0.26	0.27	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.36
Adj. R ²	0.24	0.25	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34
Num. obs.	988	1005	861	875	835	845	861	835

Table A20: **Correlates of Hosting Low-Quality Monitors (non-DOP signatories), 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

8.4 Predictors of Hosting Middle-Quality Observers

Table A21 presents the correlates of hosting at least one middle-quality observer group. While we did not hypothesize about the drivers of invitations to middle-quality groups, it is interesting to note that ties to Russia are not significantly associated with the likelihood of hosting at least one middle-quality group. Being in more democratic ROs is associated with hosting middle-quality observers.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	−0.08 (0.13)	−0.09 (0.13)	−0.05 (0.14)	−0.07 (0.14)	−0.01 (0.15)	−0.03 (0.15)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.29 (0.21)		0.21 (0.21)		0.12 (0.21)		0.22 (0.21)	0.12 (0.21)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	1.00*** (0.32)	1.05*** (0.38)	1.01*** (0.30)	1.00*** (0.37)	1.09*** (0.32)	1.09*** (0.39)	0.93*** (0.27)	1.08*** (0.28)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.02 (0.02)		0.01 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					−0.59* (0.32)	−0.57* (0.32)		−0.59* (0.31)
First Multiparty Election					0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)		0.04 (0.06)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)		−0.00*** (0.00)
R ²	0.53	0.52	0.56	0.55	0.56	0.55	0.56	0.56
Adj. R ²	0.53	0.52	0.55	0.54	0.56	0.55	0.55	0.56
Num. obs.	984	1000	858	871	832	841	858	832

Table A21: **Correlates of Hosting Middle-Quality Monitors, 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

8.5 Predictors of Hosting High-Quality Observers

Table A22 presents the correlates of hosting at least one high-quality observer group.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Democracy (lagged)	-0.36*	-0.36**	-0.38*	-0.38**	-0.11	-0.11		
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)		
Exports to Russia (lagged)	0.48*		0.50*		0.26		0.56*	0.27
	(0.27)		(0.29)		(0.27)		(0.29)	(0.27)
Regional IGO Democracy Score (lagged)	0.44	0.38	0.60	0.49	0.34	0.30	0.08	0.19
	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.42)	(0.50)	(0.37)	(0.34)
Regional IGOs with Russia (lagged)		0.01		0.00		0.00		
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		
Previously Invited Low-Quality			0.09**	0.09**	0.11***	0.11***	0.10**	0.11***
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Change in Democracy (lagged)					-1.27***	-1.27***		-1.34***
					(0.44)	(0.44)		(0.44)
First Multiparty Election					0.33***	0.33***		0.33***
					(0.11)	(0.11)		(0.11)
GDP per Capita (lagged)					-0.00***	-0.00***		-0.00***
					(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)
R ²	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.17	0.17	0.08	0.17
Adj. R ²	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.15	0.16	0.08	0.15
Num. obs.	989	1005	862	875	836	845	862	836

Table A22: **Correlates of Hosting High-Quality Monitors, 2000-2020.** Estimates are based on linear regressions controlling for region fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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