

Online Appendix and Supplemental Information for “Naming and Shaming in UN Treaty Bodies: Individual Petitions’ Effect on Human Rights”

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A Online Appendix

A.1 Committee Body Membership


Each treaty body is comprised of “independent experts who are persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2024*b*). who are “nominated and elected for fixed, renewable terms of four years by State parties. The elections of half of the committees’ members are staggered every 2 years to ensure a balance between continuity and change in committee composition. All elected members serve in their personal capacity” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2024*a*). Guidelines detailed in the General Assembly Resolution 68/268 encourage states to consider “equitable geographic distribution, the representation of different forms of civilization and the principal legal systems, balanced gender representation and the participation of experts with disabilities when nominating experts for Committee elections” (United Nations General Assembly 2014). These monitoring bodies are generally less politicized than other intergovernmental organizations and institutions although there is, to my knowledge, little to no scholarly work exploring the make-up of these Committees and their effect on Committee behavior.

A.2 Data

Table A.1: Violations in the Human Rights Committee: Full Sample

Country	Total Decisions	Violation Decisions	Physical Integrity Violation Decisions
South Korea	126	122	2
Belarus	122	104	17
Russia	63	33	18
Uruguay	59	48	39
Algeria	43	41	40
Uzbekistan	43	36	29
Colombia	36	19	10
Tajikistan	25	22	21
Democratic Republic of Congo	21	18	14
Libya	21	20	18
Sri Lanka	21	16	12
Turkmenistan	17	16	15
Philippines	17	13	10
Peru	16	15	10
Bosnia and Herzegovina	16	15	15
Zambia	15	10	8
Nepal	13	13	13
Cameroon	11	9	6
Kazakhstan	9	7	3
Panama	8	2	1
Chile	7	0	0
Ecuador	6	6	4
Bulgaria	6	1	0
Estonia	5	1	0
Georgia	5	5	5
Togo	5	4	1
Venezuela	4	3	1
Croatia	4	2	2
Azerbaijan	4	3	2
Equatorial Guinea	4	4	4
Paraguay	3	3	2
Yugoslavia	3	2	1
Dominican Republic	2	2	1
Bolivia	2	2	2
Romania	2	1	0
Côte d'Ivoire	2	1	1
Central African Republic	2	2	1
Angola	2	2	2
South Africa	2	1	1
Turkey	2	2	0
Mexico	1	0	0
Nicaragua	1	1	1
Sierra Leone	1	1	0
Tunisia	1	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	0
Honduras	0	0	0
El Salvador	0	0	0
Brazil	0	0	0
Niger	0	0	0
Guinea	0	0	0
Chad	0	0	0
Republic of Congo	0	0	0
Uganda	0	0	0
Somalia	0	0	0
Djibouti	0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	0

Figure A.1: Physical Integrity Rights Panel



A.3 Additional Empirical Analysis

A.3.1 Robustness Checks

Table A.2: Repressive Threshold as Mean Value

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Petition Submissions		0.008 (0.019)			0.005 (0.019)
PI Violation Decisions	0.028* (0.012)				
Decisions: With Representation			0.052+ (0.030)		0.049 (0.030)
Decisions: No Representation				0.013 (0.008)	0.010 (0.009)
Civil Society Index	0.190 (0.181)	0.193 (0.178)	0.186 (0.182)	0.193 (0.182)	0.202 (0.169)
Judicial Independence	-0.215 (0.293)	-0.206 (0.304)	-0.210 (0.296)	-0.217 (0.299)	-0.229 (0.299)
War	-0.269*** (0.046)	-0.272*** (0.046)	-0.274*** (0.046)	-0.272*** (0.046)	-0.273*** (0.046)
Population (ln)	-0.222 (0.236)	-0.256 (0.264)	-0.233 (0.231)	-0.232 (0.254)	-0.174 (0.253)
GDP (ln)	0.055** (0.020)	0.056** (0.020)	0.051* (0.021)	0.056** (0.020)	0.052* (0.020)
Time	0.007 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	0.006 (0.006)
DV _{t-1}	0.801*** (0.040)	0.798*** (0.039)	0.797*** (0.039)	0.800*** (0.039)	0.798*** (0.039)
<i>N</i>	662	662	662	662	662
<i>R</i> ²	0.904	0.903	0.904	0.904	0.904
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.894	0.893	0.894	0.894	0.894
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.3: Respect for Physical Integrity Rights: TWFE

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Petition Submissions		0.007 (0.012)			0.004 (0.011)
PI Violation Decisions	0.025** (0.008)				
Decisions: With Representation			0.039* (0.016)		0.037* (0.016)
Decisions: No Representation				0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)
Civil Society Index	0.282+ (0.167)	0.272 (0.165)	0.265 (0.163)	0.273 (0.166)	0.269 (0.163)
Judicial Independence	-0.215 (0.229)	-0.210 (0.231)	-0.202 (0.233)	-0.213 (0.233)	-0.200 (0.232)
War	-0.232*** (0.039)	-0.232*** (0.039)	-0.236*** (0.039)	-0.233*** (0.040)	-0.235*** (0.039)
Population (ln)	-0.233 (0.148)	-0.253 (0.151)	-0.230 (0.147)	-0.245 (0.154)	-0.212 (0.150)
GDP (ln)	0.030 (0.024)	0.028 (0.025)	0.028 (0.024)	0.028 (0.025)	0.028 (0.024)
DV _{t-1}	0.855*** (0.024)	0.858*** (0.025)	0.853*** (0.024)	0.858*** (0.026)	0.853*** (0.024)
<i>N</i>	994	994	994	994	994
<i>R</i> ²	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.941	0.940	0.941	0.940	0.941
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X
Year FE	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.4: Change in Respect for Physical Integrity Rights

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Petition Submissions		0.007 (0.009)		0.004 (0.009)
PI Violation Decisions	0.022*** (0.006)			
Decisions: With Representation			0.024* (0.012)	0.021+ (0.012)
Decisions: No Representation				0.005 (0.005)
Civil Society Index	0.245+ (0.128)	0.243+ (0.131)	0.242+ (0.130)	0.246+ (0.128)
Judicial Independence	-0.393* (0.192)	-0.388+ (0.196)	-0.394* (0.196)	-0.389* (0.193)
War	-0.151*** (0.031)	-0.153*** (0.031)	-0.154*** (0.031)	-0.154*** (0.031)
Population (ln)	-0.170 (0.160)	-0.190 (0.168)	-0.182 (0.165)	-0.145 (0.164)
GDP (ln)	0.015 (0.033)	0.014 (0.033)	0.013 (0.034)	0.013 (0.033)
Time	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)
<i>N</i>	994	994	994	994
<i>R</i> ²	0.196	0.191	0.193	0.194
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.143	0.138	0.140	0.140
Country FE	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.5: Political Terror Scale

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Petition Submissions		−0.005 (0.027)			−0.010 (0.026)
PI Violation Decisions	0.031 (0.021)				
Decisions: With Representation			0.066+ (0.034)		0.069* (0.032)
Decisions: No Representation				0.003 (0.008)	−0.001 (0.010)
Civil Society Index	−0.014 (0.233)	−0.024 (0.231)	−0.016 (0.234)	−0.020 (0.236)	−0.022 (0.228)
Judicial Independence	0.383 (0.384)	0.371 (0.388)	0.379 (0.386)	0.377 (0.388)	0.370 (0.387)
War	−0.525*** (0.080)	−0.527*** (0.080)	−0.530*** (0.080)	−0.527*** (0.080)	−0.530*** (0.080)
Population (ln)	−0.549* (0.237)	−0.601* (0.242)	−0.518* (0.239)	−0.572* (0.250)	−0.541* (0.250)
GDP (ln)	0.121* (0.052)	0.121* (0.053)	0.118* (0.052)	0.120* (0.053)	0.118* (0.053)
Time	0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.006)	0.000 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)
<i>N</i>	972	972	972	972	972
<i>R</i> ²	0.695	0.694	0.696	0.694	0.696
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.674	0.674	0.675	0.674	0.674
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A.6: CIRIGHTS Physical Integrity Index

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PI Violation Decisions	−0.020 (0.043)		0.031*** (0.007)	
Decisions: With Representation		0.009 (0.045)		0.044* (0.017)
Civil Society Index	0.774 (0.524)	0.784 (0.527)	0.146** (0.052)	0.133* (0.051)
Judicial Independence	0.536 (0.942)	0.540 (0.945)	0.013 (0.056)	0.019 (0.058)
War	−1.182*** (0.192)	−1.180*** (0.192)	−0.129*** (0.033)	−0.136*** (0.033)
Population (ln)	0.055 (0.775)	0.091 (0.797)	−0.034* (0.015)	−0.034* (0.016)
GDP (ln)	0.317 (0.271)	0.314 (0.271)	0.002 (0.009)	0.002 (0.009)
Time	−0.021 (0.022)	−0.022 (0.023)	0.003* (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)
Constant			0.278 (0.179)	0.306 (0.193)
<i>N</i>	904	904	921	921
<i>R</i> ²	0.619	0.619	0.935	0.934
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.591	0.591	0.934	0.934
Country FE	X	X		

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.7: Respect for Physical Integrity Rights: Democracy Control

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Petition Submissions		0.006 (0.011)			0.004 (0.011)
PI Violation Decisions	0.020** (0.007)				
Decisions: With Representation			0.029+ (0.016)		0.027+ (0.015)
Decisions: No Representation				0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)
Civil Society Index	0.040 (0.113)	0.037 (0.113)	0.041 (0.114)	0.035 (0.119)	0.045 (0.110)
Democracy: Polity	0.008+ (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.008+ (0.005)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.008+ (0.005)
War	-0.233*** (0.038)	-0.234*** (0.038)	-0.236*** (0.038)	-0.234*** (0.038)	-0.236*** (0.038)
Population (ln)	-0.274+ (0.139)	-0.296+ (0.150)	-0.278+ (0.140)	-0.289+ (0.148)	-0.258+ (0.145)
GDP (ln)	0.051* (0.023)	0.052* (0.023)	0.050* (0.023)	0.051* (0.023)	0.049* (0.023)
Time	0.007* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.006+ (0.003)
DV _{t-1}	0.863*** (0.022)	0.863*** (0.022)	0.860*** (0.022)	0.864*** (0.022)	0.861*** (0.022)
<i>N</i>	997	997	997	997	997
<i>R</i> ²	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947	0.947
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.944	0.943	0.943	0.943	0.943
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.8: Respect for Physical Integrity Rights: Trade Openness Control

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Petition Submissions		0.005 (0.013)			0.002 (0.012)
PI Violation Decisions	0.024** (0.008)				
Decisions: With Representation			0.039* (0.016)		0.038* (0.016)
Decisions: No Representation				0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)
Civil Society Index	0.204 (0.138)	0.201 (0.140)	0.200 (0.139)	0.200 (0.141)	0.202 (0.137)
Judicial Independence	-0.143 (0.227)	-0.138 (0.231)	-0.135 (0.233)	-0.141 (0.232)	-0.135 (0.232)
War	-0.228*** (0.039)	-0.229*** (0.040)	-0.233*** (0.039)	-0.230*** (0.040)	-0.232*** (0.039)
Population (ln)	-0.236 (0.149)	-0.262 (0.160)	-0.236 (0.150)	-0.254 (0.158)	-0.224 (0.155)
GDP (ln)	0.055** (0.020)	0.054* (0.021)	0.053* (0.021)	0.054* (0.021)	0.053* (0.020)
Time	0.006+ (0.003)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.006+ (0.003)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.006+ (0.004)
DV _{t-1}	0.857*** (0.025)	0.858*** (0.026)	0.853*** (0.025)	0.859*** (0.026)	0.853*** (0.025)
Trade / GDP	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
<i>N</i>	981	981	981	981	981
<i>R</i> ²	0.945	0.944	0.945	0.944	0.945
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.941	0.940	0.941	0.940	0.941
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.9: Respect for Physical Integrity Rights: IGO Control

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Petition Submissions		0.005 (0.013)			0.002 (0.013)
PI Violation Decisions	0.024** (0.008)				
Decisions: With Representation			0.041* (0.017)		0.040* (0.016)
Decisions: No Representation				0.004 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)
Civil Society Index	0.261 (0.161)	0.255 (0.163)	0.255 (0.163)	0.254 (0.164)	0.256 (0.161)
Judicial Independence	-0.181 (0.245)	-0.174 (0.248)	-0.172 (0.251)	-0.176 (0.249)	-0.172 (0.250)
War	-0.234*** (0.041)	-0.235*** (0.041)	-0.239*** (0.040)	-0.236*** (0.041)	-0.239*** (0.040)
Population (ln)	-0.361+ (0.184)	-0.384+ (0.198)	-0.357+ (0.184)	-0.377+ (0.197)	-0.344+ (0.193)
GDP (ln)	0.045* (0.019)	0.044* (0.019)	0.043* (0.019)	0.044* (0.019)	0.042* (0.019)
Time	0.013* (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)	0.013* (0.006)
DV _{t-1}	0.841*** (0.025)	0.842*** (0.026)	0.836*** (0.025)	0.842*** (0.026)	0.837*** (0.026)
IGO Memberships	-0.006+ (0.003)	-0.006+ (0.003)	-0.005+ (0.003)	-0.006+ (0.003)	-0.005+ (0.003)
<i>N</i>	965	965	965	965	965
<i>R</i> ²	0.945	0.944	0.945	0.944	0.945
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.941	0.941	0.941	0.941	0.941
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.10: Non-Violation Decisions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PI Violation Decisions		0.024** (0.008)		0.026** (0.008)		0.025** (0.008)
PI No Violation Decisions	0.013 (0.037)	0.015 (0.041)				
PI Inadmissible Decisions			-0.009 (0.023)	-0.033 (0.026)		
Pooled PI No Violation or Inadmissible					-0.004 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.027)
Civil Society Index	0.193 (0.140)	0.198 (0.136)	0.190 (0.141)	0.192 (0.137)	0.190 (0.141)	0.192 (0.136)
Judicial Independence	-0.127 (0.235)	-0.128 (0.229)	-0.125 (0.236)	-0.122 (0.231)	-0.125 (0.236)	-0.122 (0.231)
War	-0.231*** (0.040)	-0.229*** (0.039)	-0.231*** (0.040)	-0.229*** (0.039)	-0.231*** (0.040)	-0.229*** (0.039)
Population (ln)	-0.277+ (0.151)	-0.235 (0.145)	-0.281+ (0.152)	-0.244 (0.146)	-0.280+ (0.151)	-0.244 (0.147)
GDP (ln)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.038+ (0.021)
Time	0.008* (0.004)	0.007* (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	0.007* (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	0.007* (0.003)
DV _{t-1}	0.858*** (0.026)	0.857*** (0.025)	0.858*** (0.026)	0.856*** (0.025)	0.858*** (0.026)	0.857*** (0.025)
N	992	992	992	992	992	992
R ²	0.944	0.944	0.944	0.944	0.944	0.944
R ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.940	0.940	0.940	0.941	0.940	0.941
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.


Table A.11: Respect for Different Human Rights

	Physical Integrity		Freedom of Expression		Freedom of Association	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Physical Integrity Violation Decisions	0.023** (0.008)		0.001 (0.002)		0.000 (0.002)	
PI Violation Decisions: With Representation		0.039* (0.016)		0.002 (0.003)		-0.002 (0.002)
Judicial Independence	0.041 (0.228)	0.045 (0.234)	0.276** (0.081)	0.276** (0.081)	0.207** (0.067)	0.207** (0.067)
War	-0.231*** (0.039)	-0.236*** (0.039)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.009)
Population (ln)	-0.167 (0.112)	-0.166 (0.112)	0.080 (0.058)	0.080 (0.059)	0.098* (0.045)	0.096* (0.045)
GDP (ln)	0.023 (0.024)	0.022 (0.024)	-0.022+ (0.012)	-0.022+ (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)
Time	0.007* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
DV _{t-1}	0.853*** (0.024)	0.849*** (0.024)	0.774*** (0.045)	0.773*** (0.045)	0.796*** (0.030)	0.796*** (0.030)
<i>N</i>	994	994	994	994	994	994
<i>R</i> ²	0.944	0.944	0.954	0.954	0.962	0.962
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.940	0.940	0.951	0.951	0.959	0.959
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Figure A.2: Distribution of Missingness over Time



The bar chart displays the distribution of complete and incomplete data across various countries. The y-axis represents the count, ranging from 0 to 150. The x-axis lists 36 countries. For each country, there are two bars: a gray bar representing 'Complete Data' (0) and an orange bar representing 'Incomplete Data' (1).

Country	Complete Data (0)	Incomplete Data (1)
Algeria	50	8
Andorra	18	2
Azerbaijan	10	2
Bahrain	180	15
Bangladesh	2	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	18	15
Bulgaria	18	10
Cameroon	8	10
Canada	8	10
Cape Verde	8	10
Chad	8	10
Colombia	30	15
Cote d'Ivoire	8	2
Croatia	22	2
Dominican Republic	8	2
Dominica	2	2
Ecuador	2	2
Equatorial Guinea	2	2
Egypt	2	2
Ghana	2	2
Honduras	2	2
Kazakhstan	8	2
Mali	45	8
Mexico	20	2
Nicaragua	22	8
Niger	8	2
Pakistan	2	2
Paraguay	2	2
Philippines	2	2
Romania	15	15
Republic of Korea	130	5
Saudi Arabia	2	2
Serbia and Montenegro	80	22
Slovenia	2	2
South Africa	2	2
Tajikistan	2	2
Tanzania	15	22
Turkey	2	2
Turkmenistan	2	2
Ukraine	24	2
United Kingdom	32	28
Vietnam	32	22
Zambia	10	2
Zimbabwe	10	5

This section discusses three alternative measures of naming and shaming from other global actors, referenced in the alternative explanations section. First, Human Rights Council data is limited from 1995 to 2011, losing many observations. Additionally, the Human Rights Council has only shamed 4 countries concerning physical integrity rights with 8 instances in this sample: Bosnia (1995, 1996), Belarus (2003, 2004, 2005), Equatorial Guinea (1997), and Turkmenistan (2003, 2004) This is not correlated with Committee violation decisions, shown in Figure A.4.

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Zhou, Kiyani and Crabtree (2022) introduce a new measure of naming and shaming by global actors beginning in 1981. They use automatic text analysis on US State Department and Amnesty International reports to create two measures of naming and shaming from these distinct actors. Unlike the counts of naming and shaming discussed previously, these measures capture the intensity of shaming in these reports. While they analyze all reports yearly, not all countries are discussed every year. These two measures are uncorrelated with the PI violation decisions in the Human Rights Committee (correlation coefficients 0.001 Amnesty International and 0.037 US State Department).

When controlling for these alternative measures in the statistical models, the sample size decreases given the smaller temporal coverage. These models are found in Appendix Tables A.13 and A.14. This decreases the power to find a statistical significance for the small substantive effect, especially with country fixed effects. In these models with country fixed effects, the core finding of this paper is no longer statistically significant. When country fixed effects are removed, the core result is statistically significant with this alternate model specification. Data limitations restrict this quantitative exploration of alternative explanations, but this analysis suggests there is little concern of collinearity with other international forms of naming and shaming, and thus they are unlikely to drive the main result.

Figure A.4: Correlation: Violation Decisions and HRO Naming and Shaming




Table A.12: Violation Decisions and Human Rights Council Shaming

		Council Shaming	
		0	1
Violation Decisions	0	541	7
	1	50	0
	2	17	1
	3	6	0
	4	3	0
	5	3	0
	6	0	0
	7	1	0
	8	0	0

Note: Correlation coefficient is 0.0048.

Table A.13: Human Rights Council and NGO Shaming

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PI Violation Decisions	0.024** (0.008)	0.004 (0.016)	0.021 (0.022)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.024+ (0.012)	0.031+ (0.018)
Council Shaming		0.156 (0.154)			0.200 (0.213)	
NGO Shaming			-0.004 (0.008)			-0.010 (0.010)
Civil Society Index	0.196 (0.137)	0.162 (0.199)	0.313 (0.277)	0.156** (0.055)	0.129+ (0.072)	0.122 (0.081)
Judicial Independence	-0.128 (0.229)	-0.177 (0.284)	-0.375 (0.420)	0.042 (0.060)	-0.015 (0.078)	0.043 (0.090)
War	-0.229*** (0.039)	-0.219*** (0.046)	-0.271*** (0.060)	-0.136*** (0.032)	-0.135** (0.043)	-0.186*** (0.051)
Population (ln)	-0.236 (0.146)	-0.170 (0.190)	-0.271 (0.253)	-0.037* (0.018)	-0.045+ (0.025)	-0.046+ (0.025)
GDP (ln)	0.038+ (0.021)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.052* (0.025)	0.005 (0.009)	0.013 (0.014)	0.016 (0.014)
DV_{t-1}	0.857*** (0.025)	0.808*** (0.038)	0.755*** (0.037)	0.894*** (0.018)	0.890*** (0.028)	0.877*** (0.027)
Time	0.007* (0.003)	0.012** (0.004)	0.012* (0.006)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Constant				0.226 (0.193)	0.241 (0.252)	0.105 (0.293)
N	994	548	500	994	548	500
R^2	0.945	0.956	0.955	0.934	0.939	0.936
$R^2_{adjusted}$	0.941	0.950	0.949	0.933	0.938	0.935
Country FE	X	X	X			

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.14: AI and US Naming and Shaming

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PI Violation Decisions	0.024** (0.008)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.005 (0.014)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.025** (0.009)	0.015 (0.010)
Amnesty International Shaming		-0.044** (0.014)			-0.040** (0.012)	
US Shaming			-0.134** (0.039)			-0.111*** (0.031)
Civil Society Index	0.196 (0.137)	0.178 (0.148)	0.152 (0.121)	0.156** (0.055)	0.152* (0.060)	0.171** (0.063)
Judicial Independence	-0.128 (0.229)	-0.224 (0.236)	-0.296 (0.204)	0.042 (0.060)	0.003 (0.068)	-0.034 (0.065)
War	-0.229*** (0.039)	-0.237*** (0.048)	-0.214*** (0.046)	-0.136*** (0.032)	-0.155*** (0.040)	-0.143*** (0.039)
Population (ln)	-0.236 (0.146)	-0.201 (0.182)	-0.113 (0.166)	-0.037* (0.018)	-0.039+ (0.023)	-0.038+ (0.021)
GDP (ln)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.033+ (0.020)	0.030+ (0.018)	0.005 (0.009)	0.010 (0.012)	0.008 (0.011)
DV_{t-1}	0.857*** (0.025)	0.842*** (0.029)	0.822*** (0.031)	0.894*** (0.018)	0.892*** (0.024)	0.872*** (0.026)
Time	0.007* (0.003)	0.009* (0.004)	0.011* (0.005)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
Constant				0.226 (0.193)	0.156 (0.239)	-0.016 (0.216)
N	994	738	771	994	738	771
R^2	0.945	0.948	0.954	0.934	0.934	0.941
$R^2_{adjusted}$	0.941	0.943	0.950	0.933	0.933	0.940
Country FE	X	X	X			

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

A.3.3 Regional Courts

Table A.15: Regional Courts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PI Violation Decisions	0.024** (0.008)			0.025** (0.008)		
Petition Submissions		0.006 (0.012)			0.006 (0.012)	
Decisions: With Representation			0.040* (0.017)			0.040* (0.017)
Civil Society Index	0.195 (0.129)	0.195 (0.131)	0.193 (0.130)	0.228+ (0.125)	0.226+ (0.127)	0.225+ (0.126)
Judicial Independence	-0.128 (0.229)	-0.124 (0.233)	-0.121 (0.234)	-0.163 (0.226)	-0.155 (0.232)	-0.154 (0.233)
War	-0.229*** (0.039)	-0.230*** (0.039)	-0.234*** (0.038)	-0.232*** (0.040)	-0.233*** (0.040)	-0.237*** (0.039)
Population (ln)	-0.235+ (0.139)	-0.262+ (0.148)	-0.235+ (0.140)	-0.190 (0.146)	-0.224 (0.157)	-0.194 (0.147)
GDP (ln)	0.038+ (0.020)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.036+ (0.020)	0.038* (0.019)	0.038+ (0.019)	0.037+ (0.019)
Time	0.007* (0.003)	0.008* (0.003)	0.007* (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
DV _{t-1}	0.857*** (0.025)	0.858*** (0.025)	0.852*** (0.025)	0.856*** (0.024)	0.857*** (0.025)	0.852*** (0.024)
Regional Court Jurisdiction	0.002 (0.058)	-0.002 (0.055)	0.002 (0.056)			
African CtHR				0.176+ (0.090)	0.173+ (0.089)	0.177+ (0.091)
European CtHR				0.132* (0.052)	0.118* (0.052)	0.124* (0.052)
Inter-American CtHR				-0.016 (0.058)	-0.020 (0.055)	-0.017 (0.056)
<i>N</i>	994	994	994	994	994	994
<i>R</i> ²	0.945	0.944	0.945	0.945	0.945	0.945
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.941	0.940	0.941	0.941	0.941	0.941
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

Table A.16: Regional Court Rulings

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
PI Violation Decisions	0.024** (0.008)			0.025** (0.008)		
Petition Submissions		0.005 (0.013)			0.006 (0.013)	
Decisions: With Representation			0.040* (0.017)			0.040* (0.016)
Civil Society Index	0.214 (0.136)	0.212 (0.137)	0.213 (0.136)	0.193 (0.137)	0.192 (0.138)	0.191 (0.138)
Judicial Independence	-0.150 (0.226)	-0.147 (0.230)	-0.145 (0.231)	-0.119 (0.230)	-0.116 (0.233)	-0.113 (0.236)
War	-0.232*** (0.040)	-0.233*** (0.040)	-0.236*** (0.039)	-0.228*** (0.040)	-0.229*** (0.040)	-0.232*** (0.039)
Population (ln)	-0.197 (0.146)	-0.221 (0.156)	-0.192 (0.146)	-0.226 (0.149)	-0.250 (0.160)	-0.225 (0.149)
GDP (ln)	0.038+ (0.020)	0.038+ (0.020)	0.037+ (0.020)	0.039+ (0.020)	0.038+ (0.021)	0.037+ (0.020)
Time	0.006+ (0.003)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.006+ (0.003)	0.007+ (0.003)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.007+ (0.003)
DV _{t-1}	0.857*** (0.025)	0.858*** (0.026)	0.853*** (0.025)	0.855*** (0.025)	0.856*** (0.025)	0.850*** (0.025)
European CtHR PI Violation Rulings	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)			
Inter-American CtHR Violation Rulings				0.013 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.013 (0.015)
<i>N</i>	994	994	994	994	994	994
<i>R</i> ²	0.945	0.944	0.945	0.945	0.944	0.945
<i>R</i> ² <i>adjusted</i>	0.941	0.940	0.941	0.941	0.940	0.941
Country FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Standard errors are clustered by country.

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