Online Supplementary Material to
Decision-Making in the United Nations General Assembly: A Comprehensive Database of Resolution-related Decisions

A Addition comparisons between UNGA-DM and BSV

A.1 Classification of decisions

Not all BSV classifications are correct. The table below provides a breakdown through the end of Regular Session 76 looking only at roll-call votes. Selecting "draft resolution" from BSV (i.e., amend≠1 and para≠1) would include 231 votes that are not final passage votes on draft resolutions in a UNGA plenary session and would omit 292 votes that are.

Table A1: Comparison of UNGA-DM and BSV classification of decisions

		BSV				
		draft resolution	amendment	paragraph vote	both	missing
UNGA-DM	draft resolution	5000	49	85	17	141
	amendment	3	88	15	127	138
	separate vote	32	0	705	8	778
	motion	45	5	23	0	53
	not included	151	12	6	5	0

"not included" = BSV votes not in UNGA-DM, e.g., because they are not resolution-related or were in committee rather than plenary sessions.

A.2 Ideal-point estimations

For the estimation of ideal-points we rely on Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten's (2017) `R` code available at `https://github.com/evoeten/United-Nations-General-Assembly-Votes-and-Ideal-Points`. As the dataset on bridging observations (`Matches.csv`) only contains resolution-ids up to `A/RES/74/19`, we only estimate ideal-points up to the 74th session.[1] In addition, Voeten's (2013) data contains information on important votes (as decided by the US State Department) only up to the 73rd session. Hence, ideal-point estimates based on important votes are covering one session less.

For our comparison of the estimates based on our data and those made available by Erik Voeten (2013) we rely on two approaches. First, we calculate on a session-by-session basis the correlation coefficient between the two estimates of ideal-points. Second, we also estimate on a session-by-session basis a linear regression (with the UNGA-DM estimates serving as dependent variable; for full results see Table A2) and consider the constant term (which should be zero) and the slope coefficient (which should be equal to one).

[1] We are in the process of employing the same plagiarism tool used by Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2017) to extend the coverage of bridging observations to the 75th and 76th session.

Figure A1 first shows that the correlations between the two estimates, both for those based on all votes and those based on important votes, are all very high. These correlations diverge only slightly from 1 and for both sets of estimates are very close to each other, except around the 50th session. In these latter sessions, the correlations for estimates based on important votes dip to some extent.[2] This figure shows, however, also how misleading correlation coefficients can be. If the two measures of policy preferences (based on the two different voting databases) were on the same scale, then regressions should yield coefficients with specific values, namely a constant of 0 and a slope of 1. As the figure shows, this is not the case and there is considerable variation across time. First what strikes most is the fact that for the early sessions the constant term is negative and of considerable magnitude. This implies that the ideal-point estimates provided by Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2017) are too centrist. Overtime this constant approaches zero before starting to overshoot around the 50th session. When it comes to the estimated slopes for the ideal-points based on all votes there is also considerable variation around the (expected) value of one. Moving to the estimates based on important votes, one finds related patterns. Again, as for the correlation coefficients, one finds again a divergence around the 50th session, with the slope coefficients jumping above the value of one.

[2] As discussed in the main paper, this is the period in which Voeten (2013) codes some non-final passage votes as important even though it is the final passage vote that the US State Department declared as important.



Figure A1: Comparison of ideal-point estimates sessions 1-74/3

Yearly correlations of ideal-point estimates based on all votes and votes on important decisions as well as constant and slope estimates (and 95 % confidence intervals) from yearly regressions of ideal-point estimates based on UNGA-DM on those based on BSV-data, both for all and only important votes.

Table A2: Regression results at the basis of Figure A1

	Constant		Slope		
session	α	SE	β	SE	N
1	-1.08	0.06	1.17	0.04	54
2	-0.92	0.03	1.11	0.02	57
3	-0.62	0.02	1.04	0.02	59
4	-0.53	0.02	1.00	0.02	59
5	-0.41	0.02	0.96	0.01	60
6	-0.37	0.03	0.94	0.02	60
7	-0.28	0.02	0.92	0.02	60
8	-0.26	0.03	0.91	0.02	60
9	-0.21	0.03	0.89	0.02	60
10	-0.15	0.03	0.90	0.02	65
11	-0.22	0.01	0.98	0.01	81
12	-0.21	0.01	0.98	0.01	82
13	-0.18	0.01	0.97	0.01	82
14	-0.17	0.01	0.98	0.01	82
15	-0.13	0.01	1.02	0.01	99
16	-0.12	0.01	1.03	0.01	104
17	-0.14	0.01	1.00	0.01	110
18	-0.16	0.01	0.98	0.01	112
19					
20	-0.12	0.01	0.98	0.01	117
21	-0.09	0.02	0.93	0.02	122
22	-0.07	0.03	0.96	0.02	124
23	-0.12	0.01	0.98	0.01	126
24	-0.14	0.02	0.98	0.01	126
25	-0.08	0.01	0.98	0.01	126
26	-0.08	0.01	1.03	0.01	132
27	-0.08	0.01	1.05	0.01	132
28	-0.05	0.01	1.05	0.01	134
29	-0.04	0.01	1.01	0.01	137
30	-0.07	0.01	0.99	0.01	143
31	-0.05	0.01	1.00	0.01	144
32	-0.08	0.01	1.03	0.01	146
33	-0.09	0.01	1.03	0.01	148
34	-0.06	0.01	1.03	0.02	150
35	-0.02	0.01	1.04	0.01	151
36	-0.01	0.01	1.05	0.01	155
37	0.00	0.01	1.08	0.01	156
38	-0.00	0.01	1.08	0.01	157
39	-0.01	0.01	1.08	0.02	158
40	-0.03	0.01	1.07	0.01	158
41	-0.04	0.01	1.06	0.02	158
42	-0.01	0.01	1.07	0.01	158
43	-0.04	0.01	1.08	0.02	158
44	-0.02	0.01	1.07	0.01	158
45	-0.01	0.01	1.01	0.01	152
46	0.02	0.01	0.97	0.01	168
47	0.01	0.01	0.98	0.01	173
48	0.02	0.02	0.94	0.02	177
49	0.03	0.01	0.95	0.01	174
50	0.03	0.01	0.95	0.01	179
51	0.04	0.01	0.95	0.01	180
52	0.06	0.01	0.95	0.01	176
53	0.07	0.01	1.03	0.01	177
54	0.11	0.01	1.02	0.01	174
55	0.11	0.01	1.00	0.01	181
56	0.09	0.01	0.98	0.01	179
57	0.11	0.01	0.99	0.01	187
58	0.11	0.01	1.00	0.01	189
59	0.11	0.01	1.04	0.01	191
60	0.11	0.01	1.03	0.01	191
61	0.12	0.01	1.05	0.02	192
62	0.15	0.01	1.05	0.01	192
63	0.15	0.01	1.02	0.01	192
64	0.15	0.01	1.01	0.01	192
65	0.17	0.01	0.99	0.01	192
66	0.15	0.01	1.01	0.01	193
67	0.15	0.01	1.03	0.01	193
68	0.18	0.01	1.01	0.01	193
69	0.17	0.01	1.02	0.01	193
70	0.17	0.01	1.02	0.01	193
71	0.16	0.01	1.00	0.02	193
72	0.15	0.01	1.01	0.01	193
73	0.12	0.01	1.01	0.01	193
74	0.12	0.01	1.02	0.01	193

B Additional replications

B.1 Agreement index: Voting cohesion among EU member states

As many studies use UNGA voting data for descriptive inferences regarding possible blocs and their internal agreement, we start with replicating a graph from a study assessing how cohesive European Union (EU) member states voting is over time on final passage votes. Jin and Hoesli (2013), wishing to assess whether cohesiveness has changed due to institutional changes linked to the entry to force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, employ the agreement index proposed by Hix, Noury and Roland (2005) (for a critique of this measure and the proposal of an alternative, see Burmester and Jankowski, 2014).[3]



Figure B1: Replication of Jin and Hoesli (2013): Agreement among EU member states

Figure B1 shows the evolution of the agreement scores reported by Jin and Hoesli (2013) (solid line) and based on UNGA-DM data (dashed line). While in the earlier

[3] We are very grateful to Madeleine Hoesli for sharing these data with us.

sessions the differences are smaller, starting with the 60th session the differences become more notable. As the Lisbon treaty entered into force during session 64, the substantive conclusion regarding the effect of this treaty on cohesion is also affected. Based on the more complete data set, increased agreement among EU member-states is barely noticeable.

B.2 Similarity Scores: Democratic or Capitalist Peace

Gartzke (2007), in his study on the democratic peace, respectively the capitalist peace, uses as control for shared interests in a dyad Signorino and Ritter's (1999) similarity score (a related study by Gartzke is also used for a replication study in Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017). In Table B1 we report the respective estimation results. Model 1 replicates the analysis from the original paper, while Model 2 does the same without, however, imputing data for missing similarity scores (for instance, for dyads involving South Africa during Apartheid). Model 3 re-estimates the same model with data in which the similarity scores have been replaced by those coming from the UNGA-DM data, while Model 4 does the same, restricting the voting data, however, to those votes that are also in the dataset provided by Voeten (2013). Following Gartzke, the shared interests similar score variable is INTERESTS.

Table B1: Replication of Gartzke (2007)

	Dependent variable:			
	maoznewl			
	Replication	Without imputation	UNGA-DM data	UNGA-DM data (Voeten)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democracy (Low)	−0.017	−0.019	−0.031**	−0.031**
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Democracy (High)	−0.002	−0.002	0.007	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Trade Dep. (Low)	−5.402	−4.751	−9.879	−10.019
	(9.036)	(8.932)	(9.898)	(10.022)
Fin. Open (Low)	−0.247***	−0.250***	−0.255***	−0.256***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)
GDPPC (Low)	0.0002***	0.0003***	0.0002***	0.0003***
	(0.00003)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)	(0.00003)
GDPPC x Contig.	−0.0003***	−0.0003***	−0.0003***	−0.0003***
	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.0001)
INTERESTS	−0.982***	−0.947***	−0.319*	−0.250
	(0.200)	(0.212)	(0.188)	(0.203)
Contiguity	3.740***	3.754***	3.724***	3.737***
	(0.273)	(0.275)	(0.293)	(0.293)
Distance	−0.416***	−0.404***	−0.422***	−0.424***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Major Power	1.404***	1.442***	1.717***	1.730***
	(0.273)	(0.276)	(0.324)	(0.318)
Alliance	−0.007	−0.005	−0.168	−0.179
	(0.233)	(0.236)	(0.220)	(0.218)
Capability Ratio	−0.151***	−0.158***	−0.144**	−0.145**
	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.058)
Time (spline 1)	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time (spline 2)	−0.004***	−0.005***	−0.005***	−0.005***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time (spline 3)	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
CONSTANT	−1.088	−1.192	−1.513**	−1.586**
	(0.762)	(0.757)	(0.759)	(0.772)
Observations	166,140	163,941	163,941	163,942
Log Likelihood	−2,078.058	−2,025.979	−2,053.006	−2,054.450
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,188.117	4,083.959	4,138.013	4,140.900
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.3 Similarity Scores: Influence at the ADB

Table B2 reports the full results of the replication of the study by Kilby (2011) discussed in the main text. Following Kilby's terminology, the key variables (using UNGA voting data to measure concessions to Japan and the U.S.) are diffJPN and diffUSA.

Table B2: Replication of Kilby (2011)

	Dependent variable:	
	ADB disbursements (log)	
	Kilby (2011)	UNGA-DM
	(1)	(2)
diffJPN	1.006	3.822***
	(0.65)	(2.71)
diffUSA	2.059***	1.379*
	(3.33)	(1.71)
Blend	0.0986	0.134
	(0.29)	(0.40)
Population (log)	-0.124	-0.256
	(-0.05)	(-0.10)
GDP per capita (log)	2.072***	2.082***
	(2.81)	(2.96)
Freedom House	-0.147	-0.158
	(-1.47)	(-1.53)
Democracy indicator	-0.200	-0.140
	(-0.74)	(-0.51)
War Dummy	-0.200	-0.208
	(-1.45)	(-1.52)
diffG7-2	-2.159	-4.420***
	(-1.46)	(-2.92)
Observations	539	539
Countries	49	49

Note: t-statistics in parentheses based on country-clustered SEs.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4 Voting similarity: Vote buying at the UNSC

In Table B3 we report the results of two seemingly unrelated regression equations models based on Dreher et al. (2022) but using UNGA-DM data. In the main text we report, using these results, p-values based on Wald tests of equality of coefficients for "UNSC voted all with US x Allied" across equations (columns) within a given SUR estimation. Following Dreher et al.'s terminology, "UNSC voted all with US x Allied" is an interaction term, the product of "UNSC voted all with the US" (a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country was a non-permanent member of the UNSC and did not vote against the U.S. that year) and "Allied (=political proximity to US)" (the past voting alignment with the U.S. in the UNGA). Dreher et al. uses BSV data to calculate their "Allied" variable; the results below instead use UNGA-DM data.

Table B3: Replication of Dreher et al. (2022)

	SUR (1)		SUR (2)	
	Dependent variable:			
	US aid	IMF loans	US aid	WB loans
UNSC voted all with US	-0.363*	0.789***	0.178	1.109***
	(-1.74)	(2.85)	(0.87)	(4.05)
UNSC voted all with US x Allied	1.174***	-1.038**	-0.157	-1.648***
	(3.08)	(-2.04)	(-0.39)	(-3.08)
UNSC voted not all with US	-0.253	-0.110	0.0123	0.470*
	(-1.24)	(-0.40)	(0.06)	(1.84)
UNSC voted not all with US x Allied	0.583	-0.0249	-0.0210	-0.877*
	(1.39)	(-0.04)	(-0.05)	(-1.68)
Allied (= political proximity to US)	1.713***	0.248	1.445***	1.133***
	(8.47)	(0.92)	(6.96)	(4.11)
GDP (log, lagged)	-0.571***	-0.392***	-0.441***	-0.174**
	(-10.58)	(-5.43)	(-8.23)	(-2.44)
Population (log)	0.646***	0.0993	0.835***	0.855***
	(6.09)	(0.70)	(7.90)	(6.09)
Past IMF programs		1.539***		
		(18.77)		
Observations	7272		7004	
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.5 Ideal-point estimates: Political influence at the World Bank

In the main paper we report on the replication of analyses in the article by Clark and Dolan (2021). Here, we discuss in more detail their analysis and our replication. Clark and Dolan assess whether important stakeholders in international organizations, e.g. the US in the World Bank, influence IO policy-making. To do so Clark and Dolan regress conditions imposed on recipients of World Bank development policy loans on the distance between the ideal-points of the recipients and the US.

To replicate Clark and Dolan (2021) with the new data, we first used Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten's (2017) code to estimate new ideal-point estimates based on their dynamic item-response theory model (see A1). We used exactly the same parameters as theirs and sampled 20,000 MCMCs after discarding 1000 iterations for burnin. We thinned the samples by a factor of 20, giving us 1000 draws from the posterior distribution.[4]

Table B4: Ideal-point distances and World Bank conditions

	Number of prior actions		**Number of categories**	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
BSV UN voting (ideal pt dist from US)	0.117***		0.108***	
	(0.035)		(0.040)	
UNGA-DM voting (ideal pt dist from US)		0.057		0.174**
		(0.109)		(0.087)
Constant	2.482***	2.433***	1.397***	0.986***
	(0.036)	(0.326)	(0.040)	(0.260)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	594	594	594	594

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

In Table B4 we report the replication estimates for a simple negative-binomial regression with country fixed-effects for the two dependent variables Clark and Dolan (2021) employ, namely the number of prior actions and the number of categories.[5] For the first dependent variable we find with our new ideal-point estimates still a positive effect of the distance between the recipient and the US, but the coefficient is cut in half and estimated with considerable uncertainty.[6] For the other dependent variable the coefficient increases when using the new data, while again, the uncertainty around the point estimate is larger.

Tables B5 and B6 show the results for the same dependent variables, but this time estimated in models with control variables. When estimating these models Clark and

[4]We note that neither of these draws based on our data (whether focusing on all votes or only important votes) show any sign of convergence (based on using some usual test-statistics).

[5]We wish to express our gratitude to Richard Clark and Lindsay Dolan, who responded to each and every nit-picking question we posed to them regarding this replication.

[6]We note that Clark and Dolan (2021) center their variables, while we do not do so for our distance measure, as this only affects the estimates of the constant.

Table B5: Ideal-point distances and number of prior actions

	Number of prior actions		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
BSV UN voting (ideal pt dist from US)	0.048**	0.049**	
	(0.020)	(0.020)	
UNGA-DM voting (ideal pt dist from US)			0.104
			(0.072)
World Bank board member	0.017	0.017	0.013
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)
EU president colony	0.119	0.117	0.127
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.097)
UNSC member	−0.024	−0.025	−0.025
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)
U.S. aid	−0.009	−0.009	−0.012
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Chinese aid	−0.018	−0.017	−0.018
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
GDPPC	−0.023	−0.023	−0.034
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Debt service / GDP	−0.015	−0.016	−0.018
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Short-term debt / exports	−0.014	−0.014	−0.017
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Inflation	−0.016	−0.016	−0.010
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Debt / GDP	−0.005	−0.004	−0.002
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
FDI / GDP	−0.027	−0.028	−0.033*
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Polity2	0.031	0.034	0.024
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Openness	−0.006	−0.004	−0.002
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
War	−0.030	−0.030	−0.026
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Election year	0.065	0.065	0.066
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.053)
IMF program	−0.053	−0.053	−0.050
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Post-2012	−0.192***	−0.193***	−0.203***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Constant	2.484***	2.488***	2.192***
	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.322)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	766	757	757

***p $<$ .01; **p $<$ .05; *p $<$ .1

Table B6: Ideal-point distances and number of categories

	Number of categories		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
BSV UN voting (ideal pt dist from US)	0.100***	0.101***	
	(0.022)	(0.022)	
UNGA-DM voting (ideal pt dist from US)			0.221***
			(0.068)
World Bank board member	−0.048	−0.049	−0.055
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.073)
EU president colony	−0.114	−0.114	−0.089
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.120)
UNSC member	0.015	0.022	0.025
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)
U.S. aid	0.021	0.025	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Chinese aid	0.004	0.004	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
GDPPC	−0.019	−0.020	−0.042
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Debt service / GDP	−0.037**	−0.037**	−0.041***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Short-term debt / exports	0.006	0.002	−0.005
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Inflation	−0.013	−0.013	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Debt / GDP	−0.036	−0.034	−0.027
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)
FDI / GDP	−0.031**	−0.031**	−0.042***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Polity2	0.052	0.056	0.032
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Openness	−0.031	−0.028	−0.027
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
War	0.023	0.020	0.035
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Election year	−0.062	−0.063	−0.060
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.064)
IMF program	−0.010	−0.012	−0.005
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Post-2012	−0.007	−0.003	−0.025
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)
Constant	1.325***	1.319***	0.680**
	(0.179)	(0.179)	(0.283)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	
N	766	757	757

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1

Dolan (2021) rely imputed data. This includes imputed values for the distances between ideal-points. As this could be viewed as problematic in the present context, we first re-estimated models removing the (nine) observations with missing ideal-point distances. As the two tables show, the results are not affected by this change in the data. When using the distances based on our ideal-point estimates we find however, especially for the first dependent variable, some changes, as the coefficient, while increasing is size, is estimated with much more uncertainty. (The figures in the main text illustrate this clearly.)

B.6 Voting similarity: Political influence at the World Bank

Kilby (2013) studies World Bank project preparation, using a stochastic frontier model (SFM) to explore how quickly World Bank projects are approved. The central data issue is the lack of a direct measure of start of the project preparation. The paper works around this by using a sequentially issued project identification number generated at the time project preparation begins. The SFM simultaneously estimates both project duration from the project id (a noisy measure of the start of preparation) and the project approval date and the factors influencing this duration. The central focus is on the role of geopolitics (particularly U.S. geopolitics) in the speed of project approval. The paper makes use of UNGA voting alignment but without directly calculating a "concessions" variable. Instead, it includes the variables UNGA Important (alignment with the U.S. on important votes) and UNGA Other (alignment with the U.S. on other votes) individually. The SFM incorporates these and other factors via an exponential distribution; coefficient estimates can be translated into marginal effects on the duration of preparation measured in days. A negative coefficient indicates fewer days or, equivalently, a faster delivery of the project. Thus, a negative coefficient estimate on a geopolitical variable suggests preferential treatment, particularly since World Bank lending is widely criticized by borrowing countries for being slow and bureaucratic.

Looking at the key specification that uses detrended geopolitical variables (Table 3), the coefficient estimates and z-statistics with the two data sets are:

Table B7: Vote similarity and World Bank project preparation

	Kilby 2013	**UNGA-DM**
UNGA Important	−1.137	−1.412
	(−2.18)	(−3.12)
UNGA Other	0.395	1.461
	(0.89)	(2.87)

In both cases, countries that vote with the U.S. on UNGA decisions that matter to the U.S. are rewarded with accelerated loan approval. However, explicitly modeling the process as a reward for concessions—that is defining diffUSA=(UNGA important–UNGA Other) as in Kilby (2011)—yields insignificant results with the original data (p-value = 0.1066), largely because the UNGA Other coefficient is estimated so imprecisely. With the UNGA-DM data, the higher level of precision coupled with estimates further from zero would allow this approach (p-value = 0.0005).

B.7 Ideal-point estimates: The effect of the Trump-presidency

Mosler and Potrafke (2020) study whether the Trump-presidency has affected voting agreement with Western member states of the UN. Apart using voting agreement, they also rely on ideal-point estimates provided by Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2017) to calculate the absolute distance between each Western country and the US on a yearly basis. They find that "[t]he point estimates of the Donald Trump dummy variable are positive and statistically significant at the one percent-level in [four out of five models]" (Mosler and Potrafke, 2020, 493). We replicate the last of these models (which includes country fixed-effects, a series of country-year specific and year specific controls) and report the results in the following table.

Table B8: Replication Mosler and Potrafke (2020, Model 5, Table 5)

	Δ ideal points BSV	**Δ ideal points UNGA-DM**
	Model 1	**Model 2**
US president Donald Trump	0.141^{***}	0.050^{*}
	(0.027)	(0.028)
Ideological distance	0.0001	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Log of real GDP per capita	0.104^{**}	0.209^{***}
	(0.044)	(0.047)
Growth of real GDP	-0.001	-0.006^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log of population	-0.306^{***}	0.070
	(0.088)	(0.102)
Allied with United States in conflict	0.041^{***}	-0.0001
	(0.012)	(0.015)
1st lag of absolute ideal points difference	0.717^{***}	0.803^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.026)
Trump * ideological distance	0.00001	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.021)
constant	0.765^{*}	-2.110^{***}
	(0.405)	(0.434)
Country fixed-effects	✓	✓
Topic-share variables	✓	✓
N	1020	1020
R-squared	0.919	0.908
Adj. R-squared	0.914	0.903
Residual Std. Error	0.138 (df = 968)	0.145 (df = 968)
F Statistic	214.670^{***}	187.447^{***}
	(df = 51, 968)	(df = 51, 968)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; $^{***}p < .01$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{*}p < .1$

As referred to in the quote above, the coefficient for the dummy variable for Donald Trump's presidency is positive and statistically significant (Model 1 in Table B8). As this variable also appears in an interaction with the ideological distance, this implies

that the ideal-point distance with member states of the same ideological orientation increased during the Trump years. When using the ideal-point estimates based on the UNGA-DM data, the coefficient remains positive, its size, however, is cut to a third of its original size (see Models 2 and 3 in Table B8).



Figure B2: The effect of the Trump presidency on the absolute ideal-point distances among Western member states (with 95 % confidence intervals)

In Figure B2 we depict the average predicted differences due to the Trump presidency (based on Models 1 and 2 in Table B8) conditional on the level of ideological distance (which only takes the three values appearing in Figure B2, but is treated as continuous by Mosler and Potrafke, 2020).[7] While independent of the data used for the estimation of the ideal-points a negative effect for the Trump presidency appears in Figure B2, the magnitude of this effect differs. With the original data, the absolute ideal-point distance decreases by approximately 0.14 (independent of the ideological distance between the US and a given member-state). However, this decrease is only about a third that size if the ideal-points estimated based on the UNGA-DM data are used (note that the original scale of ideal-points, independent of the data used to estimate them, has a standard deviation of 1). While we did not replicate Mosler and Potrafke's (2020) analyses based on voting agreements, it is likely that the results reported here more accurately reflect the effect of the Trump presidency. Mosler and Potrafke (2020) attempt to control for agenda effects in voting agreement scores by

[7] Mosler and Potrafke's (2020) present in their text marginal effects calculated at the mean of covariates.

controlling for the share of resolution votes on particular topics. The way in which agenda effects are controlled for in a dynamic IRT-model (as used by Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten, 2017) is more comprehensive.[8]

[8]It bears also noting that our other replication analyses of studies using voting agreements (i.e., Kilby, 2011; Kilby, 2013; Dreher et al., 2022), also found sizeable differences.

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