

Supplementary material

Article: Lutz, P., Lavenex, S., & Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P. (2026). Trading Migration? Explaining Mobility Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements. *The Review of International Organizations*.

Appendix I: Data documentation

Table A1: Operationalization mobility provisions

Variable	Operationalization	Data source
Scope of mobility provisions	The scope of mobility provisions is measured as the number of categories of businesspeople whose mobility is facilitated by an agreement. The scope variable is measured as the aggregate sum of the following dichotomous variables (0=absence, 1=presence) : MOBIP: Does the agreement allow the movement of self-employed/independent professionals? MOBBV: Does the agreement allow the movement of business visitors? MOBICT: Does the agreement allow the movement of intra-corporate transferees? MOBCSS: Does the agreement allow the movement of contractual service suppliers? MOBTR: Does the agreement allow the movement of (graduate) trainees? MOBINS: Does the agreement allow the movement of installers/servicers? MOBINV: Does the agreement allow the movement of traders/investors? MOBEXE: Does the agreement allow the movement of executives? MOBMAN: Does the agreement allow the movement of managers? MOBSPC: Does the agreement allow the movement of specialists? MOBBS: Does the agreement allow the movement of business (service) sellers? MOBOBP: Does the agreement allow the movement of other business people? Other business persons (artists, sportspersons, fashion models, country-specific professions, legal representatives, nurses, persons engaged in specialty occupations and other skilled professionals). The scope index is calculated as the sum of the twelve indicators listed above, yielding the number of categories of businesspeople covered by the mobility provisions of an agreement. For the analysis, the index is rescaled to range from 0 to 1 by dividing it by the maximum number of categories observed in the sample. For the coding details of the different items, see MITA-codebook. Two separate variables are calculated for investment-related mobility (MOBBV, MOBICT, MOBINV, MOBTR) and non-investment-related mobility (MOBIP, MOBCSS, MOBBS, MOBINS). Each sub-index is rescaled to range from 0 to 1 in the same way.	MITA dataset (Lavenex et al. 2023)
Depth of mobility provisions	The depth of mobility provisions is measured by an aggregated index of commitments that expand (+1) or restrict (-1) the strength of mobility provisions: - Own mobility chapter (+) - mutual recognition of qualifications (+) - dispute settlement mechanism (+) - visa facilitation (+) - work permit facilitation (+) - most-favoured nation clause (+) - national treatment clause (+) - facilitation of application process (+) - regulatory cooperation (+)	MITA dataset (Lavenex et al. 2023)

	- information provision (+) - limitation of application fees (+) - sector expansion (+) - extension of stay (+) - quota limitation (+) - ENT limitation (+) - domestic employment (+) - rights of spouses (+) - limitation on permanent residence and citizenship (-) - limitation of commitment to a subset of signing parties (-) - security restrictions (-) - technology transfer requirement (-) - within-country mobility restriction (-) - sector limitation (-) - quota reservation (-) - ENT reservation (-) - skill requirement (-) - experience requirement (-) - pre-employment requirement (-) - duration limitation (-) - employment restriction (-) For each category-specific mobility-provision in an agreement, we calculate the depth of the provision based on these indicators. To calculate the overall depth of mobility provisions in an agreement, we calculate the mean across the eleven categories of businesspeople covered by the agreement, excluding the residual category of other business persons (MOBOBP). For the analysis, the resulting measure is rescaled to range from 0 to 1 by dividing it by its maximum observed value; agreements without any mobility provisions take the value 0. For the coding details of the different items, see MITA-codebook.	
Inclusion of mobility provisions	Dummy (0 = no mobility provisions, 1 = at least one mobility provision). An agreement is coded 1 if any of the mobility items listed below is present. Provisions on labour mobility (MOBLAB) and on the movement of non-business persons (MOBNBP) are excluded, so that the measure captures the mobility of businesspeople only.	MITA dataset (Lavenex et al. 2023)
Temporary mobility of business persons (used only for validation)	Index based on DESTA dataset (value 0 to 8): - Does the agreement allow the movement of natural persons in the provision of services? - If there are provisions on the movement of natural persons: do the provisions match GATS-commitments or go beyond GATS-commitments? - If there are provisions on the movement of natural persons: do the provisions match GATS-commitments or do they even include new areas of regulation for each member of the agreement? - Are there provisions on transparency and co-operation to facilitate visa for business persons? - Are there provisions on specific mechanisms to facilitate visa for business persons? - Does the agreement create for a visa-free movement? - Does the agreement allow for the temporary Movement of Business or Natural People? - Does the agreement include prohibiting provisions on the free appointment of board members and senior managers?	DESTA database (Dür et al. 2014)

Details on operationalization:

Variable list (0=absence, 1= presence)

MOBOBJ:	Does the agreement mention the objective of facilitating migration?
MOBCHP:	Does the agreement text contain a dedicated part on the mobility of natural persons?
MOBLAB:	Does the agreement allow for labour mobility?
MOBSER:	Does the agreement allow for service mobility?
MOBMRA:	Does the agreement contain a commitment on the mutual recognition of qualifications?
MOBDSM:	Does the agreement contain a dispute settlement mechanism for mobility provisions?
MOBPER:	Does the agreement mention limitations of mobility commitments regarding permanent settlement and citizenship?
MOBREG:	Does the agreement contain a commitment on regulatory cooperation regarding the mobility of natural persons?
MOBMFN:	Does the agreement contain a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause for mobility provisions?
MOBNTR:	Does the agreement contain a national treatment clause for mobility provisions?
MOBFEE:	Does the agreement contain a commitment on the limitation of application fees?
MOBINF:	Does the agreement contain commitments on the provision of publicly available information regarding the mobility of natural persons?
MOBSEC:	Does the agreement contain a limitation of mobility commitments based on security interests?
MOBTEC:	Does the agreement contain technology transfer requirements?
MOBRES:	Does the agreement contain within-country mobility restrictions?
MOBVIS1:	Does the agreement contain a commitment on entry facilitation?
MOBVIS2:	Does the agreement contain a commitment on visa extension/renewal mechanism?
MOBPRC:	Does the agreement contain a commitment on the facilitation of the application process?
MOBGATS:	Does the agreement require compliance with the 'General Agreement on Trade in Services' (1995)?
MOBBTC:	Does the agreement require compliance with the 'APEC Business Travel Card Scheme' (2013)?
MOBVSA:	Does the agreement require compliance with a visa agreement between the signing parties?
MOBIP:	Does the agreement allow the movement of self-employed/independent professionals?
MOBBV:	Does the agreement allow the movement of business visitors?
MOBICT:	Does the agreement allow the movement of intra-corporate transferees?
MOBCSS:	Does the agreement allow the movement of contractual service suppliers?
MOBTR:	Does the agreement allow the movement of (graduate) trainees?
MOBINS:	Does the agreement allow the movement of installers/servicers?
MOBINV:	Does the agreement allow the movement of traders/investors?
MOBEXE:	Does the agreement allow the movement of executives?
MOBMAN:	Does the agreement allow the movement of managers?
MOBSPC:	Does the agreement allow the movement of specialists?
MOBBS:	Does the agreement allow the movement of business (service) sellers?
MOBOBP:	Does the agreement allow the movement of other business people?
MOBNBP:	Does the agreement allow the movement of non-business people?
MOBENT:	Does the agreement contain a rule regarding economic need tests/labour market tests for the mobility of natural persons?
MOBQUO:	Does the agreement contain a quota rule for the mobility of natural persons?
MOBDRN:	Does the agreement contain a limitation regarding the length of stay for the mobility of

- natural persons?
- MOBEMP: Does the agreement contain employment restrictions for the mobility of natural persons?
- MOBEXT: Does the agreement contain a mechanism for the extension of stay for the mobility of natural persons?
- MOBEXP: Does the agreement contain limitations regarding prior professional experience for the mobility of natural persons?
- MOBSKL: Does the agreement contain a skill-level limitation for the mobility of natural persons?
- MOBSCT: Does the agreement contain specifications on the sectoral coverage for the mobility of natural persons?
- MOBSPS: Does the agreement contain a provision for the rights of spouses and dependents?
- MOBPRE: Does the agreement contain a pre-employment requirement for the mobility of natural persons?
- MOBDOM: Does the agreement contain a provision that allows for employment in the receiving country?

Calculation of independent variables

Economic globalization of the signing parties i and j at time t is calculated by the arithmetic mean of their index scores:

$$\text{KOF}_{ij,t} = \frac{\text{KOF}_{i,t} + \text{KOF}_{j,t}}{2}$$

Data source: KOF Index (Gygli et al. 2019)

Trade interdependence between country i and country j for an agreement signed in year t is calculated as the average of their bilateral trade (T_{ij}) in the preceding year relative to their respective GDPs, expressed as a percentage:

$$\text{TradeDep}_{ij,t} = \left(\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{T_{ij,t-1}}{\text{GDP}_{i,t-1}} + \frac{T_{ij,t-1}}{\text{GDP}_{j,t-1}} \right) \right) \times 100$$

Data source: International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and the complementary dataset by Gleditsch (2002). GDP data by World Bank.

Migration asymmetry within a dyad i, j at time t captures the relative difference in migration flows between the two directions:

$$\text{MigAsym}_{ij,t} = \left| \frac{M_{ij,t-5}}{M_{ij,t-5} + M_{ji,t-5}} - \frac{1}{2} \right|$$

where $M_{ij,t-5}$ denotes migration from country i to country j , taken from the five-year interval containing year $t-5$; Abel and Cohen report flow estimates for five-year intervals, and each estimate is assigned to every year of its interval. This measure ranges from 0 (perfectly symmetric migration) to 0.5 (completely asymmetric flows).

Data source: Abel and Cohen (2019)

Visa restrictiveness between countries i and j at time t is defined as the average visa policy restrictiveness from i to j and from j to i :

$$\text{Visa}_{ij,t} = \frac{\text{Visa}_{i \rightarrow j,t} + \text{Visa}_{j \rightarrow i,t}}{2}$$

where $\text{Visa}_{i \rightarrow j,t}$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if country i imposes visa restrictions on travelers from j at time t , and 0 otherwise.

Data source: DEMIG Visa dataset (DEMIG 2015)

Path dependence in mobility provisions between countries i and j at time t is calculated as the recency-weighted average of past mobility provisions in previous agreements involving either country, where more recent agreements receive greater weight:

$$\text{PathDep}_{ij,t} = \frac{P_{i,t} + P_{j,t}}{2}, \quad P_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{\tau < t} \sum_{(k,l) \ni i} \text{Mobility}_{kl,\tau} \cdot \frac{1}{t-\tau}}{\sum_{\tau < t} \sum_{(k,l) \ni i} \frac{1}{t-\tau}}$$

where

- $\text{Mobility}_{kl,\tau}$ is the mobility provision indicator in the PTA signed between countries k and l in year τ ,
- the sums are over all agreements signed before t in which country i (respectively j) is a signing party, and $\frac{1}{t-\tau}$ weights more recent agreements more heavily,
- if one signing party has no earlier agreement, the other party's average is used; if neither has one, the value is set to 0.

Data source: MITA dataset (Lavenex et al. 2023)

Diffusion effects on mobility provisions between countries i and j at time t measure the recency-weighted average mobility provisions in past agreements that do not involve i or j :

$$\text{Diffusion}_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{\tau < t} \sum_{k,l \notin \{i,j\}} \frac{1}{t-\tau} \cdot \text{Mobility}_{kl,\tau} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\text{agreement}(k,l) \text{ at } \tau}}{\sum_{\tau < t} \sum_{k,l \notin \{i,j\}} \frac{1}{t-\tau} \cdot \mathbf{1}_{\text{agreement}(k,l) \text{ at } \tau}}$$

where

- $\text{Mobility}_{kl,\tau}$ is the mobility provision indicator in the PTA signed between countries k and l in year τ ,
- the sums are over all past years τ prior to t , and all country pairs (k,l) excluding i and j ,
- and $\frac{1}{t-\tau}$ weights more recent agreements more heavily.

Data source: MITA dataset (Lavenex et al. 2023)

Table A2: Summary statistics of the main variables

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Mobility (dummy)	454	0.454	0.498	0.000	1.000
Mobility scope	454	0.250	0.323	0.000	1.000
Mobility depth	454	0.296	0.366	0.000	0.968
KOF globalization index	421	60.134	10.692	31.426	87.518
Trade interdependence (FOB, log)	416	-0.158	1.830	-6.298	6.339
Trade interdependence (CIF, log)	416	-0.093	1.843	-7.884	7.766
Migration asymmetry	367	0.340	0.169	0.000	0.500
Visa restriction	323	0.478	0.425	0.000	1.000
Path dependence mobility	454	0.405	0.353	0.000	1.000
Path dependence scope	454	0.214	0.211	0.000	0.740
Path dependence depth	454	0.268	0.253	0.000	0.915
Diffusion mobility	454	0.339	0.177	0.000	0.659
Diffusion scope	454	0.436	0.160	0.000	0.633
Diffusion depth	454	0.569	0.174	0.000	0.714

Note: Summary statistics based on the sample used for the main analysis covering bilateral trade agreements between 1995 and 2020.


Data sources

Variable(s) in the dataset	Source
mobility, mob_scope, mob_depth, the category indicators (mobbv, mobict, mobip, mobcss, mobtr, mobins, mobinv, mobbs), mobvis, atype1, atype2; path_dependence_* and diffusion_* are derived from these	Lavenex, S., Lutz, P., & Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, P. (2023). Migration Provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements (MITA) Dataset (Version 1.0) [Dataset]. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7837954
temp (cross-validation index of temporary business mobility)	Dür, A., Baccini, L., & Elsig, M. (2014). The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new database. <i>The Review of International Organizations</i> , 9(3), 353–375. DESTA, temporary-movement provisions (investment, services and visa components).
trade_depend_fob_log, trade_depend_cif_log, trade_asym_fob	International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics: goods, value of exports free on board (FOB) and goods, value of imports cost insurance and freight (CIF), bilateral, annual. Each party's bilateral trade is expressed as a share of its GDP (World Bank, World Development Indicators, GDP in current US\$). Trade interdependence is the mean of the two shares, trade asymmetry their absolute difference; both are lagged by one year.
gdp_sum	World Bank, World Development Indicators: GDP per capita, summed across the two signing parties and expressed in 10,000 units.
fdi	World Bank, World Development Indicators: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), indicator BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS, averaged across the two signing parties.
service_export_log	World Bank, World Development Indicators: service exports, indicator BX.GSR.NFSV, averaged across the two signing parties.
kof_index_economic	Gygli, S., Haelg, F., Potrafke, N., & Sturm, J.-E. (2019). The KOF globalization index – revisited. <i>Review of International Organizations</i> , 14(3), 543–574. Economic globalization sub-index, 2022 release, averaged across the two signing parties.
migass1	Abel, G. J., & Cohen, J. E. (2019). Bilateral international migration flow estimates for 200 countries. <i>Scientific Data</i> , 6, 82.
visa	DEMIG (2015). DEMIG VISA, version 1.4, full edition. Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford. Bilateral visa requirements; coverage ends in 2013.
oecd1, oecd2, pta_oecd	OECD membership by year of accession, coded by the authors.

Note: Origin of the variables in the analysis dataset. The MITA dataset codes the dependent variables; the remaining sources provide the independent variables. The replication archive contains the compiled analysis dataset; the underlying data are obtainable from the providers listed here.

Appendix II: Additional analyses


Figure A1: Histograms of mobility provisions in PTAs



Note: Histograms of the scope and depth of mobility provisions, using 10 bins and showing the mean and median (dashed/dotted line).


Figure A2 : Scatter plot of the scope and depth of mobility provisions in bilateral PTAs

Each point represents one PTA with mobility provisions. Dashed lines show trends, dotted lines show medians



Based on 241 PTAs with mobility provisions

Figure A3: Ranking of signing parties by the frequency of mobility provisions



Note: Bar plots displaying the 15 signing parties with the highest relative and absolute frequency of mobility provisions in their preferential trade agreements. For the calculation of relative frequency only signing parties with at least eight PTAs were considered.

Table A3: Base models on the determinants of mobility provisions in PTAs

	Trade economics			Migration politics			Institutional dynamics		
	Mobility (1)	Scope (2)	Depth (3)	Mobility (4)	Scope (5)	Depth (6)	Mobility (7)	Scope (8)	Depth (9)
KOF globalization index	4.605*** (0.674)	0.574*** (0.081)	0.599*** (0.091)						
Trade interdependence	3.962*** (0.853)	0.453*** (0.112)	0.472*** (0.127)						
Migration asymmetry				0.495 (0.367)	0.061 (0.054)	0.070 (0.064)			
Visa restriction				-0.399 (0.293)	-0.090* (0.044)	-0.093 (0.052)			
Path dependence							4.059*** (0.414)	0.648*** (0.048)	0.762*** (0.055)
Diffusion							0.095 (0.477)	0.053 (0.054)	-0.029 (0.062)
Constant	-4.398*** (0.574)	-0.248*** (0.068)	-0.223** (0.077)	-0.509 (0.303)	0.217*** (0.045)	0.265*** (0.053)	-1.919*** (0.269)	0.027 (0.036)	0.096* (0.049)
<i>N</i>	396	396	396	266	266	266	454	454	454
<i>R</i> ²		0.157	0.136		0.020	0.016		0.347	0.322
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		0.152	0.131		0.012	0.009		0.344	0.319
Log likelihood	-231.886	-90.097	-140.151	-178.244	-63.046	-106.564	-229.016	-34.514	-99.521
AIC	469.772	188.193	288.303	362.488	134.093	221.127	464.032	77.028	207.042

Note: Model estimates based on logistic (1,4,7) or OLS regression (2,3,5,6,8,9). Statistical significance indicated as follows: * <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001 .

Table A4: Model estimates based on full regression models

	Mobility (1)	Scope (2)	Depth (3)
KOF globalization index	2.572* (1.106)	0.179 (0.095)	0.197 (0.116)
Trade interdependence	4.878*** (1.462)	0.367** (0.129)	0.363* (0.156)
Migration asymmetry	-0.108 (0.526)	0.015 (0.047)	0.021 (0.057)
Visa restriction	0.358 (0.431)	0.006 (0.039)	0.030 (0.047)
Path dependence	4.176*** (0.642)	0.580*** (0.068)	0.692*** (0.080)
Diffusion	0.095 (0.986)	0.142 (0.105)	0.008 (0.125)
Constant	-5.807*** (1.070)	-0.304** (0.103)	-0.222 (0.130)
<i>N</i>	243	243	243
<i>R</i> ²		0.408	0.363
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		0.393	0.347
Log likelihood	-102.110	-1.797	-49.109
AIC	218.219	19.595	114.219


Note: Estimates from logistic (1) and linear (2,3) regression models including all independent variables. This reduces the sample size to 243 agreements, because the DEMIG visa data end in 2013 and bilateral migration flows are missing for some dyads. Statistical significance indicated as follows: * <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001 .

Table A5: Model estimates with alternative trade operationalization

	Mobility (1)	Scope (2)	Depth (3)
KOF globalization index	4.647*** (0.671)	0.583*** (0.080)	0.611*** (0.092)
Trade interdependence (CIF)	4.410*** (1.041)	0.549*** (0.137)	0.525*** (0.156)
Constant	-4.692*** (0.658)	-0.305*** (0.080)	-0.260** (0.091)
<i>N</i>	396	396	396
<i>R</i> ²		0.156	0.130
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		0.151	0.126
Log likelihood	-233.851	-90.297	-141.368
AIC	473.702	188.594	290.735

Note: Estimates from logistic (1) and linear (2,3) regression models including a measure of trade interdependence based on import-related data instead of export-related data as in the base model. Statistical significance indicated as follows: * <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001 .

Figure A4: Model estimates separated by mobility type




Note: Coefficient plot distinguishing investment-related from non-investment-related mobility, for scope and depth respectively. All models use OLS regression. 95% confidence intervals shown.

Table A6: Model estimates based on sub-sample of standard PTAs

	Trade economics			Migration politics			Institutional dynamics		
	Mobility (1)	Scope (2)	Depth (3)	Mobility (4)	Scope (5)	Depth (6)	Mobility (7)	Scope (8)	Depth (9)
KOF globalization index	6.251*** (0.908)	0.628*** (0.089)	0.730*** (0.105)						
Trade interdependence	5.307*** (1.015)	0.563*** (0.112)	0.602*** (0.133)						
Migration asymmetry				0.762 (0.395)	0.074 (0.056)	0.117 (0.069)			
Visa restriction				-0.224 (0.313)	-0.066 (0.045)	-0.064 (0.056)			
Path dependence							4.597*** (0.515)	0.712*** (0.050)	0.822*** (0.061)
Diffusion							-0.076 (0.591)	0.005 (0.056)	-0.055 (0.067)
Constant	-5.736*** (0.741)	-0.325*** (0.070)	-0.335*** (0.084)	-0.755* (0.330)	0.190*** (0.047)	0.224*** (0.058)	-1.934*** (0.301)	0.044 (0.036)	0.112* (0.052)
<i>N</i>	303	303	303	221	221	221	349	349	349
<i>R</i> ²		0.211	0.195		0.017	0.018		0.427	0.367
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		0.206	0.190		0.008	0.009		0.424	0.363
Log likelihood	-161.698	-49.347	-101.554	-147.597	-44.562	-92.435	-164.250	7.233	-70.469
AIC	329.396	106.694	211.107	301.194	97.124	192.871	334.499	-6.466	148.938

Note: Model estimates based on logistic (1,4,7) or OLS regression (2,3,5,6,8,9) using a sub-sample of bilateral PTAs that excludes agreements signed by trading blocs (except the EU) and interims agreements as well as protocols. Statistical significance indicated as follows: * <0.05 ; ** <0.01 ; *** <0.001 .

Figure A5: Model estimates based on sub-samples of signing parties



Note: Coefficient plot for the determinants of mobility provisions in PTAs using the binary outcome and three different sets of independent variables. Compared with the base models depicted in Figure 3 in the manuscript, these models further distinguish between three sub-samples of signing parties based on their OECD membership. All models use a logistic regression; the plot shows average marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals.

Table A7: Model estimates with two-way clustered SEs

	Trade economics			Migration politics			Institutional dynamics		
	Mobility (1)	Scope (2)	Depth (3)	Mobility (4)	Scope (5)	Depth (6)	Mobility (7)	Scope (8)	Depth (9)
KOF globalization index	4.605*** (0.737)	0.574*** (0.073)	0.599*** (0.098)						
Trade interdependence	3.962*** (1.120)	0.453** (0.142)	0.472** (0.162)						
Migration asymmetry				0.495 (0.316)	0.061 (0.058)	0.070 (0.063)			
Visa restriction				-0.399 (0.446)	-0.090 (0.053)	-0.093 (0.070)			
Path dependence							4.059*** (0.513)	0.648*** (0.050)	0.762*** (0.060)
Diffusion							0.095 (0.582)	0.053 (0.053)	-0.029 (0.067)
Constant	-4.398*** (0.810)	-0.248** (0.084)	-0.223* (0.107)	-0.509 (0.478)	0.217*** (0.063)	0.265** (0.081)	-1.919** (0.604)	0.027 (0.048)	0.096 (0.070)
<i>N</i>	396	396	396	266	266	266	454	454	454
<i>R</i> ²		0.157	0.136		0.020	0.016		0.347	0.322
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		0.152	0.131		0.012	0.009		0.344	0.319
Log likelihood	-231.886	-90.097	-140.151	-178.244	-63.046	-106.564	-229.016	-34.514	-99.521
AIC	469.772	188.193	288.303	362.488	134.093	221.127	464.032	77.028	207.042

Note: Model estimates based on logistic (1,4,7) or OLS regression (2,3,5,6,8,9). Unlike the base models, standard errors are clustered in two ways based on the signing parties (party1, party2). Statistical significance indicated as follows: *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

Table A8: Additional economic controls

	Trade asymmetry			Level of development		
	Mobility (1)	Scope (2)	Depth (3)	Mobility (4)	Scope (5)	Depth (6)
KOF globalization index	4.781*** (0.689)	0.608*** (0.081)	0.636*** (0.092)	2.751** (0.951)	0.256* (0.103)	0.333** (0.123)
Trade interdependence	0.253 (2.930)	-0.139 (0.393)	0.088 (0.448)	3.836*** (0.962)	0.385*** (0.108)	0.425** (0.129)
Trade asymmetry (log)	0.300 (0.219)	0.047# (0.028)	0.032 (0.032)			
Trade interdependence $\times$ asymmetry	-0.658* (0.329)	-0.117** (0.041)	-0.108* (0.047)			
GDP per capita (combined)				0.394*** (0.083)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.009)
Constant	-2.661 (2.270)	-0.012 (0.303)	-0.163 (0.345)	-4.370*** (0.678)	-0.176* (0.070)	-0.180* (0.083)
<i>N</i>	396	396	396	330	330	330
<i>R</i> ²		0.175	0.150		0.251	0.224
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		0.166	0.141		0.244	0.217
Log likelihood	-229.786	-85.791	-136.877	-169.887	-43.340	-101.747
AIC	469.573	183.582	285.754	347.775	96.681	213.494

Note: Model estimates based on logistic (1,4) or OLS regression (2,3,5,6). Models 1-3 add trade asymmetry and its interaction with trade interdependence; Models 4-6 add the signing parties' combined GDP per capita. Statistical significance indicated as follows: #<0.10; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.

Table A9: Alternative proxies of the economic logic

	Mobility (1)	Scope (2)	Depth (3)
FDI inflows	0.021# (0.012)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003# (0.002)
Service exports (log)	0.754*** (0.088)	0.086*** (0.009)	0.090*** (0.010)
Constant	-17.930*** (2.087)	-1.776*** (0.212)	-1.803*** (0.245)
<i>N</i>	394	394	394
<i>R</i> ²		0.225	0.175
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		0.221	0.171
Log likelihood	-216.294	-73.625	-130.868
AIC	438.587	155.250	269.735

Note: Model estimates based on logistic (1) or OLS regression (2,3) using foreign direct investment and service exports as alternative proxy measures of economic interdependence. Statistical significance indicated as follows: #<0.10; *<0.05; **<0.01; ***<0.001.