

Appendix

In this appendix, we shall provide additional information about the experiment.

This document is structured as follows:

A1: Experimental Instructions (exemplified on *Baseline Donation* and *Vote*)

A2: Questionnaire

A3: Variables Overview

A4: Regression Analysis

A1: Experimental Instructions (Exemplified on *Baseline Donation*)

(English translation, the original instructions were given in German. Part 1 and part 2 were distributed among subjects consecutively after the preceding part of the experiment was finished.)

Part 1

Welcome to our experiment! You can earn money by taking part in it. The exact amount of money you will earn is dependent on your own decision making and the decision making of other participants.

Please switch off your cell phones and refrain as of now from communicating with other participants.

In our experiment, we will be using the “Token” currency. When the experiment is over, the total of all payoff-relevant Token amounts will be converted into euro. The following exchange rate will be used:

1 Token = 5 euro cents

All decisions made in the experiment as well as the payoff amounts will remain anonymous. Any amounts shown have been rounded to one decimal place. Please feel free to use the calculator and rough paper provided.

In the following experiment, donations might be generated. In the case that donation payments are to be made, this will take place directly at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, two voluntary participants will be randomly chosen to act as witnesses that the donation payments are carried out correctly. These two participants will each receive an additional 2 €. All the other participants are welcome to be present when the donation payments are being made.

The Decision Situation

You will be randomly assigned to a group of four members. Therefore, you will be playing **with three other players** in a group. Each of the players must decide about how to allocate **20 Tokens**. You can either transfer these 20 Tokens to your **private account** or invest all of them or part of them in a **joint project**. You can always only invest full amounts of between 0 and 20 Tokens.

Your Income from the Private Account

Each Token that you do not invest in the joint project will be automatically transferred to your private account. Nobody except yourself can receive money from your private account.

$$20 - \textit{Paying into the project}$$

Your Income from the Joint Project

The **group result** consists of the total of the Tokens contributed by all of the group members. The group result will be multiplied by 2 and 80% of it will be allocated evenly among all four group members.

$$\frac{0.8 * 2 * \textit{Group result}}{4}$$

Donation

20 % of the doubled group result will be donated. Donations will be **proportionately** paid out to you and your group members' preferred charities.

$$0,2 * 2 * \textit{Group result}$$

Your Total Income

Your **total income** is composed of the **total** of the income from your **private account** and the income from the **joint project**.

$\begin{aligned} & \textit{Income from private account} \\ & 20 - \textit{Paying into the project} \\ & + \\ & \textit{Income from the joint project} \\ & \frac{0.8 * 2 * \textit{Group result}}{4} \end{aligned}$

If you have any questions about the experiment, please put your hand up. We will come to your desk to answer your questions.

Please respond to the following control questions now:

Decision Making

In this part of the experiment, each participant has to make two types of decisions. In the following, we will refer to **the two decisions** as “**Unconditional contribution**” and “**Contribution table**”.

“Unconditional contribution”

Regarding the unconditional contribution, you are required to decide how many of your 20 Tokens you want to invest in the project.

“Contribution table”

Your second decision concerns the contribution table. In the “contribution table”, you have to state for each of the possible mean contributions of your group members (rounded to whole numbers) how many Tokens you would contribute to the project.

For example, you have to state how much you would contribute to the project if the others in your group had a mean contribution of 0 Tokens, 1 Token, 2 Tokens etc.

Payoff

A member of each group will be **randomly** chosen. For this randomly chosen participant, her or his decision from the “**contribution table**” will be relevant for her or his payoff. For the other three participants, their respective “**unconditional contribution**” will be payoff-relevant for them.

Part 2

In this part, you will again be required to make a decision as described above. You will again have 20 Tokens and you have to think about how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to the joint project.

The following experiment will be played over **10 rounds**. **Group allocation** corresponds to Part 1 of the experiment and **remains unchanged over all rounds of the game**. **All rounds are payoff-relevant**.

After the first round, we will ask you to estimate the mean investment of the other three team members in the previous round. If your estimate of the mean investment of your group was accurate, you will receive a payoff. This payoff will be as follows:

$$\text{Payoff} = 20 \text{ Tokens} - |\text{deviation} * 5|$$

In each round you will decide again how many Tokens you want to invest in the project. After each round you will receive information about your investment, the group result, the amount of your payoff from your private account and from the project, your estimate, and your total profit in the respective round. Additionally, you will receive information about the size of your donation.

Experimental Instructions (Exemplified on *Vote*)

(English translation, the original instructions were given in German. Part 1 and part 2 were distributed among subjects consecutively after the preceding part of the experiment was finished.)

Part 1

Welcome to our experiment! You can earn money by taking part in it. The exact amount of money you will earn is dependent on your own decision making and the decision making of other participants.

Please switch off your cell phones and refrain as of now from communicating with other participants.

In our experiment, we will be using the “Token” currency. When the experiment is over, the total of all payoff-relevant Token amounts will be converted into euro. The following exchange rate will be used:

1 Token = 5 euro cents

All decisions made in the experiment as well as the payoff amounts will remain anonymous. Any amounts shown have been rounded to one decimal place. Please feel free to use the calculator and rough paper provided.

In the following experiment, donations might be generated. In the case that donation payments are to be made, this will take place directly at the end of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, two voluntary participants will be randomly chosen to act as witnesses that the donation payments are carried out correctly. These two participants will each receive an additional 2 €. All the other participants are welcome to be present when the donation payments are being made.

The Decision Situation

You will be randomly assigned to a group of four members. Therefore, you will be playing **with three other players** in a group. Each of the players must decide about how to allocate **20 Tokens**. You can either transfer these 20 Tokens to your **private account** or invest all of them or part of them in a **joint project**. You can always only invest full amounts of between 0 and 20 Tokens.

Your Income from the Private Account

Each Token that you do not invest in the joint project will be automatically transferred to your private account. Nobody except yourself can receive money from your private account.

20 – Paying into the project

Your Income from the Joint Project

Before you make a decision on contributions to the project, decide together with your group members on the donation factor. Each group member votes either for a donation factor of 0% (no donation) or for a donation factor of 20%. The majority of the votes in a group is necessary to actually implement the donation factor in the experiment for their group (in the event of a tie, random draw decides).

The **group result** consists of the total of the Tokens contributed by all of the group members. The group result will be multiplied by 2 and (1 - the donation factor) and will be allocated evenly among all four group members.

$$\frac{(1 - \text{donation factor}) * 2 * \text{group result}}{4}$$

Donation

Depending on the voting outcome, either 0% (no donation) or 20 % of the doubled group result will be donated. Donations will be **proportionately** paid out to you and your group members' preferred charities.

$$\text{donation factor} * 2 * \text{group result}$$

Your Total Income

Your **total income** is composed of the **total** of the income from your **private account** and the income from the **joint project**.

Income from private account

20 – Paying into the project

+

Income from the joint project

$$\frac{(1 - \text{donation factor}) * 2 * \text{Group result}}{4}$$

If you have any questions about the experiment, please put your hand up. We will come to your desk to answer your questions.

Please respond to the following control questions now:

Decision Making

In this part of the experiment, each participant has to make two types of decisions. In the following, we will refer to **the two decisions** as “**Unconditional contribution**” and “**Contribution table**”.

“Unconditional contribution”

Regarding the unconditional contribution, you are required to decide how many of your 20 Tokens you want to invest in the project.

“Contribution table”

Your second decision concerns the contribution table. In the “contribution table”, you have to state for each of the possible mean contributions of your group members (rounded to whole numbers) how many Tokens you would contribute to the project.

For example, you have to state how much you would contribute to the project if the others in your group had a mean contribution of 0 Tokens, 1 Token, 2 Tokens etc.

Payoff

A member of each group will be **randomly** chosen. For this randomly chosen participant, her or his decision from the “**contribution table**” will be relevant for her or his payoff. For the other three participants, their respective “**unconditional contribution**” will be payoff-relevant for them.

Part 2

In this part, you will again be required to make a decision as described above. You will again have 20 Tokens and you have to think about how many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to the joint project.

The following experiment will be played over **10 rounds**. **Group allocation** corresponds to Part 1 of the experiment and **remains unchanged over all rounds of the game**. **All rounds are payoff-relevant**.

After the first round, we will ask you to estimate the mean investment of the other three team members in the previous round. If your estimate of the mean investment of your group was accurate, you will receive a payoff. This payoff will be as follows:

$$\text{Payoff} = 20 \text{ Tokens} - |\text{deviation} * 5|$$

In each round you will decide again how many Tokens you want to invest in the project. After each round you will receive information about your investment, the group result, the amount of your payoff from your private account and from the project, your estimate, and your total profit in the respective round. Additionally, you will receive information about the size of your donation.

Additional information on instructions:

Please note that we also asked for the expected donation share in the group after we had asked participants to vote. This was only shown on the ztree screen and is not included in the instructions shown above.

A2: Questionnaire

General characteristics

*Mandatory field

1. Please state your gender *

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

2. Please state your year of birth. * _____

3. Which university school or department are you currently studying with? *

- ☐ Faculty 1 – Mathematics, Computer Science and Natural Sciences
- ☐ Faculty 2 – Architecture
- ☐ Faculty 3 – Civil Engineering
- ☐ Faculty 4 – Mechanical Engineering
- ☐ Faculty 5 – Georesources and Materials Engineering
- ☐ Faculty 6 – Electrical Engineering and Information Technology
- ☐ Faculty 7 – Arts and Humanities
- ☐ Faculty 8 – School of Business and Economics
- ☐ Faculty 10 – Medicine
- ☐ I don't know/Not specified

3. What is your monthly net income? *

- ☐ 0-250€
- ☐ 251-500€
- ☐ 501-750€
- ☐ 751-1000€
- ☐ 1001-1250€
- ☐ 1251-1500€
- ☐ 1500 € and more

4. How often have you participated in a laboratory experiment? * _____

5. Do you know anyone who is participating in this experiment? *

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

6. Are any friends of yours participating in this experiment? *

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Reciprocity (Cornelissen et al., 2010, p. 20)

Please mark only one correct answer for each question.

P1: If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it.

<i>does not apply to me at all</i>					<i>applies to me perfectly</i>
0	1	2	3	4	5 6

P2: I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.

<i>does not apply to me at all</i>					<i>applies to me perfectly</i>
0	1	2	3	4	5 6

P3: I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.

<i>does not apply to me at all</i>					<i>applies to me perfectly</i>
0	1	2	3	4	5 6

N1: If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost.

<i>does not apply to me at all</i>					<i>applies to me perfectly</i>
0	1	2	3	4	5 6

N2: If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her.

<i>does not apply to me at all</i>					<i>applies to me perfectly</i>
0	1	2	3	4	5 6

N3: If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back.

<i>does not apply to me at all</i>					<i>applies to me perfectly</i>
0	1	2	3	4	5 6

Altruism (Rushton et al., 1981, p. 297)

Please mark only one correct answer for each question.

1. I have helped push a stranger's car that was broken down or out of gas.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

2. I have given directions to a stranger.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

3. I have made change for a stranger.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

4. I have given money to a charity.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

5. I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it).

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

6. I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

7. I have done volunteer work for a charity.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
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<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
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8. I have donated blood.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

9. I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (book, parcels, etc.)

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

10. I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

11. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (in the supermarket, at a copy machine, at a fast-food restaurant)

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

12. I have given a stranger a lift in my car.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

13. I have pointed out a clerk's error (in a bank, at the supermarket) in undercharging me for an item.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

14. I have let a neighbor whom I didn't know too well borrow an item of some value to me (e.g, a dish, tools, etc.).

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

15. I have bought 'charity' holiday cards deliberately because I knew it was a good cause.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

16. I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with an assignment when my knowledge was greater than his or hers.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

17. I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor's pets or children without being paid for it.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

18. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

19. I have offered my seat on a bus or a train to a stranger who was standing.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

20. I have helped an acquaintance to move households.

<i>never</i>	<i>once</i>	<i>more than once</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>very often</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

Please mark only one correct answer for each question.

1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
 - ☐ **most people can be trusted**
 - ☐ **can't be too careful**
 - ☐ **depends**
2. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?
 - ☐ **would take advantage**
 - ☐ **would try to be fair**
 - ☐ **depends**
3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
 - ☐ **try to be helpful**
 - ☐ **just look out for themselves**
 - ☐ **depends**

Trust (Gächter et al., 2004, p. 514; Glaeser et al., 2000, p. 819)

Please mark only one correct answer for each question.

1. How often do you leave your door unlocked?

<i>very often</i>	<i>often</i>	<i>sometimes</i>	<i>rarely</i>	<i>never</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

2. How often do you lend money to your friends?

<i>more than once a week</i>	<i>about once a week</i>	<i>about once a month</i>	<i>once a year or less</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>

3. How often do you lend personal possessions to your friends (e.g., CD's, clothes, bicycle, etc.?)

<i>more than once a week</i>	<i>about once a week</i>	<i>about once a month</i>	<i>once a year or less</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>

Risk (Masclet et al., 2009, p. 473)

In the following, you will see ten lottery scenarios, each of them with two alternatives. For each lottery, please check the alternative (I or II) that you would choose. You are not allowed to switch more than once from the left column to the right column, or vice versa.

For example, you need to decide in the first lottery whether to choose Alternative I (you'll have a 10% chance of winning 40 euro and a 90% chance of winning 32 euro) or Alternative II (you'll have a 10% chance of winning 77 euro and a 90% chance of winning 2 euro).

	Option A				Option B			
	Prob. (p)	Payoff	Prob. (1-p)	Payoff	Prob. (p)	Payoff	Prob. (1-p)	Payoff
1	10%	40€	90%	32€	10%	77€	90%	2€
2	20%	40€	80%	32€	20%	77€	80%	2€
3	30%	40€	70%	32€	30%	77€	70%	2€
4	40%	40€	60%	32€	40%	77€	60%	2€
5	50%	40€	50%	32€	50%	77€	50%	2€
6	60%	40€	40%	32€	60%	77€	40%	2€
7	70%	40€	30%	32€	70%	77€	30%	2€
8	80%	40€	20%	32€	80%	77€	20%	2€
9	90%	40€	10%	32€	90%	77€	10%	2€
10	100%	40€	0%	32€	100%	77€	0%	2€

Feedback

*Mandatory field

1. How did you make your decision about your contribution to the project (in part 2)? Please describe your approach.

2. Did the donation influence your decision about how much to contribute? *

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Please give your reasons.

3. What influenced the voluntary donation which you could make from your total payoff at the end of the experiment?

4. Do you have any further comments to make about the experiment?

5. At the end of the experiment, we will really make the payments to the charitable organizations. Were you confident during the experiment that we would actually do so? *

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

6. How did you make your decision about the vote on the donation share at the beginning of the experiment? Please describe your approach.

7. Were you satisfied with the donation share that was implemented in your group?*

*very
dissatisfied*

1

2

3

4

*very
satisfied*

5

Please give your reasons.

A3: Overview of variables

Variable	Description
Main experiment	
Individual Contribution	Amount equals the amount of contribution in the main experiment in tokens
Average contribution	Amount equals the amount of average contributions (from 10 rounds) in the main experiment in tokens
Baseline Donation	Amount equals 1 if an internally financed donation is going to a non-profit organization, otherwise 0
Vote	Amount equals 1 if group members could vote in favor of implementing no donation or a donation share of 20 % in the public good game, when implementations was set by majority, otherwise 0.
Vote20	Amount equals 1 if a donation share of 20 % was implemented, otherwise 0.
Vote0	Amount equals 1 if no donation was implemented, otherwise 0.
Vote20 Majority	Amount equals 1 if a donation share of 20 % was implemented by majority vote, otherwise 0.
Vote20 Tie	Amount equals 1 if a donation share of 20 % was implemented after a tie occurred, otherwise 0.
Vote0 Majority	Amount equals 1 if no donation was implemented by majority vote, otherwise 0.
Vote0 Tie	Amount equals 1 if no donation was implemented after a tie occurred, otherwise 0.
Vote Share	Amount equals 1 if group members could vote in favor of implementing a donation share of between 0 % and 20 %, when the average was implemented, otherwise 0.
Vote Share High	Amount equals 1 if a high donation share was implemented, otherwise 0. The donation share in a group is high if it is higher than the median donation share of all groups.
Vote Share Low	Amount equals 1 if a low donation share was implemented, otherwise 0. The donation share in a group is low if it is smaller than or equal to the median donation share of all groups.
Conditional Cooperator	Spearman rank correlations for each subject between the own contribution and the average given contributions of others; range value from -1 to 1; absolute negative correlation: -1; high correlation: 1; no correlation: 0; insignificant correlations are recoded to zero (Grund et al., 2015)
One-shot contribution	Amount equals the amount of contribution in the one-shot public good game in tokens
Belief	Amount equals the belief about the average amount of the group members' contributions in first round in tokens
Average group members' contributions previous round	Amount equals the average amount of group members' contributions in preceding round in tokens

Round	Number equals the number of rounds
General characteristics	
Age	Number equals the age of the subjects in years
Gender	Number equals 1 if the subject is male, otherwise 0
Faculty	Amount equals 1 if subject is studying with the School of Business and Economics, otherwise 0
Participation	Amount equals the number of experiments previously participated in
Income	Monthly income of subjects coded in the following way: 1: <250 €; 2: 251 € - 500 €; 3: 501 €- 750€; 4: 751 € -1000 €; 5: 1001 € - 1250 €; 6: 1251 € -1500 €; 7: >=1500 €; 8: not specified
Acquaintance	Amount equals 1 if subject is acquainted with another subject participating, otherwise 0
Friend	Amount equals 1 if subjects are friends with another subject participating, otherwise 0
Personality traits	
Reciprocity	The reciprocity variable is composed of six items, “If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it”, “I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.”, “I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.”, “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost.”, “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her.”, “If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back.”. We use a one-to seven-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”). By adding up the underlying variables, the overall reciprocity score ranges from 0 to 36. A higher score shows stronger reciprocity. (Cornelissen et al. 2010b: 20)
PosReciprocity	The positive reciprocity variable is composed of three statements, “If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it.”, “I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before.”, “I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.” Respondents choose a one-to seven-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”). By adding up the underlying variables, overall score for positive reciprocity ranges from 0 to 18. A higher score shows a stronger positive reciprocity. (Cornelissen et al. 2010b: 20)
NegReciprocity	The negative reciprocity variable is composed of three statements, “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost.”, “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/her.”, “If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back.” Respondents choose a one-to seven-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 6 (“strongly agree”). By adding up the underlying variables, the overall score for negative reciprocity ranges from 0 to 18. A higher score shows a stronger negative reciprocity. (Cornelissen et al. 2010b: 20)

Altruism	The altruism variable is composed of twenty statements, “I have helped push a stranger's car that was broken down or out of gas.”, “I have given directions to a stranger.”, “I have made change for a stranger”, “I have given money to a charity.”, “I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it).”, “I have donated goods or clothes to a charity.”, “I have done volunteer work for a charity.”, “I have donated blood.”, “I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (book, parcels, etc.).”, “I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger.”, “I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (in the supermarket, at a copy machine, at a fast-food restaurant).”, “I have given a stranger a lift in my car.”, “I have pointed out a clerk’s error (in a bank, at the supermarket) in undercharging me for an item.”, “I have let a neighbor whom I didn’t know too well borrow an item of some value to me (e.g., a dish, tools, etc.).”, “I have bought ‘charity’ holiday cards deliberately because I knew it was a good cause.”, “I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with an assignment when my knowledge was greater than his or hers.”, “I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor’s pets or children without being paid for it.”, “I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.”, “I have offered my seat on a bus or a train to a stranger who was standing.”, “I have helped an acquaintance to move households.”. Respondents are instructed to rate the frequency with which they have engaged in the altruistic behavior using the categories 1: 'Never', 2: 'Once', 3: 'More Than Once', 4: 'Often' and 5: 'Very Often'. By adding up the underlying variables the overall score of altruism ranges from 20 to 100. A higher score shows a stronger altruistic behavior. (Rushton et al. 1981: 293).
Reciprocal Altruist	The reciprocal altruism variable consists of an altruism variable and the positive reciprocity variable. Both variables were split at the median level to classify participants as altruists and positive reciprocators. Then, both variables were multiplied by each other to create the reciprocal altruist dummy variable. Participants who are classified as reciprocal altruists are above the median regarding the altruistic as well as the reciprocity variable. Dummy equals 1 if participants are classified as reciprocal altruist, otherwise 0.
GSS	The variable for trust behavior consists of questions from the General Social Survey (GSS). It is composed of the following items: “Would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” ranging from 1 (“most people can be trusted”), 2 (“can’t be too careful”) and 1.5 (“depends”), “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?” ranging from 1 (“Would take advantage”), 2 (“Would try to be fair”), and 1.5 (“depends”), “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” ranging from 1 (“try to be helpful”), 2 (“just look out for themselves”) and 1.5 (“depends”). The sum of underlying variables is calculated by the normalized average of all three items ranging from 0 to 1. A higher score shows stronger trust. (Gächter et al. 2004: 514).
Trust	The variable for trustful behavior is composed of the following three statements: “How often do you leave your door unlocked?” ranging from 1 (“very often”), 2 (“often”), 3 (“sometimes”), 4 (“rarely”) and 5 (“never”), “How often do you lend money to your friends?”, “How often do you lend personal possessions to your friends (e.g., CDs, clothes, bicycle, etc.?)” ranging from 1 (“more than once a week”), 2 (“once a week”), 3 (“once a month”), 4 (“once a year or less”). The sum of underlying variables is calculated by the normalized average of all three items ranging from 0 to 1. A higher score shows stronger trustful behavior. (Glaeser et al. 2000: 842 f.)

Risk

The variable for risk preferences is composed of ten lottery-choices: 1. Choice between Option A with payoff of 10%, 40€ or 90%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 10%, 77€ or 90%, 2€, 2. Choice between Option A with payoff of 20%, 40€ or 80%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 20%, 77€ or 80%, 2€, 3. Choice between Option A with payoff of 30%, 40€ or 70%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 30%, 77€ or 70%, 2€, 4. Choice between Option A with payoff of 40%, 40€ or 60%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 40%, 77€ or 60%, 2€, 5. Choice between Option A with payoff of 50%, 40€ or 50%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 50%, 77€ or 50%, 2€, 6. Choice between Option A with payoff of 60%, 40€ or 40%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 60%, 77€ or 40%, 2€, 7. Choice between Option A with payoff of 70%, 40€ or 30%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 70%, 77€ or 30%, 2€, 8. Choice between Option A with payoff of 80%, 40€ or 20%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 80%, 77€ or 20%, 2€, 9. Choice between Option A with payoff of 90%, 40€ or 10%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 90%, 77€ or 10%, 2€, 10. Choice between Option A with payoff of 100%, 40€ or 0%, 32 € or Option B with payoff of 100%, 77€ or 0%, 2€, Subjects were asked to choose between lotteries in the order stated and subjects were only able to switch their preference once from Option A to Option B or vice versa. Option A represents the more risk-averse option. The variable is composed of the number of chosen options, as ranging from 0 to 10. A higher score shows a stronger risk aversion. (Masclet et al. 2009: 473)

A4: Regression Analysis

Vote: Tobit regression on individual contribution rounds 1-5 showing controls

VARIABLES	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Baseline Dummy	0.537 (1.965)	0.336 (2.039)	0.533 (1.938)	-1.396 (1.440)
Vote0 Dummy	-0.542 (2.374)	-0.316 (2.464)	0.222 (2.287)	-0.153 (1.855)
Vote20 Dummy	1.503 (1.949)	1.951 (2.040)	2.229 (1.929)	0.853 (1.453)
Average group members' contributions (previous round)		0.0739** (0.0287)	0.0713*** (0.0256)	0.0704*** (0.0172)
Conditional Cooperator			5.137*** (1.102)	3.108*** (0.741)
Belief				0.656*** (0.0736)
Age				-0.0926 (0.0760)
Gender (1 = male)				2.446*** (0.901)
Faculty				0.566 (0.950)
Participation				-0.209*** (0.0534)
Income				0.405 (0.347)
Friend (1 = yes)				-0.770 (1.787)
Acquaintance (1 = yes)				1.632 (1.776)
PosReciprocity				0.0245 (0.182)
NegReciprocity				-0.277*** (0.0902)
Altruism				-0.0124 (0.0484)
GSS (1 = trustworthy)				-3.127* (1.814)
Trust (1 = distrustful)				2.335 (2.402)
Risk				0.246 (0.258)
Round	-0.411** (0.170)	-0.394* (0.207)	-0.399* (0.206)	-0.334 (0.208)
Constant	10.34*** (1.480)	7.762*** (1.979)	4.179* (2.207)	-2.539 (5.332)
Observations	1,120	896	896	788
R-squared	0.0019	0.0044	0.0166	0.0632

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Included treatments: *Baseline*, *Baseline Donation*, *Vote*

Robust and clustered standard errors of 56 groups in parentheses

Models II-IV: First-round observations are omitted, as the averages of the group members' contributions in the previous round are not available

Model IV: Some observations are missing due to participants who did not state their monthly income

Vote: Tobit regression on individual contribution rounds 6-10 showing controls

VARIABLES	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Baseline Dummy	1.556 (2.292)	1.590 (2.160)	1.718 (2.093)	0.0777 (1.641)
Vote0 Dummy	0.946 (2.776)	0.891 (2.607)	1.350 (2.504)	0.509 (2.180)
Vote20 Dummy	5.132** (2.483)	5.133** (2.369)	5.384** (2.320)	3.611* (1.857)
Average group members' contributions (previous round)		0.0810*** (0.0299)	0.0800*** (0.0291)	0.0658** (0.0255)
Conditional Cooperator			4.209*** (1.233)	2.793** (1.100)
Belief				0.591*** (0.0889)
Age				-0.122 (0.0779)
Gender (1 = male)				2.570** (1.004)
Faculty				0.573 (1.128)
Participation				-0.252*** (0.0566)
Income				0.658* (0.389)
Friend (1 = yes)				-1.474 (1.926)
Acquaintance (1 = yes)				2.324 (1.777)
PosReciprocity				0.0336 (0.186)
NegReciprocity				-0.393*** (0.107)
Altruism				-0.00736 (0.0492)
GSS (1 = trustworthy)				-4.505** (1.964)
Trust (1= distrustful)				2.683 (2.697)
Risk				0.316 (0.260)
Round	-1.849*** (0.172)	-1.810*** (0.179)	-1.808*** (0.180)	-1.814*** (0.190)
Constant	17.78*** (2.194)	15.08*** (2.177)	12.07*** (2.314)	10.29 (6.916)
Observations	1,120	1,120	1,120	985
R-squared	0.0157	0.0185	0.0243	0.0671

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Included treatments: *Baseline, Baseline Donation, Vote*

Robust and clustered standard errors of 56 groups in parentheses

Models II-IV: First-round observations are omitted, as the averages of the group members' contributions in the previous round are not available

Model IV: Some observations are missing due to participants who did not state their monthly income

Vote Share: Tobit regression on individual contribution rounds 1-5 showing controls

VARIABLES	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Baseline Dummy	0.539 (1.953)	0.383 (2.083)	0.572 (1.980)	-1.374 (1.411)
Vote Share Low Dummy	-1.325 (2.301)	-1.238 (2.514)	-1.353 (2.405)	-0.429 (1.645)
Vote Share High Dummy	1.347 (1.943)	1.341 (2.095)	1.565 (2.041)	0.464 (1.504)
Average group members' contributions (previous round)		0.0376 (0.0262)	0.0391* (0.0231)	0.0390** (0.0169)
Conditional Cooperator			5.087*** (1.236)	2.548*** (0.832)
Belief				0.575*** 0.136*
Age				(0.0772) 1.598**
Gender (1 = male)				(0.770) -1.778*
Faculty				(0.992) -0.144**
Participation				(0.0586) -0.0388
Income				(0.275) 0.681
Friend (1 = yes)				(2.040) -0.115
Acquaintance (1 = yes)				(1.906) -0.190
PosReciprocity				(0.187) -0.0826
NegReciprocity				(0.114) -0.0833**
Altruism				(0.0378) -7.531***
GSS (1 = trustworthy)				(1.576) -2.916
Trust (1= distrustful)				(2.457) 0.0664
Risk				(0.208)
Round	-0.683*** (0.176)	-0.697*** (0.216)	-0.701*** (0.217)	-0.628*** (0.216)
Constant	11.19*** (1.467)	10.04*** (1.933)	6.346*** (2.254)	12.90*** (4.471)
Observations	1,080	864	864	756
R-squared	0.0042	0.0039	0.0153	0.0626

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Included treatments: *Baseline*, *Baseline Donation*, *Vote Share*

Robust and clustered standard errors of 54 groups in parentheses

Models II-IV: First-round observations are omitted, as the averages of the group members' contributions in the previous round are not available

Model IV: Some observations are missing due to participants who did not state their monthly income

Vote Share: Tobit regression on individual contribution rounds 6-10 showing controls

VARIABLES	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV
Baseline Dummy	1.512 (2.221)	1.535 (2.124)	1.693 (2.049)	0.416 (1.682)
Vote Share Low Dummy	2.500 (2.445)	2.432 (2.365)	2.307 (2.238)	2.215 (1.999)
Vote Share High Dummy	4.300** (2.097)	4.313** (2.014)	4.524** (1.983)	2.770 (1.757)
Average group members' contributions (previous round)		0.0585** (0.0258)	0.0585** (0.0242)	0.0361* (0.0203)
Conditional Cooperator			5.095*** (1.178)	4.058*** (1.166)
Belief				0.437*** (0.0842)
Age				0.0597 (0.116)
Gender (1 = male)				0.956 (1.034)
Faculty				-1.138 (1.198)
Participation				-0.300*** (0.0713)
Income				0.360 (0.361)
Friend (1 = yes)				-1.697 (2.184)
Acquaintance (1 = yes)				0.826 (2.054)
PosReciprocity				-0.158 (0.253)
NegReciprocity				-0.174 (0.119)
Altruism				-0.0905* (0.0476)
GSS (1 = trustworthy)				-6.041*** (2.053)
Trust (1= distrustful)				-1.541 (2.753)
Risk				-0.0895 (0.259)
Round	-1.442*** (0.188)	-1.394*** (0.185)	-1.393*** (0.185)	-1.337*** (0.191)
Constant	14.85*** (2.276)	12.73*** (2.125)	9.069*** (2.227)	18.42*** (5.858)
Observations	1,080	1,080	1,080	945
R-squared	0.0119	0.0135	0.0227	0.0502

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Included treatments: *Baseline*, *Baseline Donation*, *Vote Share*

Robust and clustered standard errors of 54 groups in parentheses

Models II-IV: First-round observations are omitted, as the averages of the group members' contributions in the previous round are not available

Model IV: Some observations are missing due to participants who did not state their monthly income

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