Factual Knowledge Can Reduce Attitude Polarization: Supplementary Information

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1. Supplementary Note 1: Regression tables for all models with control variables

Supplementary Table 1A. The main effect (1) and full control (2) models for the effect of module information content (political versus neutral) on time (log-transformed) spent in the modules, using OLS, and reporting raw betas. All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) PK GUN W1		(2) PK GUN W1	
Pol vs Neutral	b= .0127	p=.67	b= .0127	p=.672
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.0298)	(-.05, .07)	(.0301)	(-.05, .07)
Controls	No		Yes	
Constant	b= 4.142	p<.001	b= 4.065	p<.001
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.073)	(4, 4.3)	(0.339)	(3.4, 4.7)
Observations	916		916	
R-squared	0		0.100	

Supplementary Table 1B. The main effect (1) and full control (2) models for the effect of module information content (politically concordant versus discordant) on time (log-transformed) spent in the modules, using OLS, and reporting raw betas. All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) PK GUN W1		(2) PK GUN W1	
Concord vs Discord	b= .019	p=.541	b= .019	p= .544
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(0.0304)	(-.04, .08)	(0.0307)	(-.04, .08)
Constrols	No		Yes	
Constant	b= 4.155	p<001	b= 4.171	p<001
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.0671)	(4.02, 4.3)	(.408)	(3.4, 4.97)
Observations	844		844	
R-squared	0.000		0.102	

Supplementary Table 1C. The main effect (1) and full control (2) models for the effect of module information content (political versus neutral) on ratings of perceived helpfulness of the modules, using OLS, and reporting raw betas. All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) PK GUN W1		(2) PK GUN W1	
Pol vs Neutral	b= -.074	p= .004	b= -.074	p= .004
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.025)	(-.12, -.02)	(.0254)	(-.12, -.02)
Controls	No		Yes	
Constant	b= 4.265	p<.001	b= 4.482	p<.001
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.031)	(4.2, 4.33)	(.253)	(4.0, 5.0)
Observations	916		916	
R-squared	0.003		0.050	

Supplementary Table 1D. The main effect (1) and full control (2) models for the effect of module information content (politically concordant versus discordant) on ratings of perceived helpfulness of the modules, using OLS, and reporting raw betas. All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) PK GUN W1		(2) PK GUN W1	
Concord vs Discord	b= -.098	p= .001	b= -.098	p= .001
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.029)	(-.15, -.04)	(.029)	(-.15, -.04)
Controls	No		Yes	
Constant	b= 4.430	p<.001	b= 4.657	p<.001
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.052)	(4.33, 4.53)	(.250)	(4.17, 5.15)
Observations	844		844	
R-squared	0.005		0.040	

Supplementary Table 1E. The main effect (1, 3) and full control (2, 4) models for the effect of condition on gun control knowledge, using OLS, for Wave 1 (1, 2) and Wave 2 (3, 4). All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) PK GUN W1	(2) PK GUN W1	(3) PK GUN W2	(4) PK GUN W2
Exp Condition	b= .177 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.013) (.15, .20)	b= .175 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.012) (.15, .20)	b= .058 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.013) (.03, .08)	b= .059 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.012) (.04, .08)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	b= .461 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.009) (.44, .48)	b= .529 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.06) (.41, .65)	b= .410 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.009) (.39, .43)	b= .490 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.059) (.38, .61)
Observations	1,011	1,010	881	880
R-squared	0.162	0.253	0.023	0.149

Supplementary Table 1F. The main effect (1, 3) and full control (2, 4) models for the effect of condition on change in Gun control position, using OLS, for Wave 1 (1, 2) and Wave 2 (3, 4). All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) GC change W1	(2) GC change W1	(3) GC change W2	(4) GC change W2
Exp Condition	b= .139 p= .086 SE 95%CI (.081) (-.02, .3)	b= .152 p= .058 SE 95%CI (.08) (-.01, .31)	b= .245 p= .008 SE 95%CI (.092) (.06, .43)	b= .245 p= .008 SE 95%CI (.092) (.06, .43)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Constant	b= .354 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.056) (.24, .46)	b= 1.936 p< .001 ES 95%CI (.425) (1.1, 2.77)	b= .295 p< .001 SE 95%CI (.064) (.17, .42)	b= 1.118 p= .016 SE 95%CI (.464) (.21, 2.03)
Observations	924	924	808	808
R-squared	0.003	0.042	0.009	0.042

Supplementary Table 1G. The main effect (1, 3) and full control (2, 4) models for the effect of condition on which side of the gun debate participants think is correct, using ordinal logistic regression, for Wave 1 (1, 2) and Wave 2 (3, 4). All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) WhoMoreRight W1	(2) WhoMoreRight W1	(3) WhoMoreRight W2	(4) WhoMoreRight W2
Exp Condition	b= .437 p< .001 SE 95%CI (0.117) (.21, .67)	b= .448 p< .001 SE 95%CI (0.119) (.22, .68)	b= .226 p= .072 SE 95%CI (0.125) (-.02, .47)	b= .197 p= .120 SE 95%CI (0.127) (-.05, .45)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	918	918	808	808

Supplementary Table 1H. The main effect (1, 3) and full control (2, 4) models for the effect of condition on what the current gun control evidence suggests for policy, using ordinal logistic regression, for Wave 1 (1, 2) and Wave 2 (3, 4). All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) GunEvidence W1	(2) GunEvidence W1	(3) GunEvidence W2	(4) GunEvidence W2
Exp Condition	b= .346 p= .004 SE 95%CI (0.119) (.11, .58)	b= .363 p= .003 SE 95%CI (0.120) (.13, .6)	b= .157 p= .220 SE 95%CI (0.128) (-.09, .41)	b= .170 p= .194 SE 95%CI (0.131) (-.09, .43)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	921	921	808	808

Supplementary Table 1I. The main effect (1, 3) and full control (2, 4) models for the effect of condition on the social distance aggregate, using OLS, for Wave 1 (1, 2) and Wave 2 (3, 4). All models report two-sided tests. Controls include: age, gender, education dummies, race-ethnicity dummies, political party affiliation dummies, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed.

VARIABLES	(1) SocDist W1		(2) SocDist W1		(3) SocDist W2		(4) SocDist W2	
Exp Condition	b= -.021	p= .985	b= .130	p= .910	b= -.599	p= .651	b= -.645	p= .621
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(1.152)	(-2.3, 2.2)	(1.146)	(-2.1, 2.4)	(1.321)	(-3.2, 1.9)	(1.305)	(-3.2, 1.9)
Controls	No		Yes		No		Yes	
Constant	b= -.278	p= .728	b= -1.525	p= .779	b= 2.921	p= .001	b= 12.61	p= .038
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.798)	(-1.84, 1.29)	(5.432)	(-12.18, 9.13)	(.91)	(1.13, 4.7)	(6.062)	(.71, 24.5)
Observations	1,008		1,008		881		880	
R-squared	0.000		0.032		0.000		0.051	

2. Supplementary Note 2: Attrition and instrumental variable models

Here, we address overall attrition in the study. Among the 1,041 individuals who proceeded to the training, 108 (10.4%) dropped out of the study. Of these 108, we were able to preserve the outcomes of 72.2%, and found no evidence of differential attrition overall (p=.979), with 56 individuals dropping out of the control group and 52 dropping out of the treatment group. Of the 30 individuals (2.9% of the overall sample) who dropped out and for whom we were *not* able to preserve their outcomes, 16 individuals dropped out of the control group, and 14 dropped out of the treatment group (b = .056 [df = 1,039], p = .879, 95% *CI* [-.67, .78], *Chi2* = .023). Given these numbers are at such low rates and are not in the normal direction of concern (i.e., higher attrition in the treatment arm), there is little reason to think they could be explaining any of the reported effects.

Moving to the instrumental variables analyses, here, we use Stata's "ivreg2" function. We created a variable for our instrument that represents experiencing the *full* experimental treatment, setting all participants who dropped out of the experimental condition as "0," as well as all of those randomized to control condition as they were never in the experimental condition. This gives us: n=448 who experienced the *full* treatment, and n=563 who did not (n=38 of which dropped out of the experimental condition).

2A. Wave 1

Learning outcomes: There is a clear effect of experiencing the full experimental treatment on knowledge, b = .192 (df = 1,009), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.17, .22), indicating that those who experienced the full experimental treatment increased their gun-control knowledge relative to those who did not. This relationship holds when accounting for all control variables (age, gender, race, education, political party, political ideology and amount of political news consumed), b = .19 (df = 992), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.17, .22).

Attitudinal outcomes: Looking at the effect of experiencing the full experimental treatment on the attitude change score, we see that those who experienced the full experimental treatment were more likely to move in the opposing direction compared to those who did not experience the full experimental treatment, b = .151 (df = 922), p = .086, 95% *CI* (-.02, .32), and this relationship only grew stronger when adding controls into the model, b = .166 (df = 906), p = .056, 95% *CI* (-.01, .34).

Looking at perceptions of who is more right in the gun control debate, while accounting for those who dropped out of treatment, we again see those experiencing the full experimental treatment are more likely to move in the opposing direction compared to those who did not experience the full treatment, b = .363 (df = 916), p = .005, 95% *CI* (.11, .62), and this relationship only grew stronger when adding controls into the model, b = .372 (df = 900), p = .004, 95% *CI* (.12, .62).

Lastly, for the outcome looking at what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy, while accounting for those who dropped out of treatment, we again see those experiencing the full experimental treatment were more likely to move in the opposing direction compared to those who did not finish the full treatment, b = .259 (df = 919), p = .034, 95% *CI* (.02, .5), and this relationship only grew stronger when adding controls into the model, b = .261 (df = 903), p = .028, 95% *CI* (.03, .49).

Affective outcomes: Turning next to an exploratory analysis of the effects of our treatment on affective polarization, we again use the overall aggregate of social distance measures as our dependent variable. As in the main analysis, there is no statistically significant effect of

experiencing the full treatment on this outcome, without controls b = -.023 (df = 1006), p = .985, 95% *CI* (-2.46, 2.41), or with controls, b = .189 (df = 990), p = .877, 95% *CI* (-2.22, 2.59).

2B. Wave 2

Learning outcomes: One month later, there is still a clear effect of the experimental treatment on knowledge, b = .063 (df = 879), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.04, .09), indicating those who increased their gun-control knowledge held on to a significant percentage of it, compared to those in the control. This relationship holds when accounting for all control variables, b = .064 (df = 862), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.04, .09).

Attitudinal outcomes: Looking at the attitude change score, we see those who experienced the full experimental treatment a month prior are even more likely to move in the opposing direction compared to those who did not experience the full experimental treatment, b = .268 (df = 806), p = .008, 95% *CI* (.07, .47), and this relationship was very similar when adding controls into the model, b = .268 (df = 790), p = .007, 95% *CI* (.07, .47).

Looking at perceptions of who is more right in the gun control debate, while accounting for those who dropped out of treatment, experiencing the full experimental treatment a month prior still produced visible (though not statistically significant) movement in the opposing direction compared to those who did not experience the full treatment, b = .2 (df = 806), p = .154, 95% *CI* (-.08, .48). Adding controls to this model weakened the relationship slightly, b = .173 (df = 790), p = .21, 95% *CI* (-.1, .44).

Lastly, for the outcome looking at what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy, while accounting for those who dropped out of treatment, at a full month later this relationship was almost entirely eliminated, though still in the predicted direction with no evidence of a backlash, b = .045 (df = 806), p = .736, 95% *CI* (-.22, .31) without controls; b = .05 (df = 790), p = .706, 95% *CI* (-.21, .31) with controls.

Affective outcomes: One month later, we still see no evidence of an effect of experiencing the treatment on affective polarization, without controls b = -.652 (df = 879), p = .650, 95% *CI* (-3.47, 2.16), or with controls, b = -.568 (df = 862), p = .685, 95% *CI* (-3.32, 2.18).

3. Supplementary Note 3: Construction of the three-level initial gun control attitude measure

The initial gun-control attitude categories were created using the initial pre-treatment gun control policy question: *Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following policy: Increasing gun control*? - *Strongly oppose, Oppose, Somewhat oppose, Neither oppose nor support, Somewhat support, Support, Strongly Support.*

Those who selected: *Strongly oppose, Oppose,* or *Somewhat oppose,* were labeled "anti-gun control." Those who selected: *Somewhat support, Support,* or *Strongly Support,* were labeled "pro-gun control." And those who selected: *Neither oppose nor support,* were labeled "moderate gun control."

This coding schema produced the following numbers: Anti-gun control: n = 336, Pro-gun control: n = 590, Moderate gun control: n = 85. See the diagram below to illustrate.



Supplementary Figure 3A. Recoding of initial gun control attitude into three categories.

4. Supplementary Note 4: Interaction models for types of partisan facts

Supplementary Table 4A. The table presents the interaction between gun control knowledge category and treatment condition, divided by participants' initial gun control position: anti-gun control (Model 1) and pro-gun control (Model 2). Note this analysis required reshaping the data to long form, and thus the number of observations does not match that reported in the article.

Model 1 shows individuals initially identifying as anti-gun control learned more pro-gun control facts compared to anti-gun control facts. Model 2 shows that individuals initially identifying as pro-gun control learned more anti-gun control facts compared to pro-gun control facts. All models report two-sided tests.

VARIABLES	Model 1		Model 2	
Knowledge Category	b= .108 SE (.03)	p= .004 95%CI (.04, .18)	b= .480 SE (.021)	p< .001 95%CI (.44, .52)
Condition	b= .159 SE (.031)	p< .001 95%CI (.1, .22)	b= .214 SE (.022)	p< .001 95%CI (.17, .26)
Knowledge Category x Condition	b= .08 SE (.043)	p= .095 95%CI (-.01, .17)	b= -.177 SE (.031)	p< .001 95%CI (-.24, -.12)
Constant	b= .384 SE (.021)	p< .001 95%CI (.34, .43)	b= .219 SE (.015)	p< .001 95%CI (.19, .24)
Observations	2,016		3,540	
R-squared	0.063		0.179	

5. Supplementary Note 5: Subgroup analyses for initial gun-control attitude, education, and political ideology

Looking for heterogeneous treatment effects, three categories appear relevant: initial gun control attitude, level of education, and political party identification. Looking at each subgroup in turn, we run a model interacting the subgroup variable and the treatment for each one of the key outcome variables, with and without controls. We may be underpowered to identify some interactions; therefore, we also show results divided by the subgroup categories for full transparency.

5A. Initial gun control attitude

First looking at initial gun control position (pro vs. anti-gun control) interacted with treatment and predicting *change* in gun control position, we see no evidence of an interaction, β = .012 (*df* = 920), *p* = .821, 95% *CI* (-.09, .11) and disaggregating the initial gun control position shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those who initially supported gun control (*n* = 588) and running a standard OLS regression shows a positive non-significant effect β = .051 (*df* = 586), *p* = .219, 95% *CI* (-.08, .33) and when adding controls, β = .058 (*df* = 569), *p* = .157, *b* = .146, 95% CI (-.06, .35). Subsetting the sample on those who initially were anti-gun control (*n* = 336), we see a positive non-significant effect β = .072 (*df* = 334), *p* = .191, *b* = .165, 95% *CI* (-.08, .41), which is similar with the addition of controls, β = .055 (*df* = 319), *p* = .292, *b* = .128, 95% *CI* (-.11, .37).

Changing the dependent variable to "who is more right in the gun control debate," we again see no evidence of an interaction, *b* = -.2 (*df* = 914), *p* = .403, 95% *CI* (-.68, .27), and disaggregating initial gun control position again shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those who initially supported gun control and running an ordinal logistic regression we see a positive significant effect, *b* = .531 (*df* = 582), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (.24, .82), which is similar when adding controls, *b* = .59 (*df* = 569), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (.29, .89). Subsetting the sample on those who initially were anti-gun control we see a positive non-significant effect *b* = .294 (*df* = 332), *p* = .128, 95% *CI* (-.08, .67), which is similar when adding controls, *b* = .308 (*df* = 320), *p* = .114, 95% *CI* (-.07, .69).

Changing the dependent variable to "what the current evidence on gun control supports for policy," we again see no evidence of an interaction, *b* = -.257 (*df* = 917), *p* = .295, 95% *CI* (-.74, .22), and disaggregating initial gun control position again shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those who initially supported gun control and running an ordinal logistic regression, we see a positive significant effect, *b* = .458 (*df* = 585), *p* = .002, 95% *CI* (.16, .75), which is similar when adding controls, *b* = .552 (*df* = 572), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (.25, .86). Subsetting the sample on those who initially were anti-gun control we see a positive non-significant effect *b* = .202 (*df* = 332), *p* = .301, 95% *CI* (-.18, .59), which is similar when adding controls, *b* = .11 (*df* = 320), *p* = .581, 95% *CI* (-.28, .5).

Lastly, changing the dependent variable to social distance aggregate, we see some evidence of an interaction, *b* = -4.766 (*df* = 920), *p* = .059, 95% *CI* (-9.71, .18). Subsetting the sample on those who initially supported gun control and running a standard OLS regression, we see a small non-significant positive effect β = .046 (*df* = 587), *p* = .27, *b* = 1.687, 95% *CI* (-1.31, 4.69), which is similar when adding controls, β = .055 (*df* = 573), *p* = .174, *b* = 2.05, 95% *CI* (-.91, 4.99). Subsetting the sample on those who initially were anti-gun control, we see a small non-significant negative effect β = -.085 (*df* = 333), *p* = .122, *b* = -3.079, 95% *CI* (-6.99, .83), which is similar when adding controls, β = -.097 (*df* = 319), *p* = .074, *b* = -3.518, 95% *CI* (-7.38, .35).

5B. Education level

Looking next at education level, we create a dichotomous variable indicating college education or higher (n = 455) vs. less than college education (n = 556). We then interact this variable with the treatment predicting *change* in gun control position, and see no evidence of an interaction, β = .024 (df = 920), p = .665, b = .07, 95% *CI* (-.25, .39). Disaggregating education level shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those with a college degree and running a standard OLS regression shows a positive trending though non-significant effect, β = .084 (df = 422), p = .085, b = .177, 95% *CI* (-.03, .38), which is similar when adding controls (obviously leaving out education), β = .097 (df = 411), p = .048, b = .206, 95% *CI* (.01, .41). Subsetting the sample on those with no college degree, we see a smaller positive non-significant effect, β = .04 (df = 498), p = .376, b = .107, 95% *CI* (-.13, .34), which is similar when adding controls, β = .045 (df = 487), p = .317, b = .122, 95% *CI* (-.12, .36).

Changing the dependent variable to "who is more right in the gun control debate," we see evidence of an interaction, b = .646 (df = 914), p = .006, 95% *CI* (.19, 1.1), and disaggregating education level shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those who have a college education and running an ordinal logistic regression, we see a positive significant effect, b = .877 (df = 420), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.53, 1.22), which is similar when adding controls, b = .92 (df = 411), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.56, 1.28). Subsetting the sample on those with no college education we see a positive non-significant effect, b = .107 (df = 494), p = .499, 95% *CI* (-.20, .42), which is similar when adding controls, b = .145 (df = 485), p = .367, 95% *CI* (.17, .46).

Changing the dependent variable to "what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy," we again see no evidence of an interaction, b = -.014 (df = 918), p = .952, 95% *CI* (-.48, .45), and disaggregating education level again shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those who have a college education and running an ordinal logistic regression, we see a positive significant effect, b = .352 (df = 420), p = .045, 95% *CI* (.01, .7), which is similar when adding controls, b = .419 (df = 411), p = .02, 95% *CI* (.07, .77). Subsetting the sample on those with no college education, we see a positive significant effect, b = .344 (df = 497), p = .033, 95% *CI* (.03, .66), which is similar when adding controls, b = .37 (df = 488), p = .024, 95% *CI* (.05, .69).

Lastly, changing the dependent variable to social distance aggregate, we see no evidence of an interaction, b = .05 (df = 1,004), p = .355, 95% *CI* (-2.4, 6.68). Subsetting the sample on those with a college degree and running a standard OLS regression, we see a non-significant small positive effect, β = .032 (df = 452), p = .495, b = 1.146, 95% *CI* (-2.15, 4.44), which is similar when adding controls, β = .042 (df = 442), p = .368, b = 1.5, 95% *CI* (-1.77, 4.76). Subsetting the sample on those with no college degree, we see a small non-significant negative effect, β = -.027 (df = 552), p = .529, b = -.995, 95% *CI* (-4.1, 2.11), which is similar when adding controls, β = -.023 (df = 542), p = .588, b = -.857, 95% *CI* (-3.97, 2.25).

5C. Party identification

Looking next at political party identification, we create a dichotomous variable indicating if participants identify as (or lean) Democrat (n = 528) vs. Republican (n = 483). We then interact this dichotomous party identification variable with condition, predicting *change* in gun control position, and see no evidence of an interaction, β = .04 (df = 920), p = .485, b = .113, 95% *CI* (-.20, .43). Disaggregating party identification shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Democrat and running a standard OLS regression shows a positive though non-significant effect, β = .08 (df = 482), p = .078, b = .196, 95% *CI* (-

.02, .41), which is similar when adding controls, β = .091 (*df* = 469), *p* = .045, *b* = .222, 95% *CI* (.01, .44). Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Republican, we see a small positive non-significant effect β = .034 (*df* = 438), *p* = .478, *b* = .083, 95% *CI* (-.15, .31), which is similar when adding controls, β = .028 (*df* = 425), *p* = .562, *b* = .068, 95% *CI* (-.16, .3).

Changing the dependent variable to "who is more right in the gun control debate," we see evidence of a significant interaction, *b* = .46 (*df* = 914), *p* = .049, 95% *CI* (.01, .92), and disaggregating party identification shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Democrat and running an ordinal logistic regression, we see a positive significant effect, *b* = .693 (*df* = 480), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (.371, 1.01), which is similar when adding controls, *b* = .694 (*df* = 469), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (.37, 1.01). Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Republican we see a positive non-significant effect, *b* = .202 (*df* = 434), *p* = .231, 95% *CI* (-.13, .53), which is similar when adding controls, *b* = .186 (*df* = 423), *p* = .274, 95% *CI* (-.15, .52).

Changing the dependent variable to "what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy," we see evidence of an interaction, *b* = .483 (*df* = 917), *p* = .042, 95% *CI* (.02, .95), and disaggregating party identification again shows both levels have a positive coefficient. Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Democrat and running an ordinal logistic regression we see a positive significant effect, *b* = .61 (*df* = 482), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (.28, .94), which is similar when adding controls, *b* = .667 (*df* = 470), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (.33, 1.0). Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Republican, we see a positive non-significant effect *b* = .151 (*df* = 435), *p* = .374, 95% *CI* (-.18, .49), which decreases with the addition of controls, *b* = .059 (*df* = 423), *p* = .730, 95% *CI* (-.28, .4).

Lastly, changing the dependent variable to social distance aggregate, we see no evidence of an interaction, β = .09 (*df* = 1,004), *p* = .104, *b* = 3.74, 95% *CI* (-.78, 8.26). Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Democrat and running a standard OLS regression, we see a non-significant small positive effect, β = .05 (*df* = 525), *p* = .254, *b* = 1.837, 95% *CI* (-1.32, 4.99), which is similar when adding controls, β = .061 (*df* = 512), *p* = .162, *b* = 2.247, 95% *CI* (-.9, 5.4). Subsetting the sample on those identifying as Republican, we see a small non-significant negative effect, β = -.053 (*df* = 479), *p* = .247, *b* = -1.9, 95% *CI* (-5.13, 1.32), which is similar when adding controls, β = -.059 (*df* = 466), *p* = .192, *b* = -2.13, 95% *CI* (-5.34, 1.07).

6. Supplementary Note 6: Reanalysis using OLS

Two of the four outcome variables used ordinal scales:

"*When thinking about the different sides of the gun control debate, what statement below is closest to accurate?*"

-Those who *oppose* gun control are aligned with the evidence, those who *support* gun control are not
-Those who *oppose* gun control are mostly aligned with the evidence, those who *support* gun control are mostly not
-Those who *oppose* gun control are slightly more aligned with the evidence, those who *support* gun control are slightly less
-Those who *oppose* gun control are about equally aligned with the evidence as those who *support* gun control
-Those who *support* gun control are slightly more aligned with the evidence, those who *oppose* gun control are slightly less
-Those who *support* gun control are mostly aligned with the evidence, those who *oppose* gun control are mostly not
-Those who *support* gun control are aligned with the evidence, those who *oppose* gun control are not

"*What statement do you think is most true about the current evidence for the gun control debate in the U.S.?*"

-The available evidence makes it *very* clear that we need to restrict gun ownership in the U.S.
-The available evidence makes it *somewhat* clear that we should restrict gun ownership in the U.S.
-The available evidence suggests it would *maybe* be better to restrict gun ownership in the U.S.
-The available evidence is *not* clear on if we should restrict gun ownership, or not, in the U.S.
-The available evidence suggests it would *maybe* be better to *not* restrict gun ownership in the U.S.
-The available evidence makes it *somewhat* clear that we should *not* restrict gun ownership in the U.S.
-The available evidence makes it *very* clear that we need to *not* restrict gun ownership in the U.S.

Due to the use of ordinal scales, we use an ordinal logistic model in the article. However, some may argue a linear model is still of value. We present each of the main models from the article here, showing the ordinal model in the first column, followed by the OLS model in the second column.

Supplementary Table 6A. Effect of experimental condition on "who is more right in the gun control debate." Model 1 shows ordinal results, Model 2 shows OLS results. All models report two-sided tests.

	(1)		(2)	
VARIABLES	WhoMoreRight		WhoMoreRight	
Exp Condition	b= .437	p< .001	b= .335	p= .005
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.117)	(.21, .67)	(.119)	(.1, .57)
Constant	NA		b= 2.981	p< .001
			SE	95%CI
			(.083)	(2.82, 3.14)
Observations	918		918	
R-squared	NA		0.009	

Supplementary Table 6B. Effect of experimental condition on "what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy." Model 1 shows ordinal results, Model 2 shows OLS results. All models report two-sided tests.

	(1)		(2)	
VARIABLES	GunEvidence		GunEvidence	
Exp Condition	b= .346	p= .004	b= .238	p= .034
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.119)	(.11, .58)	(.112)	(.02, .46)
Constant	NA		b= 2.456	p< .001
			SE	95%CI
			(.078)	(2.3, 2.61)
Observations	921		921	
R-squared	NA		0.005	

Supplementary Table 6C. Effect of experimental condition *a month later* on Wave 2 "who is more right in the gun control debate." Model 1 shows ordinal results, Model 2 shows OLS results. All models report two-sided tests.

	(1)		(2)	
VARIABLES	WhoMoreRight		WhoMoreRight	
Exp Condition	b= .226	p= .072	b= .183	p= .154
	SE	95%CI	SE	95%CI
	(.125)	(-.02, .47)	(.128)	(-.07, .43)
Constant	NA		b= 2.746	p< .001
			SE	95%CI
			(.089)	(2.57, 2.92)
Observations	808		808	
R-squared	NA		.003	

Supplementary Table 6D. Effect of experimental condition *a month later* on Wave 2 "what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy." Model 1 shows ordinal results, Model 2 shows OLS results. All models report two-sided tests.

	(1)		(2)	
VARIABLES	GunEvidence		GunEvidence	
Exp Condition	b= .157 SE (.128)	p= .220 95%CI (-.09, .41)	b= .042 SE (.124)	p= .736 95%CI (-.2, .29)
Constant	NA		b= 2.398 SE (.086)	p< .001 95%CI (2.23, 2.57)
Observations	808		808	
R-squared	NA		0.000	

7. Supplementary Note 7: Alternative coding scheme – extremity

The pre-registered coding scheme used in the main manuscript reconfigures the three gun-control attitudes such that higher scores indicate movement in the opposing direction from the side participants started on. For all three attitudinal outcomes, the initial position was determined based on the pre-treatment question asking them to indicate, on a 1-7 scale, what their gun control attitude was (see Note 3 above for details). Those who started at the midpoint, by definition, had no starting side and thus no opposing direction to move toward. Therefore, they were removed.

An alternative coding schema that preserves those starting at the midpoint on gun control can be achieved by "folding" the response scale at the midpoint. Here, the midpoint is recoded to be the lowest point on the scale, and movement in either direction is combined to be one, two, or three levels above that lowest level, effectively recoding the variable into a measure of *pure extremity* by measuring distance from the scale midpoint. Note that this has an obvious issue in that if a participant moved *across* the midpoint (e.g., changing from a 3 to a 5 on the 7-point scale) they would show no movement on this coding schema, even though they changed their position quite notably. It is for this reason that we went with the other coding option in the pre-registration.

Below, we show the results of models using the alternative, "pure extremity" coding schema for the three attitudinal outcomes (the social distance outcome does not have this same issue). The two coding schemas test closely related, yet different and complementary questions. As can be seen, some of the below results are stronger and some are weaker than the ones displayed in the main manuscript, yet the overall pattern of attitude depolarization holds.

Extremity outcomes: We first test for treatment effects on gun control attitude extremity. Here, gun control attitudes of participants in the treatment group are more likely to be in the moderating direction compared to those in the control group, but only slightly and non-significantly, Wave 1, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = -.03 (*df* = 1,008), *p* = .333, *b* = -.059, 95% *CI* (-.18, .06); Wave 2, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = -.004 (*df* = 880), *p* = .911, *b* = -.007, 95% *CI* (-.13, .12).

Next, we examined extremity in perceptions of which side in the gun control debate is more aligned with the evidence. Here we see a notably larger effect than found in the main text for change in the opposing direction. Those in the experimental condition are more likely to be further in the moderating direction compared to those in the control condition, Wave 1, *b* = -.571 (*df* = 1,000), *p* < .001, 95% *CI* (-.8, -.35); Wave 2, *b* = -.208 (*df* = 879), *p* = .088, 95% *CI* (-.45, .03).

For extremity in perceptions of what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy, we see a comparable effect to change in the opposing direction. Those in the experimental condition are less distant from the scale midpoint than those in the control condition, Wave 1, *b* = -.314 (*df* = 1,003), *p* = .006, 95% *CI* (-.54, -.09); Wave 2, *b* = -.23 (*df* = 879), *p* = .065, 95% *CI* (-.48, .01).

8. Supplementary Note 8: Mediation analyses

Supplementary Table 8A. Effect of experimental condition on attitudes, mediated by counter- and pro-attitudinal learning.

Independent variable	Mediator	Dependent variable	*N*	ACME [95% CI]	*p*-value
Intervention (1=Treatment, 0=Control)	Counter-attitudinal learning	Change score	924	.01 [–.04, .07]	0.57
	Pro-attitudinal learning		924	–.05 [–.09, –.02]	< 0.001
	Counter-attitudinal learning	Who is more right	924	.11 [.03, .19]	0.004
	Pro-attitudinal learning		918	–.07 [–.11, –.03]	< 0.001
	Counter-attitudinal learning	Gun evidence	918	.10 [.03, .18]	0.01
	Pro-attitudinal learning		921	–.07 [–.13, –.03]	< 0.001

Note. ACME = Average Causal Mediation Effect. The mediation models implement the approach described in Imai et al. (2010). 95% CIs were computed using the bootstrap method with 1,000 simulations.

9. Supplementary Note 9: Steps to mitigating attrition

9A. Filtering

We used several filters on the front end, all intended to select participants who were willing to do work for payment. Given the design of the task, this requirement was necessary for recruitment. This included a full script to indicate the level of work that would be involved and a commitment from participants that they would only proceed if they were willing and able to finish a study that could take up to 25 minutes, that they would only get the full payment if they completed the full study and didn't drop out, and that there would be a good amount of reading required. $n = 53$ individuals opted out of the study at this stage.

Further, due to the level of attention and engagement required, we also only recruited non-cellphone users to the study. Those indicating still using a cellphone were blocked and asked to take the study using a computer. $n = 29$ individuals were blocked and re-invited via computer.

We also implemented an effort filter that presented participants with an image of a block of nonsensical text to be retyped in a text box where the paste function had been deactivated. If the text was not correct they could not proceed. Due to the effort level required, we informed participants that they would be compensated ten cents for this task alone. $n = 316$ opted out of the study at this stage.

Given the focus of the study was exposing participants to information that was both concordant and discordant to their ideological beliefs, we decided to focus recruitment on partisans and leaning independents, and did not collect data from individuals who were a "true" independent or a political "other" in the supplier's (Bovitz) database. Consistent with this plan, any participant who indicated their identity was True Independent or Other was dropped at that point. $n = 80$ individuals were dropped for this reason.

9B. Intent to treat pipeline

Once past the filter stage, we made efforts to keep participants from leaving the study and protect inference. To achieve this, we informed participants that they would lose the money they had already earned (both in finishing the filters and the show-up fee for participating) if they simply closed out the window. To help them preserve their payment and to keep them in the study, participants were informed that there were several exit points (four) posted throughout the study that would bypass the main section of the study. Participants were told they would only need to answer several questions before finishing, sacrificing the additional bonuses but allowing them to preserve the money they already earned. All participants who passed this section indicated they understood this feature of the design and agreed to use this option versus closing out the study window.

Once a participant indicated they wanted to leave the study, they would select an exit option. They were then asked if they intended to exit or wished to reenter the study. If they indicated they did want to exit ($n = 78$), participants were thanked for using this option, were told they had several questions left to finish before the study would end, and were also told that there were still some opportunities to earn a bonus based on the quality of their responses (in the form of payment for answering knowledge questions correctly).

10. Supplementary Note 10: Trust in the veracity of the materials

At the end of the study, participants were asked several "exit" questions, including how much trust they had that the material they saw was real, researched information. The question wording was "How skeptical or confident were you that the content we were presenting was real researched information?" The response options ranged from 1 = Very skeptical it was real to 7 = Very confident it was real. Overall trust in the facts and training modules was quite high and did not differ significantly between conditions, without controls ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = -.004 [*df* = 957], *p* = .895, *b* = -.012, 95% *CI* [-.2, .17]), or with controls added ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = -.01 [*df* = 941], *p* = .751, *b* = -.029, 95% *CI* [-.21, .15]). Nor was there evidence of an interaction effect between treatment condition and initial gun-control position on trust, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = -.037 (*df* = 872), *p* = .481, *b* = -.142, 95% *CI* (-.54, .25).



Supplementary Figure 10A. Effect of condition on trust, Wave 1. Violin plots (left) show distributions, interquartile ranges, and medians; bar graphs (right) show means with 95% CIs and raw data overlaid (n = 959).

11. Supplementary Note 11: Evidence that gun control is comparable to other politically charged topics

11A. Evidence from reporting

This work was conducted in September 2021, during a time where this topic was salient in popular cultural conversation. There is notable variation in the definition of what constitutes a mass shooting, and so, it is not always easy to quantify the number of such events in a given time frame. Still, according to sources such as the Gun Violence Archive and the Mass Shooting Tracker Project, using the broader definition of a mass shooting that includes more than 4 people shot (though not necessarily killed) in one location, at one time, with no focus on the intentions of the shooter, 2021 had anywhere between 650-700 events that qualified as a mass shooting. While these events had notable variation in coverage, we believe there has been consistent and increasing concern regarding this topic and, as we show below, this topic is quite representative of a highly polarized political issue.

11B. Evidence from this study

Participants were asked about their agreement with nine different policies at the beginning of the study, including their position on gun control. They responded on a seven-point ordinal scale ranging from: *Strongly oppose, Oppose, Somewhat oppose, Neither oppose nor support, Somewhat support, Support, Strongly Support*. As shown in Note 3 above, answers about gun control were consistently polarized.

11C. Evidence from a previous pilot

In a separate pilot run at the same time as this study on the same population, participants (55 conservatives and 87 liberals) were asked their opinion about a much larger (17) set of topics. Specifically, participants were presented with opinions that indicated opposition to the standard in-party position on each political topic (e.g., *I think making gun laws less (more) restrictive will actually protect more people in society*). They were then asked how they felt about this position on a scale ranging from *0-Extremely negative – 100-Extremely positive*. Below we plot the relationships showing how each policy position elicits a positive to negative reaction from both liberals and conservatives. Scores lower than 50 indicate increasingly negative opinion, whereas scores above 50 indicate an increasingly positive opinion.

Note that the bottom-left quadrant of the plot is the section where both liberal and conservatives are indicating negative reactions to the stated opinion. The opposing ideological opinion on gun control is perceived as being comparable to opposing ideological opinions on abortion and healthcare.



Supplementary Figure 11A. Shown here are the mean reactions to each political opinion presented. Plotted on the y-axis are conservative scores, plotted on the x-axis are liberal scores. The top panel shows the full set of participants, while the bottom panel shows those in the top quartile of liberal/conservative political ideology. (n = 142)

Both the scores from the main study mentioned in Note 11b above, and the results of this pilot presented here, indicate that gun control is a highly contentious issue within the American political conversation.

12. Supplementary Note 12: Reanalysis subsetting on those with no indication of cheating

Along with the items used to measure gun control knowledge, one additional item was included that was overly difficult and functioned to "catch" participants inclined to cheat (Berinsky et al., 2012). The item asks: "*In what year did the Supreme Court of the United States decide Menominee Tribe v. United States?*" Only 12% of participants showed any signs of cheating; further, cheating showed a weak correlation with overall gun knowledge score (r = .12). To check if cheating had any effect on the results reported in the main text, we replicate the full results section here, broken into Wave 1 and Wave 2 outcomes. All results in this section represent only those who showed *no cheating* behavior.

12A. Wave 1

Learning outcomes: Using the average number of correct answers to all gun-control items as the outcome of interest, we see a clear positive effect of experimental condition on gun knowledge, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .395 (df = 888), p < .001, d = -.862, 95% *CI* (-.99, -.72), indicating those in the experimental condition increased their gun-control knowledge significantly and substantially relative to the control condition, even when subsetting on those who did not show cheating behavior. This relationship holds when accounting for all control variables (age, gender, race, education, political party, political ideology, and amount of political news consumed), $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .398 (df = 871), p < .001, b = .176, 95% *CI* (.15, .20).

We also see that all gun control groups showed clear gains in knowledge of general facts from the training: all $\boldsymbol{\beta}$*s* > .3, and, in all cases, p < .001. For pro-gun control facts, we see no significant gains for initially pro-gun control subjects ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .043 [df = 506], p = .337, b = .025, 95% *CI* [-.03, .08]), a notable effect for those who started out anti-gun control ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .364 [df = 306], p < .001, b = .252, 95% *CI* [.18, .32]), and a modest non-significant increase for those with an initially moderate attitude ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .123 [df = 72], p = .297, b = .083, 95% *CI* [-.08, .24]) (though the latter group had only 74 individuals). Looking at anti-gun control facts, we see a reversal, with those pro-gun control showing clear gains from being in the treatment, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .352 (df = 506), p < .001, b = .221, 95% *CI* (.17, .27), those who started out anti-gun control showing a smaller but still significant effect, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .266 (df = 306), p < .001, b = .156, 95% *CI* (.09, .22), and those with an initially moderate attitude showing an overall smaller non-significant effect, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .123 (df = 72), p = .298, b = .069, 95% *CI* (-.06, .2). In sum, the treatment increases knowledge of different types of relevant facts – especially counter-attitudinal ones – even when accounting for potential cheating.

Attitudinal outcomes: Looking at the effect of condition on the attitude change score, we see that those in the experimental condition were more likely to move in the opposing direction compared to those in the control condition, OLS: $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .065 (df = 812), p = .063, b = .158, 95% *CI* (-.01, .33), and this relationship only grew stronger when adding controls into the model, OLS: $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .07 (df = 796), p = .044, b = .171, 95% *CI* (.01, .34).

Looking at the second outcome, which measures perceptions of who is more right in the gun control debate, we again use ordinal logistic regression. Again, see those in the experimental condition are more likely to move in the opposing direction compared to those in the control condition, b = .485 (df = 806), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.24, .73), and this relationship only grew stronger when adding controls, b = .491 (df = 791), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.24, .74).

Lastly, for the third outcome, what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy, we again use ordinal logistic regression. Again, we see those in the experimental condition were more likely to move in the opposing direction compared to those in the control condition, b = .317

(*df* = 809), *p* = .012, 95% *CI* (.07, .57), and this relationship only grew stronger when adding controls, *b* = .353 (*df* = 794), *p* = .006, 95% *CI* (.10, .61).

Affective outcomes: We turn next to the effects of our treatment on the social distance aggregate. Using OLS, we see no evidence of an effect of condition on this outcome, without controls $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .017 (*df* = 885), *p* = .623, *b* = .597, 95% *CI* (-1.79, 2.98), or with controls, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .024 (*df* = 869), *p* = .471, *b* = .871, 95% *CI* (-1.5, 3.24).

12B. Wave 2

Learning outcomes: As in Wave 1, there is a clear effect of condition on gun-control knowledge (measured in Wave 2) among those who showed no cheating behavior, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .15 (*df* = 784), *p* < .001, *b* = .057, 95% *CI* (.03, .08), and this relationship holds when including all controls, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .155 (*df* = 767), *p* < .001, *b* = .059, 95% *CI* (.03, .08).

Attitudinal outcomes: Turning to the depolarization outcomes, we first look at the change score. As in the main text, we use OLS and find a find a stronger effect in Wave 2: $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .098 (*df* = 717), *p* = .008, *b* = .258, 95% *CI* (.07, .45), which holds when adding controls, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .1 (*df* = 701), *p* = .008, *b* = .26, 95% *CI* (.07, .45). Looking at the second outcome, who is more right in the gun control debate, the relationship is again diminished a month later but still observable, *b* = .254 (*df* = 717), *p* = .056, 95% *CI* (-.01, .52), and slightly attenuated when adding controls, *b* = .241 (*df* = 702), *p* = .073, 95% *CI* (-.02, .51). For the third outcome, we again see an attenuated effect a full month later, though stronger when removing those who showed cheating behavior, *b* = .219 (*df* = 717), *p* = .108, 95% *CI* (-.05, .49), and this effect is slightly stronger when adding controls, *b* = .235 (*df* = 702), *p* = .091, 95% *CI* (-.04, .51).

Affective outcomes: Lastly, we use the social distance aggregate and again see no effect of condition on affective responses, without controls, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = -.004 (*df* = 784), *p* = .912, *b* = -.154, 95% *CI* (-2.89, 2.58), or with controls, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = -.004 (*df* = 767), *p* = .917, *b* = -.144, 95% *CI* (-2.86, 2.57).

13. Supplementary Note 13: Comparison of Wave 1 and Wave 2 demographics

Wave 2 had *n* = 881 participants (~87%) returning to a study they had no way of tying to the initial study. Participants were invited to take a survey study online, as they had previously. Thus, there was no way for them to opt out based on any features of the previous study. Further, we see no asymmetry in return rates across several relevant categories:

Condition
Control, Wave 1: 51.9% | Treatment, Wave 1: 48.1%
Control, Wave 2: 52.5% | Treatment, Wave 2: 47.5%

Political party
Dem, Wave 1: 52.23% | Rep, Wave one: 47.77%
Dem, Wave 2: 51.52% | Rep, Wave two: 48.49%

Gender
Female, Wave 1: 45.54% | Male, Wave 1: 53.76% | Other, Wave 1: 0.7%
Female, Wave 2: 46.34% | Male, Wave 2: 52.98% | Other, Wave 2: 0.6%

Education
Wave 1: Edu_1: 1.58%, Edu_2: 16.02%, Edu_3: 37.39%, Edu_4: 29.28%, Edu_5: 15.73%
Wave 2: Edu_1: 1.69%, Edu_2: 16.09%, Edu_3: 37.57%, Edu_4: 29.25%, Edu_5: 15.41%

Age
Wave 1: Median age = 43, Mean age = 45, SD = 15.3
Wave 2: Median age = 45, Mean age = 46, SD = 15.2

14. Supplementary Note 14: Wave 1 attitudinal results subsetting on those who returned for Wave 2

Rerunning the three main attitudinal models from Wave 1 while subsetting on the n = 881 participants who returned for Wave 2, we first test for treatment effects on gun control policy attitudes. Here we see that, though the p-value shifts to the other side of the .05 threshold, the difference between results is quite small; with the original result seen in Wave 1 ($\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .057 [df = 922], p = .086, b = .139, 95% *CI* [-.02, .3]) is now, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ = .069 (df = 805), p = .048, b = .173, 95% *CI* (.01, .34). Looking next at perceptions of which side in the gun control debate is more aligned with the evidence (using ordinal logistic regression, as in the main text), we see that results for all participants from Wave 1 (b = .437 [df = 916], p < .001, 95% *CI* [.21, .67]) are quite similar to results of the same model with only those who returned for Wave 2, b = .467 (df = 798), p < .001, 95% *CI* (.22, .71). Further, this persists for our final attitudinal measure of perceptions of what the current evidence on gun control implies for policy. Here, the results for all participants in Wave 1 (b = .346 (df = 919), p = .004, 95% *CI* [.11, .58]) are again comparable to the same model constrained to those who returned for Wave 2, b = .325 (df = 801), p = .011, 95% *CI* (.08 .57). Thus, as noted in the main text, there seems to be no clear evidence of a different “type” of person who returns a month later in Wave 2.

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