
Supplementary information

Changes in Americans' prejudices during the presidency of Donald Trump

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Changes in Americans' Prejudices During the Presidency of Donald Trump

Author List

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Supplementary Materials

A more detailed description of our key variables is provided here. The full version of all materials can be found in the OSF page for this project (<https://osf.io/9syz8/>), along with the Qualtrics files for all studies for readers wishing to view the exact format and design of each survey.

Longitudinal Studies (Studies 1-9)

Independent Variable:

Our primary independent variable in these studies was support for Donald Trump. In our Mechanical Turk studies (Studies 1-8), support for Donald Trump was measured by four items: 1) “Generally speaking, how *positive* do you feel towards Donald Trump?” 2) “Generally speaking, how *negative* do you feel towards Donald Trump?” (reverse scored), 3) “During the recent U.S. election, how strong of a *supporter* of Donald Trump were you?” and 4) “During the recent U.S. election, how strongly *opposed* to Donald Trump were you?” (reverse scored). Each item was measured on a seven-point scale. In the VOTER data (Study 9), support for Donald Trump was assessed by a single question asking participants to rate how positively they viewed Donald Trump on a 4-point scale ranging from “Very Unfavorable” to “Very Favorable.” As an additional measure of support for Donald Trump, we asked participants to tell us which candidate they voted for in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, if any. A similar measure was included in the VOTER survey.

Dependent Variables:

- 1) *The “Islamoprejudice” subscale of The Differentiating Islamophobia scale*⁴¹ (Studies 1-3) contains 10 statements about Islam/Muslims: 2 expressing positive sentiment (reverse-scored) and 8 expressing negative sentiment. Agreement with each item was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”
- 2) *The Guantanamo Scenario*⁴² (Study 3) describes a Muslim man who is apprehended by U.S. forces while vacationing with his family and subjected to harsh confinement and interrogation techniques, causing severe emotional and financial problems for him and his family. The vignette states that after 5 years, the U.S. government acknowledges that they have no case against the man, and he is released. After reading the vignette, participants rate the anger, guilt, shame, and compassion they feel on 100-point scale ranging from “not at all” (0) to “very” (100).
- 3) *The Ascent of Man scale*⁴² (Study 3) assesses blatant dehumanization of different cultural, racial, and religious groups. Participants are asked to rate the “humanness” of various groups (Americans, Europeans, Muslims, Gypsies, Christians, Jews) on a 100-point scale. The scale is anchored by images depicting several apparent stages of

evolution of a chimpanzee (0) to a modern human (100).

- 4) *The Symbolic Racism scale*⁴³ (Study 4, VOTER) assesses dislike/resentment of African-Americans. The items on the scale are somewhat less blatant and direct than other prejudice scales, and ask about beliefs such as that African-Americans no longer face much discrimination, and that their disadvantage stems from a lack of willingness to work hard. Study 7 included the full 8-item scale, while the VOTER survey included a shortened version containing 4 items. Response scales differ by item (see Supplementary Text).
- 5) *The Attitudes Towards Blacks scale*⁴⁴ (Studies 4-8) assesses blatant prejudice against African-Americans. Participants are asked to rate their agreement with 20 statements assessing various aspects of prejudice (e.g., feelings of dislike or discomfort around African-Americans, the belief that Black people are violent or less intelligent than Whites). Agreement with each item was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”
- 6) *Warmth Measures* (VOTER data). Participants were asked to rate their levels of warmth/positivity towards various groups on a scale ranging from 0 (“Very cold or unfavorable feeling”) to 100 (“Very warm or favorable feeling”). Groups included at both time points were Blacks, Whites, Asians, Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Gays/Lesbians. Additionally, Time 1 included a measure of warmth towards Latinos, and Time 2 included a measure of warmth towards Hispanics. Though these terms denote distinct groups, these groups have substantial overlap⁶⁵, and for the purpose of our analyses we treat both measures as assessing attitudes towards a single group of Hispanics/Latinos.
- 7) *Negativity Towards Illegal Immigrants* (VOTER data) was assessed by the item “Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain?” with the response options “Mostly make a contribution” (coded as 2) “Neither” (coded as 1), and “Mostly a drain” (coded as 0).
- 8) *Fear of Illegal Immigrants* (Studies 1 and 2) was measured by four items assessing perceptions of threat from illegal immigrants, in terms of the degree to which participants believed that illegal immigrants 1) had the potential to increase violence in the U.S., 2) posed a threat to the U.S. economy, 3) limited the jobs available to Americans, and 4) posed a threat to the U.S. healthcare system. Each item was measured on an 11-point scale ranging from “Very Little” to “Very Much.”
- 9) *Anti-Minority Policy Positions* (VOTER data). The VOTER survey also asked participants to indicate their support for a range of policy measures and “proto-policy” attitudes that enact punitive or restrictive measures towards minority groups. 13 of these items were relevant to the specific minority groups that we examined in this research. Policy items included support for a temporary ban preventing Muslims from entering the U.S., opposition to gay marriage, support for limiting immigration, and opposition to providing pathways to citizenship for illegal immigrants. Proto-policy items included concern about discrimination against Whites, the belief that speaking English is important to being “truly American,” and the belief Democrats/Republicans should focus more on achieving racial equality (reverse scored). (See Supplementary Table 8 for all items.)

Additionally, our longitudinal studies included eight dependent measures that we do not discuss

in the main text:

- 1) *The “Secular Critique” subscale of The Differentiating Islamophobia scale*⁴¹ (Studies 1-3) assesses dislike of Islam for “secular” reasons such as a perceived lack of separation of church and state and violations of women’s rights. Agreement with each item was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” In our preregistration documentation we specified that we would not be using this subscale in our primary analyses, so we omit it from the main text.
- 2) *The Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice scale*⁴⁷ (Study 4). This scale does not assess prejudice *per se*, but rather an individual’s motivation to control her/his own prejudice against Black people for “internal” reasons such as, e.g., egalitarian values. Although, as predicted, we also observed a significant relationship between Trump support and decreases in internal motivation to control prejudice ($\beta = -.22$, $t(93) = 2.12$, $p = .036$), we omit this finding from the main text for brevity.
- 3) *The External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice scale*⁴⁷ (Study 4). Similarly to the Internal Motivation scale, this scale does not assess prejudice, but rather an individual’s motivation to control her/his own prejudice against Black people for “external” reasons such as, e.g., rebuke from other people. Although we observed a marginally significant relationship between Trump support and decreases in external motivation to control prejudice ($\beta = -.19$, $t(93) = 1.86$, $p = .069$), we omit this finding from the main text for brevity.
- 4) *Racial Bias in Punishment* (Study 4). We also included a novel task intended to assess racial bias in punishment decisions. In this task, participants first read a short vignette about a criminal suspect who is charged with selling drugs on school property. Half of the participants are randomly assigned to read about a suspect with a stereotypically Black name, while the other half read about a suspect with a stereotypically White name (participants were also assigned to a high or low self-relevance condition (see Supplementary Text), though this condition was not of interest for the present project). After reading the vignette, participants were asked to make a recommendation about the charges they would suggest be brought against the suspect, and the amount of jail time he should serve if convicted. In this study ($N = 275$), we found that Trump support predicted a general increase in punitiveness ($\beta = .166$, $t(273) = 2.78$, $p = .006$), but this effect did not differ by suspect race ($p = .16$), suggesting that Trump supporters may simply have increased in their negativity towards criminals generally. We omit this finding from the main text for brevity.
- 5) *Three Greatest Threats* (Studies 1 and 2). We also assessed prejudice using one novel open-ended measure: “Please list, in order, what you believe to be the three greatest threats to the continued safety and prosperity of the U.S.” Participants were provided with three empty text boxes in which to type their responses. Using this measure, we found that Trump supporters had also increased in their spontaneous expressions of negativity towards minority groups (e.g., Muslims, immigrants, Black people; $\beta = .27$, $t(246) = 4.46$, $p < .001$). However, we omit this finding from the main text for brevity.
- 6) *Terrorist Threat scale* (Studies 1 and 2). We also included a novel 7-item measure of perceived threat from terrorists. This measure was designed to assess participants’ perceptions of the probability of future terrorist attacks in the U.S., as well as the concern that they felt about terrorism. Although, as predicted, we found that Trump

support was associated with significant increases in perceptions of threat from terrorists ($\beta = .19$, $t(247) = 3.08$, $p = .002$), we omit this finding from the main text for brevity.

- 7) *The American=White IAT*⁴⁹ (Studies 7 and 8) assesses the strength of an individual's implicit (that is, automatic, uncontrollable) associations between the concepts of "America" (vs. "Foreign") and the concept "White" (vs. "Black"). In the task, participants are asked to quickly categorize various images representing the four abstract concepts listed above. The speed at which a person is able to categorize two types of images together is generally taken as an indication of the strength of that individual's cognitive association between those concepts, with faster responses indicating a stronger association^{44,47}. Because our manuscript primarily concerns changes in *explicit* prejudice, we have omitted these findings from the main text.
- 8) *The Black/White IAT*⁴⁸ (Study 6) assesses the strength of an individual's implicit association between the concepts of "Black" (vs. "White") and "Bad" (vs. "Good"). We also included this measure in Study 6 as an measure of implicit bias. However, we received complete IAT data from only 57 participants, and so did not have sufficient statistical power to test our hypotheses. For this reason – and because our manuscript specifically concerns changes in explicit prejudice – we omit this measure from the main text.

Mechanism Studies (Studies 10 through 13)

All materials are described in the main text.

Supplementary Procedure

Recruitment

Longitudinal Studies (Studies 1-9)

Longitudinal Mechanical Turk Studies (Studies 1-8): Participants were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk⁴⁶. For our Time 1 survey, we recruited participants by posting an ad (or "HIT") on Mechanical Turk. Individuals who chose to participate were paid at a rate of \$.10 per minute, in keeping with the standards on the site at the time⁵⁸. Participants who provided complete data at Time 1 were invited to participate in the second session.

For the second session, we used participants' anonymous worker identification numbers to email them a link to the survey via Turkprime.com⁵⁷ (an independently owned and operated website that provides enhanced functionality for Mechanical Turk). When contacted, participants were not given any specific information about the content of the survey, in order to avoid any selective attrition based on survey content⁵². For all studies following our initial exploratory study (Study 2), the payment and recruitment timeline followed a fixed schedule. Payment for the second session survey began at ~.15 per minute, and was increased gradually: after

approximately one week, we increased the payment to between \$1-2 (depending on the length of the survey). Approximately 3 days later, we increased the payment to \$5. The high rate of pay was meant to incentivize completion and minimize attrition. (The final rate we offered for completion, \$5, equates to approximately \$1 a minute (based on an average survey length of ~5 minutes), which is roughly 10 times higher than the average pay rate at the time of this writing, \$.10 per minute⁵⁸.) We sent additional emails to notify participants about both payment increases. After two weeks, we ended recruitment by deactivating the HIT. Recruitment dates for both sessions can be found in Supplementary Table 3.

2016 Views Of The Electorate Research (VOTER) Survey (Study 9): A description of recruitment procedures is included in the main text. More information can be found here:

<https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2016-elections/data>.

Mechanism Studies (Studies 10 through 13)

Participants were paid at a rate of \$.15 per minute for completing the studies. All other recruitment details are included in the main text.

Additional Statistical Information

Data were analyzed with R versions 3.4.1 - 4.0.5 and SPSS 20.0. SPSS and R syntax/scripts for all analyses are available at the OSF site for this project: <https://osf.io/9syz8/>. Details regarding exclusions and hypothesis testing can be found in the main text. Additional statistical information is provided below.

Longitudinal Studies (Studies 1-9)

Independent Variable

For the Trump support scale used in Studies 1-8, we calculated general support for Donald Trump by reverse-scoring the appropriate variables and computing participants' mean score across the four items of the scale ($\alpha = .96$). In the VOTER sample, participants who responded "don't know" to the question about their favorability towards Trump were not included in analyses.

Scale Measures of Prejudice

For all scale measures of prejudice (the Islamoprejudice scale, Secular Critique scale, Guantanamo Scenario, Symbolic Racism scale, Attitudes Towards Blacks scale, Fear of Illegal Immigrants scale, and EMS/IMS) we calculated prejudice scores by reverse-scoring the appropriate items and then computing a mean score for each participant. Reliability for all of these measures was quite high, ranging from .87 to .96. (Reliability scores, means, standard deviations, and observed ranges for all scale measures are contained in Supplementary Table 7.)

Warmth Measures of Prejudice

We computed a difference score by subtracting participants' reported warmth toward the target minority group from their reported warmth towards the most directly analogous high-status/majority group, giving us a numerical index of *relative* liking of the target group. For Muslims and Jews, the comparison group was Christians (the dominant religious group in the U.S.), and for Hispanics, Asians, and Blacks, the comparison group was Whites. Because we lacked a perfectly analogous comparison group for gays and lesbians, we first computed participants' mean warmth towards the two high-status majority groups, Christians and Whites, and used this score as the comparison point for participants' warmth towards gays and lesbians.

Three Greatest Threats

For the open-ended question on perceived threats to the U.S., two trained research assistants blind to both the study hypotheses and the time point of participants' responses were asked to code each participant's response for whether it expressed "dislike or fear of racial, religious, or cultural outgroups." If yes, the response was scored as "1", If no, the response was scored as "0". If the response was judged to express ambiguously prejudicial sentiment, it was scored as ".5". We then weighted each score to reflect the relative importance assigned to it by the participant, as indicated by whether it was listed in the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd position: We multiplied the score for the first-listed (most important) item by 3 and multiplied the score for the second-listed (second most important) item by 2. We made no adjustments to the score for the third-listed item. The alpha for the two coders' responses was high ($\alpha = .96$, $r = .924$, 1,485 responses), so we averaged them into a single score. We then computed the mean of these three weighted scores, such that higher numbers indicated greater expressed dislike or fear of minority groups (similar results are obtained if the unweighted mean score is instead used in analyses).

Examining Alternative Explanations for the Relationship Between Trump Support and Increases in Prejudice

To examine whether other factors could explain the association between Trump support and increases in prejudice, we first collapsed across individual studies to conduct analyses by measure. This ensured that we had sufficient statistical power to reliably detect effects. We then added various factors to the regression model – both one at a time and in various combinations by theme/topic (e.g., economic concerns, ideological factors) – to see if the presence of those covariates rendered the association between Trump support and increases in prejudice non-significant. As noted in the main text, none of the factors that we examined had this effect; in all cases the relationship between Trump support and changes in prejudice remained significant (all $ps < .01$, see Supplementary Tables 11 and 14 for all analyses).

Trump Support, Prejudice, and Support for Anti-Minority Policies

Do the changes in prejudice we observed on our prejudice measures have implications for real-world policy support? To assess this question, we examined participants' support for the 13 policies relating to the restriction of minority group rights that were included in the VOTER

dataset (e.g., banning Muslims from entering the U.S., opposition to affirmative action and same-sex marriage).

As anticipated, we found that participants' scores on these prejudice measures predicted their endorsement of all 13 of these policies (all $ps < .001$, average $r = .61$, 95% CI [.60,.61], Supplementary Table 1). Furthermore, this was true even when controlling for Time 1 prejudice (Supplementary Table 1), suggesting that the observed changes in prejudice may have implications for participants' endorsement of real-world policies concerning minority group rights.

To further examine whether the observed changes in prejudice could help account for Trump supporters' endorsement of these policy measures, we next conducted 13 separate mediation analyses, using Andrew Hayes's PROCESS macro for SPSS⁵⁹. For each analysis, we entered Trump support as the independent (X) variable, one of the 13 policy measures as the dependent (Y) variable, and the relevant Time 2 prejudice measure as the mediator (M) variable. In all analyses, we controlled for Time 1 prejudice. We generated a bias-corrected bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect using 10,000 samples. We considered the hypothesis to be supported (i.e., significant mediation) if this confidence interval did not include 0. For all 13 of these mediation analyses, we found that Time 2 prejudice significantly mediated the relationship between Trump support and anti-minority policy endorsement. See Supplementary Table 9 for all of these mediation models, as well as more detailed information about the mediator and dependent variables for each analysis.

Changes in Support for Anti-Minority Policies

Additionally, for 4 of these 13 policy items, participants' endorsement was assessed at both time points, allowing us to examine whether the observed changes in prejudice also mediated *changes* in participants' support for these policies. To test this question, we conducted four additional mediation analyses. These analyses were identical to those described above, except that the mediator variable in each model was *change* in prejudice, and the dependent variable was *change* in policy endorsement (rather than Time 2 policy endorsement). All 4 of these mediation analyses were significant, suggesting that the observed changes in prejudice also explained, at least in part, how participants' endorsement of these policies had changed over time. See Supplementary Table 10 for these mediation models.

Mechanism Studies (Studies 10 through 13)

All statistical information is included in the main text.

Supplementary Analyses

To provide additional tests of our hypotheses, we also conducted two additional series of analyses using data from (1) The American National Election Studies and (2) additional waves of

the VOTER survey that were conducted with a subset of the original study participants. We briefly detail these analyses below.

ANES Data

To provide additional tests of our hypotheses, we also examined data from 9,770 participants from three nationally representative studies from the American National Election Studies (ANES), among the most widely used and well-trusted sources of data on Americans' political attitudes and behavior. Surveys are conducted both in election years (a two-part survey conducted shortly pre- and post-election) and election off years (single-time-point cross-sectional surveys). The samples from each study are weighted by demographic and non-demographic factors to approximate the U.S. population. Following ANES recommendations, all analyses were conducted using weighted data. All data and detailed information about the methodology can be found at <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/>.

Unlike other large-scale surveys on social attitudes, these ANES studies included measures of Trump support as well as identical prejudice measures at multiple time points during the early years of Trump's presidency, allowing us to examine how expressions of prejudice changed among Trump supporters and non-Trump supporters over time. Although these studies are cross-sectional and therefore offer an indirect test of changes in prejudice, the ANES studies have several additional features that make them an excellent complement to our own longitudinal studies. In particular, the timeline of the ANES studies allows us to specifically isolate and examine changes in attitudes during the period of Trump's presidency (rather than from pre- to post election)—a time during which Trump has had unprecedented visibility and thus, we predicted, unprecedented normative influence.

Procedure

The first of these studies ($N = 4,270$) was conducted at the time of Trump's election (i.e., shortly before and shortly after November 8th, 2016). The latter two studies were conducted during Trump's subsequent presidency, one in December 2018 ($N = 2,500$) and one in December 2019.¹ Additionally—and importantly—these three studies included several prejudice measures that were identical to those included in our previous longitudinal studies: the more subtle 4-item measure of prejudice against African-Americans from Study 4 and the VOTER data, as well as feeling thermometers towards a wide range of groups (e.g., Blacks, Whites, Muslims, Hispanics, gay people, transgender people). These measures allowed us to conduct analyses that were a direct analogue to our longitudinal studies to provide additional convergent support for our hypotheses. Consistent with our longitudinal studies, we predicted that Trump's supporters would show significant increases in mean prejudice during this time period, whereas individuals who opposed Trump would either show no changes in prejudice, or would have decreased in prejudice.

¹For the 2016 survey, 1,180 participants were interviewed face-to-face, while 3,090 participants completed the study online. This is a methodological difference between this study and the 2018 and 2019 studies, which were conducted solely online. However, the results of these analyses are nearly identical if we restrict all analyses only to participants who completed the study online.

Support for Donald Trump was measured by a 100-point feeling thermometer scale, ranging from “0° Very cold or unfavorable feeling” to “100° Very warm or favorable feeling.” Consistent with our other studies, Trump supporters were defined as individuals who rated Trump above the neutral (“50° No feeling at all”) midpoint of the scale, and non-Trump supporters were defined as those who rated Trump below the midpoint. Feeling thermometer measures towards the racial/ethnic, cultural, and religious minority groups were measured on the same response scale. To assess the degree of prejudice against these minority groups, the rating of each group was subtracted from the relevant majority group, Whites, such that higher scores indicated greater relative preference for Whites over minorities.

The wording of the four items comprising the more subtle prejudice measure (from the Symbolic Racism Scale⁴³) is below. All items were measured on a 5-point scale from “1 Agree strongly” to “5 Disagree strongly.”

1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

Results

The results of these analyses supported our hypotheses. On the measure of explicit prejudice against African-Americans, we observed an interaction between time and Trump support (Support versus Oppose) consistent with our previous studies ($\beta = .16$, $t(5724) = 5.67$, $p < .001$). Average prejudice among Trump supporters showed a significant increase from the time of the election to 2018 ($t(2153) = 3.55$, $p < .001$). Conversely, levels of prejudice among individuals opposed to Trump showed a significant decrease over the same time period ($t(1573) = 3.27$, $p = .001$). Together, these changes in prejudice corresponded to a 30.4% increase in the prejudice gap between pro-Trump and anti-Trump individuals over a span of only two years. Further, analyses of the 2019 ANES study suggested that these changes in prejudice were not fleeting: prejudice scores in 2019 among both Trump supporters and non-Trump supporters did not statistically differ from those observed in 2018 ($ps = .14$, $.36$).

The feeling thermometer measures of prejudice showed similar effects. We observed a significant interaction between time and Trump support (Support versus Oppose) on mean prejudice ($\beta = .11$, $t(5686) = 3.37$, $p = .001$). Once again, prejudice among Trump supporters showed a significant increase from 2016 to 2018 ($t(906.00) = 5.58$, $p < .001$, unequal variances), while prejudice among non-Trump supporters showed a significant decrease ($t(885.91) = 3.98$, $p < .001$, unequal variances). Analyses of the 2019 study revealed that although prejudice on this measure subsequently “rebounded” downward somewhat among Trump supporters after 2018 ($t(1110.22) = 2.56$, $p = .01$, unequal variances), it nonetheless remained significantly higher than in 2016 ($t(2044.43) = 2.24$, $p = .03$, unequal variances). Prejudice levels among non-Trump supporters did not differ from 2018 to 2019 ($p = .19$), and remained significantly lower than in

2016 ($t(1850.37) = 4.19, p < .001$, unequal variances). These analyses therefore provided compelling additional support for the hypothesis that prejudice increased among Trump's supporters—and decreased among non-Trump supporters—during his presidency.

Subsequent Waves of the VOTER Survey

We also conducted an additional set of analyses to provide further convergent evidence that Trump support plays a *causal* role in driving these shifts in prejudice in the real world. To test this question, we analyzed two additional waves of data from the VOTER survey that were released following the completion of our initial studies, in which a subset ($N = 4,502$) of the original respondents were re-interviewed in July of 2017 and April-May of 2018. Importantly, both of these waves of surveys included measures of both Trump support and prejudice. These data therefore allowed us to circumvent the potential limitations of our previous longitudinal studies (both the VOTER survey and our own studies)—in which Trump support was measured only at one time point, after the election—to examine whether Trump support *prospectively* predicts changes in prejudice over time. Additionally, these data allow us to provide a particularly stringent test of our hypothesis, by examining whether an individual's degree of support for Trump will continue to prospectively predict changes in prejudice *even after Trump's campaign and election*.

Using these data, we examined whether participants' levels of Trump support in 2016 (post-election) prospectively predicted how their prejudice changed over the following years, in 2017 and 2018. Because our primary aim was to isolate the causal influence of Trump support on changes in prejudice (rather than identifying whether and how Americans' prejudices changed from pre- to post election, as was our aim in the nine longitudinal studies), in these analyses we controlled for a number of potential confounding factors: gender, age, education, income, race (White versus non-White), and baseline prejudice. We also adjusted for changes in Trump support over the same time period (i.e., how an individual's degree of Trump support changed from 2017 to 2018). These analyses therefore allowed us to parcel out the unique influence of Trump support in prospectively predicting changes in prejudice.

Procedure

Measures

The 14 prejudice and prejudice-relevant measures included in the 2017 and/or 2018 waves of the VOTER survey are listed below:

Prejudice against Muslims

1. Feeling thermometer scores for Muslims versus Christians
2. Do you favor or oppose temporarily banning Muslims from other countries from entering the United States? (1-4; Strongly favor-Strongly Oppose)

Prejudice against Black people

3. Feeling thermometer scores for Blacks versus Whites

Prejudice against Hispanics/Latinos

4. Feeling thermometer scores for Hispanics versus Whites

Prejudice against Asians

5. Feeling thermometer scores for Asians versus Whites

Prejudice against gay people

6. Feeling thermometer scores for gay people versus high-status groups (Whites and Christians)

Prejudice against women

7. Modern Sexism – the average of six items (1-4; Strongly agree-Strongly disagree):
 - a. Women should return to their traditional roles in society.
 - b. When women demand equality these days, they are actually seeking special favors.
 - c. Women often miss out on good jobs because of discrimination.
 - d. Women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve.
 - e. Sexual harassment against women in the workplace is no longer a problem in the united states.
 - f. Increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in the united states.

Prejudice against Jewish people

8. Feeling thermometer scores for Jews versus Christians

Prejudice against immigrants

9. Feeling thermometer scores for immigrants versus Whites
10. Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the US legally than it is currently? (1-5; Much easier-Much Harder)
11. Do you favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens? (Favor, Oppose)
12. Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain? (Mostly make a contribution, Neither, Mostly a drain)
13. Currently the federal government caps the number of immigrants it allows into the country each year. Do you think the government should increase the number of immigrants it allows in each year, decrease the number, or keep it about the same? (Increase, Keep about the same, Decrease)

Warmth towards the Alt-Right

14. Feeling thermometer towards the Alt-Right movement

Results*Predicting Future Changes in Prejudice from Trump Support in 2016*

Consistent with our predictions, we found that Trump support in 2016 significantly predicted future changes in prejudice across *all 14 of the measures of prejudice that were collected*. Mirroring the effects that we observed in Studies 1 through 10, we found that Trump support predicted changes in prejudice against Muslims (two measures: β s = .32, .66, $ps < .001$) and prejudice against Black people ($\beta = .13$, $t(3493) = 7.64$, $p < .001$), as well as increases in prejudice against a range of other minority groups, including Latinos/Hispanics ($\beta = .16$, $t(3478)$

= 9.23, $p < .001$), women ($\beta = .30$, $t(3691) = 15.23$, $p < .001$), gay people ($\beta = .17$, $t(3323) = 24.93$, $p < .001$), Jewish people ($\beta = .11$, $t(3425) = 6.11$, $p < .001$), Asians, ($\beta = .10$, $t(3461) = 6.08$, $p < .001$), and immigrants (5 different indices; β s = .23, .24, .31, .37, .51; all $ps < .001$), as well as greater warmth towards the Alt-Right ($\beta = .38$, $t(2419) = 16.57$, $p < .001$). Once again, we examined additional factors (e.g., ideology, political party identification, geographic factors like county-level income inequality) – 33 in total – to see if any other variable could explain these effects. In all cases Trump support remained a robust predictor of these changes in prejudice.

Further, although the reverse causal direction – the effect of prejudice on changes in support for Trump – also received some support (showing significant relationships across most, though not all, measures), these relationships were weaker, being only approximately half the effect size. These results suggest that although prejudice, consistent with past work⁶⁻⁸, does lead to greater support for Trump, the opposite causal direction – that supporting Trump leads people to express greater prejudice – may be even stronger.

Predicting Concomitant Changes in Prejudice from Changes in Trump Support

We also conducted additional sets of analyses in which we examined the unique influence of *changes in Trump support* on changes in prejudice, testing whether the degree to which a person became more or less favorable towards Trump – over and above the factors listed above – might also predict how that person's prejudices changed over the same time period.

As noted above, the 2016 and 2017 surveys were conducted only seven months apart. Unsurprisingly, both Trump support and prejudice remained quite stable over this short period of time (e.g., the correlation between Trump support in 2016 and 2017 was .9). Nevertheless, participants' responses did exhibit sufficient variance for us to examine the unique contributions of changes in Trump support on changes in prejudice. Consistent with our predictions, we found that—even in this short period of time—changes in Trump support significantly predicted changes in prejudice (average effect size: $\beta = .07$, $p < .001$), with significant associations emerging on 11 of our 14 prejudice measures (β s = .04-.17, $ps = .008 - < .001$).

Predicting Future Changes in Prejudice from Changes in Trump Support

Finally, we examined the four measures of prejudice that were included in all three of the latter waves (2016, 2017, and 2018) of the VOTER survey. Using these data, we provided an even more stringent test of the causal role of Trump support on these changes in prejudice, by examining whether changes in Trump support from 2016 to 2017 would predict *the trajectory of participants' future changes in prejudice* over the following year, between 2017 and 2018.

The dependent variable for these analyses was a composite score of four questions assessing respondents' attitudes towards minority groups: three pertaining to immigrants and one pertaining to Muslims. These questions were identical at all time points, with one exception: the 2017 wave randomized participants to view one of two different versions of one question, asking them to indicate their attitudes towards either *illegal* immigrants (original version, as worded in the other waves) or towards *legal* immigrants. Because of this inconsistency, we omitted this question from the composite prejudice score for respondents who received the altered version in 2017. However, these effects are consistent (and, in fact, considerably larger) if this question is not omitted from the composite score. Consistent with the other analyses in this section, these

analyses controlled for the same demographic factors, as well as baseline Trump support and baseline prejudice.

Consistent with our predictions, we found that changes in Trump support predicted future changes in prejudice across all four of these measures (average effect size: $\beta = .15$, $p < .001$; β s = .06-.27, all $ps < .001$). As before, the inverse causal direction—changes in prejudice predicting future changes in support for Trump—yielded a weaker effect size ($\beta = .10$; β s = .05-.16). A closer examination of this effect revealed that individuals who increased in Trump support ($n = 342$) showed significant increases in prejudice over the subsequent year ($t(340) = 3.96$, $p < .001$). Conversely, individuals who decreased in Trump support ($n = 409$) showed significant decreases in prejudice over the following year ($t(407) = 2.00$, $p = .047$). Americans who did not change in their level of Trump support ($n = 2,816$) exhibited no changes in prejudice ($p = .92$; Supplemental Figure 1).

These results therefore provided additional convergent evidence for the causal role of Trump support in driving these changes in prejudice: Individuals who generally felt positively towards Trump—and those who *became more positive towards Trump*—exhibited corresponding increases in their expressions of prejudice.

Supplementary Text

Rationale for Selection of the VOTER Dataset

There are several other nationally representative surveys that assess Americans' political and social attitudes, and which therefore might be viewed as potentially suitable for testing hypotheses relating to changes in prejudice over time. Here, we briefly outline the reasons why we view the VOTER survey as providing the best additional test of our research questions.

The VOTER dataset has several design features that make it uniquely well-suited for assessing the generalizability of these effects, thereby answering the question of whether the changes in prejudice that we observed in Studies 1-8 generalize to the broader U.S. population. As noted, the VOTER survey featured a (1) nationally representative, (2) longitudinal sample, which included (3) measures of Trump support and (4) measures of prejudice at multiple time points. This is the only existing dataset to our knowledge that fulfills these four criteria, all of which are necessary for decisively testing the questions of whether and how prejudice may have changed in the U.S. during Trump's administration, as a function of support for Trump. Other nationally representative datasets assessing attitudes towards social and political topics, such as those from the GSS, ANES, CCES, RAND, and Pew, all lack one or more of these features—e.g., they are not longitudinal, did not collect measures of Trump support, and/or did not include measures of prejudice at multiple time points. Additionally, given that it is a representative sample, the VOTER dataset also overcomes the limitation posed by the positively skewed (i.e., disproportionately anti-Trump) distribution of Trump support in our previous studies.

Potential Weaknesses of the VOTER Dataset

However, the VOTER dataset does share a few critical weaknesses with these other nationally representative datasets. In particular, it does not hold presentation order or survey

content constant across waves. That is, although the VOTER dataset (unlike other nationally representative surveys) included measures of both Trump support and prejudice at multiple time points, the order in which these measures were presented, and the content that preceded and followed each measure, differed at each time point. In a pilot study using identical measures (detailed below), we found that these design features (i.e., differing survey content and question order) affected participants' mean levels of prejudice, thereby having the potential to create the appearance of increases or decreases in prejudice where none in fact exist. This is a critical advantage of our own longitudinal studies (i.e., Studies 1-8): We held presentation order and survey content constant across time points, thus ruling out the possibility that any changes in expressions of prejudice could be explained by other extraneous design factors. Thus, although the VOTER dataset provides important additional support for our hypothesized effects—showing that the relationship between Trump support and changes in prejudice generalizes to the U.S. population more generally—our studies provide more carefully controlled conditions for estimating the direction and size of these changes in prejudice over time. Therefore, although we present the correlations between Trump support and changes in prejudice from the VOTER data, we focus on our own studies when assessing the absolute degree of changes in prejudice among Trump supporters and non-Trump supporters. This allows us to avoid potentially misleading conclusions regarding changes in prejudice that can be derived from the VOTER data and other similar surveys.

Accounting for Apparent Disparities Between the VOTER Studies and our Own Longitudinal Studies

As noted in the main text (and as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, to whom we are grateful), there are a few measures in the VOTER survey—specifically, certain feeling thermometer measures—on which Trump supporters did not significantly increase in prejudice, and may even have exhibited slight decreases in prejudice. We judged that this apparent inconsistency was deserving of closer examination. Below, we discuss possible reasons for this discrepancy, and we report the results of an additional experimental study we conducted that provides empirical evidence in support of our arguments. In doing so, we also further detail why we view our initial eight longitudinal studies as offering the best measures of whether and how prejudice changed over time.

Survey Content Confounds

One possible reason for Trump supporters' apparent decrease in prejudice on these feeling thermometer measures in the VOTER dataset is that—as noted above—the VOTER survey design varied across waves, and did not hold survey content or presentation order constant across time points. There is abundant evidence in the survey literature supporting the idea that “context matters,” and that when it comes to survey design, participants' responses can be influenced by the context/surrounding content (e.g., the materials and measures that precede a given question or measure; subtle wording changes).

These concerns are perhaps even more important when dealing with sensitive measures such as those assessing racial and religious prejudice. In addition to (somewhat more straightforward) biases such as anchoring and contrast effects, there are also additional

considerations to contend with regarding, e.g., self-presentational motives, perceived intergroup threat, identification with one's racial and/or ideological ingroup, etc.—all of which can be amplified or attenuated by surrounding survey content. Thus, the fact that the VOTER survey measures of prejudice are embedded within completely different sets of measures at each time point raises questions about the degree to which these measures can be relied on as indices of the *absolute* degree of prejudice of Trump supporters and non-Trump supporters at either time point.

Pilot Study

To directly test the question of whether these survey content differences may have artificially created the appearance of a decrease in prejudice among Trump supporters, we ran an additional experimental study. In this study, we wanted to directly test whether the content differences between the different waves of the VOTER survey would influence how participants respond on the feeling thermometer measures of prejudice.

Although there were many differences in survey content between the two waves of the VOTER study, we focused specifically on the differences in the social groups that were included as part of the feeling thermometer measures themselves. Specifically, the feeling thermometer measures in the 2011 study included only racial, religious, and sexual orientation-based groups: Blacks, Whites, Asians, Latinos, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Mormons, and Gays/Lesbians. The 2016 survey, in contrast, included these same groups (with the exception of Mormons) *and* several other, more explicitly political/politicized groups: Black Lives Matter, The Alt-Right, Wall Street Bankers, Labor Unions, Police Officers, Immigrants, and Feminists. We anticipated that these content differences—that is, the differing groups that were included at the two time points—may have influenced participants' mean ratings of the racial and religious minority groups that we analyzed in our manuscript. In particular, it seemed possible that the inclusion at Time 2 (the 2016 panel) of more explicitly political groups such as the Alt-Right and Black Lives Matter—which are likely to receive more extreme (negative or positive) ratings from participants—would shift participants' ratings of the target racial and religious minority groups (e.g., due to contrast or anchoring effects) in ways that might create the illusion that mean prejudice towards these groups was lower.

Participants

We recruited 402 participants from Mechanical Turk. Ten participants who did not report their support for Trump (i.e., those who skipped the question or chose “Don't know”) were excluded from analyses, consistent with our other studies, leaving an analyzable sample of 392 participants.

Procedure

The study used the exact same measures and materials from the 2011 and 2016 VOTER surveys. Participants were asked to rate a series of racial, religious, and sexual orientation-based groups on a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 “Unfavorable” to “Favorable.” They received the following instructions, borrowed from the VOTER survey:

“We'd like to get your feelings toward some groups who are in the news these days. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group. If you come to a group who you don't recognize, you don't need to rate that group. Click on the thermometer to give a rating.”

The experimental manipulation consisted of the specific groups that participants were asked to rate. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either:

- (1) the 2011 version of the feeling thermometer measure, which included nine racial, religious, and sexual orientation-based groups: Blacks, Whites, Asians, Latinos, Christians, Jews, Muslims, Mormons, and Gays/Lesbians.
- (2) The 2016 version of the measure, which featured 15 groups: all of the 2011 groups with the exception of Mormons, along with seven more politicized groups: Black Lives Matter, The Alt-Right, Wall Street Bankers, Labor Unions, Police Officers, Immigrants, and Feminists.

After rating these groups, participants rated their favorability toward Trump using the same item from the VOTER study: “Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Donald Trump?”, rated on a 4-point scale from “Very Favorable” to “Very Unfavorable,” and also including the option of “Don’t Know.”

Results and Discussion

We first calculated participants’ mean ratings of the racial/religious minority groups that we examined in our longitudinal studies: Blacks, Muslims, Hispanics/Latinos, Jews, and Asians. We then tested whether ratings of these minority groups differed between the two conditions.

We found that this manipulation—subtle though it may have seemed—influenced participants’ ratings of these minority groups. Consistent with our predictions, participants who completed the 2016 version of the measures rated the racial and religious minority groups significantly more positively ($t(390) = -2.18, p = .03$). In other words, the differing survey content in the 2016 version made participants appear to be less prejudiced.

We also examined the effect of the manipulation at different levels of Trump support. Notably, we found that this increase in positivity was also significant—and, in fact, even more substantial—among individuals who identified as “very favorable” towards Trump, $t(48) = -2.58, p = .01$. In this experimental study, the average increase in positivity among these “very favorable” Trump supporters corresponded to a difference of 16.4 on the 100-point warmth scale.

To put this into perspective, we computed the mean size of the (apparent) decrease in prejudice towards these same five groups among “very favorable” Trump supporters in the VOTER dataset. The mean decrease among this group was 0.91 points on the 100-point scale. Thus, adjusting for the effect of the differential survey content across waves—which we estimate

to be around 16.4 points on a 100-point scale, based on this experimental study—would be more than sufficient to wash out the very slight apparent decrease in prejudice among Trump supporters in the VOTER dataset.

Thus, there is clear evidence that the content differences between VOTER survey waves affects participants' responses. Critically, these effects are such that they would create the *appearance* of a decrease in prejudice (i.e., more positivity) among Trump supporters where none in fact exists. Further, it is also important to emphasize that this is only one of the many differences that the VOTER survey featured across waves. The other content differences could have further affected participants' responses and artificially influenced their apparent degree of prejudice.

Importantly, however, we addressed these exact kinds of issues in our own studies. In all eight of our longitudinal studies, we held presentation order and survey content identical until after the collection of the dependent measures. Thus, these extraneous factors cannot explain the differences in prejudice that we documented, and our studies therefore provide a more reliable measure of the absolute levels of prejudice among Trump supporters and non-Trump supporters across time. For all of these reasons, we find our data to be the more compelling test of these research questions, and these are therefore the studies that we have foregrounded in the main text.

Time Point Confound

As demonstrated above, then, the content differences between survey waves could, on their own, have accounted for why these few measures in the VOTER dataset appear to be at odds with the bulk of our other findings. However, there is a second important factor that could have further contributed as well. This second factor concerns the specific time points at which the VOTER study (versus our own eight longitudinal studies) surveyed participants.

Our Time 1 studies were conducted shortly before Trump's arrival on the national political stage, and therefore provide a good baseline measure of the levels of prejudice immediately preceding Trump's political rise. The Time 1 VOTER survey, conversely, was conducted more than five years prior to Trump's political rise. This roughly half-a-decade difference is important given that other research has shown that prejudice among Americans—in line with the widely documented trends that we discuss in the introduction of our manuscript—continued to decrease between 2011 and early 2016.

For example, Sawyer and Gampa⁶⁰ traced the decline of Americans' implicit bias and explicit prejudice against Black people between early 2009 and mid-2016. They found a significant decrease in both implicit bias and explicit prejudice among both liberals and conservatives during this period (particularly between 2013 and 2016). (Sawyer and Gampa argue that the decrease in prejudice was driven by the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement, but whatever the cause, the decrease in prejudice during this time is clear.)

As illustrated in our manuscript, there was then a significant increase in prejudice among supporters of Donald Trump following his election in 2016—which would have effectively “undone” the decreases in prejudice that had occurred over the preceding years. Crucially, however, successfully detecting the post-election increase in prejudice would depend on the exact time points at which measurements are conducted. If a Time 1 prejudice measure is collected shortly before the election—as was the case in our eight longitudinal studies—then this


increase should be easily detectable. If, however, this Time 1 prejudice measure is taken several years in the past—as was the case in the VOTER data—this increase in bias would appear smaller, if not be completely undetectable, since the Time 1 measure would have been administered at a time when prejudice was still relatively high (that is, preceding the substantial declines that occurred during the subsequent half decade.)

The trends documented by Sawyer and Gampa therefore may also help to explain why the VOTER data are less consistent than our data in documenting the increase in prejudice among Trump’s supporters: The Time 1 VOTER measures were collected before the declines in prejudice that occurred between 2011 and 2016. More generally, given the well-documented evidence of widespread societal decreases in prejudice in the years between the administration of the 2011 VOTER survey and Trump’s emergence on the political stage in 2016, any Time 1 survey conducted closer to the beginning of Trump’s rise (such as our own studies) should be expected to provide a more accurate test of whether and how prejudice changed following Trump’s political ascent.


(Importantly, however, as noted earlier, despite these countervailing forces in the timeline, Trump supporters *did* nonetheless show significant increases in prejudice on other measures in the VOTER survey. For example, Trump supporters—that is, those who were “somewhat favorable” or “very favorable” toward Trump—significantly increased in prejudice against Blacks using a well-validated multiple-item scale [a 4-item version of the symbolic racism scale] from 2011 to 2016: $F(1,3157) = 55.54, p < .001$. This was also true when limiting the analyses only to those “very favorable” toward Trump, $F(1,1913) = 70.69, p < .001$.)

Finally, beyond the two major issues above relating to changing survey content and time point of the initial prejudice measurement, there are several other reasons why we view the data from our longitudinal studies as providing a more compelling test of our questions of interest. For example, our studies employed a more comprehensive 4-item measure of Trump support, compared with the (ceiling- and floor-effect prone) single 4-point item from the VOTER study. Our studies also included a far wider range of validated measures of prejudice, which provide a more comprehensive picture of whether and how prejudice changed.

For all of the above reasons, we believe that our eight longitudinal studies provide the best measure of changes in Americans’ prejudice over time, and that the available evidence, taken together, provides strong support for our interpretation that these changes in prejudice were driven *both* by increases in prejudice among Trump supporters and decreases in prejudice among non-Trump supporters. This interpretation is further bolstered by the two experimental studies that we conducted (Studies 12 and 13), which show that even a brief reminder of Trump supporters’ endorsement of Trump’s rhetoric (versus no reminder) is enough to increase prejudice among Trump’s supporters.



Supplementary Figure 1. Future changes in prejudice (2017 to 2018) as a function of change in Trump support from 2016 to 2017. Plot displays estimated marginal means adjusting for baseline Trump support and the demographic factors of age, gender, income, education, and race. Shaded error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.



Key

1	Prejudice Against Muslims (S1)	14	Blacks/Whites Warmth Diff. (V)
2	Prejudice Against Muslims (S2)	15	Fear of Illegal Immigrants (S1)
3	Prejudice Against Muslims (S3)	16	Fear of Illegal Immigrants (S2)
4	Guantanamo Scenario (S3)	17	Dislike of Illegal Immigrants (V)
5	Ascent of Man (S3)	18	Christians-Jews Warmth (V)
6	Muslims-Christians Warmth (V)	19	Whites-Asians Warmth (V)
7	Symbolic Racism (S4)	20	Whites-Hispanics Warmth (V)
8	Symbolic Racism (V)	21	Majority Groups-Gays Warmth (V)
9	Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks (S4)	22	Three Greatest Threats (S1)
10	Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks (S5)	23	Three Greatest Threats (S2)
11	Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks (S6)	24	Internal Motivation to Control (S4)
12	Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks (S7)	25	External Motivation to Control (S4)
13	Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks (S8)		

Supplementary Figure 2. Baujat plot⁶¹ showing the relative contribution of each observation to the overall heterogeneity of effect sizes in our longitudinal studies. Excluding #16 does not meaningfully change meta-analysis results.

# ¹	Policy Attitude	Prejudice Measure	Correlation (r)	N	p	CI LB	CI UB
1	Support for a Muslim travel ban	Muslims/Christians warmth difference score	.71	6836	< .001	.70	.72
2	Opposing naturalization for illegal immigrants	Negativity towards illegal immigrants	.69	6518	< .001	.68	.70
3	Make legal immigration more difficult	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score ²	.42	7440	< .001	.40	.44
4	Politicians should restrict immigration	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.56	7746	< .001	.55	.58
5	Being American means being of European descent	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.35	7443	< .001	.33	.37
6	Being American means being Christian	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.54	7570	< .001	.52	.55
7	Being American means speaking English	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.51	7721	< .001	.49	.53
8	Racial equality is not an important goal	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.43	7772	< .001	.41	.45
9	Politicians should focus less on racial equality	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.43	7731	< .001	.41	.45
10	Whites suffer as much discrimination as Blacks	Symbolic racism	.75	7230	< .001	.74	.76
11	There is no systemic pattern of police shooting Black men	Symbolic racism	.72	7170	< .001	.70	.73
12	Opposition to affirmative action	Symbolic racism	.71	6342	< .001	.69	.72
13	Opposition to gay marriage	Gays/Majority groups warmth difference score	.71	6768	< .001	.70	.72

Supplementary Table 1. Associations between Time 2 prejudice and policy attitudes (VOTER data).

¹ Numbers correspond to Supplementary Tables 2 and 8-10.

² For items that relate to attitudes towards minority groups more generally, our prejudice measure is participants' relative liking for high-status/majority groups (Christians, Whites) vs. minority groups (Asians, Blacks, Gays, Hispanics, Jews, Muslims).

# ¹	Policy Attitude	Prejudice Measure	β	t	df	p	CI LB	CI UB
1	Support for a Muslim travel ban	Muslims/Christians warmth difference score	.62	49.99	6228	<0.001	.59	.64
2	Opposing naturalization for illegal immigrants	Negativity towards illegal immigrants	.62	48.53	6073	<0.001	.60	.65
3	Make legal immigration more difficult	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score ⁴	.31	22.13	7278	<0.001	.28	.34
4	Politicians should restrict immigration	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.42	33.25	7571	<0.001	.39	.44
5	Being American means being of European descent	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.24	14.94	7289	<0.001	.21	.27
6	Being American means being Christian	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.38	28.23	7411	<0.001	.36	.41
7	Being American means speaking English	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.51	36.27	7559	<0.001	.48	.54
8	Racial equality is not an important goal	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.35	24.87	7600	<0.001	.32	.38
9	Politicians should focus less on racial equality	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score	.37	24.77	7559	<0.001	.34	.40
10	Whites suffer as much discrimination as Blacks	Symbolic racism	.59	45.17	7216	<0.001	.57	.62
11	There is no systemic pattern of police shooting Black men	Symbolic racism	.53	36.82	7155	<0.001	.51	.56
12	Opposition to affirmative action	Symbolic racism	.44	27.56	6329	<0.001	.41	.47
13	Opposition to gay marriage	Gays/Majority groups warmth difference score	.46	36.23	6413	<0.001	.43	.48

Supplementary Table 2. Associations between Time 2 prejudice and policy attitudes with Time 1 prejudice as a control variable (VOTER data).

¹ Numbers correspond to Supplementary Tables 1 and 8-10.

² For items that relate to attitudes towards minority groups more generally, our prejudice measure is participants' relative liking for high-status/majority groups (Christians, Whites) vs. minority groups (Asians, Blacks, Gays, Hispanics, Jews, Muslims).

Study	<i>Time 1</i>		<i>Time 2</i>		Interval (years)	Response Rate
	Dates	N	Dates	N		
1	Dec.1-Dec. 4, 2014	298	Apr. 20-May 4, 2017	127	2.38	43%
2	Dec.1-Dec. 4, 2014	295	Feb. 7-Mar. 27, 2017	121	2.18	41%
3	Feb. 21-Feb 23, 2014	265	Jun. 19-Jul. 1, 2017	142 ¹ (136)	2.32	54%
4	Sep. 3-Sep. 5, 2015	395	Jun. 12-Jun. 24, 2017	275	1.77	70%
5	Nov. 11, 2014	302	May 9-May 23, 2017	147	2.49	49%
6	Jul. 15, 2014	289	Jul. 11-Jul. 26, 2017	62 (59)	2.99	22%
7	Feb. 4-Mar. 15, 2014	317	Jul.28-Aug. 8, 2017	91 (89)	3.42	28%
8	Jun. 11-Jun. 17, 2014	337	Jun. 3-Jun 17, 2017	100 (96)	2.98	30%
1-8 Avg.		312		133	2.56	42%
VOTER	Dec. 2011	11,168	Nov. 29-Dec. 29, 2016	8,637 (8000) ²	4.96	77%

Supplementary Table 3. Recruitment Dates, inter-session intervals, and response rates for longitudinal studies.

¹The number in parentheses indicates the number of participants with complete, analyzable data.

²For the VOTER data, 11,168 of the original 45,000 respondents were invited to participate in the 2016 survey. 8,637 of these participants (77%) completed the survey. 8,000 representative participants were then chosen through YouGov's sample matching procedure.

Dimension	Study	<i>t</i>	df	<i>p</i>	CI LB	CI UB
Age	1	-2.73	298	0.007	-6.58	-1.06
	2	-3.93	295	<0.001	-8.34	-2.77
	3	-2.17	261	0.031	-5.38	-0.26
	4	-2.63	395	0.000	-6.45	-0.94
	5	-2.86	302	0.005	-6.22	-1.15
	6	-2.95	289	0.004	-7.53	-1.5
	7	-3.34	316	<0.001	-7.95	-2.05
	8	-4.85	337	<0.001	-10.6	-4.48
Education	1	0.76	298	0.45	-0.09	0.20
	2	-0.92	295	0.36	-0.23	0.08
	3	0.92	261	0.36	-0.09	0.24
	4	-1.12	395	0.26	-0.22	0.06
	5	-0.48	302	0.63	-0.18	0.11
	6	-0.47	289	0.64	-0.23	0.14
	7					
	8					
Income	1	0.68	298	0.5	-0.14	0.28
	2	-1.36	295	0.18	-0.37	0.07
	3	-0.08	261	0.93	-0.25	0.23
	4	-0.45	395	0.65	-0.26	0.16
	5	1.00	302	0.32	-0.1	0.3
	6	0.67	289	0.5	-0.18	0.37
	7	1.72	317	0.087	-0.03	0.44
	8					
Gender	1	0.81	298	0.42	-0.07	0.16
	2	-0.5	295	0.61	-0.15	0.09
	3	-0.74	261	0.46	-0.17	0.08
	4	-1.02	395	0.31	-0.16	0.05
	5	1.08	302	0.28	-0.05	0.18
	6	-1.68	289	0.094	-0.25	0.02
	7	0.37	317	0.71	-0.11	0.16
	8	1.55	337	0.12	-0.02	0.2
Race (White vs. Non-White)	1	-1.16	298	0.25	-0.14	0.04
	2	-0.06	295	0.95	-0.1	0.09
	3	1.24	265	0.22	-0.04	0.16
	4	0.1	395	0.92	-0.08	0.09
	5	-0.17	302	0.86	-0.08	0.07
	6	-0.14	289	0.89	-0.12	0.1
	7	-0.22	317	0.83	-0.1	0.08
	8	0.00	337	.999	-0.09	0.09
Political Orientation	1	-1.09	298	0.28	-0.35	0.1
	2	-1.55	295	0.12	-0.41	0.05
	3	0.33	261	0.74	-0.2	0.29
	4	-0.67	394	0.5	-0.3	0.15
	5	-0.48	302	0.63	-0.29	0.18
	6	0.26	289	0.8	-0.24	0.31
	7	0.06	317	0.95	-0.23	0.24
	8	-0.37	337	0.71	-0.28	0.19
Party Identification	1	0.04	298	0.97	-0.22	0.23
	2	-1.94	295	0.053	-0.45	0
	3	0.28	261	0.78	-0.22	0.29
	4					
	5	-0.53	302	0.6	-0.3	0.17
	6	0.93	289	0.35	-0.14	0.4
	7					
	8	-0.19	337	0.85	-0.27	0.22

Supplementary Table 4. Time 1 demographic differences between responders and non-responders, Studies 1-8. Missing values indicate that the measure was not included in that study.

Study	Measure	Non-Responder Mean	Responder Mean	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>CI LB</i>	<i>CI UB</i>
1	Islamoprejudice	3.3	3.59	-1.85	298	0.066	-0.6	0.02
	Fear of Immigrants	5.46	5.84	-1.03	298	0.3	-1.11	0.35
2	Islamoprejudice	3.28	3.68	-2.63	295	0.0091	-0.7	-0.1
	Fear of Immigrants	5.54	5.67	-0.35	295	0.72	-0.87	0.6
3	Islamoprejudice	3.07	3.56	-3.04	262	0.0026	-0.8	-0.17
	Guantanamo	73.15	71.46	0.52	262	0.61	-4.79	8.18
	Ascent of Man	8.64	8.6	0.01	262	0.99	-5.05	5.13
4	Attitudes Towards Blacks	2.79	2.7	0.41	127	0.68	-0.35	0.53
	Symbolic Racism	2.15	2.31	-1.26	134	0.21	-0.42	0.09
5	Attitudes Towards Blacks	2.65	2.79	-1.18	302	0.24	-0.39	0.1
6	Attitudes Towards Blacks	2.34	2.4	-0.46	289	0.65	-0.32	0.2
7	Attitudes Towards Blacks	2.53	2.35	1.55	317	0.12	-0.05	0.41
8	Attitudes Towards Blacks	2.38	2.55	-1.36	337	0.17	-0.4	0.07

Supplementary Table 5. Time 1 prejudice score differences between responders and non-responders, Studies 1-8.

Characteristic		MTurk %	VOTER % ¹
Age	18-24	11.4	14.5
	25-34	34.9	15.9
	35-44	24.4	19.6
	45-54	14.1	19.4
	55-64	12.4	16.9
	65+	2.7	13.8
Gender	Man	48.3	48.5
	Woman	51.6	51.5
	Other	0.2	0.0
Race	Asian	6.2	2.1
	Black	7.2	10.9
	Latino/Hispanic	5.4	11.7
	White	82.5	70.2
	Other	0.9	5.2
Religion	Atheist	28.2	26.3
	Buddhist	2.1	0.8
	Christian	48.6	57.9
	Hindu	1.4	0.3
	Jewish	2.8	2.3
	Muslim	0.7	0.5
	Other	16.2	12.0
Political Orientation	Liberal	51.18	26.5
	Moderate/Neutral	15.4	33.9
	Conservative	32.8	39.6
Party ID	Democrat	44.5	43.9
	Independent	27.6	15.5
	Republican	27.9	38.9
Income	\$25,000 and under	6.1	
	under \$30,000		23.5
	\$25,000 - \$50,000	22.7	
	\$30,000-\$49,999		20.3
	\$50,001 - \$75,000	31.6	
	50,000 and 79,999		21.3
	\$75,001 - \$100,000	19.0	
	\$80,000-119,999		7.1
	\$100,001 - \$125,000	10.4	
	120,000-149,000		12.4
	\$125,001 and over	10.3	
	\$150,001 and up		5.1
Education	Less than High School	0.3	7.4
	High School or GED	10.6	34.4
	Some College	23.3	20.2
	Technical School or Associate's Degree	7.8	9.6
	Bachelor's Degree	43.3	18.1
	Graduate School or above	14.7	10.2

Supplementary Table 6. Demographic information. Not all variables were collected in all studies; percentages are calculated from the available data.

¹In some cases individual response categories were combined in order to facilitate comparison between the datasets. See full measures below, and VOTER topline for exact questions and response options.

Measure	# of Items	Time	N	M	SD	α	Range	
							Possible	Actual
Trump Support	4	Time 2	1,050	2.77	2.06	.96	1.00-7.00	1.00-7.00
Islamoprejudice	10	Time 1	855	3.40	1.32	.93	1.00-7.00	1.00-7.00
		Time 2	386	3.61	1.55	.95	1.00-7.00	1.00-7.00
Secular Critique	10	Time 1	855	5.24	0.82	.72	1.00-7.00	1.90-7.00
		Time 2	387	5.30	0.85	.74	1.00-7.00	3.00-7.00
Guantanamo Scenario	4	Time 1	262	72.25	26.56	.87	0.00-100.00	0.00-100.00
		Time 2	139	69.49	27.84	.87	0.00-100.00	0.00-100.00
Full Symbolic Racism	8	Time 1	134	2.26	0.70	.90	1.00-3.88	1.00-3.88
		Time 2	89	2.22	0.79	.92	1.00-3.88	1.00-3.88
Short Symbolic Racism	4	Time 1	7,957	3.48	1.08	.86	1.00-5.00	1.00-5.00
		Time 2	7,854	3.33	1.27	.90	1.00-5.00	1.00-5.00
Attitudes Towards Blacks	20	Time 1	1,372	2.52	1.01	.95	1.00-7.00	1.00-7.00
		Time 2	491	2.51	1.09	.97	1.00-7.00	1.00-6.90
Fear of Illegal Immigrants	4	Time 1	593	5.61	3.16	.95	1.00-11.00	1.00-11.00
		Time 2	248	5.60	3.49	.97	1.00-11.00	1.00-11.00
Internal Motivation Scale	5	Time 1	134	6.98	1.94	.91	1.00-9.00	1.00-9.00
		Time 2	95	7.27	2.05	.95	1.00-9.00	1.00-9.00
External Motivation Scale	5	Time 1	134	4.20	2.27	.91	1.00-9.00	1.00-9.00
		Time 2	95	3.69	2.49	.94	1.00-9.00	1.00-9.00

Supplementary Table 7. Properties of independent and dependent scale measures, Studies 1-8.

# ¹	Question Text ²	Response Scale	Correlation (<i>r</i>)	<i>N</i>	<i>p</i>	CI LB	CI UB
1	Do you favor or oppose temporarily banning Muslims from other countries from entering the United States?	1-4; Strongly Oppose-Strongly Favor	0.73	7129	<0.001	0.72	0.74
2	Do you favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens?	1=Favor, 2=Oppose	0.56	6738	<0.001	0.54	0.57
3	Do you think it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the US legally than it is currently?	1-5; Much easier-Much harder	0.35	7367	<0.001	0.33	0.37
4	Would you like to see the [Republican/Democratic] ³ Party focus more, less, or about the same amount on...restricting immigration ⁴	1-5; Much Less-Much More	0.65	7684	<0.001	0.64	0.66
5	How important do you think...being of European heritage or dissent is to being American?	1-4; Not important at all-Very important	0.25	7377	<0.001	0.23	0.27
6	How important do you think...being Christian is to being American?	1-4; Not important at all-Very important	0.43	7502	<0.001	0.41	0.45
7	How important do you think...speaking English is to being American?	1-4; Not important at all-Very important	0.44	7647	<0.001	0.42	0.46
8	How important are the following issues to you? Racial Equality	1-4; Very Important-Very Unimportant	0.46	7710	<0.001	0.44	0.48
9	Would you like to see the [Republican/Democratic] Party focus more, less, or about the same amount on...increasing racial equality?	1-5; Much More- Much Less	0.47	7673	<0.001	0.45	0.49
10	Today discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.	1-4; Strongly disagree-Strongly agree	0.64	7124	<0.001	0.63	0.66
11	Do you think the recent killings of African American men by police in recent years are isolated incidents, or are they part of a broader pattern of how police treat African Americans?	1= Part of a broader pattern, 2 = Isolated incidents	0.64	7082	<0.001	0.63	0.66
12	Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative action programs for women and racial minorities?	1=Favor; 2=Oppose	0.61	6268	<0.001	0.60	0.63
13	Do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?	1 = Favor, 2= Oppose	0.53	6880	<0.001	0.51	0.55

Supplementary Table 8. Policy attitudes, response scales, and associations with Trump support (VOTER data). All questions are coded so that higher values indicate greater support for anti-minority positions.

¹ Question numbers correspond to Supplementary Tables 1, 2, 9, and 10.

²Measures containing ellipses (...) are abbreviated slightly for clarity. Full wording can be found in VOTER dataset.

³The party specified matched the participants' own preferred political party

# ¹	Mediator (M) ²	Outcome (Y)	N	Effect	b	p	95% CI
1	Muslims/Christians warmth difference score (-100 to 100) ³	Support for a ban on Muslims entering the U.S. (1-4)	6,132	A path	11.79	< .001	11.17,12.42
				B path	.01	< .001	0.009,0.010
				Direct	.43	< .001	.415,.453
				Indirect	.11	+++	0.103,0.124
2	Negativity towards illegal immigrants (1-3)	Opposing paths to naturalization for illegal immigrants (binary)	5,978	A path	.302	< .001	.288,.315
				B path	1.39	< .001	1.273,1.509
				Direct	.328	< .001	.216,.395
				Indirect	.420	+++	.376,.467
3	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	Support for making legal immigration more difficult (1-5)	7,137	A path	5.480	< .001	5.15,5.81
				B path	.0124	< .001	.011,.014
				Direct	.147	< .001	.122,.171
				Indirect	.068	+++	.058,.079
4	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	Politicians should focus more on restricting immigration (1-5)	7,421	A path	5.55	< .001	5.229,5.874
				B path	.014	< .001	.013,.015
				Direct	.534	< .001	.512,.556
				Indirect	.078	+++	.069,.087
5	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	To be truly American, one must be of European descent (1-4)	7,164	A path	5.504	< .001	5.178,5.832
				B path	.007	< .001	.006,.008
				Direct	.053	< .001	.035,.070
				Indirect	.040	+++	.033,.047
6	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	To be truly American, one must be Christian (1-4)	7,281	A path	5.47	< .001	5.141,5.791
				B path	.014	< .001	.013,.016
				Direct	.158	< .001	.137,.179
				Indirect	.077	+++	.068,.086
7	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	To be truly American, one must speak English (1-4)	7,421	A path	5.481	< .001	5.160,5.802
				B path	.011	< .001	.010,.011
				Direct	.141	< .001	.127,.156
				Indirect	.057	+++	.051,.065
8	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	Racial equality is not an important goal (1-4)	7,449	A path	5.478	< .001	5.157,5.780
				B path	.008	< .001	.007,.009
				Direct	.235	< .001	.218,.253
				Indirect	.045	+++	.038,.052
9	Minority/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	Politicians should focus less on racial equality (1-5)	7,412	A path	5.521	< .001	5.198,5.844
				B path	.011	< .001	.010,.013
				Direct	.347	< .001	.323,.372
				Indirect	.063	+++	.054,.073
10	Symbolic racism (1-5)	Whites suffer as much discrimination as Blacks	7,091	A path	.285	< .001	.267,.301
				B path	.403	< .001	.380,.427
				Direct	.208	< .001	.191,.225
				Indirect	.115	+++	.104,.126

11	Symbolic racism (1-5)	(1-4) There is no pattern of police shooting African- American men (binary)	7,040	A path	.281	< .001	.265,.296
		B path		1.038	< .001	.939,1.137	
		Direct		.717	< .001	.650,.785	
		Indirect		.291	+++	.259,.326	
12	Symbolic racism (1-5)	Opposition to affirmative action programs (binary)	6,229	A path	.275	< .001	.259,.292
				B path	.900	< .001	.799,1.001
				Direct	.552	< .001	.482,.623
				Indirect	.248	+++	.216,.283
13	Gays/Majority groups warmth difference score (-100 to 100)	Opposition to gay marriage (binary)	6,299	A path	7.089	< .001	6.574,7.603
				B path	.059	< .001	.054,.063
				Direct	.368	< .001	.299,.436
				Indirect	.415	+++	.369,.464

Supplementary Table 9. Mediation models: Trump support, Time 2 prejudice, and Time 2 anti-minority policy positions (VOTER data). Independent (X) variable for all analyses is Trump support. All analyses control for Time 1 Prejudice.

+++ significant indirect effect.

¹Numbers correspond to Supplementary Tables 1, 2, 8, and 10.

²because some outcome measures are binary, we report unstandardized effects for consistency across models⁶². The response scales for Y and M are shown in parentheses to aid in interpretation.

³For items that relate to attitudes towards minority groups more generally, our prejudice measure is participants' relative liking for high-status/majority groups (Christians, Whites) vs. minority groups (Asians, Blacks, Gays, Hispanics, Jews, Muslims).

# ¹	Mediator (M)	Outcome (Y)	N	Effect	b	p	95% CI
2	Change in negativity towards illegal immigrants	Increases in opposition to naturalization	5,123	A path	.089	<.001	.075,.102
				B path	.126	<.001	.111,.142
				Direct	.002	.642	-.009,.006
				Indirect	.011	+++	.009,.014
3	Change in Minority/High-Status groups warmth difference score	Increases in support for making legal immigration more difficult	6,734	A path	3.13	<.001	2.815,3.450
				B path	.003	<.001	.002,.005
				Direct	.102	<.001	.080,.123
				Indirect	.011	+++	.006,.016
12	Increases in symbolic racism	Increases in opposition to affirmative action	5,251	A path	.146	<.001	.132,.161
				B path	.064	<.001	.053,.076
				Direct	.012	<.001	.006,.018
				Indirect	.009	+++	.007,.012
13	Change in Gays/High-Status groups warmth difference score	Increases in opposition to gay marriage ²	5,769	A path	2.565	<.001	2.060,3.069
				B path	.002	<.001	.0018,.0024
				Direct	.018	<.001	.013,.024
				Indirect	.005	+++	.004,.007

Supplementary Table 10. Mediation models: Trump support, changes in prejudice, and changes in anti-minority policy positions (VOTER data). Independent (X) variable for all analyses is Trump support.

+++ significant indirect effect

¹Model numbers correspond to Supplementary Tables 1, 2, 8, and 9.

²Although there is no significant association between Trump support and change in opposition to gay marriage, we nonetheless test for (and find) mediation, based on the recommendations of Hayes⁶² and others, who have demonstrated that a significant simple association between X and Y is not a necessary condition for mediation.

ID	Variable	β	t	df	p	CI LB	CI UB
General Demographic Factors							
V1	Age	0.35	7.33	379	<0.001	0.26	0.45
V2	Education	0.34	7.09	379	<0.001	0.25	0.44
V3	Gender	0.34	7.11	379	<0.001	0.25	0.43
V4	Income Time 1	0.34	7.17	379	<0.001	0.25	0.44
V5	Income Time 2	0.32	6.60	380	<0.001	0.22	0.41
V6	Party Identification	0.37	5.27	381	<0.001	0.23	0.51
V7	Political Orientation	0.35	4.96	381	<0.001	0.21	0.49
V8	Participant race (White vs. non-White)	0.32	6.61	381	<0.001	0.22	0.42
Political Engagement							
V9	Perceived importance of following the news	0.33	6.80	381	<0.001	0.23	0.42
V10	Following conservative vs. liberal news	0.46	6.37	245	<0.001	0.32	0.60
V11	Following local vs. national news	0.42	6.94	245	<0.001	0.30	0.54
V12	News following	0.53	6.84	118	<0.001	0.38	0.69
Social/Political Beliefs							
V13	Pride of being American	0.42	5.85	244	<0.001	0.28	0.56
V14	Identification as American	0.43	6.60	244	<0.001	0.30	0.56
V15	Mood	0.55	6.66	117	<0.001	0.38	0.71
V16	Secular critique Pt1	0.32	6.73	381	<0.001	0.23	0.41
V17	Secular critique Pt2	0.31	6.66	381	<0.001	0.22	0.40
V18	Belief that the U.S. economy is strong	0.42	6.88	245	<0.001	0.30	0.54
V19	Perceived # of enemies of the US	0.43	6.96	245	<0.001	0.31	0.55
V20	Perceived # of allies of the US	0.42	6.83	245	<0.001	0.30	0.54
V21	Perceived percent of U.S. population that is White	0.42	6.86	244	<0.001	0.30	0.54
V22	Perceptions of when the U.S. would become a minority-majority nation	0.53	6.84	118	<0.001	0.37	0.68
V23	Perceived support for Obama among other nations	0.45	4.51	118	<0.001	0.25	0.65
V24	Three Greatest Threats measure	0.37	6.06	245	<0.001	0.25	0.49
V25	Belief that Illegal immigrants pose a threat to the U.S. economy	0.40	4.20	245	<0.001	0.21	0.59
V26	Belief that illegal immigrants pose a threat to the U.S. healthcare system	0.38	4.39	245	<0.001	0.21	0.56
V27	Belief that illegal immigrants will increase violence	0.42	4.48	245	<0.001	0.23	0.60
V28	Belief that illegal immigrants take jobs from Americans	0.36	4.01	245	<0.001	0.18	0.54
V29	Perceived percent of friends who voted for Trump	0.33	4.22	244	<0.001	0.18	0.49
V30	Perceived percent of neighborhood who voted for Trump	0.39	5.99	244	<0.001	0.26	0.51
Regional Factors							
V31	Actual percent of county who voted for Trump	0.34	6.56	362	<0.001	0.24	0.44
V32	Gini coefficient	0.35	6.90	357	<0.001	0.25	0.45
V33	Median income	0.35	6.79	355	<0.001	0.25	0.45
V34	Persons per square mile	0.34	6.86	363	<0.001	0.24	0.44
V35	Percent Black	0.34	6.81	363	<0.001	0.24	0.44
V36	Percent White	0.34	6.77	363	<0.001	0.24	0.44
V37	Rural urban continuum	0.34	6.65	359	<0.001	0.24	0.44
V38	Unemployment rate	0.35	6.91	354	<0.001	0.25	0.44
V39	Violent crime	0.33	6.40	344	<0.001	0.23	0.43

Supplementary Table 11. Factors examined as potential mediators of the relationship between Trump support and increases in prejudice against Muslims (Studies 1-3). Beta weight indicates the strength of the relationship when the variable is controlled for in the regression model.

Measure	<i>N</i>	Study	Group ¹	Obs. ²	Target	β/r	<i>t</i>	df	<i>p</i>	CI LB ³	CI UB ⁴
Prejudice Against Muslims	127	1	1	1	Muslims	0.28	3.22	125	0.002	0.11	0.45
Prejudice Against Muslims	121	2	1	1	Muslims	0.53	6.91	119	<0.001	0.38	0.69
Prejudice Against Muslims	136	3	1	1	Muslims	0.10	1.20	134	0.230	-0.06	0.26
Guantanamo Scenario	136	3	1	2	Muslims	0.22	2.63	134	0.010	0.05	0.38
Ascent of Man	136	3	1	3	Muslims	0.07	0.79	134	0.430	-0.10	0.24
Muslims-Christians Warmth	6,265	9	1	1	Muslims	0.23	18.48	6631	<0.001	0.20	0.25
Symbolic Racism	89	4	1	1	Blacks	0.37	3.59	87	<0.001	0.17	0.58
Symbolic Racism	7,555	9	1	2	Blacks	0.30	26.49	7732	<0.001	0.28	0.32
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	91	4	2	1	Blacks	0.23	2.19	89	0.031	0.02	0.44
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	147	5	1	1	Blacks	0.21	2.58	145	0.011	0.05	0.37
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	59	6	1	1	Blacks	0.19	1.46	57	0.150	-0.07	0.46
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	89	7	1	1	Blacks	0.22	2.09	87	0.040	0.01	0.43
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	96	8	1	1	Blacks	0.35	3.57	94	<0.001	0.15	0.54
Blacks/Whites Warmth Diff.	6,823	9	1	3	Blacks	0.17	13.14	7134	<0.001	0.14	0.19
Fear of Illegal Immigrants	127	1	1	2	Other	0.24	2.74	125	0.007	0.07	0.41
Fear of Illegal Immigrants	121	2	1	2	Other	0.41	4.92	119	<0.001	0.25	0.58
Dislike of Illegal Immigrants	6,467	9	1	8	Other	0.21	17.09	6764	<0.001	0.19	0.23
Christians-Jews Warmth	6,666	9	1	4	Other	0.15	11.73	7035	<0.001	0.12	0.17
Whites-Asians Warmth	6,680	9	1	6	Other	0.17	13.68	7037	<0.001	0.15	0.20
Whites-Hispanics Warmth	6,707	9	1	5	Other	0.15	12.07	7061	<0.001	0.13	0.18
Majority Groups-Gays Warmth	6,814	9	1	7	Other	0.15	11.5	7103	<0.001	0.12	0.17
Three Greatest Threats	127	1	1	3	Other	0.24	2.82	125	0.006	0.07	0.42
Three Greatest Threats	121	2	1	3	Other	0.24	2.75	119	0.007	0.07	0.42
Internal Motivation to Control	95	4	3	1	Other	0.20	2.12	93	0.036	0.01	0.39
External Motivation to Control	95	4	3	2	Other	0.18	1.84	93	0.069	-0.01	0.37

Supplementary Table 12. Effect sizes for the relationship between Trump support and changes in prejudice (Studies 1-9). Prejudice measures are coded such that higher scores indicate greater prejudice. Observations that are included in the main text and primary meta-analyses are in bold.

¹indicates unique samples

²Indicates unique observations within samples

³95% confidence interval lower bound

⁴95% confidence interval upper bound

Measure	<i>N</i>	Study	Group ¹	Obs. ²	Target	β/r	<i>t</i>	df	<i>p</i>	CI LB ³	CI UB ⁴
Prejudice Against Muslims	127	1	1	1	Muslims	0.19	1.41	124	0.16	-0.07	0.45
Prejudice Against Muslims	121	2	1	1	Muslims	0.71	5.93	118	<0.001	0.47	0.95
Prejudice Against Muslims	136	3	1	1	Muslims	0.09	0.78	133	0.440	-0.14	0.32
Guantanamo Scenario	136	3	1	2	Muslims	0.34	2.95	133	0.004	0.11	0.57
Ascent of Man	136	3	1	3	Muslims	-0.07	-0.55	133	0.590	-0.30	0.17
Muslims-Christians Warmth	6,265	9	1	1	Muslims	0.19	11.75	6497	<0.001	0.16	0.22
Symbolic Racism	89	4	1	1	Blacks	0.66	5.04	86	<0.001	0.40	0.92
Symbolic Racism	7,555	9	1	2	Blacks	0.24	16.73	7529	<0.001	0.21	0.27
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	91	4	2	1	Blacks	0.18	1.18	88	0.240	-0.12	0.49
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	147	5	1	1	Blacks	0.24	1.98	144	0.049	0.01	0.49
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	59	6	1	1	Blacks	0.26	1.75	56	0.086	-0.04	0.55
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	89	7	1	1	Blacks	0.11	0.67	86	0.500	-0.22	0.44
Blatant Prejudice Against Blacks	96	8	1	1	Blacks	0.18	1.23	93	0.220	-0.11	0.48
Blacks/Whites Warmth Diff.	6,823	9	1	3	Blacks	0.08	4.71	6978	<0.001	0.04	0.11
Fear of Illegal Immigrants	127	1	1	2	Other	0.28	2.13	124	0.035	0.02	0.55
Fear of Illegal Immigrants	121	2	1	2	Other	0.52	4.00	118	<0.001	0.26	0.78
Dislike of Illegal Immigrants	6,467	9	1	8	Other	0.20	12.96	6620	<0.001	0.17	0.24
Christians-Jews Warmth	6,666	9	1	4	Other	0.09	5.91	6884	<0.001	0.06	0.13
Whites-Asians Warmth	6,680	9	1	6	Other	0.13	7.93	6884	<0.001	0.10	0.16
Whites-Hispanics Warmth	6,707	9	1	5	Other	0.12	7.22	6909	<0.001	0.08	0.15
Majority Groups-Gays Warmth	6,814	9	1	7	Other	0.13	8.05	6938	<0.001	0.10	0.16
Three Greatest Threats	127	1	1	3	Other	0.17	1.28	124	0.200	-0.09	0.43
Three Greatest Threats	121	2	1	3	Other	0.24	1.73	118	0.087	-0.04	0.52
Internal Motivation to Control	95	4	3	1	Other	0.29	1.76	92	0.082	-0.04	0.61
External Motivation to Control	95	4	3	2	Other	0.08	0.52	92	0.610	-0.24	0.41

Supplementary Table 13. Effect sizes for the relationship between Trump support and changes in prejudice, controlling for political conservatism (Studies 1-9). Prejudice measures are coded such that higher scores indicate greater prejudice. Observations that are included in the main text and primary meta-analyses are in bold.

¹indicates unique samples

²Indicates unique observations within samples

³95% confidence interval lower bound

⁴95% confidence interval upper bound

ID	Variable	β/r	<i>T</i>	df	<i>p</i>	CI LB ³	CI UB ⁴
General Demographic Factors							
V1	Gender	0.29	25.99	7731	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V2	Age	0.28	24.25	7731	<0.001	0.26	0.3
V3	Education 2011	0.30	26.31	7715	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V4	Education 2016	0.29	25.71	7731	<0.001	0.27	0.31
V5	Family income 2011	0.28	23.20	6318	<0.001	0.26	0.31
V6	Family income 2016	0.27	22.96	6685	<0.001	0.25	0.30
V7	Marital status	0.30	26.57	7729	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V8	Whether or not the participant has children under 18	0.30	26.52	7731	<0.001	0.28	0.32
Race/Ethnicity-Relevant Factors							
V9	Participant race, White vs. Non-White	0.30	26.21	7731	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V10	Belief that one is affected by what happens to members of one's race	0.30	26.39	7694	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V11	Importance of own racial/ethnic identity	0.30	26.46	7694	<0.001	0.28	0.32
Religion/Religiosity							
V12	Participant's religion	0.27	23.36	7721	<0.001	0.25	0.30
V13	Whether or not participant is a Christian	0.28	24.03	7728	<0.001	0.26	0.30
V14	Whether or not the participant is a born-again Christian	0.28	24.30	7725	<0.001	0.26	0.30
V15	Importance of religion to participant	0.27	23.36	7731	<0.001	0.25	0.30
V16	Frequency of prayer	0.29	25.08	7550	<0.001	0.27	0.31
V17	Frequency of church attendance	0.29	25.61	7662	<0.001	0.27	0.32
Political Identification							
V18	Political Ideology 2011	0.25	18.08	7347	<0.001	0.22	0.27
V19	Political Ideology 2016	0.24	16.73	7529	<0.001	0.21	0.27
V20	Political Party Identification 2011	0.29	20.17	7554	<0.001	0.26	0.31
V21	Political Party Identification 2016	0.29	17.93	7681	<0.001	0.25	0.32
V22	Whether participant is a member of the tea party	0.30	21.71	6786	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V23	Support for tea party	0.28	16.67	4673	<0.001	0.25	0.31
Political Engagement							
V24	News Following	0.31	27.65	7687	<0.001	0.29	0.33
V25	Frequency of watching local television news (2011)	0.29	25.24	7206	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V26	Frequency of reading local newspaper	0.30	26.21	7678	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V27	Hours per day watching television	0.30	26.61	7699	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V28	Interest in politics	0.30	26.52	7722	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V29	Self-reported political knowledge	0.30	26.48	7669	<0.001	0.28	0.32
Support for Other Politicians							
V30	Support for Ted Cruz	0.28	18.53	7309	<0.001	0.25	0.31
V31	Support for Paul Ryan	0.28	20.62	7210	<0.001	0.25	0.31
V32	Support for Marco Rubio	0.28	19.39	7197	<0.001	0.25	0.31
V33	Support for Mitt Romney	0.31	25.57	7390	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V34	Support for Barack Obama	0.20	11.16	7662	<0.001	0.16	0.23
V35	Support for Hillary Clinton	0.30	18.61	7667	<0.001	0.27	0.33
V36	Support for Bernie Sanders	0.23	15.39	7493	<0.001	0.2	0.26
Beliefs About Society							
V37	Belief that one will be the victim of a crime within the next 12 months	0.30	24.16	6303	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V38	Belief that most people can't be trusted	0.29	25.18	7201	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V39	Belief that people tend to look out only for themselves	0.30	25.75	7087	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V40	Belief that people take advantage of others	0.29	24.52	6669	<0.001	0.27	0.32
Personal Life Trajectory							
V41	Belief that personal finances have gotten worse	0.29	25.08	7651	<0.001	0.27	0.31
V42	Belief that one's own values are becoming rarer	0.27	22.63	7138	<0.001	0.25	0.30
V43	Belief that life for people like you is worse than in the past	0.29	24.35	7341	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V44	Belief that future generations will be worse off than participant	0.30	23.12	6032	<0.001	0.28	0.33

Beliefs About the State of the U.S.							
V45	Belief that the country is on the wrong track	0.31	25.45	6712	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V46	Belief that American economy is getting worse	0.28	24.21	7280	<0.001	0.26	0.31
V47	Belief that wealth distribution in the U.S. is fair	0.27	18.27	6743	<0.001	0.24	0.30
V48	Belief that success is determined by factors outside one's control	0.30	26.24	7340	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V49	Belief that the U.S. is less respected than in the past	0.30	25.44	7301	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V50	Belief that the government can't be trusted	0.30	26.33	7692	<0.001	0.28	0.32
V51	Approval of Obama's job as president	0.19	10.85	7671	<0.001	0.15	0.22
V52	Belief that Obama's policies favored Blacks over Whites	0.27	19.10	6957	<0.001	0.24	0.29
V53	Would rather be American than live in any other country	0.26	20.71	7131	<0.001	0.23	0.28
V54	Not ashamed of the U.S.	0.26	21.26	7433	<0.001	0.24	0.29
V55	People from other countries should be more like Americans	0.29	20.23	6247	<0.001	0.26	0.31
V56	Proud of U.S. democracy	0.29	23.70	7383	<0.001	0.26	0.31
V57	Proud of U.S. history	0.24	18.58	7473	<0.001	0.21	0.26
V58	Proud of how U.S. treats all groups equally	0.25	18.86	7417	<0.001	0.22	0.27
V59	Belief that elections don't matter	0.30	26.81	7666	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V60	Belief that America is a fair and meritocratic society	0.23	17.86	7645	<0.001	0.2	0.25
V61	Economic system biased in favor of the wealthy	0.27	20.56	7632	<0.001	0.24	0.30
V62	Belief that the media can't be trusted	0.26	19.92	7646	<0.001	0.23	0.28
V63	Belief that one has no power over what the government does	0.30	26.61	7640	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V64	Belief that elites don't understand one's problems	0.30	26.12	7625	<0.001	0.27	0.32
Policy Beliefs							
V65	Belief that the government regulates too much	0.24	16.29	6910	<0.001	0.21	0.27
V66	Support for raising taxes on the wealthy	0.31	22.54	6969	<0.001	0.28	0.33
V67	Opposition to increasing trade with other nations	0.28	21.27	5634	<0.001	0.26	0.31
V68	Support for small (vs. large) government	0.27	18.72	6799	<0.001	0.24	0.30
V69	Belief that free trade limits jobs	0.29	25.62	7586	<0.001	0.27	0.31
V70	Belief that free trade limits wages	0.30	26.05	7575	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V71	Belief that free trade increases prices	0.29	25.47	7574	<0.001	0.27	0.31
V72	Belief that free trade decreases production	0.29	25.52	7573	<0.001	0.27	0.31
V73	Belief that free trade decreases product quality	0.29	24.88	7589	<0.001	0.26	0.31
Regional Factors							
V74	Percentage of county population who voted for Trump	0.30	25.77	7675	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V75	Gini coefficient (2015)	0.29	25.93	7584	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V76	Median income (2014)	0.30	26.01	7510	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V77	Persons per square mile (2010)	0.29	25.73	7663	<0.001	0.27	0.31
V78	Percent Black (2014)	0.29	26.02	7661	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V79	Percent White (2014)	0.29	25.91	7661	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V80	Rural urban continuum (2013)	0.29	25.77	7592	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V81	Unemployment rate (2012)	0.30	26.00	7482	<0.001	0.27	0.32
V82	Violent crime (2014)	0.30	22.79	5768	<0.001	0.27	0.33

Supplementary Table 14. Factors examined as potential mediators of the relationship between Trump support and increases in symbolic racism (VOTER data). Beta weight indicates the strength of the relationship when the variable is controlled for in the regression model.

Supplemental References

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