

Supplementary Information for
Humans expect generosity

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Table 1 in the main text displays the distribution of expected behavior across conditions. Table S1 below presents an overview of the main statistics in each condition. We can test whether all guesses come from the same distribution using a Kruskal-Wallis test. This cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions at any common significance level, both when we assume that guesses from C1 and C2 are unpaired (p -value = 0.199) and when we exclude any of the two conditions from the analysis (p -values = 0.173 and 0.287, when we exclude C1 and C2 respectively).

We have performed pairwise comparisons using a Mann-Whitney test (a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for paired samples is used to compare Condition 1 and 2). Because multiple tests were performed, the p -values (reported in Table S2) are corrected to control the familywise

error rate using the Holm-Bonferroni method (1, 2). The results suggest that there are not statistically significant differences between the underlying distributions of any two conditions at any common significance level (p -values > 0.305).

In order to assess whether or not expectations about generosity are accurate, we need to compare them with the actual behavior of dictators. Fig. S1 displays the distribution of donations in all the conditions. While we observe that dictators are generous, the Kruskal-Wallis test suggests that at least one sample stochastically dominates one other sample ($\chi^2_2 = 7.11$, $p = 0.028$). Pairwise comparisons across conditions confirm that donations are smaller in Conditions 3 and 4 ($p < 0.021$) indicating that dictators are more selfish when stakes are high or there is social distance (3–5). These findings, in turn, imply that subjects overestimate the generosity of dictators in these conditions, while they are quite accurate in the rest of conditions. The p -values when comparing the distribution of guesses and donations using the Mann-Whitney test are as follows. Condition 1: $p = 0.844$; Condition 2: $p = 0.182$; Condition 3: $p = 0.0090$; Condition 4: $p = 0.003$; Condition 5: $p = 0.322$; Condition 6: $p = 0.130$.

Table S1: Summary of the data

Condition	n	Mean	Median	Min.	Observed frequency	
					Max.	Guess = 0 Guess = 5
C1. Recipient (own-dictator)	50	3.40	4	0	6	10% 32%
C2. Recipient (other dictator)	50	4.02	4	1	10	0% 44%
C3. Recipient (field)	28	4.14	4	0	10	11% 36%
C4. Recipient (absent dictator)	27	3.93	4	0	10	15% 41%
C5. External (observer)	50	3.10	3	0	10	16% 28%
C6. Dictator (other dictator)	50	3.40	4	0	10	10% 32%

Note: The modal value was 5 in every single condition.

Table S2: Pairwise comparison of distributions across conditions.

	C2 (other dictator)	C3 (field)	C4 (absent dictator)	C5 (observer)	C6 (dictator)
C1 (own-dictator)	1.728	1.146	1.212	0.934	0.510
C2 (other dictator)		0.005	0.059	2.320	0.848
C3 (field)			0.017	1.750	0.630
C4 (absent dictator)				1.724	0.576
C5 (observer)					1.272

Notes: The comparison between C1 and C2 is a within-subject (i.e., we consider the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Because we perform a total of 15 pairwise comparisons, we correct the p-values using the Holm-Bonferroni method. The smallest of the unadjusted p-values is 0.020 (when comparing C2 and C5). This is not smaller than $\alpha/15$ so we fail to reject the null hypothesis that guesses in C2 and C5 come from the same distribution at any common significance level $\alpha = 0.10, 0.05, 0.01$. The rest of the null hypotheses are therefore rejected.

References

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


Figure 1: **Experimental subjects are generous and donate positive amounts but we observe an effect of high-stakes and social distance.** Histograms of the donations by dictators in the different conditions.