APPENDIX I: SUPPLEMENTARY LABORATORY STUDIES

We used three laboratory studies to supplement our main archival study. Study A corroborated the validity of measuring symbolic threats as government corruption and realistic threats as economic volatility in the main archival study. Study B clarified the cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying the relationships between the two domains of threats and divergent behavioral responses. Study C operationalized symbolic threats using a different measure (i.e., human rights violations) and cross-validated our findings.

Study A: Economic Volatility as a Realistic Threat and Corruption as a Symbolic Threat

Fifty-three masters' students in business administration (26 females, 27 males) at a large public university in the United States participated in the study for course credit. To conceal the true purpose of the study, we asked participants to imagine that they were hired as managers at a multinational enterprise (MNE) entering a foreign host country and that they needed to evaluate the host country environments for the company. Following prior studies (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), we assigned participants to read two news articles in a randomized order. We informed participants that the articles recently appeared in a Sunday section of *The Wall Street Journal*. The articles were formatted to look like web articles featuring the newspaper's logo, font, and style. One article, used in previous research (e.g., Hill, Rodeheffer, Griskevicius, Durante, & White, 2012; Mittal & Griskevicius, 2014) and titled "Economy is Getting More Volatile," described recent examples of economic turmoil and the increasing sense of economic volatility in the host country. The other article, titled "Corruption is Getting Worse," described the rising number of corruption convictions in the host country.

After reading both articles, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed with statements regarding realistic and symbolic threats on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Again, we presented the statements in random order to mitigate order biases. To assess the realistic threat, participants indicated their levels of agreement with six statements, adapted from previous studies (e.g., Morrison & Ybarra, 2008; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Statements included the following: "Such an environment represents a substantial financial threat to our firm," and "Our firm has

difficulties in securing financial resources in this environment." Subsequently, we averaged participants' responses to form a realistic threat index ($\alpha = 0.66$), with a higher score indicating a higher perceived realistic threat. To assess the symbolic threat, participants were also presented with six statements, adapted from previous research (e.g., McLaren, 2003; Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2009). Statements included the following: "Such an environment represents a substantial moral threat to our firm," and "Our firm has difficulties in maintaining its own moral values in this environment." We averaged participants' responses to form a symbolic threat index ($\alpha = 0.81$), with higher scores indicating a higher perceived symbolic threat.

We then performed a two-way (Article × Threat Perceptions) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the mean difference threat ratings (see Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005); a significant Article × Threat Perceptions interaction term would reveal that economic volatility and corruption pose different threats. Our analyses showed that, as predicted, this interaction term was statistically significant ($F = 12.33$, $p = 0.001$). Overall, the results supported our measures in the archival study; in other words, business professionals are likely to perceive economic volatility as a realistic threat and corruption as a symbolic threat.

Study B: Different Psychological Mechanisms as Evoked by Realistic and Symbolic Threats

After revealing the various threats evoked by economic volatility and corruption in the first experiment, we conducted a second laboratory experiment to examine the possible psychological mechanisms driving participants' diverging responses toward realistic versus symbolic threats, exploring both cognitive and affective mechanisms. First, we examined whether threats alter cognitive flexibility in information processing; compared to realistic threats, perceived symbolic threats may lead to a lower level of cognitive flexibility, which can result in an increased likelihood of rigid and defensive reactions. In addition, we examined whether threats can trigger different affective reactions (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) that can lead to divergent reactions.

Participants

We recruited 141 participants (51 females, 90 males) who were international business majors at a public university in the United States to participate in the study for course credit.

Procedure

We randomly assigned participants to three experimental conditions: realistic threat, symbolic threat, and control. Similar to the first laboratory study, we asked participants to assume the role of top executives in an MNE entering a foreign host country. We randomly assigned one-third of participants to read the news article about economic volatility in the host country, as described in the first experiment; one-third of participants to read the news article about corruption, also as previously described; and one-third of participants to read an article from a similar source and with a similar length and style as the control condition. The control article described only the cruel history of the host country and was designed to elicit similar levels of negative arousal.

Measures

In addition to the perceived realistic threat measure and the perceived symbolic threat measure described in the first experiment, we assessed participants' cognitive flexibility and affective responses after reading their assigned article. Following prior studies on cognitive flexibility (e.g., De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008), we asked participants to list as many tactics as they could think of to handle the host country environments within the 20 minutes allotted; afterward, we asked them to complete a short questionnaire that assessed their affect and conducted manipulation checks. Subsequently, two students without knowledge of the study goals and hypotheses coded the tactics each participant proposed; interrater reliability was acceptable (Cohen's Ks > .83). Following previous studies (e.g., De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008), we grouped reported tactics into eight categories and created a cognitive flexibility index by adding the number of categories a participant used to generate tactics. Moreover, we asked participants to report the extent to which they experienced each feeling when thinking about the host country environment (1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely) based on the well-established Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson & Clark, 1999). Each participant completed these affective response items in the same randomized order.

Manipulation Check

The manipulation check was successful. We used one-way ANOVAs to examine the effect of different experimental conditions on the perceived symbolic threat (i.e., corruption) and realistic threat (i.e., economic volatility). The participants who read the newspaper article on economic volatility evaluated the host country environment as having a higher level of economic volatility and perceived a higher level of realistic threat than those who read the article on corruption ($F = 6.541$, $p = 0.002$). Additionally, the participants who read the article about corruption evaluated the environment as having a higher level of corruption and perceived a higher level of symbolic threat than those who read the article on economic volatility ($F = 62.580$, $p = 0.001$).

Results

Participants in different experimental conditions displayed significantly different levels of cognitive and affective reactions. Participants in the realistic threat (economic volatility) condition were likely to experience a higher level of cognitive flexibility than those in the symbolic threat (corruption) condition ($F = 3.597$, $p = 0.030$). Regarding affective responses, participants in the symbolic threat (corruption) condition were likely to experience a higher level of disgust ($F = 36.182$, $p = 0.001$) and a higher level of shame ($F = 19.531$, $p = 0.001$) than those in the realistic threat (economic volatility) condition. Lastly, participants in the symbolic threat condition were more likely to assign a parent country national to lead the subsidiary than those in the realistic threat condition ($F = 5.062$, $p = 0.008$), consistent with our predictions in Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Alternative Explanation

An alternative explanation of divergent responses to threats is related to the magnitude of potential losses or failure (Greve, 2011; Shimizu, 2007). For example, rigid responses may be limited to reactions to relatively large losses (Greve, 2011; Shimizu, 2007). Following this reasoning, in the situation of symbolic threats, executives may perceive potential losses to be large and are likely to prefer more rigid and conservative alternatives. However, in the situation of realistic threats, top management may perceive potential losses as nonruinous and prefer proactive behaviors. Therefore, we asked

participants to evaluate their perceived potential losses in the host country environment on a five-point Likert scale. The ratings of potential losses for groups with different experimental conditions did not differ from one another ($F = 1.86$, $p = 0.17$). The results suggest that the divergent responses to realistic and symbolic threats are not driven by the magnitude of perceived potential losses.

Study C: Different Operationalization of Symbolic Threats

We performed Study C to further corroborate our arrival study. Specially, we operationalized symbolic threats by a new prime article that described human rights violations in the host country.

Participants

We recruited 56 participants (23 females, 33 males) who were international business majors at a public university in the United States to participate in the study for course credit.

Procedure and Measures

Procedures and measures were similar to those in Study B, except that we changed the prime article to operationalize symbolic threats alternatively. The group of participants in the symbolic threat condition were assigned to read a news article titled "Human Rights Violations Are Getting Worse" and described the situation of human rights abuse in the host country. The articles for the realistic threat and the control conditions were the same as in Study B.

Manipulation Check

The manipulation check was successful. We used one-way ANOVAs to examine the effect of different experimental conditions on perceived symbolic threats and realistic threats. The participants who read the article about human rights perceived a higher level of symbolic threat than those who read the article on economic volatility ($F = 3.558$, $p = 0.035$). The participants who read the newspaper article on economic volatility felt a higher level of realistic threat than those who read the newspaper article on human rights ($F = 3.948$, $p = 0.025$).

Results

Consistent with the results in Study B, participants in different experimental conditions displayed significantly different levels of cognitive and affective reactions. Participants in the realistic threat

condition were likely to experience a higher level of cognitive flexibility than those in the symbolic threat condition ($F = 5.077$, $p = 0.010$). Regarding affective responses, participants in the symbolic threat condition were likely to experience a higher level of disgust ($F = 7.897$, $p = 0.001$) and a higher level of shame ($F = 8.230$, $p = 0.001$) than those in the realistic threat condition. Lastly, participants in the symbolic threat condition were more likely to assign a parent country national to lead the subsidiary than those in the realistic threat condition ($F = 4.075$, $p = 0.023$), consistent with our predictions in Hypotheses 1 and 2.

APPENDIX II: ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES

We conducted a series of additional archival data analyses to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, the models of analysis reported in Table 3 were based on the traditional approach for testing the interaction effects in linear models. However, as our models are nonlinear, interpreting coefficients can be challenging (Bowen, 2012; Hoetker, 2007). It is important to note the estimates of interaction terms in a nonlinear model do *not* capture the true interaction effects (Zelner, 2009) and, therefore, *cannot* be used to test moderating hypotheses (Aguinis, Edwards, Bradley, 2017; Bowen, 2012). To address this limitation, we conducted additional simulation-based analyses (Zelner, 2009) in addition to marginal approach techniques already reported in the paper (Busenbark et al., 2022). These additional analyses enhance confidence in our findings.

The simulation-based approach derives robust standard errors for effects on each observation based on repeated simulations from the multivariate normal distribution. This approach offers an advantage over conventional mathematical techniques as it produces more accurate results by avoiding reliance on the delta method and correcting biases in the formula used for the calculation (Zelner, 2009). In contrast to the conventional approach, which interprets the signs and significances of interaction effects based only on the coefficients and standard errors reported in the nonlinear discrete logit models, the simulation-based approach provides a more comprehensive picture. It depicts the signs and statistical significance of the estimated effect of an independent variable, conditional on each observation of its moderating variable and with specified different confidence intervals.

To carry out this analysis, we used *Intgph logit* in Stata (Zelner, 2009) and conducted additional simulation-based analyses to retest Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5. The results, summarized in Models 1–5 of Table A1, remain consistent with the main results presented in Table 3 of the paper, further reinforcing the reliability of our findings.

[Insert Table A1]

Using the same command, we also graphically illustrated the moderating effects reported from the simulation-based analyses. Using the model (Model 4) that includes all the 2-way interactions in

Table A1, we first plotted the interaction between the two threats in Figure A1 and then plotted the interactions between the two threats and the moderator (i.e., industry globalization) in Figures A2 and A3, respectively.

[Insert Figures A1-A3]

Figure A1a illustrates that the negative effect of realistic threats on the deployment of parent country nationals as subsidiary general managers depends on the level of symbolic threats in the host country. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the negative effects of realistic threats in a host country become weaker when the symbolic threats in that country are high (Mean + 1SD) than when they are low (Mean – 1SD). Additionally, Figure A1b shows the difference between the predicted probabilities, which, as expected, increases and is statistically significant across the entire range of realistic threats, as represented by the upward-sloping solid line with dots. Together, Figures A1a and A1b indicate that the negative effect of realistic threats weakens when symbolic threats are high.

Figure A2a illustrates the effect of symbolic threats in a host country on the probability of an MNE appointing parent country nationals as the subsidiary executives, which changes depending on the extent of globalization of the industry where the subsidiaries compete. In line with Hypothesis 4, the positive effect of symbolic threats appears to be stronger when industry globalization is higher (Mean + 1SD), as indicated by the dashed line. Conversely, the effect becomes weaker when industry globalization is lower (Mean – 1SD), as shown by the solid line. Figure A2b shows that the difference between the predicted probabilities becomes more pronounced and mostly significant, as represented by the dotted line. This nonlinear curve with small dots suggests that the difference between the predicted probabilities initially increases as symbolic threats rise, but this increase has a limit and eventually stabilizes, or even reverses, when symbolic threats surpass a certain threshold. Overall, Figure A2 illustrates that the effect of symbolic threats increases when industry globalization is high.

Figure A3a plots the effect of realistic threats in a host country on reducing the likelihood of an MNE appointing parent country nationals as subsidiary executives, which changes across industries with varying degrees of globalization. Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the negative effects of realistic threats

appear to be stronger when industry globalization is low (Mean – 1SD) than when it is high (mean + 1SD). Figure A3b then plots the difference between the predicted probabilities, which, as expected, becomes more pronounced and statistically significant across the entire range of realistic threats, as represented by the upward-sloping solid line with dots. The upward-sloping curve away from zero further suggests that the difference between the predicted probabilities increases as realistic threats intensify. In combination, Figures A3a and A3b corroborate that the negative effect of realistic threats decreases when industry globalization is high.

To summarize, both the results of simulation-based analysis and graphical illustrations derived from the simulation analyses provide support for our moderating hypotheses (i.e., Hypotheses 3–5). Unfortunately, the simulation-based approach using *Intgph* in Stata does not yet allow the graphic presentation of a three-way interaction (Zelner, 2009). Therefore, we are only able to plot the three-way interaction by using the marginal effects technique, as shown in Figure 4 in the paper.

In addition, we expanded the composite measures for symbolic threats and realistic threats by including additional dimensions, even though doing so reduces the sample size. Specifically, we replaced the two-dimensional measure of symbolic threats (i.e., government corruption and human rights) with a three-dimensional measure that included the third dimension of *reverse ESG performance score* in a host country. Similarly, we replaced the two-dimensional composite measure of realistic threats (i.e., dispersions of GDP and unemployment rates) with a four-dimensional measure by including two additional dimensions: *dispersion of inflation rates* and *dispersion of interest rates* in a host country. The results using these multidimensional measures of symbolic and realistic threats, summarized in Models 6–9 of Table A1, were consistent with the results reported in Table 3 of the paper.

Further, our moderator, *industry globalization*, is at the industry level. We sought to examine whether the moderating effects would remain if industry-level globalization were replaced with a firm-level orientation toward global integration. In the robustness analyses, we evaluated the subsidiary motives recorded in the Toyo Keizai database and created four dummy indicators to identify whether a subsidiary had indicated any of the four strategic motives: market-, strategic asset-, resource-, and

efficiency-seeking motives (Dunning, 1993).[1] Among the various MNEs' motivations for establishing a foreign subsidiary, we believed *efficiency-seeking motives* best captured a firm's global orientation. Regression analyses using *efficiency-seeking motives* as a moderator, summarized in Models 10–12 of Table A1, yielded similar results to those of the analysis reported in Table 3 of the paper that used industry globalization.

[1] Details regarding how we coded subsidiary motives are available upon request.

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Figure A1: Interaction Effects Between Symbolic Threats and Realistic Threats on the Deployment of Parent Country Nationals as Subsidiary General Managers (H3)



a



b

Figure A2 : Moderating Effects of Industry Globalization on the Relationship between Symbolic Threats and the Deployment of Parent Country Nationals as Subsidiary General Managers (H4)



a



b

Figure A3: Moderating Effects of Industry Globalization on the Relationship Between Realistic Threats and the Deployment of Parent Country Nationals as Subsidiary General Manager (H5)



a



b

Table A1. Robustness Analyses

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
Symbolic threats (H1)	0.388	0.342	0.389	0.346	0.348	0.625	0.607	0.654	0.617	0.401	0.381	0.379
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Realistic threats (H2)	-0.146	-0.133	-0.199	-0.197	-0.193	-0.440	-0.350	-0.593	-0.655	-0.179	-0.166	-0.185
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Industry globalization	0.599	0.488	0.610	0.510	0.499	0.937	0.847	0.835	0.823	1.064	1.059	1.060
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Symbolic threats x Realistic threats (H3)	0.034			0.020	-0.003	0.285			0.250	0.057		0.057
	(0.029)			(0.211)	(0880)	(0.012)			(0.053)	(0.029)		(0.031)
Symbolic threats x Industry globalization (H4)		0.256		0.229	0.231		0.217		0.071			
		(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.063)		(0.572)			
Realistic threats x Industry globalization (H5)			0.307	0.268	0.218			0.978	0.959			
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)			
Symbolic threats x Realistic threats x Industry globalization (3-way)					0.125				-0.126			
					(0.055)				(0.709)			
Symbolic threats x Efficiency seeking (H3)											0.104	0.108
											(0.018)	(0.013)
Realistic threats x Efficiency seeking (H4)											0.044	0.030
											(0.299)	(0.483)
Efficiency seeking (=1)										-0.078	-0.098	-0.098
										(0.116)	(0.050)	(0.050)
Market seeking (=1)										-0.073	-0.072	-0.073
										(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Resource seeking (=1)										0.237	0.216	0.216
										(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Terrorism	0.032	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.032	1.495	1.110	1.135	1.400	0.031	0.034	0.032
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.015)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Host country experience	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.013	0.011	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.013
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of Japanese parent firms	0.219	0.220	0.217	0.218	0.218	0.176	0.176	0.172	0.172	0.215	0.216	0.215
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Ownership ratio	3.738	3.726	3.749	3.736	3.737	3.794	3.789	3.819	3.820	3.711	3.710	3.708
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Capital investment	-0.071	-0.102	-0.053	-0.084	-0.081	0.090	0.076	0.127	0.125	-0.108	-0.109	-0.110
	(0.389)	(0.217)	(0.531)	(0.319)	(0.335)	(0.704)	(0.748)	(0.592)	(0.600)	(0.512)	(0.508)	(0.504)
Subsidiary age	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	-0.025	-0.025	-0.025	-0.025	-0.022	-0.022	-0.022
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Culture distance	-0.052	-0.051	-0.050	-0.053	-0.053	0.034	0.031	0.043	0.037	-0.063	-0.058	-0.064
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.616)	(0.647)	(0.526)	(0.588)	(0.065)	(0.087)	(0.064)
Administrative distance	-0.559	-0.537	-0.558	-0.552	-0.552	-0.451	-0.464	-0.497	-0.475	-0.522	-0.503	-0.520
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Geographic distance	0.413	0.403	0.411	0.396	0.395	0.445	0.398	0.393	0.417	0.422	0.422	0.417
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)

Economic distance	0.019	0.020	0.019	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.019	0.021	0.019	0.019	0.019
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Linguistic distance	-1.924	-1.761	-1.882	-1.728	-1.718	0.624	0.957	0.908	0.792	-1.892	-1.850	-1.817
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.553)	(0.361)	(0.379)	(0.448)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Japanese immigrants	0.044	0.045	0.044	0.046	0.046	0.077	0.074	0.074	0.079	0.038	0.039	0.039
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Constant	4.343	2.778	4.165	2.675	2.652	-5.756	-6.805	-6.452	-6.236	7.501	7.188	7.189
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.227)	(0.154)	(0.172)	(0.189)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Wald Chi2	19560.34	19638.69	19592.08	19669.59	19678.56	1649.82	1648.2	1669.39	1671.66	3122.68	3132.89	3136.06
Pseudo R2 (%)	17.81	17.85	17.85	17.89	17.89	20.44	20.45	20.58	20.59	17.79	17.8	17.81
Log pseudolikelihood	-60020.9	-59991.5	-59991.7	-59966.1	-59963.7	-22177.3	-22176.4	-22140.2	-22135.8	-57586.6	-57579.5	-57573.2
N	151877	151877	151877	151877	151877	63057	63057	63057	63057	19100	19100	19100

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported; *p*-values in parentheses